# POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS LIMITED &ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [2015] 11 S.C.R. 935
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2015-12-01
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 10130-10131 of2010
- **Bench:** V. Go Pala Gowda, Amitava Roy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/poona-employees-union-v-force-motors-limited-another-30341
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Maharashtra Regulation of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971-ss.11, 12, c
14, 19 - Status of recognized Union under- Determination
of eligibility cum suitability of a Union - Application by
appellant Union before the Industrial Court for being
registered as a recognized Union in place of an existing ·
recognized Union (BKS Union) in the undertaking- Industrial D
Court referring to the report of the Investigating Officer and
the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellant Union held that
the appellant Union was entitled to be conferred the status of
recognized Union since it had more than 30% of membership
of the total employees of the Company as well as larger E
membership than the membership of BKS Union during the
period, andthere was compliance of ss. 11, 14and19-High
Court held that the appellant Union was not eligible under
the Act to be conferred the status as recognized Union and
set aside the decision of the Industrial Court - Interference F
with - Held: Not called for...:. View taken by High Court is
plausible and rational being based on a logical analysis of
the materials on record and the law applicable - Report of
the Investigating Officer clearly reveals that the contribution G
collected from the members of the appellant Union had not
been deposited in its bank account - Vital informations is
prescribed form pertaining to the claim of membership of
appellant Union, in order to wrestthe title of recognized union
H
935
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
from an existing rival Union enjoying the said status, not
furnished -
Dehors the affidavits, the evidence or the
materials laid by the appellant Union are not overwhelmingly
determinative of its claim of majority membership as required
uls. 11, 12, and 14 - AdjudicatiQn on the issue of deduction
B of bonus amount by the company for adjustment against the
membership fee of BKS in the background perlaining thereto
does not conclusively clinch the cause in favour of the
appellant Union -
The analysis and evaluation of the
materials on record as underlaken by the High Court cannot
C be denounced as illogical, irrational or uncalled for.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 On a cogent reading of Sections 9, 11,
o 12, 13, 14, 19, 30 of the Maharashtra Regulation of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,
1971, it is abundantly and predominantly clear that the
exercise of examining an application of a union in an
undertaking seeking the status of recognized union
E whether by replacing an existing recognized union or
not, is neither a routine ritual n"or an idle formality. Not
only the applicant-union has to be eligible to apply as
per the prescriptions with regard to the extent of
membership it has to command for the relevant period,
F its application has to be bona fide in the interest of the
employees and it must not have indulged in any activity
of instigating, aiding or assisting, the commencement
or continuation of a strike during the said period. The
detailed procedure in both the eventualities, as
G ccntemplated in Sections 12 and 14 of the Act, enjoins a
participating enquiry to verily ascertain the membership
pattern of the rival unions, and also the existence or
otherwise of th~ disqualifying factors as stipulated by
H the Act. [Para.46][966-B-E]
-.
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
937
LIMITED &ANOTHER
1.2 The report of the Investigating Officer clearly A
reveals that the cQntribution collected from the members
of the appellant union had not been deposited in its bank
account. This finding is based on a scrutiny of the original
records of the appellant union. Though the then
President of the appellant union, in his testimony claimed B
that the membership fee had been duly deposited in the
bank, he conceded that no complaint had been made
against the Investigating Officer for incorporating a
finding contrary thereto. No overwhelming evidence was
also produced to counter this finding. This w

## Text

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[2015] 11 S.C.R. 935
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION
v.
FORCE MOTORS LIMITED &ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10130-10131 of2010)
DECEMBER 1, 2015
A
B
[V. GO PALA GOWDA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.)
