# PRAMATHA NATH TALUQDAR v. SAROJ RANJAN SARKAR - **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 297 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1959-04-03 - **Bench:** S. K. DAs, J. L. Kapur, M. HmAYA'fULLAH - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pramatha-nath-taluqdar-v-saroj-ranjan-sarkar-2610 - **Pages:** 70 ## Headnote Criminal .Comp taint-Scope ojenquiry-Secmid complaint on same facts but fresh evidence-When ca" be entertained-- Exceptional circumstances-Manifest error-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), as. 200, 202, 203, 204-0riminal Matter-Special Bench-Validity of Constitution-Calcutta High Court (Appellate) RukB-Sanction-Abetment by conspiracy-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1891 (Act 5 of 1898), s. J96A-lndian Penal Gode, 1860 (XLV of 1860), ss. 107, 109, 120A, 12CB. On March 17, 1954, Promode Ranjan a brother of N. R. Sarkar filed a complaint under s. 200 Code of Criminal Procedure against Pramathanath and S. M. Basu alleging offences punishable under ss. 467, 471 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, before the Chief Presidency Magistrate in respect of a document appointing Pramathanath as the Managing Director of N. R. Sarkar & Co. and the minutes of the Board meeting resolving the same. It was alleged therein that me signatures of N. R. Sarkar on 11..- documents were forgeries. After considering the evidence of the Handwriting Expert the Magistrate dismissed the complaint. Promode Ranjan preferred a revision petition to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision Petition. By an application dated January 6, 1956, when the revision petition was pen<;ling, attention of the High Court was. drawn to the fact that the minutes dated January 16, 1948, had been typed on· a letter bearing at the top in print "Telephc>ne City 6091" where as the City Exchange had not come into existence till December 1948. The Supreme Court granted special leave against the dismissal of the revision petition by the High Court but the appeal was withdrawn. On April 3, 1959, Saroj Ranjan, another brother of N.R.Sarkar, laid a complaint on the same facts and ail~tions Ifill The Poolrari Fakir Bad .. a.rlh;y of Bondillrpuram v. The Commissioner, Hindu. Reli1ious anti Charitable Endownunts Raghuhor Da;yal J. 1'6J Dicnnber 2 t "" Pr•oluN.ih Tollll/tlar •. s..; Raja .Satiar 298 SUPR.EKE COURT REPORTS [1962] SOPP. agaimt the appellants, in addition alleging the further fact about the City Exchange in support of the allegation that the minutes were forged dishonestly and fraudulently and wed as genuine. Neither in this complaint nor before the High Court had it been stutd as to when it came to be known that on the purported date of the minutes the City Exchange was not in existence. The Presidency Magistrate issued pcOCCM against the appellants. The appellants went up in reruion to the Hiirh Court. The matter was first heard by a Division Bench and was later referred to a larger Bench of three Judges which dimiissed the revision petition. In these appcab on special leave it .was contended by the appellants that the second complaint ought not to have been entertained, that the· constitution of the special Bench was illegal and that as the complaint alleged criminal conspiracy sanction under s. I 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required. Held, that the enquiry contemplated by ss. 200 to 204, Code of Criminal Procedure is for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate to find out if sufficient grounds exist for issuing prc»:ess. V adilal Pa~hUB complaint on the •ame allegations has been dismissed under 1. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But a oecond complaint containing more or less the same allegations can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. It is not possible nor desirable that the exceptional circumstances must be stated with particularity or precision. Generally speaking, the exceptional circumstances may be classified under three categoric•: (1) manifest err6r in the earlier procreding, (2) resulting miJcarriage of justice ## Text _Characters 0–39,895 of 139,094. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39895 for what follows._ 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT' REPORTS 297 restore the order of the District Judge, Vizagapa· tam, setting aside the order of the Board dated March 28, l!J4 7. Appeal allowed. PRAMATHA NATH TALUQDAR v. SAROJ RANJAN SARKAR (S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR, and M. HmAYA'fULLAH JJ.) Criminal .Comp taint-Scope ojenquiry-Secmid complaint on same facts but fresh evidence-When ca" be entertained-- Exceptional circumstances-Manifest error-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), as. 200, 202, 203, 204-0riminal Matter-Special Bench-Validity of Constitution-Calcutta High Court (Appellate) RukB-Sanction-Abetment by conspiracy-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1891 (Act 5 of 1898), s. J96A-lndian Penal Gode, 1860 (XLV of 1860), ss. 107, 109, 120A, 12CB. On March 17, 1954, Promode Ranjan a brother of N. R. Sarkar filed a complaint under s. 200 Code of Criminal Procedure against Pramathanath and S. M. Basu alleging offences punishable under ss. 467, 471 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, before the Chief Presidency Magistrate in respect of a document appointing Pramathanath as the Managing Director of N. R. Sarkar & Co. and the minutes of the Board meeting resolving the same. It was alleged therein that me signatures of N. R. Sarkar on 11..