# POLLISETTI PULLAMMA AND ORS v. KALLURI RAMESWARAMMA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 393
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1990
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos._ 152, 153, 155, 156, 158, 160and 162of 1972
- **Bench:** K.N. S<\.Ikia, K. Ramaswamy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pollisetti-pullamma-and-ors-v-kalluri-rameswaramma-and-ors-11039
- **Pages:** 40

## Headnote

A11dhra Pradesh !Andhra Area) Estutes (Aboluiun 11111' Cumw·
1·iu11 intO Rvotw11ri) Act, 19411: Sections 3( /Oj(b)(i). /5-lnam V1//11gc
-Hu11· deier111ined-Priv111e /11nds-.Proof' of personal ~·u/t11•atw11-·
~i1ether necessarv.
The appellants are the tenants and the respondents are the land·
holders in respect of the tenanted agricultural lands of the hitherto
inam estates. After the coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Art,
I 948, the inam estates were abolished, the land stood vested in the
Government free of all encumbrances, and the pre-existing rights, title
and interest of erstwhile landholders ceased except to claim ryotwari
patta.
The respondents-landholders claimed that the lands, in question, were either under their personal cultivation or they intended to
resume those for private cultivation, and as such those were their private lands and they were entitled to ryotwari pattas. The appellants--
tenants on the contrary claimed that those lands were neither under the
personal cultivation of the landholders nor the landlords intended to
resume those for personal cultivation, but were in possession of the
tenants who were entitled to ryotwari pattas after the abolition of the
estates.
The Settlement Officer, after making inquiry under section 15 of
the Estates Abolition Act, held that the landholders failed to establish
that they were personally cultivating the lands or that they intenoed to
resume the lands for personal cultivation, and as such rejected their
claims.
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The laudholders' appeals to the Estates Abolition Tribunal were
allowed. The Tribunal held that the landholders were entitled to the
grant of ryotwari pattas as the lands were private lands within the
meaning of section 3 (lO)(b)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)
Estates Land Act, 1908 and that the tenants were not entitled to ryotwari
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pattas in respect of the same.
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The appellants-tenant~ moved writ petitions before the High
Court. The learned Single Judge observed that it was common ground
before the Subordinate Tribunal, as well as before him, that the nature
of the lands at the inception, whether ryoti or private, was not known;
that the burden of establishing that the lands were private lands was on
the landholders; and that it was also common gronnd before him that
apart from the fact that there were occasional changes of tenants, and
the lands \Vere sometimes leased under short-term leases, there were no
other circumstances indicating that the landholders intended to resume
cultivation of lhe lands. The. learned Single Judge held that after the
pronouncement of this Court in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santhanara111aswamy Odayar, [1968] 2 SCR 764 the decision of the Full Bench of
the Madras High Court in Periannan v. Amman Ko vii, AIR 1952 Mad.
323 (F .B.) could no longer be considered good law, and further that the
decision in Jagdeesam Pillai v • .Kuppamma/, ILR 1946 Mad. 687 and in
Perish Priest of Narayar v. 71zingaraja Swami Devasthanam, App. Nos.
176-178 and 493 of 1946, once more held the field. It was also observed
that since in all the cases the only mode of proof attempted by the
landholders was the grant of short-term leases and change of tenants
and rent, it must be held that the lands were not established to be
private lands and that no attempt was made to prove personal cnltivation or any intention to resume personal cultivation.
The Division Bench, in writ appeals filed by the landholders, held
that, in the first place, the observations of this Court in Chidambaram's
case were in accord with the rule in Periannan's case, and secondly,
even if some of the dicta in the judgment of this Court in Chidambaram
suggested a contrary principle, the effect of the entire observations did
not support the contention that Periannan's case had been impliedly
overruled by this Court.
.Before this Court, i

## Text

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POLLISETTI PULLAMMA AND ORS.
v.
KALLURI RAMESWARAMMA AND ORS.
OCTOBER 26. 1990
[K.N. S<\.IKIA AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ]
A11dhra Pradesh !Andhra Area) Estutes (Aboluiun 11111' Cumw·
1·iu11 intO Rvotw11ri) Act, 19411: Sections 3( /Oj(b)(i). /5-lnam V1//11gc
-Hu11· deier111ined-Priv111e /11nds-.Proof' of personal ~·u/t11•atw11-·
~i1ether necessarv.
