# PRAGA TOOLS CORPORATION v. SHRI C. A. IMANUAL & ORS

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 773
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-02-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 612 of 1966
- **Bench:** J. M. SliELAT, V. Bhargava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/praga-tools-corporation-v-shri-c-a-imanual-ors-4640
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Constitution ol India, Art. 226--Wrlt of mandamus whether can be
iuued against a company-High Court holding petition under Art. 226 to
be misconceived but still granting declaration to some petitioner1 that
action of company agt;·inst them was illegal-Competence of High Court
to pass such order,
The appellant was a company registered under the Companies Act,
1913. At the material time 56% ol its shares were held by the Union
Government, 32% by the Andhra Pradesh Government. and 12% by
private iJ:>dividuals. On July 1, 1961 a settlement was arrived at between
the company and the workmen's union under which the workmen inter
alia agreed to observe industrial truce for a period of three years i.e.
upto July 1, 1964 and not to resort to strikes, stoppage of work or go·
Blow tactics.
On December 10, 1962 the company and the said union
entered into a supplementary settlement under which the company agreed
not to retrench or lay-off any of the workmen during the said period of
truce.
The said two settlements were arrived at and recorded in the
presence of the Commissioner of Labour under s. 2(p) and s. 18(1) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
were to
be in force as aforesaid
until July 1, 1964. On December 20, 1963, however, the company en·
tered into another agreement with the said union.
The effeCtt of this
agreement was to enable the company
notwithstanding
the two earlier
llC!tlements to carry out retrenchment of 92 of the workmen with effect·
from January 1, 1964. Some of the affected workmen filed a writ petition
under -Art. 226 of the Censtitution μraying
for
a writ of mllndamus
against the company restraining it from giving effect to the said agreement. The Single Judge dismissed the petition on merits. In appeal the
Division Bench held that the company being one registered under the
Companies Act and not having any statutory duty or function to perform
was no~ one again·st which a writ μetition for mandamus or any other Writ
could be .. No such petition could also lie against the conciliation officer
who had signed the agreement, as on the facts of the case it was not he
who sought to implement the agreement.
The Division Bench however
held th~! th.ough the writ petition was not maintainable it could grant a
declarallon. m favour of. three of the petitioners that the impugned agree·
men! was dlega) and void. The competency of the High Court to make
such a dectaratton was challenged by the company . in appeal before this
Court.
HELD : ! i) The c<;>n~ition precedent to the issue of a mandamllJ'
jg
that there IS m one clatmmg it a legal right to the performance of a legal
duty by one against. whom it is sought. An order of mandamllJ' is, in
form! .a co~mand directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal
reQwri~g him .or them. to do a particular thing therein specified which
!'ppertams to hIS or •theil' office and is in the nature of a public duty. It
IS however .no~ necessary that the person or authority on whom the statu·
tory duty IS n~posed need be a public official or an official body.
A
"'f"'damllJ' can issue, for instance, to an official of a sbcioty to compel
him to carry out the terms ef the statute under or by which the society
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry
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out duties placed on them by the statutes authorisint! their unctertakings.
A mandamus would also lie against a company_ constituted bv a statute
for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities. [778 H-779 CJ
In the present case the company being a non-statutory body and one
incorporated under the Companies Act there was neither a statutory nor
a pubJic duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement
could be sought bY means of a 1nanda1nus nor \\!JS there in its workmen
B
any corresponding right for enforcement of any such statutory or public
duty. The High Court therefore was right in holding that no writ petition
fo'r a mandarnus or an

## Text

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773
PRAGA TOOLS CORPORATION
v.
SHRI C. A. IMANUAL & ORS.
February 19, 1969
[J. M. SliELAT AND V. BHARGAVA, JJ.]