- documents were forgeries. After considering the evidence of the Handwriting Expert the Magistrate dismissed the complaint. Promode Ranjan preferred a revision petition to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision Petition. By an application dated January 6, 1956, when the revision petition was pen<;ling, attention of the High Court was. drawn to the fact that the minutes dated January 16, 1948, had been typed on· a letter bearing at the top in print "Telephc>ne City 6091" where as the City Exchange had not come into existence till December 1948. The Supreme Court granted special leave against the dismissal of the revision petition by the High Court but the appeal was withdrawn. On April 3, 1959, Saroj Ranjan, another brother of N.R.Sarkar, laid a complaint on the same facts and ail~tions Ifill The Poolrari Fakir Bad .. a.rlh;y of Bondillrpuram v. The Commissioner, Hindu. Reli1ious anti Charitable Endownunts Raghuhor Da;yal J. 1'6J Dicnnber 2 t "" Pr•oluN.ih Tollll/tlar •. s..; Raja .Satiar 298 SUPR.EKE COURT REPORTS [1962] SOPP. agaimt the appellants, in addition alleging the further fact about the City Exchange in support of the allegation that the minutes were forged dishonestly and fraudulently and wed as genuine. Neither in this complaint nor before the High Court had it been stutd as to when it came to be known that on the purported date of the minutes the City Exchange was not in existence. The Presidency Magistrate issued pcOCCM against the appellants. The appellants went up in reruion to the Hiirh Court. The matter was first heard by a Division Bench and was later referred to a larger Bench of three Judges which dimiissed the revision petition. In these appcab on special leave it .was contended by the appellants that the second complaint ought not to have been entertained, that the· constitution of the special Bench was illegal and that as the complaint alleged criminal conspiracy sanction under s. I 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required. Held, that the enquiry contemplated by ss. 200 to 204, Code of Criminal Procedure is for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate to find out if sufficient grounds exist for issuing prc»:ess. V adilal Pa~hUB complaint on the •ame allegations has been dismissed under 1. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But a oecond complaint containing more or less the same allegations can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. It is not possible nor desirable that the exceptional circumstances must be stated with particularity or precision. Generally speaking, the exceptional circumstances may be classified under three categoric•: (1) manifest err6r in the earlier procreding, (2) resulting miJcarriage of justice, and C'l new facts which the complainant had no knowledge of or could not with reason• able diligence have brought forward in the previous proceedings. Where the previous order of dismissal was passed on an incomplete record or on a miJunderstanding of the r.aturc of the complaint, a oecond complaint may be entertained. Where a Magistrate misdirects himself as to the scope of an enquiry under s. 202, Code of. Criminal Procedure, and the mistake, made gives a wrong direction to the whole proceeding on the first complaint, the order of dismissal pas•ed thereon would be due to a m4nifcst error resulting in a miscarriage of justice. In such a case, a second complaint is entertainable. .. • •. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 299 Per Kapur and Hidayatullah, JJ.--There is no legal bar to the ent~rtainability of a second complaint. It is only when the Magistrate had misdirected himself, with regard to the scope of the enquiry under s. 203, Code of Criminal Procedure, or has passed an order misunderstanding the nature of the complaint or the order is manifestly unjust or absurd or the order is based on an incomplete record, can it be said that_ there is such a manifest error or a manifest miscarriage of justice that a second complaint on the same allegations may be ente1 tained. The other exceptional circumstances in which a second complaint may be ente1tained is when it is supported by fresh and further evidence. Case,law referred to. In the case of fresh evidence it must be such as could not have been with due diligence on the part of the complaint adduced on the earlier occJsion. Queen Empress v. Dole GobinJ,a Das I.L.R. 28 Cal. 211, Du·arkanath Mandal v. Daniradha Banerjee, I.L.R, 28 Cal. 692 (F .B.), disapproved. Allah Ditta v. Karam Bakshi, 12 Lah. 9 Ram Narain Cho1ed/auy v. Punac/1andJain, A.l.R. 1949 Pat. 255, Hansabai .v. Ananda, A.LR. 1949 Born. 384 and Dorais1cami v. Subramania, A.I. R. 1918 Mad. 484, approved. In the present case permitting the second co1nplaint to proceed would be a gross abuse of process. Htld, further, concurring with S.K. Das, J ., that the Special Bench was properly constituted. Per S. K. Das, J.