The appellants are the tenants and the respondents are the land·
holders in respect of the tenanted agricultural lands of the hitherto
inam estates. After the coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Art,
I 948, the inam estates were abolished, the land stood vested in the
Government free of all encumbrances, and the pre-existing rights, title
and interest of erstwhile landholders ceased except to claim ryotwari
patta.
The respondents-landholders claimed that the lands, in question, were either under their personal cultivation or they intended to
resume those for private cultivation, and as such those were their private lands and they were entitled to ryotwari pattas. The appellants--
tenants on the contrary claimed that those lands were neither under the
personal cultivation of the landholders nor the landlords intended to
resume those for personal cultivation, but were in possession of the
tenants who were entitled to ryotwari pattas after the abolition of the
estates.
The Settlement Officer, after making inquiry under section 15 of
the Estates Abolition Act, held that the landholders failed to establish
that they were personally cultivating the lands or that they intenoed to
resume the lands for personal cultivation, and as such rejected their
claims.
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The laudholders' appeals to the Estates Abolition Tribunal were
allowed. The Tribunal held that the landholders were entitled to the
grant of ryotwari pattas as the lands were private lands within the
meaning of section 3 (lO)(b)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)
Estates Land Act, 1908 and that the tenants were not entitled to ryotwari
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pattas in respect of the same.
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The appellants-tenant~ moved writ petitions before the High
Court. The learned Single Judge observed that it was common ground
before the Subordinate Tribunal, as well as before him, that the nature
of the lands at the inception, whether ryoti or private, was not known;
that the burden of establishing that the lands were private lands was on
the landholders; and that it was also common gronnd before him that
apart from the fact that there were occasional changes of tenants, and
the lands \Vere sometimes leased under short-term leases, there were no
other circumstances indicating that the landholders intended to resume
cultivation of lhe lands. The. learned Single Judge held that after the
pronouncement of this Court in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santhanara111aswamy Odayar, [1968] 2 SCR 764 the decision of the Full Bench of
the Madras High Court in Periannan v. Amman Ko vii, AIR 1952 Mad.
323 (F .B.) could no longer be considered good law, and further that the
decision in Jagdeesam Pillai v • .Kuppamma/, ILR 1946 Mad. 687 and in
Perish Priest of Narayar v. 71zingaraja Swami Devasthanam, App. Nos.
176-178 and 493 of 1946, once more held the field. It was also observed
that since in all the cases the only mode of proof attempted by the
landholders was the grant of short-term leases and change of tenants
and rent, it must be held that the lands were not established to be
private lands and that no attempt was made to prove personal cnltivation or any intention to resume personal cultivation.
The Division Bench, in writ appeals filed by the landholders, held
that, in the first place, the observations of this Court in Chidambaram's
case were in accord with the rule in Periannan's case, and secondly,
even if some of the dicta in the judgment of this Court in Chidambaram
suggested a contrary principle, the effect of the entire observations did
not support the contention that Periannan's case had been impliedly
overruled by this Court.
.Before this Court, it was inter alia contended on behalf of the
appellants-tenants (i) that the learnd Single Judge having found as fact
that the landholders had failed to establish that the lands were their
private lands as these were neither under their personal cultivation nor
they were intended If! be resumed for personal cultivation, and applying
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the rule in Chidambaram's case, the learned Single Judge having held
that the lands were not private lands, the Division Bench erred in
holding to the contrary; (ii) that the learned Single Judge correctly held
that Perriannan's case was no longer good law as in Chidambaram
Chettiar v. Santhanaramaswamy Odayar, it was held that the definition
of private land in section 3(10) of the Estate Land Act of 1908 read as a
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whole indicated clearly that the ordinary test for private land was the
POLLISETTI v. KALLURI
395
test of retention by the landholder for his own personal use and cultivation by him or under his personal supervision, though they might be let
on short leases; (iii) that it was not the intention or the scheme of the Act
to treat as private those lands with reference to which the only peculiarity was the fact that the landholder owned both the varams in the land
and had been letting them out on short leases; and (iv) that the Division
Bench erred in holding that Periannan's tests were still applicable.
On the other hand, it was contended that the correct tests for
determining what was private land had been laid down in Periannan 's
case, which were not different from those of Chidambaram 's case, and
the Division Bench correctly applied those tests to find that the lands
were private lands of the landholders.