Constitution ol India, Art. 226--Wrlt of mandamus whether can be
iuued against a company-High Court holding petition under Art. 226 to
be misconceived but still granting declaration to some petitioner1 that
action of company agt;·inst them was illegal-Competence of High Court
to pass such order,
The appellant was a company registered under the Companies Act,
1913. At the material time 56% ol its shares were held by the Union
Government, 32% by the Andhra Pradesh Government. and 12% by
private iJ:>dividuals. On July 1, 1961 a settlement was arrived at between
the company and the workmen's union under which the workmen inter
alia agreed to observe industrial truce for a period of three years i.e.
upto July 1, 1964 and not to resort to strikes, stoppage of work or go·
Blow tactics.
On December 10, 1962 the company and the said union
entered into a supplementary settlement under which the company agreed
not to retrench or lay-off any of the workmen during the said period of
truce.
The said two settlements were arrived at and recorded in the
presence of the Commissioner of Labour under s. 2(p) and s. 18(1) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
were to
be in force as aforesaid
until July 1, 1964. On December 20, 1963, however, the company en·
tered into another agreement with the said union.
The effeCtt of this
agreement was to enable the company
notwithstanding
the two earlier
llC!tlements to carry out retrenchment of 92 of the workmen with effect·
from January 1, 1964. Some of the affected workmen filed a writ petition
under -Art. 226 of the Censtitution μraying
for
a writ of mllndamus
against the company restraining it from giving effect to the said agreement. The Single Judge dismissed the petition on merits. In appeal the
Division Bench held that the company being one registered under the
Companies Act and not having any statutory duty or function to perform
was no~ one again·st which a writ μetition for mandamus or any other Writ
could be .. No such petition could also lie against the conciliation officer
who had signed the agreement, as on the facts of the case it was not he
who sought to implement the agreement.
The Division Bench however
held th~! th.ough the writ petition was not maintainable it could grant a
declarallon. m favour of. three of the petitioners that the impugned agree·
men! was dlega) and void. The competency of the High Court to make
such a dectaratton was challenged by the company . in appeal before this
Court.
HELD : ! i) The c<;>n~ition precedent to the issue of a mandamllJ'
jg
that there IS m one clatmmg it a legal right to the performance of a legal
duty by one against. whom it is sought. An order of mandamllJ' is, in
form! .a co~mand directed to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal
reQwri~g him .or them. to do a particular thing therein specified which
!'ppertams to hIS or •theil' office and is in the nature of a public duty. It
IS however .no~ necessary that the person or authority on whom the statu·
tory duty IS n~posed need be a public official or an official body.
A
"'f"'damllJ' can issue, for instance, to an official of a sbcioty to compel
him to carry out the terms ef the statute under or by which the society
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry
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out duties placed on them by the statutes authorisint! their unctertakings.
A mandamus would also lie against a company_ constituted bv a statute
for the purposes of fulfilling public responsibilities. [778 H-779 CJ
In the present case the company being a non-statutory body and one
incorporated under the Companies Act there was neither a statutory nor
a pubJic duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement
could be sought bY means of a 1nanda1nus nor \\!JS there in its workmen
B
any corresponding right for enforcement of any such statutory or public
duty. The High Court therefore was right in holding that no writ petition
fo'r a mandarnus or an order in the nature of niandanuts could lie against
the company. [779 0-El
Sohan Lal v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 738, Regina v. Industrial
Court & Ors., [ 19651 l Q.B. 377, R. v. Lewisham Union. [18971 I Q.B.
498, 501, Mc. Clelland v. Northern
Irelan,/ General Health
Servica
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Boards, (1951) l W.L.R. 594, Ridge v. Bc/dwin. [19641 A.C. 40. Short v.
Poole Corooration, [1926], Ch. 66 at pp. 90 to 91 and Attorney-General v.
St. Ives R.D.C. [1961] l Q.B. 366, referred to.
(ii) The High Court was ho\vever in error in granting the declaration
in favour of the thr·'e workmen. [781 A]
Once the writ petition was hetd to be misconceived on the ground that
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it could not lie against a compafly which was neither a statutory company
nor oae having public duties or responsibilities imposed on it by statute,
no reiief by way of .a declaration as to the invalidity of an impugned
agreemt"nt Mtween it and its employees could be granted. The only course
open to the High Court was to dismiss the petition and leave the workmen
to tho remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act. [780 F-HJ
Bldi, Bidi Leaves' Gnd Tobacco Merchants Association
v.