-On the first complaint the Presidency Magistrate had misdirected himself regarding the scope of the enquiry under ss. 203 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was a manifest error. The facts about the City Exchange urged and fresh evidence were decisive of a prima facie case for issuing process and it was an exceptional circumstance justifying entertaining the second complaint and not to permit the trial of the case in such circumstances would be a denial of justice. K-umariah v. U. Naicker, A.J.R. 1946 Mad, 167 and Ramanand v. Sh,,,.;, I.L.R. ! 56 All 425, referred :o. Though Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court (Appellate Sid~) in terms applies to Civil cases, their substance could. L~ applied to criminal cases by the Chief Justice in const 1tuung a larger bench. The substance of the allegations in the complaint amounted to an offence of abetment by conspiracy under 1961 Pramal/ia Nath r aluqdar v. Saroj R 1nj in Sar'/ear 1961 P101Mlho Nath Toluqchir •• 841oj Rujan s,11<,, Du J, 300 SUPREME COURT REFORTS [1962] SUPP. s. 107 Indian Penal Code and not tte offence of Criminal Conspiracy as defined bys. 120A and the1efore •sanction under a. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not necessary. The distinction between the two offences lies in that the first rrquircs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement whereas the second makes the agreement to do the unlawful act itself punishable. Baairul Jiaq v. Slate of lr•st li ' • 2 S.C,R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~303 The appeal was accordingly withdrawn on March 12, 1959. Then, within about 22 days of that order, Saroj Ranjan Sarkar filed the complaint wkich has given 'rise to the present proceedings. For convenience and brevity, I shall refer to Promode Ranjan Sarkar's complaint as the first complaint and Saroj Ranjan Sarka.r's as the second complaint. It is necess&ry here to give a little more of the background history of the second complaint. As stated earlier, the late Nalini Ranjan .Sarkar was a well-known person in Bengal. He was the Governing or Managing Director of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd., which managed several public limited companies, such as, Hindusthan Development Corporation Ltd., Hindusthan Heavy Chemicals Ltd., and Hindusthan Pilkington Glass Works Ltd. He was also closely connected with the Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., of• which he held a large number of shares. On January 4, 1948 he obtained leave of absence from the Directors of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. for a period of one year with a view to joining the Mini3try in West Bengal and he assumed office as Finance Minister of the West Bengal Governmeriton January 23, 19+8. Later, the leave granted to him for one year was extended. He owned 4ti49 shares of N: R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. Pramatha Nath Talukdar, who was a paid employee of the Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. np to the end of July, 1953 was also a Director of N. R. Sirkar & Co. Ltd. He held 299 shares of the said company. Promode Rajan Sarkar held 50 shares. Santi Ranjan Sarkar; son of a deceased brother of Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, held one share. Thus, it would appear that Nalini Ranjan Sarkar was the owner of the largest number of shares of N. R. Sarkar & Co., Ltd., and for all practical purposes he controlled the affairs of that company. On July 31, 1951 Nalini Ranjan Sarkar executed a deed of trust in respect of 3649 shares out of the 19111 Parmath" N.th Taluqd01 v. Saroj RanjtJn Sar.' ar DasJ. ,951 Pr..,.u.. Kalli TaJ"'I®' ••• Stuo.f Rottjan Sarbr t:•as J. S04 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. shares held by hitn in N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. By the said trust-deed he · appointed Promode Ranjan Sarkar, Pramathe. Nath Talukdar e.nd Narendra Nath Law as the· trustees; but the beneficiaries under the trust-deed were his four brothers, namely, Promode Re.njan Sarkar, Pabitra Ranjan Sarkar, Prafulla Ranjan Sarkar and Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, as also Santi Ranjan Sarkar, the son of a deceased brother. It 'llas alleged that the balance of 1000 shares held by Nalini Ranjan Sarkar was kept in custody with Pramatha Nath Te.lukdar and according to the case of the complaine.nt, these she.res were kept in . depoeit with Pramatha Nath Talukdar for tht benefit of the complainant and this brothers. Nalini