Allowing the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the Division
Bench, and restoring that of the learned Single Judge, this Court,
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HELD: (1) To rmd out whether a village was designated as inam
village or not, prima facie the revenue accounts of the Government
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which were there at the time of the Jnam Abolition Act came into force
had to be looked into. If it was so shown, no further proof was necessary. Only when the entries in the revenue accounts were ambiguous,
and it was not possible to come to a definite conclusion, it might be
necessary to consider other relevant evidence which was admissible
under the Evidence Act. [406H; 407A-B]
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(2) An interpretation of the words "private land" and "ryoti
land" had to be made in consonance with the legislative purpose,
provisions and scheme of the enactment. Interpretare at Concordure
leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus. To interpret and in
such a way as to harmonize laws with laws in the best mode of interF
pretation. [410E]
(3) The Estate Abolition Act accepted the definitions of occupancy right and ryoti as in the Estates Land Act, 1908. The above
provisions conferred permanent, heritable and transferable right of
occupancy on the Tenant. This right stemmed from the will of the
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legislature and involved an element of social engineering through law
stat pro rationa vo/untas populi: the will of the people stands in place
of reason. The right of the landholder to keep his private land to himself
has therefore to be interpreted in its proper perspective. Statwu pro
pub!ico !me interpretuur. Statute made for the public good ought to be
liberally construed. [425E-F]
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( 4) The concept of past or present intention of the landholder to
resume personal cultivation of land let out to a tenant and strl in possession of the tenant has to be strictly construed against the landlord and
liberally in favour of the tenant. [42SE]
(S) The learned Single Judge in the instant case lightly observed
that the legislature did not use the word domain or home-farm land
without attaching to them a meaning, and it was reasonable to suppose
that they would attach to those words the meaning which would be
given to them in ordinary English, namely, to connote land appurtenant
to the mansion of the lord of the manor kept by the lord for his personal
use and cultivated under his personal supervision is distinct from land
let to tenant to be farmed without any contrnl from the lord of the
manor other than such control as incident to u,0 lease. To that extent,
the propos!tions of the learned Judges in Penannan ·s case can no longer
be held to be good law in view of this Court's decisions in Chidambnram ·s case and Venkataswami's case, and the decision in Zamindar of
Challapali v. Rajalapari; Jagadesan Pillai v. Kuppamal, and in Punsh
Priest of Karayar Perish v. Thiaparajaswami Devasthanam must be
held to have been correctly decided. [421C·E]
Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Rajalapato Somayya, 39 Mad. 3'41;
Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppamal, ILR 1946 Mad. 687; Parish Priest of
Karayar Parish v. Thiagarajaswami Devasthanam, App. Nos. 176-178
& 493 of 1946; Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santhanaramaswamy
Odayar, [1968] 2 SCR 754; Yer/agadda Malikarjuna Prasad Nayudu v.
Somayya, ILR 42 Mad. 400 PC; P. Venkataswami v. D.S. Ramireddy,
[1976] 3 SCC 665; Suryanarayana v. Patanna, [1918] 41 ILR Mad. 1012,
referred to.
Periannan v. Amman Kovil, AIR 1952 Mad. 323 F .B. partly
overruled.
( 6) In the instant case the pattas and the muchilkas are not
claimed to have shown anything to establish the lands to be private
lands. Only the facts of occasional change of tenants and rents have
been shown. [431B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos._
152, 153, 155, 156, 158, 160and 162of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.1970 of the Andhra
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Pradesh High Court in W.A. No. 616 of 1969, 103 of 1970, 472
POLLISETII v. KALLURl [SAIKIA,J.J
397
of 1970, 474 of 1970, 473 of 1970, 99 of 1970 and W.P. No. 4947 of
1968.
G. Venkatesh Rao and A.V. Rangam fot the Appellants.
C. Sitaramiah, B. Parthasarthi, A.D.N. Rao and A. Subba Rao
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for the Respondents.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.N. SAIKIA, J. These seven appeals by certificate under
Article 133(J)(a) of the Constitution of India are from the common
Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 20. 11. 1970 in
several appei!ls and writ petitions. The appellants are the tenants and
respondents are the landholders or their legal representatives, as the
case may be, in respect of the tenanted agricultural lands of the
hitherto inam estates 01 Kukunuru and Veerabhadrapuram villages in
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the West Godavari Disorict of Andhra Pradesh. After coming into
force of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates. (Abolition and D
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (A.P. Act 25 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as 'the Estates Abolition Act', the inam estates were
abolished and the land stood vested in the Government free of all
encumbrances. The pre-existing right, title and interest of erstwhile
landholders ceased except to claim ryotwari patta. The tenants were
not liable to be evicted pending the proceedings for issuance of E
ryotwari patta. The respondents-landholders, hereinafter referred to
as 'the landholders', claimed that the lands in question were either
under their personal cultivation or they intended to resume those for
private cultivation and as such those were their private lands and they
were entitled to ryotwari pattas. The r.rpellants-tenants on the contrary
claimed that those were not private iands of the landholders as those
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were neither under their personal cultivation nor they intended to
resume those for personal cultivation, but those were in possession of
the tenants who were entitled to ryotwari pattas after the abolition of
the estates.
