# PORRITTS & SPENCER (ASIA) LTD v. STATE OF HARYANA

- **Citation:** [1979] 1 S.C.R. 545
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1978-09-06
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, V. D. Tulzapurkar, R. S. Pathak
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/porritts-spencer-asia-ltd-v-state-of-haryana-7592
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Puniab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, ltem 30 of Schedule 'B' to the Ac/-
Whether 'dryer felts' fall within the category of "all varieties of cotton, woollen
or !liken textiles."
The "<n>~ • felts' manufactured by the appellQnt assessee were held by the
assessing autno."'"ities to be not 'textiles' within the
meaning of Item 30 of
Schedule 'B' tu the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948
and
thereafter, oii
appeal the Tribunal and on reference the High Court also confirmed this view.
Allowing the. appeal by special leiove, the Court
HEW : 1. 'Dryer fe1ts' are 'textiles' withi.Q the meaning of that expression
in Item 30 of Schedule 'B' to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. [551 BJ
2. In Or taxing statute words of every day use must be construed not in their
sci'entific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance, meaning
"that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the
statute is dealing would attribute to it." [548 A, F]
·Ramavatur ·Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, A.I.R. 1961
SC 1325, Mis. Motipur Jamindary Co. Ltd. v. State of Bilwr, Al.R. 1962 SC
660, State of West Bengal v. Washi A/uned. [19771 3 S.C.R. 149 and Madhya
Pradesh Pan Merchant's Association, Santara
Market, Nagpur v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 7 S.T.C. 99 at 102 referred to.
Gretfell Vo lR.C. [1876)] 1 Ex. D. 242 at 248, Planters Nut a11d Chocolate
Co. Ltd. v. The King [1951] 1 DLH 385 and 200 Chests of Tea, (loZ4) 9
Wheaton (U.S.) 430 a.I 438; quoted with approval.
Where a word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary
meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taXJng
statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary in1ention is
clearly expressed by the legislature. The reason is that the Lcgisla-ture does not
suppose our merchants to be ''riaturaEsts, or geologists, or botanists"'. fn the instant case the word 'textiles' is not sought by the assessee to be given a scientific
in preference to its pvpular meaning. It has only one meaning nameJy a woven
fabric and lhat is the meaning or technical meaning which it bears in ordinary
parlance. [550 E-GJ.
3. The concept of 'textiles' is not a static concept. It has, having regard to
newly developing materials, methods techniques and
processes, a continually
expanding content k'i:nd new kinds of ·fabric may be invented which may legitimately, without doing any violence to the language be regarded as textiles.
[550 G-HJ
The word 'textiles' is derived from Latin 'texere' which n1eans 'to weave' and
it means woven fabric. When yarn, whether cotton, silk, woollen rayon, nylon
or of any other description or made out of any other materiel is woven into a
fabric, \Vhat comes into being\ is a 'textile' and is known as such. \Vhatever be
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 1 S.C.R.
the mode of weaving
employed, woven fabric would be
'textile'.
What is
necessary is no more than meaning of yarn and weaving would mean binding
or putting together by some process so as to form a fabric. A textile need not
be of any particular size or strength or weight.
~fhe use to which it may be
put is also immaterilal and does not bear on its character as a textile. The fact·'
that the 'dryer felts' are used only as absorbents of moisture in the process of
manufacture in a paper manufacturing unit, cannot militate against 'dryer felts'
falling within category of textiles, if otherwise they satisfy the description of
textiles.
The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 refers to textile fabrics in this sense.
[549 C-D, E-F, G-H]
Ramavatar Budhaiprasrul v. Assista/11 Sales Tax Officer Ako/a, A.I.R. 1961
SC 1325 and Mis. Motipur Jamindary Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.l.R. 1962
SC 660, distinguished.
C
CIVIL A1 l'ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2212 of 1977.
D
E
F
G
H
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and· Order dated
11-5-1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in General Sales
Tax Rc[ercncC' No 16/74.
A. K.

## Text

PORRITTS & SPENCER (ASIA) LTD.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
September 6, 1978
545
[P. N. BHAGWATI, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.j
Puniab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, ltem 30 of Schedule 'B' to the Ac/-
Whether 'dryer felts' fall within the category of "all varieties of cotton, woollen
or !liken textiles."