Ranjan Sarkar died on January 25, 1953. It W88 alleged that a few days after the funeral re forged. The main allegations in the first and second complaints related to three documents and were to the effect "that in order to assume complete control over N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. and the concerns under its managing agency, the accused persons entered into a criminal conspiracy with one another and others unknown, to dishonestly and fraudulently forge a deed of agreement, a deed of transfer and make a false document, to wit, minute book ofN. R. 1farkar & Co. Ltd. andin pursuance thereof dishonestly and fraudulently forged and or ca.used to be forged and used as genuine the said documents". It will be noticed that three documents were stated to have been forged, and they were-- (1) An unregistered deed of agreement purpor· ting to have been executed by the late Nalini Ra'njan Sarkar as Governing Director of N. R. l:larkar & Co. Ltd. on January 19, 1948 appointing :rramatha Nath Talukdar as the Managing Director of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. on a remmuneration of Rs. 1500-100-2000 per month. This document bore 19~1 Pramathti Nath Taiuqdar •• S111oj &l!jan S""'° Dos J. lgfl fT(fffttzfM N•tA To/Ul/i/Jr v. s.,.i R .. J•• s.,,_ D•1J. 306 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. the signature of Saurindra Mohan Basu as a witue88 attesting the ~ignature of Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, which signature was stated to have been forged. (2) A transfer deed in reBpt>ct of 1000 shares ofN. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. which were said to ha'l'e been entrusted to Pramatha Nath Tal11kdar, transferring them to the Ia~ter for and alleg<'d consideration of rupees one )ao purporting to have been executed by the late Nalini Ranjan ~arkar on February 5,1951 with Saurindra Mohan Basu as the attesting witness both for the transferor and the transferee. (3) Minutes of the proceedings of the Board meeting of N.R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. dated January 16, 1948 purporting to bear the signature of the late Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and containing s resolution to the effect that the Governing Director approvt>d of a draft agreement of appointment between the Company and Pramatha Nath Talnkdar for appointing the latter as Managing Director of the Company and that the Board of Directors approved of the said draft agreement. Of the aforesaid three documents the one relating to the alleged transfer of 1000 shares referred to as (2) above, is the subject of a separate suit stated to be now pending in the Calcutta High Court. That document is not, therefore, directly the subject matter of the second complaint. As to the unregistered deed of agreem"nt referred to es ( 1) above, it may bo stated that the original document could not be later found, and on b~half of the appellants and other accused p<>rsons it was stated that the document was not in.thdr posses· sion or control. As statPd earlier, Promode Ranjan Sarkar had obtained a photostatic copy of the rele. vant portions of the document. As to this dcicu· mcnt the main e.Jlege.tion of the complainant was that it was engrossed on a rupee stamp·paper whirh had been iaeued, on renewal, in the name of P.D. Himatsinghka & Co., a firm of soliciters in Calcutta ... 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 307 and evidence was led at the enquiry into the first complaint that the paper was stolen from that firm and furthermore that the signature on the document purporting to be that of Na!ini Ranjan Sarkar was not his signature at all. With regard to the minutes of the proceedings dat~d January 16, 1948 the allegation was that the minutes were typed on a sheet of paper bearing the letter-head N.R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. with telephone number "City 6091" printed thereon; but the City Exchange did not come into existence .untill December, 1948 and the telephone connection relating to number "City 6091" was· obtained for the first time by the Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. on or about March 18, 1949; and therefore the paper with ti.e letter-head N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. with telephone number "City 6091" printed thereon could not have been in existence on the alleged date of the proceeding of the Board of Directors, namely January 16, 19!8. In the second complaint certain other circumstances wPre also alleged in support of the allegation that the unregistered dPed of agreement dated January 19, 1948 and the minutes of the proceedings dated January, 16, 1948 were forged. It is, however, unnecessary to refer to those circumstances in detail here. 