Maharashtra Regulation of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971-ss.11, 12, c
14, 19 - Status of recognized Union under- Determination
of eligibility cum suitability of a Union - Application by
appellant Union before the Industrial Court for being
registered as a recognized Union in place of an existing ·
recognized Union (BKS Union) in the undertaking- Industrial D
Court referring to the report of the Investigating Officer and
the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellant Union held that
the appellant Union was entitled to be conferred the status of
recognized Union since it had more than 30% of membership
of the total employees of the Company as well as larger E
membership than the membership of BKS Union during the
period, andthere was compliance of ss. 11, 14and19-High
Court held that the appellant Union was not eligible under
the Act to be conferred the status as recognized Union and
set aside the decision of the Industrial Court - Interference F
with - Held: Not called for...:. View taken by High Court is
plausible and rational being based on a logical analysis of
the materials on record and the law applicable - Report of
the Investigating Officer clearly reveals that the contribution G
collected from the members of the appellant Union had not
been deposited in its bank account - Vital informations is
prescribed form pertaining to the claim of membership of
appellant Union, in order to wrestthe title of recognized union
H
935
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
from an existing rival Union enjoying the said status, not
furnished -
Dehors the affidavits, the evidence or the
materials laid by the appellant Union are not overwhelmingly
determinative of its claim of majority membership as required
uls. 11, 12, and 14 - AdjudicatiQn on the issue of deduction
B of bonus amount by the company for adjustment against the
membership fee of BKS in the background perlaining thereto
does not conclusively clinch the cause in favour of the
appellant Union -
The analysis and evaluation of the
materials on record as underlaken by the High Court cannot
C be denounced as illogical, irrational or uncalled for.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 On a cogent reading of Sections 9, 11,
o 12, 13, 14, 19, 30 of the Maharashtra Regulation of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,
1971, it is abundantly and predominantly clear that the
exercise of examining an application of a union in an
undertaking seeking the status of recognized union
E whether by replacing an existing recognized union or
not, is neither a routine ritual n"or an idle formality. Not
only the applicant-union has to be eligible to apply as
per the prescriptions with regard to the extent of
membership it has to command for the relevant period,
F its application has to be bona fide in the interest of the
employees and it must not have indulged in any activity
of instigating, aiding or assisting, the commencement
or continuation of a strike during the said period. The
detailed procedure in both the eventualities, as
G ccntemplated in Sections 12 and 14 of the Act, enjoins a
participating enquiry to verily ascertain the membership
pattern of the rival unions, and also the existence or
otherwise of th~ disqualifying factors as stipulated by
H the Act. [Para.46][966-B-E]
-.
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
937
LIMITED &ANOTHER
1.2 The report of the Investigating Officer clearly A
reveals that the cQntribution collected from the members
of the appellant union had not been deposited in its bank
account. This finding is based on a scrutiny of the original
records of the appellant union. Though the then
President of the appellant union, in his testimony claimed B
that the membership fee had been duly deposited in the
bank, he conceded that no complaint had been made
against the Investigating Officer for incorporating a
finding contrary thereto. No overwhelming evidence was
also produced to counter this finding. This witness C
admitted as well that the accounts of the appellant union
were not being audited by a Chartered Accountant,
appointed by the Government which per se is also in
repudiation of the mandate of Section 19(iv) of the Act. 0
This witness in course of the cross-examination was
also confronted with the annual return submitted by the
union for the period in which he admitted that the few
columns of the prescribed form had been left blank. The
blank columns refer to: number and date of receipt for E
payment of application fee; number of members
admitted during the year; number of members on books
at the end of year i.e., on 31•1 December and number of
members who paid their subscription for the whole year ..
These are vital informations pertaining to the claim of 'F ·
membership of appellant union, in order to wrest the title
of "recognized union" from an existing rival union
enjoying the said status. [Para 54] [969-G-H; 970-A-G]
1.3 The reportof the Investigating Officer based on G
a scrutiny of all relevant records of the appellant union
including the list of employees, membership receipt
book, register of membership, cash book, bank pass
books etc. does not as such admit of any doubt about
its credibility.Even some of the affiants, in their crossH
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A examinations, on their affidavits filed in support of the
claim of membership of the appellant union, had stated
that they had affirmed the same because they were
·promise.d by the appellant union that their deducted
wages for the go-slow tactics would be reimbursed.
B Though the respondents have nursed a remonstrance
that the permission granted by the Industrial Court to
cross-examine only 100 of the affiants out of 1556
deponents did denude them of their valuable right of
defence, nothing much turns thereon. (Para 55] (970-H;
C 971-A-C]
1.4 These affidavits could not have been, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, and more particularly in
view of the undertaking given by the appellant union and
D also the order to that effect by the Industrial Court that
the same would not be used to decide the issue of
membership, acted upon for this purpose. It had
throughout been in the understanding of all concerned
that the contents of the affidavits would be used only
E for relevant and ancillary purpose but divorced from the
issue of membership. The Industrial Court however, in
concluding that the appellant union did have more than
30% of the membership of the total employees, took
F cognizance of these affidavits and relied on the same.