The "<n>~ • felts' manufactured by the appellQnt assessee were held by the
assessing autno."'"ities to be not 'textiles' within the
meaning of Item 30 of
Schedule 'B' tu the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948
and
thereafter, oii
appeal the Tribunal and on reference the High Court also confirmed this view.
Allowing the. appeal by special leiove, the Court
HEW : 1. 'Dryer fe1ts' are 'textiles' withi.Q the meaning of that expression
in Item 30 of Schedule 'B' to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. [551 BJ
2. In Or taxing statute words of every day use must be construed not in their
sci'entific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance, meaning
"that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the
statute is dealing would attribute to it." [548 A, F]
·Ramavatur ·Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, A.I.R. 1961
SC 1325, Mis. Motipur Jamindary Co. Ltd. v. State of Bilwr, Al.R. 1962 SC
660, State of West Bengal v. Washi A/uned. [19771 3 S.C.R. 149 and Madhya
Pradesh Pan Merchant's Association, Santara
Market, Nagpur v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 7 S.T.C. 99 at 102 referred to.
Gretfell Vo lR.C. [1876)] 1 Ex. D. 242 at 248, Planters Nut a11d Chocolate
Co. Ltd. v. The King [1951] 1 DLH 385 and 200 Chests of Tea, (loZ4) 9
Wheaton (U.S.) 430 a.I 438; quoted with approval.
Where a word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary
meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taXJng
statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary in1ention is
clearly expressed by the legislature. The reason is that the Lcgisla-ture does not
suppose our merchants to be ''riaturaEsts, or geologists, or botanists"'. fn the instant case the word 'textiles' is not sought by the assessee to be given a scientific
in preference to its pvpular meaning. It has only one meaning nameJy a woven
fabric and lhat is the meaning or technical meaning which it bears in ordinary
parlance. [550 E-GJ.
3. The concept of 'textiles' is not a static concept. It has, having regard to
newly developing materials, methods techniques and
processes, a continually
expanding content k'i:nd new kinds of ·fabric may be invented which may legitimately, without doing any violence to the language be regarded as textiles.
[550 G-HJ
The word 'textiles' is derived from Latin 'texere' which n1eans 'to weave' and
it means woven fabric. When yarn, whether cotton, silk, woollen rayon, nylon
or of any other description or made out of any other materiel is woven into a
fabric, \Vhat comes into being\ is a 'textile' and is known as such. \Vhatever be
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1979] 1 S.C.R.
the mode of weaving
employed, woven fabric would be
'textile'.
What is
necessary is no more than meaning of yarn and weaving would mean binding
or putting together by some process so as to form a fabric. A textile need not
be of any particular size or strength or weight.
~fhe use to which it may be
put is also immaterilal and does not bear on its character as a textile. The fact·'
that the 'dryer felts' are used only as absorbents of moisture in the process of
manufacture in a paper manufacturing unit, cannot militate against 'dryer felts'
falling within category of textiles, if otherwise they satisfy the description of
textiles.
The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 refers to textile fabrics in this sense.
[549 C-D, E-F, G-H]
Ramavatar Budhaiprasrul v. Assista/11 Sales Tax Officer Ako/a, A.I.R. 1961
SC 1325 and Mis. Motipur Jamindary Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.l.R. 1962
SC 660, distinguished.
C
CIVIL A1 l'ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2212 of 1977.
D
E
F
G
H
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and· Order dated
11-5-1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in General Sales
Tax Rc[ercncC' No 16/74.
A. K. Sen, A. R. Lal and Ashok Grover for the Appellant.
!. D. lain and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BIIAGWATI, J.-The short question which aris.es for determination
in this nppeal is whether 'dryer felts' manufactured by the assessce fall
within the category of "all varieties of cotton, woollen or silken textiles" specified in Item 30 of Schedub 'B' of the Punjab General Sales
Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
If they are
covered by this description, they would be exempt from Sales
Tax
impooed under the provisions of the Act, otherwise they would
b~
liable to sales tax.