State of
E
Bom.bzy, [19621 Suvl'· l S.C.R. 381 and A. B. Abdulkadir v. State o/
Kuala. [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 741, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No. 612 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 16, 1965 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal
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No. 37 of 1964.
S. V. Gupte and R. Thiagarajan, for the appellant.
Janardan Sharma, for respondents Nos. 1 and 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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Shelat, J.
The Fraga Tools Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as the Company) is a company incorpotated under
the Indian Companies Act, 1913.
At the material time however, the Union Government and the Government of Andhra
Pradesh between them held 56% and 32% of its shares respectively and the balance of 12 % shares were hel~ by private
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individuals.
Being the largest shareholder, the Umon Government had the power to nominate the company's directors. Even
so, being registered under the Companies Act and governed by
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PRAGA TOOLS CORP. v. !MANUAL (Shelat, J.)
775 -
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the provisions of that Act, the company is a separate le,gal entity
and cannot be said to be either a Government corporation or an
indUJtry run by or under the authority of the Union Government.
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At the material time there were two rival workmen's u.mons
in the company, the Praga Tools Employees Union and ·the
Praga Tools Corporation Mazdoor Sabha (hereinafter referred to
as the union and the sabha respectively).
On July 1, 1961 n
settlement was arrived at between the company and the said
union under which the wnrkmen inter alia agreed to observe
indUJtrial truce for a period of three years and not to resort to
strikes, stoppage of work or go-slow tactics. On December
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1962 the company and the said union entered into a supplemen-
!Ary settlement under which the company agreed not to retrench
or lay-off any of the workmen during the said period of truce
on an assurance from the said union of coope·ation and willingness of the workmen to carry out alternative tasks assigned to
them even if they were in a slightly lower cadre without loss of
emoluments.
The said two settlements were arrived
at
and
recorded in the presence of the Commissioner of Labour under
ss. 2(p) and 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
were to be in force as aforesaid until July 1, 1964. On December 20, 1963, however, the company entered into an agreement
with the said union to which the said sabha was not a party.
The agreement recited that there were several disputes between
the company and the union and that s0me of them were
the
subject-matter of concHiatioin proceedings and some were
pending arbitration or adjudication. Clause ( 1) provided that
the said agreements dated July !, 1961 arid December 10, 1962
to the extent that they were inconsistent with this a 'reement would stand automatically repealed or modified by. this
agreement. Clause ( 6) stated that there was an immediate, unavoidable need for reducing substantially the overhead expenditure of the company and for effecting economy and therefore
notwithstanding the agreement dated December 10, 1962 "both
the parties have preriared a list of the categories and persons who
would be retrenched after car~ful consideration''.
The said list
was attached to the agreement as annexure VI. Clause (6) also
provided that the agreement dated December 10, 1962
stood
modified so as to allow the said retrenchment to take olacc
immediately in accordance with law.
The clause further· nrovided that in order to mitigate the consequences of the pronosed
retrenchment the company had evolved a scheme of voluntary
retirement with terminal benefits suoerior to
those
provided
under the Industrl•.1 Disnutes Act, but the r.cheme of Voluntary
retirement would be available to the workmen only for a period
of 10 days from the date ot the agreement. It further provided
776
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
that the company ll\nd the said union had agreed that an attempt
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would be made to rehabilitate the retrenched persons by helping
them to obtain alternative employment and the company had for
that purpose contacted public sector and other industries
and
in particular the Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi
for
absorption as far as possible of the retrenched personnel.
The
effect of this agreement was to enable the company, notwithB
standing the two earlier settlements, to carry out retrenchment of
92 workmen mentioned in annexure VI thereto with effect from
January I, 1964.
Respondent I and 40 other workmen thereupon filed a writ
petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
challenging the validity of the said agreement impleading therein the company, the said union and the Regional Assistant Commissioner
as
respondents.