The contents of the affidavits, which are identical and in
a format are to the effect that the deponents had not paid
subscription to the BKS for the last two years and that
they had accepted the membership of appellant union
G on 20.12.2002 and that BKS does not have majority of
the membership since 1.1.2003. These affidavits taken
on their face value, irrefutably testified on the aspect of
membership of the two unions and though the Industrial
Court did endeavour to construe the same for the
H purpose of ascertaining the intention of the affiants to
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
939
LIMITED &ANOTHER
support the appellant union, it indeed ·had a decisive A
bearing on ultimate conclusion of its majority
membership. [Para 56] [971-D-H; 972-A]
1.5 Dehors the affidavits, the evidence or the
materials· laid by the appellant union are not
overwhelmingly determinative of its claim of majority· 8
membership as required under Sections 11, 12, and 14
of the Act. The adjudication on the issue of deduction of
bonus amount lly the company for adjustment against
the membership fee of BKS in the background pertaining C
thereto and as narrated does not conclusively clinch the
cause in favour of the appellant union. [Para 57] [972B-D]
1.6 Having regard to the judicially acknowledged
and proclaimed contours of the jurisdiction under Article D
136 of the Constitution of India, the impugned decision
does not merit annulment. As it is, the extra-ordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 is to be
exercised sparingly and even mere errors in the
appreciation of the evidence on record are insufficient E
to attract this Court's invigilatory intervention thereunder.
Tis Court may interfere in rare and exceptional cases
where manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage
of justice has been occasioned by the decision under · F
scrutiny. If two views are possible and the view taken in
the impugned decision is a plausible one, it would not
warrant intervention of this Court under Article 136.
[Para 58] [972-E-H]
1.7 In the facts of the instant case, the analysis and G
evaluation of the materials on record as undertaken·.
cannot be denounced as illogical, irrational or-uncalledfor and the view recorded in the impugned judgment and
order is one permissible on the basis thereof. [Para 59]
[973-A-B]
H
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
1.8 The view taken by High Court is plausible and
rfltional being based on a logical analysis of the materials
on record and the law applicable, does not merit any
interference. Having regard to the paramount objectives
of the Act and in the interest of industrial orderliness,
B stability, peace and overall well being as well, there is no
persuasive reason to intervene. [Para 60] [973-B-D]
Automobile Products of India Employees' Union
Vs. Association of Engineering Worl<ers, Bombay
C
and Others 1990 (2) SCR 177:(1990) 2 SCC 444;
Balmer Lawrie Workers' Union, Bombay and Anr.
Vs. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. and Ors. 1985 SCR
492:1984 Supp. sec 663; R.G. D'SOUZA Vs.
Poona Employees Union and Another (2015) 2
D
SCC 526; Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs.
E
F
State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2012 (10) SCR
994:2013 (4) SCC 465; Union of India and others
Vs. Gangadhar Narsingdas Aggarwal (1997) 10
sec 305 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
1990 (2) SCR 177
referred to.
Para 20
1985 SCR 492
referred to.
Para 21
(2015) 2 sec 526
referred to.
Para 21
2012 (10) SCR 994
referred to.
Para 25
(1997) 10 sec 305
referred to.
Para 58
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
10130-10131 of2010
From the juagment and order dated 02.02.2009 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 2907
H of 2006 along with Writ Petition 2878 of 2006.
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
941
LIMITED &ANOTHER
Colin Gonsalves, V. Sareen, Jyoti Mediratta for the A
Appellant.
C. U. Singh, Shyam Divan,
P. S. Sudheer, Rishi
Maheshwari, Anne Mathew, Raj Kumar Kaushik, Shruti Jose,
Pratap Venugopal, Surekha Raman, Anuj S., Debarshi B
Bhuyan, Niharika, (for M/s K. J. John & Co.) for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Al\lllTAVA ROY,J. 1. Two employees unions of the C
industrial establishment, Force Motors Limited (hereinafter to
be referred to as "the company") are locked in a legal tussle,
the appellant for acquiring the status of a recognized union
under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and 0
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short,
hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") and the respondent
No. 2 to ward off such an endeavour, it being the recognized
union. The pursuit for recognition that had commenced in the
year 2003, on an application filed by the appellant before the E
Industrial Court under Section 11 of the Act, has witnessed a
prolonged adjudication, however, leaving the issue unresolved.
Though the appellant union tasted success before the Industrial
Court, the fortune reversed. before the High Court thus,
catapulting it before this Court for its pancean intervention. In
F
challenge, is the judgment and order dated 2.2.2009 rendered
by the High Court of judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (C)
No. 2907 of2006 jointly with W.P. (C) No. 2878of2006, lodged
by the company and the defender union independently
assailing the determination of the Industrial Court.