The Settlement Officer of Anakappalla, after making inquiry G
under S. 15 of the Estates Abolition Act held in all the cases in these
appeals, except one (out of which W.P. No. 695/1968 arose) that the
landholders failed to establish that they were personally cultivating the
lands or they intended to resume the lands for personal cultivation and
as such rejected their claims, except in the aforesaid case. The landholders' appeals th.erefrom to the Estates Abolition Tribunal were
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allowed relying on, and applying the tests formulated in Periannan v.
Amman Kovil, AIR 1952 Mad. 323 (FB) and holding that in all cases
the landholders were entitled to the grant of ryotwari pattas as the
lands were private lands within the meaning of S. 3(10)(b)(i) of the
Andhra Pradesh. (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908 (A.P. Act I
of 1908), hereinafter referred to as 'the Estates Land Act', and that the
tenants were not entitled to ryotwari pattas in respect of the same. The
appellants-tenants moved writ petitions before the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh impugning the decision of the Estates Abolition Tribunal. 0. Chinnappa Reddy, J. as he then was, sitting singly, after
discussing the case law on the question, by a common Judgment in
nine writ petitions, observing that it was common ground before the
Subordinate Tribunal as well as before him that the nature of the lands
at the inception, whether ryoti or private, was not known and that the
burden of establishing that the lands were private lands was on the
landholders; and that it was also common ground before him that apart
from the fact that there were occasional changes of tenants, and that
the lands were sometimes leased under short-term leases, there were
D · no other circumstances indicating that the landholders intended to
resume cultivation of the lands, held that after the pronouncement of
this Court in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santhanaramaswamy Odayar,
[ 1968] 2 SCR 754, the decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High
Court in Periannan v. Amman Kovil, (supra) could no longer be conE
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sidered good law and thai the decision in Jagdeesam Pillai v. Kuppamma/, !LR 1946 Mad. 687 and in Perish Priest of Karayar v. Thiagaraja
Swami Devasthanam, App. Nos. 176-178 and 493 of 1946 once mote
held the field. It was also observed that since in all the cases before
him the only mode of proof attempted by the land holders was the
grant of short-term leases and change of tenants and rent, it must be
held that the lands were not established to be private lands and that no
attempt was made to prove personal cultivation or any intention to
resume personal cultivation. As the Estates Abolition Tribunal
applied the tests laid down by the Madras Full Bench in Periannan's
case (supra) and since Periannan's case was no longer good law, the
writ petitions had to be allowed and the impugned orders of the Tribunal quashed in eight writ petitions. In Writ Petition No. 695 of 1968
the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer was quashed.
The landholders preferred writ appeals therefrom. Two Writ
Petiti.ons, namely, Writ Petition No. 4947 of 1968 and Writ Petition
No. 310 of 1968 were also taken up for hearing analogously. The
Division Bench observing that the main question for consideration in
1 · the appeals was whether the decisior. of the Full Bench in Periannan's
POLLISETTI ''· KALI.URI [SAIKIA.J I
Jl)l)
case was good law and it turned on the effect of some important
precedents and a review of the principles enunciated by them, and
after discussing the case law took the view that in the first place the
observations of this Court in Chidambaram's case were in accord with
the rule in Periannan's case and secondly, even if some of the dicta in
the Judgment of this Court in Chidambaram suggested a contrary
principle, the effect of the entire observations did not support the
contention that Periannan 's case had been impliedly overruled by this
Court. The writ appeals were accordingly allowed except Writ Appeal
No. 616 of 1969 which was dismissed. Writ Petition No. 4947 of 1968
was allowed and Writ Petition No. 310 of 1968 was dismissed taking
the same view. Hence these appeals by certificate.