The petition claimed a writ of
mandamm or an order in the nature of mandamus or any other
order or direction restraining the respondents to implement or
enforce the said agr~cmcnt. The writ pe•ition was in the first
instance heard by u learned Sin:_!ie Judge of th~ High
Court
before whom the ·workmen raised the fo!lowin~ contentions :
(I) that the said agreement dated December 20.
1963
was
invalid as it was entered into by the unbn in collusion with the
company and was in violation of the said two earlier settlements,
(2) that there could be no industrial dispute within the m~an
ing of s. 2(k) of the Act as the said two earlier settlements,
not having been terminated under s. 19(2) were in force, that
therefore there could not be a valid conciliation under s. 12 and
accordingly the fact of the conciliation officer having signed the
impugned agreement gave no binding force to it, (3) that the
retrenchment of the 92 workmen was illel!al and void as it wa~
in hreach of s. 25 <Fl inasmuch as no notice thereof was ~iven
to the anpropriate Government. and ( 4) that the comoany b~ing
under the manaqement of the Union Government, the
annropriate Government in regard to the disnute was
the Central
Government and nnt the State Gove"!lment •nd conseauent1v the
imouqned ai?reemerit which was signed bv the cl)nciliation rffi~er
appo:nted by the State Government was not vali•l anrl no ret' enchment could validly be effected under the force of such agreement.
The learned Single Judge ne·gatived these contentions holdinii that the comnanv wa~ neither an industry run by or unrler
the authority of the Union Government nor under its management but being a comoanv re~istered under the Companies Act
the annrooriate, Government was the State Government. He also
held that there was no nroof of the said union having entered
into the imoup.ned a!!reement in collusion with the companv. He
further held that the union hy its letter dated April 5, 1963.
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PRAGA TOOLS CORP. v. !MANUAL (She/at, I.)
777
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had raised an industrial dispute and had thereby requested that
the question of retrenchment should be
settled
between
the
parties, that the said dispute with
t~e. c?nsent of the comp~~y
and the union was brought for conc1hat1on before the conc1hation officer and that the
impugned
agreement,
having been
brought obout in the course of the said conciliation proceeding~,
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was binding o.n all workmen including the petitioners in the writ
petition despite the fact that they were members of the sabha
and not of the union. In this view the learned Single Judge
held that it was not necessary for him to decide the preliminary
objection
raised by the
company that no writ petition for a
mandamus could lie against it.
He dismissed the writ oetition
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on merits on the basis of the aforesaid findings given by him.
28 out of the said 41 workmen who had filed the writ petition
filed a letters patent apoeal a~ainst the said
judgment.
The
Division Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal held :
( l) that since the dispute relating to the company's right to
retrenchment was already sett1e1 under s. 18 (I )
by the said
supp!ementary settlement of December I 0, 1952. no industrial
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dispute could be said to exist or arise until the said sett'ement
was dulv terminated under s. 19(2), that therefore there could
be no valid conciliation oroceedings in respect of the ouestioo of
retrenchment and that the impu~ned all-cement permitting
the
com'>anv to retrench. though it bore the signoture of the conciliation officer, was not a valid agreement: (2) that so ]l)ng as
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the earlier settlements were not terminated th~v held the field, and
(3) tha• the sai~ JP-tter dated Aoril 5.
1963 relied on bv the
learn~<! Sin~Je J"dge as having rai•ed
an
in~usHal <lisputc
rezardinll retrenchment did not in fact C011tain or raise anv such
question.