G
2. We have heard Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior
counsel forthe appellant and Mr. Shyam Divan and Mr. C.U.
Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2
respectively.
H
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
3. The factual backdrop has to be summarily outlined to
better comprehend the issue and the rival assertions. The
company, Force Motors Limited, earlier named as Bajaj Tempo
Limited, has its office atAkurdi, Pune. The respondent No. 2union i.e. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (for short, hereinafter to be
B referred to as "the BKS")
is the recognized union of the
company. The appellant union in its bid to be adjudged as the
recognized union in place of BKS, filed an application on
6.9.2003 before the Industrial Court, Pune, as required under
the provision of the Act. It insisted that almost all the employees
C members of BKS had meanwhile tendered their resignation,
and had expressed their desire to discontinue their
membership therewith. · It claimed that majority of the
employees had become its members, so much so that in the
0
month of January, 2003, it had in its fold 1973 employees
members. Claiming that it was a union registered under the
Trade UnionsAct, 1926 (for short, hereinafter to be referred to
as "1926 Act") on 20. 7.1986 with a valid certificate to that
effect, it asserted that with the exodus of the employees
E members from BKS to its ranks, it had the holding of 85% of
the total employees of the company. It disclosed, inter alia, as
well the names and particulars of the office bearers and
members of the Executive Committee as in the month of
January, 2003 and mentioned as well that its membership
F subscription was Rs. 2 per month and that the meetings of the
Executive Committee were being held at regular intervals of.
not more than 3 months. It maintained as well that the
resolutions passed by the Executive Committee and the
General Body thereof were recorded in the Minute Book and
G that its accounts were being duly audited by a Chartered
Accountant for every financial year and that certificate(s) to
that effect was/were issued as well. Contending that it, in any
case, had in its roll more than 30% membership of the
employees of the company, this along with the other factors
H entitled it to be adjudged as the recognized union thereof under
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
943
·LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
the Act. That it complied with the prescription of the statute A
more particularly as laid down in Sections 11 and 19 of the
Act, was emphasized.
4. The company resisted the application by pleading, .
amongst others, that the appellant union was not duly registered
B
under the 1926 Act. It denied as well that it did have, at that
point of time, 30% membership of the employees of the
company and that it did comply lil(ith the imperatives of Section
19 of the Act. Dismissing the appellant union's claim of majority
membership to be a bogey, it refuted its claim of having larger C
membership of the employees of the company compared to
BKS. The company alleged that the appellant union had failed
to maintain the records as per Section 22 of the 1926 Act and
that it was, thus not eligible to be conferred the status of
recognized union of the company.
D
5. BKS, as well, joined the fray in similar lines with the
company. Apart from reiterating that the appellant union was
not duly registered under the 1926Act and thus it had no locus
standi to claim the status of a recognized union, it categorically E
controverted its clam of holding 30% membership of the
company as compared to it (BKS). It denied that the appellant
union had complied with the mandatory provisions of Section
19 of the Act pertaining to minimum subscription of
membership, meetings of the Executive Committee at regular
F
intervals, record of resolutions in Minute Book and audit of its
accounts. It alleged that the appellant union had produced false
and fabricated records in respect of membership as well as
the meetings of its Executive Committee. BKS claimed that it
had been.working efficiently and effectively as the recognized
G
union of the company over the years and had zealously guarded
the interest of the workers by entering into settlements with the
company from time to time to effectuate the same. It alleged
further that the office bearers of the appellarit union were H
944
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
outsiders and that it (appellant upon) had not been working in
the interest of the employees of the company.
6. In the proceedings registered as Application (MRTU)
No. 3 of 2003 before the Industrial Court at Pune, following
B issues were framed founded on the rival pleadings:
c
D
"1) Whether the Applicant Union proves that it has
membership of not less than 30% of the total number of
the employees, employed in the undertaking for the whole
of the period of six months, immediately preceding the
calendar month, in which it so applies"?
2) Whether the membership of Applicant Union was larger
than that of the membership of the Non-Applicant No. 2
(Recognized Union), during the whole of the period of
six months, prior to the filing of the petition?
3) Whether the Applicant Union has made compliance
of Section 19 of MRTU & PULP Act, 1971?
E
4) Whether the Applicant Union is entitled for the
certificate of registration as a recognized union in place
of Non-Applicant No. 2 Union as per Section 14 (3) of
MRTU & PULP Act, 1971?