The assessing authorities held that the 'dryer
felts' manufactured by the assessce were not "textiles" within
the
meaning of Item 30 of Schedule 'B' and they were, therefore,
not .
exempt from sales tax.
The Tribunal, on appeal, also took
the
same view and rejected the claim of the assessee to exemption from
sales tax in respect of sale§ of 'dryer felts'.
The assessee thereupun
moved the Tribunal for 111aking a reference to the Hi&]i Court and
on this application, the following question of law was referred by the
Ttibunal for the opinion of the High Court :
"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
products manufactured by the petitioner are not covered by
Item 30 of Schedule 'B' of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act,
1948, and therefore, not exe111pt from sales tax both under
the P11njab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 and the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956."
~
'
PORR!TTS V. HARYANA (Bhagwiiti, !.)
547
The Reference was heard by n Division Bench and on a difference
of opinion between the two Judges constituting the Division Bench,
the Reference was placed befor~ a third Judge.
The third Judge
hdd that ·dryer felts' were not included in the expression 'textiles'
occurring in Item 30 of Schednle 'B' df the Act and were, therefore,
net exempt from sales tax and on this view the question referred to
rl:e High Court was answered against the assessee and in favour of
the Revenue.
The assessee thereupon preferred the present appeal
with special leave obtained from this Court.
It is clear from section 5 sub-section ( 1) of the Act that it levies
sales tax on the taxable turnover of a dealer subject to the provisions
of the Act.
Sub-section (2) of section 5 defines "taxable turnover"
to mean tliat part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which
remains after deducting therefrom inter alia his turnover on the
sale
of goods cledared tax free under section 6.
Section 6 provides that
no tax shoul<l be payable on the sale of goods specified in the first
column of Sehedule 'B' subject ts the conditions and exception,
if
any, set out it•. the corresponding entry in the second column thereof
and no dealer shall charge sales tax on the sale of goods
which
arc declared tax-free from time to time under this section.
Sched11le
'B' sets out in the first column, various categories of goods which are
declared tax-free under secti<m 6 and Item 30 specifies the following
category of tax-free goods :
"All rnrieties of cotton, woollen or silken textiles including rayon. artificial silk or n)lon whether manufactured by
handl.oom or power!ciom or otherwise but not including pure
silk fabrics, carpets, druggets, woollen durees and cotton
Jloor dur~es."
TJ1c question is : whether 'dryer felts' manufactured by the assei-
.. see fell within this category of goods so as to be exempt from s~le,,
tax ? Can it be said that 'dryer felts' constitute a variety of cotfoii
or woollen textiles ?
The answ~r to the question depends on what
is the true meaning of the word "textiles' as used in Item 30 of Sche.
dule 'B'.
Now, the word 'textiles' is not defined in the Act, but i\ is well
settled as a result of several decisions of this Court. of which we may
mention only a few, namely, Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant
Sales Tax Officer, Ako/a(') and Mis Motipur Jamindary Co. Ltd. v.
State of Bihar(') and the State of West Bengal .v.
Wash! Ahmed(6)
(I) A. I. R. 1961 SC.1325.
(2) A. I. R. 1962 SC 660.
(3)" [l 977) 3 SCR 149.
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B
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 S.C.R.
that in a taxing statute words of every day use must be construed not
in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance.
The question which arose in Ramm·ata:/s case (supra) was
whether betel leaves are vegetables and this Court held that they are
not indllded within that term.
·:-his Court quoted with approval the
following passage from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in /'.1ad/;ya Pradesh Pan '''lerchanl'':' Association, Santara Market,
Nagpur v. State of Madhya Pradesh(') :
In our opinion, the word "vegetables'' cannot be given
the comprehensive meaning the term bears in natural history
and has not been given that meaning in taxing statutes bee
fore
The term "vegetabies" is to be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes of vegetable matter
which arc grown in kitcl1rn gardens and are used for the
table."
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And observed that "the word 'vegetables' in taxing statutes is to be
understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class of vegetables
which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for
the table."