The D;vision Bench held that the said Jetter raised
onlv the ouestion o' revision of wage-structure and other demonds
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bnt n~t the ouestin., of retrenchment. The le't~r of Ju•v 29,
191i1 of the c~dia•ion oftke- fl) the com,,anv relied on bv the
cl)m'>•n" also ,.,.ferre-< to the, deman.J, containei in the sa;d Jetter
of Anr;I 5, 1963. nomely, the revision. cf wage-structi1re. tle•rness allowance. nro!'l()tlon and ('lther m•tters. hut not the question
of the commnv•, ri<?ht of retren~hment. The o;visicm Bencb
therefore held that there was nothing on reco-d to show
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retrenchment was t'1e subject-m"tter of anv c~udliation befo·1
the conciliation officer and therefore anv ~~P-ement conferrini
on the comoanv the rfoht to retrench so '""" ·a, the said e~·lie1
s;•.tl•!Jlent• were not terrninMe~ was invalid ;,., snite of •h• con·
c1li~t1on nffic~r havl,,.,'! ~iven his assent ti) •nd affi~e-l his •i<!M.,Jre
on it. '!'he Jearne<l Tu<l~es. hl)wever. held that the comn•nv ~ing
ff
one re11istered uncler the Comnanies Act an.J
nnt
!revi'1~ •nv
statu!orv ~~IV or function to nerforrn wa• not one again•t. whie.h
a writ pet!tton for a m.an-famur or anv other writ coul<! lie. No
such petition could also lie against the conciliation officer as on
.
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778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
the facts of the case that officer did not have to implement the
impugned agreement. The Division Bench, however, held that
though the writ petition was not mairitainable it could grant a
declaration iiIJ. favour of three workmeq, namely, appellants 6,
16 and 25 before it, that the impugned agreement was ·illegal
and void and dismissed the writ petition subject to the said declaration. The company challenges in this appeal by special leave
the va1idity of this judgment making such a declaration .
. Thus the only question which arises in this appeal is whether
in the view that it took that the writ petition was not maintainable against the company the High Court could still grant the
said declaration.
In our view the High Court was correct in holding that the
writ petition filed under Art. 226 claiming against the company
mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus was misconceived and noi maintainable. The writ obvi~usly was claimed
against the company and not against the conciliation officer in
respect of any public or statutory duty imposed on him by the
Act as it was not he but the company who sought to implement
the impugned agreement. No doubt, Art. 226 provides that every
High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority
orders :wd writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus.
mandamus etc., or any of them for the enforcement of any of the
rights conforred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other
purpose.
But it is well understood that a mandamus lies
to
secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it. has a sufficient
legal interest.
Thus, an application for mandamus will not lie
for an order of restatement to an office which is essentially of a
private character nor can such an application be maintained to
secure performance of obligations owed by a comp~iny towards
its workmen or to resolve any private dispute. (see Sohan Lal v.
Union of India)(').
Jin Regina v.olndustrial Court & Ors.(')
mandamus was refused against the Industrial court though set up
under the Industrial Courts Act, 1919 on the ground that the
reference for arbitration made to it by a minister was not one
under the Act but a private reference.
"This CoUrt has never
exercised a general power" said Bruce, J., in R. v. Lewisham
Union(') "to enforce th.e perfomiance of their statutory duties
by public bodies on the application of anybody who chooses to
apply for a mandamus. It has always required that the applicant
for a mandamus should have a legal and a specific right to enforce
the perforrnnce of those duties". Therefore, ~e ~ndition ~re7e
de11t for the issue of mandamus is that there ts m one claunmg
(1) [l957J s.c.R. 738.
(2) [\965J 1Q.tl.377.
(3) (\897] \ Q.ll. 498, 501.
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PRAG· 'fOOLS CORP. v. !MANUAL (Shelat, /.)
779
it a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by one against
whom it is sought. An order of mandamus is, in form, a command
directed to a person, corporation or an inferior trib~l requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which
appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public
duty. It is, however, not necessary that the person or the auth<;>-
rity on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public
official or an official body.
A mandamus can issue, for im!ani;e,
to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms
of the statute unde~ or by which the socie•y is constituted or
governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out
duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertakings.
A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purposes oi fulfilling public resp<ll!ISibilities.
(cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, (3rd ed.) Vol.
II, p. 52 and onwards).
The company being a non-statutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act there was neither a statutory nor
a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcemeint could be sought by means of a mandamus, nor was
there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty.