F
5) What order? "
7. At the outset, the Industrial Court recorded that the
application of the appellant union was in keeping with the
requirement that there should be a time lag of two years since
G the date of registration of the recognized union and an
interregnum of one year since the date of disposal of the
previous ~pplication for recognition, if any.
8. The Industrial Court in the course of adjudication
H entrusted an exercise to the Investigating Officer contemplated
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
945
LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
bytheActto verify the membership of both the unions and fo A
submit a report before it. This was patently in order to satisfy
itself of the compliance of the prescriptions of Sections 11 and
12 of the Act, by the appellant union seeking the status of
recognized union. As the decision eventually rendered by the
Industrial Court on 22.3.2006 would reveal, both the unions B
were afforded sufficient opportunity by the Investigating Officer
to adduce evidence on the rival claims of membership. The
report of the Investigating Officer dated 26.10.2004, as is
available on record, was taken note by the Industrial Court in
details.
C
9. It took into account the findings recorded in the report
tha_t there were 26 and 217 exclusive members of the appellant
union and BKS respectively and 1908 common members of
both the unions. This was in the face of the total strength of the D
employees of the company ranging from 2109 to 2155 during
the relevant period i.e. March 2003 to August, 2003. That visa-vis, this strength, whereas the appellant union had claimed
its hold over 1973, BKS asserted that it had 2166 employees
as its members. As a plea was raised before the Industrial E
Court that the aspect of overlapping membership ought to be
excluded and that exclusive membership of the unions ought
to be determined as a correct index of the membership strength
of the competing unions, it undertook an analysis, inter alia, of F
the oral evidence adduced before it as would be adverted to
hereafter. The appellant union had examined witnesses
including its President- Madhav and a member-Gugario to
prove the issue of majority membership of the employees of
the (:ompany. The company and.the BKS produced witnesses G
as well in support of their resistance. For BKS, office bearers
including its General Secretary, President of Pune Unit,
Executive Member of Pune Unit, Secretary and Vice-President
of BKS were examined.
H
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
10. In the process of evaluation of the oral evidence
adduced, it transpired that the membership fee of BKS was
being deducted from the bonus amount payable to the workers
every year. That the act of the company in deducting the
membership fee from the bonus amount was the subject matter
B of assailment in the Industrial Court in a separate proceeding
was noted. The Industrial Court recorded that for the last five
to six years prior to the adjudication, the company was
collecting Rs. 100 per worker per annum from the bonus amount
and adjusting the same against the membership fee of BKS.
C It also noted that such deduction was at the instance of BKS,
requesting the company to do so from the bonus payable to
the workers every year. It was also recorded that there was no
.practice to pay membership fee in cash by the employee~ of
0
the company to BKS for this period. The endeavour on the
part of the witnesses of the BKS in the capacity of office bearers
to testify that it used to collect membership fee in cash from
the workers was not accepted as the same was opposed to
the contemporaneous records. To fortify this conclusion, the
E Industrial Court also referred to the documentary evidence as
available demonstrating that more than 1500 workers of the
company along with appellant union had raised this issue in
the year 2002 and had impeached the deduction of
membership fee of BKS from the bonus amount by filing
F complaints in the year 2003 before the s9me forum. That there
was no individual consent letter of the workers authorizing the
company or the BKS to effect deduction used for adjustment
against membership fee was noted as well. The Industrial
Court returned a finding that such deduction did not amount to
G voluntary subscription of membership fee from the workers'
accounts and in fact was an exaction against their consent
and will since the year 2002. The oral evidence adduced on
behalf of BKS about acceptance of membership fee in cash
for the year 2003 was, thus discarded as untrustworthy.
H
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
947
LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
11. In arriving at this conclusion, the Industrial Court, inter A
alia, referred to the findings of the Investigating Officer
pertaining to the anomalies noticed in the cash book of BKS
maintained forthe relevant period. To discard the entries made
therein, as proof of collection of membership fee, the
observation of the Investigating Officer that the cash book was B
not only not in the prescribed proforma but also not signed by
·any of the office bearers of BKS, was noted. The oral evidence
of the witnesses produced by BKS relating to the transactions
with the bank involving membership fee was not accepted,
being not duly corroborated by the documentary evidence on C
record, besides being inherently untrustworthy. The Industrial
Court, in particular, recorded its reservation on the
inconsistency between the two versions, namely, deduction
from the bonus amount by the company till the year 2003 against 0
membership fee and the claim of the BKS of collection of such
fees by cash which w~re mutually mutilative. Taking
cognizance of the proceedings separately instituted in a
representative capacity on behalf of the members of the
appellant union and other employees of the Company,
E
objecting to the deduction from bonus amount, for the
membership fee of BKS, its (BKS) claim of majority
membership was rejected.