Mr. A.V. Rangam, the learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the learned Single Judge having found as fact that the landholders had failed to establish that the lands were their private lands as
those were neither under their personal cultivation nor they were
intended to be resumed for personal cultivation and applying the rule
in Chidambaram's case the learned Single Judge having held that the
lands were not private lands, the Division Bench erred in holding to
the contrary; and that the learned Single Judge correctly held that
Periannan's case was no longer good Jaw as in Chidambaram Chettiar
v. Santhanaramaswamy Odayar, (supra), it was held that the definition of private land in S. 3( 10) of the Estates Land Act of 1908 read as
a whole indicated clearly that the ordinary test for private land was the
test of retention by the landholder for his own personal use and cultivation by him or under his personal supervision, though they might be
let on short leases, it was not the intention or the scheme of the Act to
treat as private those lands with reference to which the only peculiarity
was the fact that the landholder owned both the varams in the land and
had been letting them out on short leases, the Division Bench erred in
holding that Periannan's test were still applicable. Mr. C. Sitaramiah,
the learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the correct tests
for determining what was private land had been laid down in l'eriannan's case, which were not different from those of Chidambaram's
case and the Division Bench correctly applied those tests to find that
the lands were private lands of the landholders; and that in Chidambaram' s case the appellant had not adduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption under S. 185 of the Estates Land Act that the
lands conc.erned in the inam village were not ryoti lands as defined in
S. 3( 16) as the T&njore Pala'ce Estate was held to be an 'estate' within
the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act and the widows of
the Raja enjoyed both the varams, but were not personally cultivaiHlg
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them. In the instant case, according to counsel, the rights of the landholders were not the same as those of the widows of the Raja of
Tanjore after the relinquishment of the landed properties by the
Government which amounted to a re-grant. Tr.c Division Bench
pointed out several misconceptions in some precedents for which they
could not be said to have laid down the correct law. Counsel further
submits that in Chidambaram's case, the grant of Orathur Padugai
village was of the whole village and a named one and, therefore, it was
an Estate within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of Estates Land Act and the
courts having concurrently found that the lands in dispute were ryoti
lands and not private lands, the landholders claiming that the lands
were private lands had to show that they converted the ryoti lands into
private lands which they could prove only by showing their personal
cultivation and they failed to prove it, and that case was therefore
distinguishable on facts and could not be held to have overruled
Periannan's tests.
The questio.n to be decided in these appeals, therefore, is
whether in view of this Court's decision in Chidambaram's case the
decision in Periannan's case is still good law, and whether on application of the correct legal tests the lands in dispute are private lands of
the landholders entitling them to ryotwari pattas in respect thereof or
those are ryoti lands in possession of the appellants as tenants of the
landholders and, as such, they are entitled to ryotwari pattas thereof.
In other words, whether the appellants or the respondents are entitled
to ryotwari pattas under the Abolition of Estates Act ..
To appreciate the rival submissions, reference to the relevant
provisions of the Estates Land Act and the Estates Abolition Act is
necessary, and to understand the relevant provisions of the two Acts a
little knowledge of development of the land system and legislation in
the area will be helpful.
The Estates Land Act amended and declared the Jaw relating to
the holding on land in estated in the Andhra Area of the State of
Andhra Pradesh which includes the West Godavari District to which
the two inam villages concerned in this appeai belong, It appears the
scheme of the Estates Land Act divides cultivable lands in the two
categories, namely, (!) private Jand.s and (2) ryoti lands. The Act
relates to the holding of land in estates. As defined in S. 3(2) 'estate'
means:
"(a) any permanently settled estate or temporarily settled
zamindari;
•
POLLISETII r. KALLURI [SA!KIA..1.I
4111
(b) any portion of such permanently-settled estate or A
temporarily settled zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector;
(c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;
(d) (i) any inam village, or
B
(ii) any hamlet or khandriga in an inam village, of
which the grant as an inam has been made, confirmed or
recognized by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, such village, hamlet or khandriga has
been partitioned among the grantees, or the successors-intitle of the grantee or grantees.
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[Explanation: ( 1) Where a grant as an inam is expressed to
be of a named village, [hamlet of khandriga in an inam
village] the area which forms the subject-matter of the
grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that D
it did not include certain lands in the village [hamlet or
kbandriga] of that name which have already been granted
on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal
purposes).
[Explanation: (I-A) An inam village, hamlet or kandriga E
in an inam village granted in inam, shall be deemed to be
an estnn:.:, even though it was confirmed or recognized on
different dates, or by different title deeds or in favour of
different persons .