'Ihe learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Shri Bijayesh Mukherjee, who dealt with the second complaint considered all the relevant materials and came to the following conclusions: (1) there was no delay in making the second complaint, if one had regard to the ciroumstances which led to the firet complaint and the withdrawal of the appeal in the Supreme Court on March 12, 1959 arising out of the order made on the first complaint; (2) the dismissal of the first complaint and the applic iti.m in revision arising therefrom by Debabrata Mookerjee, J. did not, as a matter oflaw, 19111 Pramatha Naf./z Taluqdar •• 8 jTOj Ranjan sa,kar DasJ. 1951 PtanurlMN•IA TollJl/hr y, s....; Rcti .. Bua Doi J •. 308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19~2] SUPP. operate as a. ba.r to the entertainment of the second complaint. (3) the second complaint wa.e not an attempt a.t blackmail; a.nd (4) the relevant materials in the record showed prima facie tha.t the minutes of the proceedings dated January 16, 1948 were forged and so a.lso tho unregistered deed of agreement dated January, 19, 1948. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate then ea.id : "Prima facie, I am satisfied about the truth pf the allegations the complaint makes. That a.pa.rt, the complaint is for an offence triable bv a Court of lfCSSions. And the ma.teria.le I e~e before me a.re euoh a.s in my opinion may lead a reasonable body of men to believe the truth thereof. Judged so, there is in my opinion sufficient ground for proceedin~ within the meaning of seotion 20! of the procedure Code. On the question a.e to whioh of the fou~ accused persons against whom prooesa should i11S11e, the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate oame to the oonclusion that there was a prima f acie case Against two of the acoueed persons only, namely, Prams.th& Nath Talukdar and Saurindra Mohan Basu. Saurindra Mohan Basu, it may be stated here, was a solicitor of N.R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. and had attested the signature of Nalini Ranj11n Sarkar on the unregistered deed of agreement. The !tl&rned Chief Presidency Magistrate h<'ld that there was no sufficient ground for pruct edinga against the other two aocuaed persons, namely, Narendra Nath Law ana Amiya Chakravarty. Againet!the aforesaid order pf tho Chief Presidency Magistrate two applications in revision l\'ero • filed by the appellants hereir... These applications 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 309 in revision were first heard by a division Bench of two Judges of the Calcutta. High Court, P. B. Mukherjee and H. K. Bose, JJ. In view of the importance of the questions raised in the two applications in revision and some earlier decisions of the Calcutta High Court bearing on those questions to which I shall presently refer, P.B. Mukherjee, J. ca.me to the conclusion that the applications should be referred to a larger Bench to bo constituted by the Chief Justice under the rules of the Court. H.K. Bose. J. (as he then was) was inclined to take the view that the applications in revision must fail, but in deference to the views expressed by P.B. Mukherjee, J. agreed that the applications should be referred to the Chief Justice for constitu,ting a larger Bench. The matter was then referted to the learned Chief Justice, who constituted a Special Bench of three Judges to hear the two applications in revision. This ::lpecial Bench heard the two applications in revision and dismissed them by its order dated December 22/23, 1960. Three questions were agitated before the Special Bench. The first was whether the Special Bench was lawfully in seizin of the case and was competent to deal with the applications in revision. The second was whether the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance of th~ offences alleged, in the absence of a. sanction under s. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The third and the principal question was whether it was open to the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate to entertain a second complaint on the same allegations when bis predecessor bad dismissed the first complaint; and if it was open to him to entertain the second complaint should he have entertained it in the circumstances of the present case ? The Special Bench unanimusly decided these three questions against the appel· !ants and further came to the conclusion that there was no undue delay in making the second 1961 Pramatha Nath TaluqJar v. Saroj Ranjan SarkaJ Das J. 310 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1002] SUPP. IHI complaint; neither was it frivolous nor made in Pr•.iM Nol/I bad faith. It further expressed the view that it T.,._ saw no reasons to differ from the finding of the ~ s.;:.. Sa1kt.r learned Chief Presidency M 'l.gistrate that there was a prima facie ea.se against the two applla.nts. DasJ. Now, aa to the first question. Chapter II of Rules of the High Court at Calcutt& (Appellate Side) deals with the constitution and powers of the Benches of the Court. Rule l of tbe said chapter says in effect that & Division Bench for the hearing of appeals from decrees or orders of tho Subordinate Civil Courts shall consist of two or more Judges &s the Chief Justice may