12. In contradistinction, the Industrial Court noted thatthe F
Investigating Officer had not detected any irregularity or mistake
with regard to the collection of membership fee for the relevant
period of six months and that the entries :n cash book of the
appellant union were correct and were in conformity with the
receipt books maintained therefor. The finding of the G
Investigating Officer that the amount of membership fee
collected, however, was not deposited in the bank, was also
marked. This omission on the part of the appellant union,
according to the Industrial Court, was not a cardinal lapse, as ·
it was making its endeavour to acquire the status of a H
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
recognized union. The Industrial Court recorded as well that
the appellant union, as per the report of the Investigating Officer,
could collect membership fee from 1973 employees which
amply demonstrated their spontaneous support for it. It was
deduced that the objections raised by 1500 employees of the
B company against its action of effecting deductions from the
bonus amount towards the membership fee of BKS also
evinced that there was no voluntary payment thereof, belying
thus its (BKS) claim of having a hold on majority of the
employees members of the company.
c
13. In course of the adjudication before the Industrial
Court, an application was filed by the appellant union to produce
affidavits of its members numbering 1556 to consolidate its
decision of majority membership. The Industrial Court in the
D proceedings dated 29.11.2004 under Section 11 of the Act
overruled the objection of the respondents that such proof of
affidavits was inadmissible and allowed the prayer with the
condition that the same would not be used for proving the point
of membership of the appellant union and would be used for
E other relevant and ancillary purposes. In granting this
permission, the Industrial Court took note of the submission
made on behalf of the appellant union that these affidavits
would not be used or proving the issue of membership but for
F other relevant and ancillary purposes. The non-applicants/
respondents were also granted the liberty to file counteraffidavits of rebuttal, if so advised. BKS, though did challenge
this order before the High Court, the petition was dismissed
on 9.8.2005. Eventually, BKS, also filed affidavits of 170
G employees.
14. The Industrial Court took note of the contents of 1556
affidavits filed on behalf of the appellant union to deduce that
the affiants had resigned from the membership of BKS in the
H year 2002 and had not paid the membership fee since
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
949
LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J J
December, 2002. It was tield by the Industrial Court that these A
affidavits did substantiate that these 1556 employees did bring
an end to their relationship with the BKS and had not paid the
membership fees to it after December, 2002. That the contents
of these affidavits did clearly indicate that the concerned
employees had severed their ties with the BKS and had come
B ·
over to the appellant union was concluded. On a scrutiny of
the cross-examination of the 100 affiants, as was permitted,
the Industrial Court held that there was no circumstance or
ground to disbelieve the deponents on their plea that they had
disconnected their membership with the BKS and had stopped
C
paying membership fees to it after December, 2002. The
intention of the affiants numbering 1556 to support the appellant
union, according to the Industrial Court, was cDnspicuously
established. It referred to as well the 170 affidavits filed by D
BKS only to return a finding that if its claim of common
membership of 1908 employees was credible, it ought to have
been in a position to produce more affidavits. The Industrial
Court thus inferred that this fact also authenticated that only a
small segment of the employees of the company was in support E
of BKS. The claim of common membership of 1908
employees advanced by BKS was thus rejected. The Industrial
Court, thus eventually in deciding the issue of membership,
held thus:
F
"So, after comparing the entire evidence adduced by both
unions on the point of strength of their membership read
together with report of Investigating Officer as well 1556
affidavits of the employees filed on record by Applicant
Union, I am of the (Opinion that the Applicant Union was G
having more than 30 % of membership of the total
employees of the Company as well as larger
membership than the membership ofB.K.S. during the
period of six months from the month of March 2003 till
August 2003. In such circumstances, mandatory H
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 11 S.C.R.
A
requirements as given under Section 11 and Section ·14
of MRTU & PULP Act. 1971. are substantially complied
by the Applicant Union. and Applicant Union has
succeeded in establishing membership of not less than
30 % of total employees as well as larger membership
B
of the total employees of the company with it during the
period of six months prior to filing of the present petition.
So. I answer No. 1 and 2 in affirmative."
15. As would be evident from the above extract, the
C
Industrial Court did take note of the contents of 1556 affidavits
of the employees and acted thereon to conclude that the
appellant union did hold at that point of time more than 30%
membership of the total employees of the company during the
relevant time i.e. March, 2003 to August, 2003 and that it had
D otherwise satisfied as well, the mandatory requirements of
Sections 11and14 of the Act.