This meaning of the wore' 'vegetables' was reiterated
in M/s Motipur Jamindary case where sugarcane was held not fc\
fall within the definition of the word 'vegetables' and the same mean·
ing was given to the word 'vegetables' in Washi Ahmed's case (svpra)
where green ginger was held!'.) be 'vegetables' within the meaning of
that word as used in common parlance.
It was pointed out by this Court in Washi Ahmed's case (supra)
that the same principle of construction in :·daticm to words used in a
taxing statute has also been adopted in English, Canadian and American
Courts. Pollock B. pointed out in Gretfell v. l. R. C. (').
that "if
a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in
a popular sense, such a statute h not to be construed according to the.
strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be
construed in its popular sense, meaning, of course, by the words
"popular sense that which people conversant with the subject-matter
w;th which the statute is dealing would attribute it."
So also
the
Supreme Cour: of Canada said in Plant'''" Nut and Chocolate Co. Ltd.
v. The King(') while interpreting the words 'fruits' and 'vegetables'
in the Excise Act." They are ordinary words in every day use and
are, t11erefore, to be construed according to their popular sense". The
same ruk was expressed in slightly different language by Story,
J.,
in 200 Chests of Tea( 4 ) where the learned Judge said that "the parti-
(I) 7 S. T. C. 99 at 102.
(3) ll951j l D. L. R. 385.
(2) 118761 I fa. D. 242 at 248.
(4) [1824] 9 Wheaton (US.) 430 at 438.
'
PORRITTS v. HARYANA (Bhagwati, J.)
549
cu!ar words used by the Legis)ature in the denominat:on of articles
A
are to be understood according to the common commercial understanding of the terms used, and not in their scientific or technical sense, for
the Legislature does "not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or
geologists, or botanists.". "
There can, therefore, be no doubt that the word 'textiles' in Itrm
30 of Schedule 'B' must be interpreted according to its popular sense,
meaning "that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter
with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it".
There we are
in compft•te agreement with the Judge~ who held in favour of the
Revenue and against the assesst'e.
But' the question is : What result
does the applirntion of this test yield ?
Are 'dryer felts' not 'textiles'
within the ordinary accepted meanini; of that wor<;I ?
The word
'textiles' is derived from the Latin 'texere' which means 'to weave' and
it means any woven fabric. When yarn, whether cotton, silk, woollen,
;ayon, nylon or of any other description or made out of any other
material is w0'ven into a fabric, what comes into being is a 'textile'
and it is known as such.
It may be cotton textile, silk textile, woollen
textile, rayon textile, nylon textile or any other kind of textile.
The
method of weaving adopted may be the warp and wonf pattern as
is gen~rally the case in most of the textiles, or it may be any other
process er technique.
There is such phenomenal advance in science·
and technology, so woncjrous is the varietv ~! fabrics manufactured
from materials hithereto unknown or unthought of and so many are
the new techniques invented for making fabric out of yarn that it
would be most unwise W confln~ the weaving process to the warp
and woof pattern.
Whatever be the mode of weaving employed,
woven fabric would be 'textiles'.
What is necessary is no more than
weaving of yarn and weaving would mean binding or putting together
by S'lmc process so as to fo'rm a fabric.
Moreover a textile need
not be of any particular size or strength or weight.
It may be in
sm•·ll pieces or in big rolls : it may k weak or strong, light or heavy,
bleached or dyed, according to the requirement of the purchaser. The
use to which it may be put is also immaterial and does not bear on
its character as a textile. It may-be used for making wearing apparel,
or it may be used as a covering or bedsheet or it may be used as tapestry or upholstery or as duster for cleaning or as towel for drying the
body.
A trxtile may have diverse uses and it is not the use which
determines its character as rextile.
It is, therefore, no argument
against the assessee f.haf 'dryer felts' are used only as absorbents of
moisture in the process of manufactur~ in a paper manufacturing umt.
That cannot militate against 'dryer felt>' falling within the category
of 'textilos', if otherwise they satisfy the description of 'textiles'.
8
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550
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 1 s.c.R.
Now, wt.a, are 'dryer felts' ?
They are of two kinds, cotton
dryer felts and woollen dryer felts. Both are made of yarn, cotton
in one case and woollen in the other. Some synthetic yarn is also
used.