think fit; there is & proviso [proviso (ii)J to the rul'l which says that on the requisition of any Division Bench, or whenever he thinks fit, the Chief J nstice may appoint a special Division Bench to consist of three or more Judges for the hearing of any particular appeal, or any particular question of law a.rising in an appeal, or of the any other matter. It is clear that the rule and the provieo deal with the hearing of appeals from decrees or orders of the Subordinate Civil CourtAJ ; in other words, they deal with civil matters. Rule 9'of the same chapter deals with criminal matter and sub-r. ( l) of the said rule says that a Division Bench for the hearing of cases on appeal, reference, or revision in respect of tho sentt'nce or order of any Criminal •0ourt shall consist of two or more Judges. There is no proviso to this rule similar to tho proviso to r. l, referred to earlier, and the argument is that in the absence of such a proviso it was not open to the Division Bench consisting of Mukherjee and Bose, JJ. to refer the case back to the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench (though it was open to the Chief Justice to constitute originaily a Division Beneh of three Judges to hear the case), and iftheJudgee were equally divided in opinion, s. 429 of the Code of Criminal procedure would apply and the case had to be la.id hefore another Judge and judgment given according to the 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 311 opinion of the third Judge. I am unable to accept this argument as correct. It is clear from the rules in Chapter II that the constitution of Benches is a matter for the Chief Justice and r. 13 in Chapter II says that a Full Bench appointed for any of the purposes mentioned in Chapter VII, rr. 1 to 5, shall consi.>t of five Judges or three Judges as the Chief Justice may appoint. Now, r. 1 in Ch. VII says inrer alia that whenever one Division Bench shall differ from any other Division Bench upon a point of law or usage having the force of law, the case shall be referred for decision by a Full Bench and r. 5 says that if any such question arises in any case coming before a Di vision Bench as Court of Criminal Appeal, Hefertnce or Revision, the Court referring the the case sh11ll state the point or points on which they differ from the decision of a former Division Bench, and shall refer the ease to a Full Bench, for such orders as to such Bench seem fit. In his judgment P.B. Mukherjee, J. refer· red to two earlier decisions of the Calcutta High Court, Nilraf,anSen v. Jogesh Chandra Bhattacharia(') and Kamal Chandra Pal v. Gourchand Adhikary (') and observed that the question as to whether those decisions were good law arose in the case and he gave that as a reason for referring the case to the Chief Justice for the constitution of,a larger Bench. Even if rr.l and 5 in Chapter VII may not,strictly speaking, apply to the present case because the Division Bench consisting of Mukerjeeand Bose JJ. did not formulate the point or points on which they differed from the earlier Division Bench decisions refferred to by Mukherjee, J., I think that the principle of those rules would apply and it was open to the Chief Justice, on a reference by the Division Bench, to constitute a larger Bench to consider the case. I am also in agreement with the view expressed by the Special Bench that the ab· sence of a proviso to r. 9 in Chapter II correspon· (1) I. L, R, 23 Cal, 983. (2) (1897) J.L.R.24 Ca!.286, 1961 Pramatha Noth Taluqdar v. Ba1oj Ranjan Sar/cm DasJ. 11181 Pr-"'- NoJo TallM/k Y, 8,roj R~ion s,,f,r D•sJ. 312 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP. ding to tho proviso to r. l does not take nway the inherent power of the Chief Justice to rnfer any matter to Bench of three Judges. Sub-rule( l)uf r.11 itself provides that a Division Bench for th1; hearing of cases on appeal, reference, or revision in respect of the sontence or order of any Criminal Court shall consist of two or more Judges. Therefore, it was open to the Chief .Justice to constitute a Bench of three Judges for the hearing of tho case and in my view it made no difference whether he constituted such a ilench originally or on a reforence back by the Division Jfonch. I further think that the Chief Justice must have the inherent power to constitute a larger Bench in special circumstances. Take, for instance, a case where one Judge of th!l Division Bench feels, for a eufficient and good reason, that he should m. t hear th11 case. lt id obvious that in such a case the matter must be referred back to the Chief Justice for the constitution of another Bencil. The Chief Justice, I think, must possess such a.n inherent power in the matter of constitution of Benches and in the exercise thereof he can surely constitute a larger Bench in a. case of importance where the Division Bench hearing it considers that a question of the correctness or Otherwise of earlier Division Bench decisions of the ea.me Court will fa.II for consideration in tho case. Section 