Explanation: ( 1-B) [If any hamlet or khandriga granted as F
inam) was at any time dcsigm1ted as an inam village of as a
part thereof in the revenue accounts, it shall for purposes
of item (ii) of sub-clause (d) be treated as being a h.o.mlet or
khandriga of an inam village, notwithstanding that subsequently it [has come to be designated) in the Revenue
accounts as a ryotwari or zamindari village or part thereof).
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Explanation (2) Where an inam village is resumed by the
State Government, it shall cease to be an estate; but, if any
village so resumed is subsequently regranted by the
Government as an inam, it shall from the date of such
re-grant, be regarded as an estate.
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Explanation (3): Where a portion of an inam village is
resumed by the Government such portion shall cease to be
part of the estate, but the rest of the village shall be
deemed to be an inam village for the purposes of this subclause. If the portion so resumed or any part thereof is
subsequently regranted by the Government as an inam,
such portion or part shall from the date of such re-grant, be
' regarded as forming part of the inam village for the
purpose of this sub-clause;
( e) any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of
the estates specified above in clauses (a), (b) and ( c) which
is held on a permanent under tenure."
It appears that the original definition had undergone several
amendments. Clause (d) and Explanation (1-A) were_flubstituted by
S. 2(i) of Act XXXV of 1956. The Explanation(!) was inserted by
S. 2(1) of Act II of 1945. Explanation (1) and (1-B) were amended by
S. 2(ii) of Act XXXV of 1956 and Explanation (2) and (3) are the
renumbered old Explanations (l) and (2) inserted by S. 2(1) of Act II
of 1945.
The respondents claim to have been 'landholders'. As defined m
s. 3(5):
" 'Landholder' means a person owning an estate or part
thereof and includes every person entitled to collect the
rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of
any transfer from the owner or his predecessor-in-title or of
any order of a competent Court or of any provision of law.
Where there is a dispute between two or more
persons as to which of them is the landholder for all or any
of the purposes of this Act or betwen two or more joint
landholders as to which of them is entitled to proceed and
be dealt with as such landholder, the person who shall be
G
deemed to be the landholder for such purposes shall be the
person whom the Collector subject to any decree or order
of a competent Civil Court may recognize or nominate as
such landholder in accordance with rules to be framed by
the State Government in this behalf."
H
Both "Private land" and "ryoti land" have been defined in the Act. As
...
,
POLLISETrl •·. KALLURI [SAIKIA.J.[
403
defined in S. 3( IO) private land means:
"(a) in the case of an estate within the meaning of subclauses (a), (b), (c) or (e) of clause (2) means the domain
A
or home-farm land of the landholder by whatever designation known such as, kambattam, khas, sir, or pannai, and
includes all land which is proved to have been cultivated as
B
private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants
or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years immediately before the commencement of this Act; and
(b) in the case of an estate within the meaning of subC
clause (d) of clause (2), means-
(i} the domain or home-farm land of the landholders, hy
whatever designation known, such as kambattam, khas, sir
or pannai; or
(ii} land which is proved to have been cultivated as private
land by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by
hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve yea.rs
immediately before the first day of July 1908, provided that
the landholder has retained the kudivaram ever since and
D
has not converted the land into ryoti land; or
E
(iii) land which -is proved to have been cultivated by the
landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour,
with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of
twelve years immediately before the first day of November,
1933, provided that the landholder has retained the kudiF
varam ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti
land; or
(iv) land the entire kudivaram in which was acquirea by
the landholder before the first day of November, 1933 for
valuable consideration from a person owning the kudivaG
ram but not the melvaram, provided that the landholder
has retained the kudivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land, and provided further that,
where the kudivaram was acquired at a sale for arrears of
rent, the land shall not be deemed to be private land unless
it is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder him- . H
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c
D
E
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SU'REME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
self, by his own servants or by hired labour. with his own or
hired stock. for a continuous period of twelve years since
the acquisition of the land and before the commencement
of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Third
Amendment) Act, 1936."
A' defined in S. 3(16):
" 'Ryoti land' means cultivable land in an estate other than
private land but does not include-
(a) beds .and bunds of tanks and of supply, drainage surplus of irrigation channels;
(b) threshing-floor, cattle-stands, village-sites, and other
lands situated in any estate which are set apart for the
common use of the villagers;
(c) land granted on service tenure either free of rent or on
favourable rent if granted before the passing of this Act or
free of rent if granted after that date, so long as the service
tenure subsists.
Village is defined in S. 3(19):
" 'Village' means any local area situated in or constituting
an estate which is designated as a village in the revenue
accounts and for which the revenue accounts are separately
maintained by one or more karnams or which is now recognized by the State Government or may hereafter be by the
State Government for the purposes of this Act to be a
village, and includes any hamlet or hamlets which may be
attached thereto."