The High Court,
therefore, was right in holding that no writ petition for a mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus could lie against the
company.
The grievance o.f the company, however, is that though the
High Court held rightly that .no such petition was maintainable,
it nevertheless granted a declaration in favour of three of the
said workmen, a declaratiqn which it could not issue once it
held that the said writ petition was misconceived.
The argument was that such a declaration, if at all, could only issue against
public bodies or companies or corporations set up or controlled
by statutes in respect of acts done by them contrary to or in
breach of the provisions of such statutes. If a public authority
purports to dismiss ain employee otherwise than in accordance
with mandatory procedural requirements or on grounds other
~!II! those sanction~d by the stat~te the courts would have ill!1sd1ction to declare its act a nullity. Thus, where a Hospital
Services' Board dismissed a clerk for reasons not authorised by
the relevant ccmditions of service a declaration was granted to the
applicant by the House of Lords. (Mc. Clelland v. Northern [re-
/and General Health Services Boards)('). Even
where
the
statutory power of dismissal is not made subject to express procedural requirements or limited to prescribed grounds courts have
granted a declaration that it was invalidly exercised if the autho0 l [1957] I W.L.R. 594.
"780
SUPREME COURT :REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.IL
rity has failed to observe rules of natural justice or has acted
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capriciously or in bad faith or for impliedly unauthorised purposes.
(see Ridge v. Baldwin(') and Short v. Poole Corpora1ion)(2). Declarations of invalidity have often been founded
on successful assertions that a public duty has not been complied
with. (see Attorney-General v. St. Ives R.D.C.) (3). It is, therefore, fairly clear that such a declaration can be issued against a
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person or an authority or a corporation where the impugned act
is in violation of or contrary to a statute under which it is set up
or governed or a public duty or responsibility imposed on such
person, authority or body by such a statute.
The High Court, however, relied on two decisions of this
Court as justifyiing it to issue the said declaration. The two
decisions are Bidi, Bidi Leaves' and Tobacco Merchants Ass0ciation v. The State of Bomba,v(') and A. B. Abdulkadir v.
The
State of Kera/a ( "). But neither of these two decisions is a parallel case which could be relied on. In the first case, the declaration was granted not against a company, as i~ the present case,
but against the State Govel1lUilent and the declaration was as regards the invalidity of certain clauses of a notification issued by
the Government in pursuance of power under s. 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 on the ground that the said clauses were
beyond the purview of that section. In the second case also,
certai.n rules made under the Cochin Tobacco Act of
1081
(M.E.) and the Travancore Tobacco Regulation of 1087 (M.E.)
were declared void ab initio. These cases were therefore not
~ases where writ petitions were held to be not maintainable as
having been filed against a company and despite that fac~ a declaration of invalidity of an impual!].ed agreement having been grantc
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In our view once the writ petition was held to be misconceived on the ground that it could not lie against a company .
which was neither a statutory company nor one having public
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duties or responsibil,ities imposed on it by a statute, no relief by
way of a declaration as to invalidity of an impugned agreement
between it and its employees could be granted. The High Court
in these circumstances ougl!t to have left the wo-kmen to resort
to the remedy available to them under the !industrial Disputes Act
by raising ·an industrial dispute thereunder. The ooly course left
open to the High Court was therefore to dismiss it.
No such
declaration against a company re!!istered under the Companies
Act and not set up under any statute or having any public duities
and responsibilities to perform under such a statute could be
issued in writ proceedings in respect of an agreement which was
il-ntially of a private character between it and its workmen. The
(I) [l%4] A.C. 40.
(2) [1921] Ch. 66 at PP. 90 to 91.
(3) (1961] I Q.B. 366.
(4) (1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 381.
(S) [\962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 741.
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PRAGA TOOLS CORP. v. !MANUAL (She/at, J.)
781
High Court, therefore, was in error in granting the said declaration.
·
The result is that the appeal must ~ allowed and the said
declaration set aside.
~ the circumstances of the case we make
no order as to costs.
B G.C.
Appeal allowed.