16. Referring to Section 19 of the Act, the Industrial Court
next adverted to the constitution of the appellant union placed
E on record and the evidence of its President to the effect that
the membership fee of Rs. 2 per month from each member
was being collected and that the Minute Book of the meetings
of the Executive Committee as well as the audit of its accounts
was being done regularly and further that the necessary records
F
namely, receipt book, register of members, cash book etc.
were also being maintained. It held that the prescriptions of
Section 19 of the Act had also been complied with. It, however,
recorded that any irregularity in the observance of the
enjoinment of Section 19 of the Act, per se would not debar a .
G union from claiming the status of recognized union as those,
were to be necessarily complied with after the said status was
conferred. The allegation leveled against the appellant union
that it had instigated, aided or assisted illegal strikes during
H the relevant period, was also dismissed in absence of
•
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
951
LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J.]·
corroboration thereof by any evidence. The imputation that A
the appellant union's request for being acknowledged as the
recognized union, lacked bonafide, was rejected as well. In
all, the Industrial Court, thus returned a finding that having ·
regcird to the materials on record, the appellant union was
entitled to be adjudged eligible to be conferred the status of a
recognized union and did issue a direction to that effect. It
was directed that the appellant union be registered as
recognized union in place of BKS for the company and also
saddled BKS with costs of Rs. 25000/- for resisting the
process without the support of the majority employees' of the C
company.
17. The High Court, as the impugned judgment would
disclose, took note of the order dated 29.09.2004 of the
Industrial Court by which the objection of BKS to the prayer of D
the appellant union to file affidavits was rejected with the
observation that the same would not be taken into consideration
for the purpose of verification of the membership. It also took
cognizance of the fact that as per the report of the investigating
officer dated 26.10.2004, the appellant union had exclusive E
membership of 26, and BKS of 270 and that 1908 employees
were common to both the unions. It also marked the finding of
the Investigating Officer that the appellant union had never
deposited any amount in its bank account. Taking note of the
F
order dated 29.9.2004 whereby the Industrial Court had
permitted cross-examination of 99 affiants out of 1556
affidavits, the High Court did record tha.t 17 of them had
admitted that they still continue to be the members of the BKS
and that 7 had admitted in their cross-examination that they G
had filed the affidavits only on the assurance of the appellant
union that they would be reimbursed the wages deducted on
account of go-slow initiatives resorted to by them. The fact
that the prayer of the BKS to cross-examine all the 1556 affiants
was rejected by the Industrial Court, was minuted.
H
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 11 S.C.R.
A
18. Vis-a-vis the first limb of impugnment registered by
the respondents, namely, the applicant union had no right to
represent the employees, the High Court referred to its
constitution and more particularly its object of organizing and
uniting the employees, and recorded that though the same was
B represented to be included in the schedule thereto, the same
was not d iscernable therefrom and th us the purpose for which
the applicant union had been established was not forthcoming
for which it was not eligible to be recognized under Section 11
of the Act.
c
19. On the aspect of the reception of 1556 affidavits,
the High Court was of the view that the liberty to crossexamination only 99 affiants, when the contents of the affidavits
were the same, was unfair as these documents were relied
D
upon to draw conclusions about the factum of membership of
the unions. It referred to the report of the Investigating Officer
in details pertaining to the facet of membership and held that
the approach of the Industrial Court in dealing with this issue
E by overlooking the fact that it was the onus of the appellant
union to prove that the BKS had lost its representative character
and that :twas eligible to be recognized under Section 11 of
the Act, was defective. It was of the considered view, that the
Industrial Court in fact had relied upon the affidavits as a proof
F of membership of the applicant union by marking a departure
from its order that the same would not be used for such purpose.
The High Court thus concluded that the affidavits filed by 1556
employees did play a decisive role to enable the Industrial Court
to reach the conclusion that the applicant union commanded
G majority of memb\;lrship of the undertaking which was
unsustainable in law.
20. The High Court also took note of the findings
recorded in the report of the Investigating Officer about the
H exclusive and dual membership claimed by both the unions
POONA EMPLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
953
LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
as per the records as well as the observations on the A
documents produced by them. Referring to the decision of
this court in Automobile Products of India Employees'
Union Vs. Association of Engineering Workers, Bombay
and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 444, the High Court returned the
finding that the decision of the Industrial Court holding the B
appellant union to be eligible under the Act to be conferred the
status as the recognized union was flawed and untenable and
· thus interfered with the same.