The Estates Abolition Act provided for the repeal of the permanent settlement, the acquisition of the landholders in permanent
estate and in certain other estates in the State of Andhra Pradesh and
the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. It extended
to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh and applied to all estates
as defined in S'. 3 clause (2) of the Estates Land Act. This Act, in
S. 2(3) defined 'estate' to mean a zamindari or an under-tenure or an
inam estate. As defined in S. 2(7) 'inam estate' means an estate within
the meaning of S. 3, clause (2)(d) of the Estates Land Act.
i'OLLISETll c. KALLURI [SAIKIA.J I
The statement of objects and reasons of the Estates Abolition
Act speaks of acute discontent among es•ate ryots and good deal of
agitation under zamindati administration which was considered to
have outlived its usefulness and needed abolition. It also mentioned
about the election manifesto issued by the Working Committee of the
Congress Party in December 1945 urging reform of the land system
and that such reform involved the removal of all intermediaries between the pc:botlt and the State ond that the right~ of such intermed1atie· ,11, ·ttld be abolished on payment of equitable compensation.
In Fcbruarv 1947 the Madras Legislative Council passed a resolution
accepting the general principle of the abolition of the zamindari
system and recommending to the Government that legislation for the
purpose be undertaken and brought forward at an emly date: The
Government accordingly proposed to abolish the zamindari system by
acquiring all estates governed by the Estates Land Act including whole
i nam vill'1gt:s and Cllnverting them into ryotwari paying equitable compensation to the several persons having an interest in the estates.
The Estates Abolition Act has abu undergone a number of
ar1endments. The Amendment Act I of 1950 inserted S. 54(a) &
S. 54(b) dealing with compensation. The Amendment Act XVII nf
195 1 clarified certain positions in regard to Inam villages. Sectwn
17( 1) of the Estates Abolition Act provided for the grant of ryotwari
p<.1tta to a person holding any land granted on service tenure falling
under S .. l( 16)(c) of the Estates Land Act irrespective of whether such
land rnns1stcd of only a portion of a village or of one or more villages.
The reference to one or more villages in the section had given rise to
the misapprehension that \t applied also to an entire village granted on
service tenure. But the intention was that the provisions of the section
should not apply to such a village and clause 3 of the Act gave effect to
it and clause 4 was consequential of clause 3. The provisions of the
Estates Abolition Act were brought into force in certain inam villages
on the assumption that they were under tenure estates. But it had been
subsequently found that the assumption was not correct. It was therefore necessary to withdraw the operation of the Act from those villages
and the Amendment Act provided for such withdrawal. The Amendmcilt Act X-XI of 1956 dealt with annual payments to any religious
educational or charitable institutions. The Amendment Act XVII of
1957 made provisions for the abolition and conversion in the ryotwari
tenure of certain categories of inams under the Estates Abolition Act.
Under S. 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act, as originally enacted, whole
inam villages in respect of which the original grant conferred only the
melvaram tight on a person not owning the kudivaram thereof alone
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
became 'estates'. By virtue of Third Amendment of the Estates Land
Act·whole inam villages in which both melvaram and kudivaram rights
vested in the inamdars also became estates. The provisions of the
Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Madras Act
XXX of 1947) were applicable to both these categories of whole inam
villages. But the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act were not
applicable to the whole inam villages which became estates under the
Madras EStates, Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, i.e. those in
which the inamdars possessed both the melvaram and kudivaram
rights. Under S. 2 of the Estates Land Amendment Act, 1946,
S. 3(2)(d} of the Estates Land Act was further amended so as to
include within the definition of 'estate' hamlets and khandrigas of
inam villages which were previously held to be not estates. Provision
was also made so as to bring within its purview only such of the inam
hamlets and inam khandrigas of inam villages wherein the melvaram
rights alone vest in the inamdars. Thus, the only categories of inam
estates which now remained outside the purview of the Estates Abolition Act were: (a) the whole inam village which became e'tate by.