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to such a. caso because it is not a case where the Judges composing the Court arc equally divided in opinion. Rather it i~ a. case where the Judges composing the Division Bench consider that the case is one of such importance that it should be heard by a larger Bench. My conclusion, therefore, is that there wa.s nothing illegal in the Division Bench consisting of Mukherjee and Boso, JJ. referring the ca.seback to the Chief Justice ; nor was there anyting illegal in tho Chief Justice co11stituting a special Bench of 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 313 three Judges to hear the applications in revision. The special Bench constituted by the Chief Justice was IJ.wfully in seizin of the ca.se and was competent to deal with it. The objection as to the jurisdic· tion of the special Bench to hear the case was, in my opinion, rightly overruled by it. Now, as to saction, .Section l96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be read first. That section is in these terms : "l96A. No Court shall take cognizance of the offence of crimi11al conspiracy punishable under section 120B of the Indian l'enal Code. (1) in a case where the object of the conspiracy ·is to commit either an illegal act other than an offence, or a legal act by illegal means, or an effence to which the provisions of section 196 apply, unless authority from the "State Governupon complaint made by order or under authority frc·m the "State 'Government" or some officer empowered by the "State Government" in this behalf, or (2) in a case where the· object of the cons. piracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, or a cognizotble offence not punishable with death, imprisonment jQr life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the "State Government", or a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the "State Government", has, by order in writing, consented to the intiation of the proceedings: Provided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of subsection (4) of section 195 apply no such consent shall be necessary." 1961 P1amatha Nat!. T.Juqdar v, Sdf"ntioned in s. 196A, the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate could not be said to have violated the provisions of that section. The correctness of these views of the special Bench has been very seriously contested. I may make it clear at the very outset that the mandatory provisions of s. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be evaded by resorting to a mere device or camouflage. The test whether sanction is or is not necessary does not depend on mere astuteness of drafting the petition of complaint. For example, in the second petition of complaint under consideration before us the heading indicated, that the offences in re~pect of which the petition of complaint was filed were offences under ss.467, 471 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code ; but in para. 5 of the petition the allegation was that the accused persons had entered into a criminal conspiracy with one another and others unknown, to forge certain documents. It would not be .proper to decide the question of sanction merely by taking into consideration the offences mentioned in the heading or the use of the expression "criminal conspiracy" in para. 5. The proper test should be whether the allegations m:i.de in the petition of complaint disclosed primarily and essentially an offence or offences for which a consent in writing would be nece~sary" to the initiation of the proceedings within the meaning of s.196A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is from that point of view that the petition of complaint must be examined. There is another principle laid down by this Court which should be kept in mind. The allegations made in tho complaint may have more than one aspect; and may disclose more than one offence. What would be the position when some of the offences disclosed do not require any sanction while others require sanction.? This question was considered by this Court in 1961 Pramat\a Nath Taluqdr,r •• Sr.rof Ranjan 8 ar/ca Das J. 1961 Prmatlra Nath To!uqd"' v. S•roj Rcnjan Sarkar D•s J. 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. Ba.1ir-.v.l·huq v. State of West Bengal('). That was case m which the accused person lodged informatil>n at a police station that X had beaten and throttled his ?1other tu death and when tho funeral pyre was m flames, he entered· the cremation ground with police; the dead body was examined and the complaint was found to be fa 1,e, On the complaint of X the acc'!bed person was charged with offences under s. ~97, Indian Penal Cude (tresspass to wound religious feelings) and s. iiOO, Indian Pena.I Cede (defamation). It was contended that as tho complaint disclosed offences under ss. 182 and 211, Indian Penal Code, the Court could not take cognizance of the case except on a complaint by the proper authority under s. I !J5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.