21. Mr. Gonsalves has emphatically argued that as the C
appellant union had on the basis of the materials on record
demonstrated that it had fully complied with the enjoinment of
Sections 11, 14 and 19 of the Act, the High Court ought not to
have reversed the finding of the Industrial Court that it (appellant
union) was entitled to be conferred the distinction of recognized
D
union under the statute. The Industrial Court having, on an
elaborat~ analysis of the evidence adduced as required by
law having held that the appellant union was adequately suitable
to be adjudged, the recognized union in place of BKS, the
High Court had fallen in error in recording a conclusion contrary
E
thereto, he urged. The learned senior counsel insisted, that it
being apparent on the face of the materials laid before the
Industrial Court that during the relevant period, BKS had been
reduced to a minority with regard to its membership holding
F
and that in the interest of collective bargaining, the appellant
union ought to be handed over the reins thereof, the impugned
judgment needs to be interfered with on the touchstone of
welfare of the industrial community as well. Mr. Gonsalves
maintained that the appellant union had been able to establish G
its eligibility as well as suitability for being adjudged as the .
. recognized union of the company as a replacement of BKS
on the basis of the report of the Investigating Officer as well as
the other evidence adduced sans the affidavits on record and
thus the High Court had erred in returning a finding that the H
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015) 11 S.C.R.
A
Industrial Court had impermissibly taken note of and relied upon
the affidavits for a decisive finding in its favour. He urged that
the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellant union having been
referred to by the Industrial Court principally to take cognizance
of the deduction by the company, from the yearly bonus, for
B adjustment against the membership fee of BKS, the High Court
went wrong in deducing that the same had been relied upon to
decide the issue of membership. In any view of the matter, Mr.
Gonsalves <!rgued that not only the 1556 affidavits filed on
behalf of the appellant union did evince a mass migration of
C the members of BKS to the appellant union, as the respondents
had been accorded and had availed the opportunity of crossexamining 100 affiants, the process by no means was
repugnant to the one as envisaged by Section 14 of the Act
0
and is thus beyond reproach. Though admitting, that reception
of affidavits on the aspects of enquiry contemplated by the Act
qua the issue of conferment of the status of recognized union
is not obligatory, the course adopted by the Industrial Court in
thafregard in the case in hand, thereby ipso facto did not vitiate
E the exercise, he pleaded. Apart from referring to the report of
the Investigating Officer and the other evidence on record as
well as the concluded determination of impermissible
deduction from the annual bonus of the employees by the
company for payment of membership of BKS, the learned
F senior counsel insisted that the im·pugned judgment and order
ought to be interfered with to secure industrial peace, amity
and stability. The learned senior counsel took pains as well, to
take us through the oral evidence of the witnesses of the
appellant union to authenticate its claim of compliance of the
G pre-conditions embodied in Sections 11, 14 and 19 of the Act.
H
Mr. Gonsalves distinguished the decision of this Court in
Automobile Products of India Employees' Union (supra)
in its application to the facts of the case. He cited the decision
in Balmer Lawrie Workers' Union, Bombay and Anr. Vs.
POONAEMFLOYEES UNION v. FORCE MOTORS
955
LIMITED &ANOTHER [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. and Ors., 1984 Supp. SCC 663 A
and R.G. D'SOUZA Vs. Poona Employees Union and
Another, (2015) 2 SCC 526 to buttress his contentions.
22. In controversion, the learned senior counsel for the
respondents have asserted that having regard to the scheme B
of the Act and the provisions pertaining to the enquiry for
verification of membership for conferment of status of a
recognized union, the Industrial Court ought to have limited
the adjudication of the issue on a consideration of the report
of the Investigating Officer and the evidence adduced by the C
parties only and its reliance on the affidavits did vitiate the
process undertaken by it, as rightly held by the High Court.
Placing emphatic reliance on the decision of this Court in
Automobile Produ.cts of India Employees' Union (supra},
they have urged that on this count alone the present challenge D
oughtto be negated.
23. Without prejudiced to this, they have argued that on
a cumulative evaluation of the findings recorded in the report
of the Investigating Officer and the other evidence on record, it· E
being apparent that the appellant union had failed to satisfy
the statutorily prescribed pre-requisites to entitle a union to be
acknowledged as a recognized unioh under the Act, no
interference in the impugned judgment and order is warranted.
24.