D
virtue of the Madras Act XVlll of 1936 and (b) inam hamlets and
khandrigas of inam villages which became estates by .virtue of the
Estates Land (Andhra Amendment) Act, 1956 but in respect of which
both melvaram and kudivaram rights vested in the inamdars. The
Amendment Act XX of !960 dealt with all post 1936 inam villages
E
F
G
which were also brought within the purview of the Estates Abolition
Act by the Amendment Act XVIII of 1957. The Andhra Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1956 (Act XXXVII of 1956) provided for conversion of all inam lands
other than estates into'ryotwari tenure. The Act extended to the whole
of the Andhra State, but applied only to lands described in clause (c)
of S. 2. Section 2(c) defined "inam land" to mean any land in respect
of which the grant in inam has been made, confirmed or recognised h,
the Government, (Act 3 of 1964 inserted thereafter the words) "land
includes any land in _the merged territory of Banaganapalle in respect
of which the grant in inam has been made, confirmed or recognised by
any former Ruler of the territory", but does not include an inam
constituting an estate under the Estates Land Act. Section 2(d) defines
an "lnam Village'' to mean a village designated as such in the revenue
accounts of the Government, (and includes a village so designated
immediately before it was notified and takn over by the Government
under the Estates Abolition Act.
Thus to find out whether a village was designated as inam village
H
or not, prima facie ihe revennP. accounts of the Government which
POLLISETII v. KALLURI [SA!KIA,J.]
407
were there at the time of the Inam Abolition Act came into force had
to be looked into. If it was so shown no further proof was necessary.
Only when the entries in the revenue accounts were ambiguous, and it
was not possible to come to a definite conclusiort, it might be necessary
to consider other relevant evidence which was admissible under the
evidence Act.
Section 2-A of this Act said: "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act all communal lands and poramookes, grazing lands,
waste lands, forest lands, mines and querries, tanks, tank·beds and
irrigation works, streams and rivers, fisheries and ferries in the inam
lands shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free
of all encumbrances."
Section 3 of the Act prescribed the procedure for determination
of inam lands and provided for giving opportunity to interested
persons.
A
B
c
As we have already noted the High Court found that the basis of D
the decision of the Tribunal in all the cases was that sometimes the
leases were for short terms with occasional change of tenants and rents
payable by them and that the nature of the lands, whether ryoti or
private, was not known and that it was the burden of the landholder to
prove that the lands were private lands and that there was no other
circumstances to show that the landholders intended to resume cultivaE
tion of the same. It was conceded before the Single Bench by the
learned Advocate for the petitioners that if the tests formulated by the
Full Bench in Periannan's case applied to ihe facts of these cases the
land must be held to be private land and the landholders must be
considered to have established their claim to grant of ryotwari pattas.
The Division Bench did not change this position in view of the provi- , F
sions of Section 185 of the Estates Land Act as amended from time to
time. The original section said:
"185. When in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary
to determine whether any land is landholder's private land,
regard shall be had to local custom and to the question
G
whether the land was before the first day of July 1898,
specifically let as private land and to any other evidence
that may be produced, but the land shall be presumed not
to be private land until! the contrary is shown: Provided
that all land which is proved to have been cultivated as
private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants
H
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c
D
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
or hy hired labour with his own or hired stock for twelve
years immediately before the commencement of this Act
shall be deemed to be the landholder's private land."
Section 185 was amended in 1934, 1936 and 1955 whereafter it
,1ond '"follows:
"185. When in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary
to determine whether any land is the landholder's private
land, regard sht1ll be had-
( I) to local custom,
(2) in the case of an estate within the meaning of subclausc (a). (h), (c) or (c) of clause (2) of section 3, to the
q ucstion whether the land was before the first day of July
1898, specifically let as private land, and
(3) to any other evidence that may be produced:
Provided that the land shall be presumed not to be
private land until the contrary is proved:
Provided further thai in the case of an estate within
E
the meaning of sub-clause ( d) of clause (2) of section 3-
(i) any expression in a lease, patta or the like, executed or
· issued on or after the first day of July 1918, to the effect or
implying that a tenant has no right of occupancy or that his
right of occupancy is limited or restricted in any manner,
F
shall not be admissible in evidence for the purpose of prov-
. ing that the land concerned was private land at the commencement of the tenancy; and
(ii) any such expression in a lease, patta or the like,
executed or issued before the first day of July 1918, shall
G
not by itself be sufficient for the purpose of proving that the
land concerned was private land at the commencement of
the tenancy."
When the Estates Abolition Act was passed, the legislature
envisaged the difficulties that could arise in respect of the estates in
H
which the landholder would be entitled to ryotwari patta. Section 13
POLLISETTI v. KALLURI [SAIKIA,J.]
409
provided as to in respect of what lands in inam estates the landholder
would be entitled !o ryotwari patta and said:
"S. 13.