111e process employed is that of weaving according lo warp
and woof pattern.
This is how the manufacturing process is described by the assessing authority in its order dated 12th November,
B · 1971 "the raw material used 11y the company is cotton and woollen
yarn which they themselves manufacturecl from raw cotton and wool
l•nd the finished products called 'felts'. are manufactured on power
.looms from ccittO'n and woollen yarn."
'Dryer felts' are, therefore,
clearly woven fabrics and m~1st be held to fall within the ordinary
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meaning of the word 'textiles'.
\Ve do not think that the word 'tex·
tiks' has any narrower meaning in common parlance other than the
ordimry meaning given in the dictionary, namely, a woven fabric.
There may te wide ranging varieties df woven fabric and they may
go on muit;pJying and proliferating with new developments in science
and leclmology and inventions of new method~, materials and techniques, but nonetheless they would all be textiles.
The analogy of
cases where the word 'vegetables' was held not to include betel leaves
or sugaHane is wholly inappropriate.
There, what was disapprrNed
by the Court was resort to the botanical meaning of the word 'vegetatles' when that word had acqulrcd a popular meaning whicl1
was
different. It was said by Holmes, J., in his inimitable style : KA
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a
living lhought and may vary greatly in colour and content accdrding
to the cfrcumstances and the time in which it is used."
Where a word
has a scientific or t~hnical meaning and also an ordinary moaning
according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense \hat in
a
taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the Legislature.
The rcaw11
is that, as pointed out by Story, J., in 200 Chests of Tea (supra), the
Legislature does "not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geO:
logists, or botanists".
But here the word 'textiles' is not sought by
the assessee to be given a scientific or technical meaning in preference
to its p0pufar meaning.
It lias· only one meaning, namely, a woven
fabric and that is the meaning which it bears in ordinary parlance. It
is true that out minds are conditioned by old and antiquated notioi1s
of what are textiles and, therefore, it may sound a little strange
to
regard 'dryer felts' as 'textiles' : But it must be remembered that the
concept of 'textiles' is not a stat'.c concept.
It has, having regard to
newly developing materials, methods, techniques and processes, a continually expanding content and new kinds of fabric may be invented
which may legitimately, Without doing auy Violence to the language,
be regarded as 'textiles'. Take for example rayon and nylon fabrics
J
•
•
PORRITTS v. HARYANA (Bhagwati, J.)
551
which have now become very popular for making
w~ing apparel.
When they first came to be made, they must have been intruders in
the field of 'textiles' because only cotton, silk and woollen fabrics
were till then recognized as 'textiles'.
But today no one can dispute
that rayon and nylon fabrics are textiles and can properly be described
as such.
We may take another example which is nearer to the ca$e
be[ore us.
It is COJll}IlOn knowledge that certain kinds of hats are
made out of felt and though felt is not ordinarily used for making wearing apparel, can it be suggested that felt is not a 'textile.' ?
The
character of v fabric or material as textile does not depend upon the
use to which it may be put.
The uses of textiles in a fast developing economy are manifold and it is quite common now to find 'textiles'
being used even for industrial purposes.
If we loo'k at the Customs
Tariff Act, 1975, we find in Chapter 59 occurring in section XL of tl1e
First Schedule that there is a reference lo 'textile fabrics and textile
articles, of a kind commonly used in machinery or plant' and clause
-8
c
( 4) of that Chapter provides that this expression shall be taken
to
apply inter alia to 'woven textile felts. . . . . . of a kind commonly used
D
in paper making or other machinery ...... ". This reference in a
~tatute which is intended to apply to imports made by the trading
community clearly shows that 'dryer felts' which are woven textile
felts ....... of a kind commonly used in paper making machinery" are
regarded in common parlance, according tO' the sense of ordinary
traders and merchants, textile fabrics.
We have, therefore, no doubt
E
that 'dryer felts' are 'textiles' withh the meaning of that expression in
Item 30 of Schedule 'B'.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment of the
High Court and answer the question referred by the Tribunal in favour
of the a6sessee and against the Revenue.
The State will pay to the
assessee costs thr()'Ughout.
S.R.
Appeal aliowed .
F