# PRATAP SINGH v. RAJINDER SINGI'l & ANR

- **Citation:** [1975] 3 S.C.R. 584
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-02-20
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 808 of 1973
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, Y. v. Cf-V\NDRACHUD, A. c. GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pratap-singh-v-rajinder-singi-l-anr-6449
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Representation of the People Act, 1951-s. 123(5)-Corrupt pracliceB
When the Supreme Court appreciates oral evidence-Whether oral testimony ,
could not be accevted unless corroborated in material particulars-A witness ,,'
need not be proved to be a perju;er before his evidence is discarded--How a
court should evaluate evidence in a case of corrupt practice.
The respondent, in his election petition before the High Court, alleged a
number of ':orrupt practices hit by ,s. 123(4), (5) and (6) of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 against the appellant. who was the duly elected candidate
to the State Assembly.
The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the
C
e1ection. , On appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court overlooked the_ well established principle that the charge of corrupt practice must
be treated as quasi-criminal in character which has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the High (:ourt,
HELD : (I )(a) The judgment of the High Court rests largely on appreciation
of 'oral evidence. It could not, therefore, be easily, disturbed by this OJ,urt even
D
in first appeal on facts in election cases.
[587B]
(b) But if the High Court overlooks serious infirmities in the
1~vidence
adduced to support the case accepted by it or misreads evidence or igr1ores tht:
principle that a charge of corrupt practice, in the course of an election, is a
grave one which, if established, casts a serious reflection and impose's a oisability upon the candidate l)eld guilty of it, so that the Court must be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt about its
veracity, this Court will not
hesitate to
E
interfere.
[587C]
In the instant case, the High Court did nothing more than to rather mechanically accept the oral_and documentary evidence given to support the cliarge of
corrupt practice.
There was no consideration or discussion of a number of
infirmities' both in the oral and docum~ntary evidence to support the charge.
This is so be1;ause the High Court has held the view that a mere consideration
of probabilities, withou,t applying a strict standard of proof beyond reasonable'
doubt to a charge of corrupt practice was enough. There is no· indication anyF
where in the judgment that the stricter standard of proof, which is applicable
to such charges, was kept in view by the High Court.
[588G-H]
,
Rahim Khan
v.
Khurshid Ahmed & Ors. [1974] 2 S.C.C. 660 @? 666,
followed.
2(a) It is difficult to accept the contention of the appellant that oral testimony could not be accepted in an allegation of corrupt practice unless it is
G
corroborated by other kinds of evidence in material particulars.
There is 'no
such general inflexible rule of Jaw or practice which could justify a wholesale
condemnation or rejection of a species of evidence which i~ legally ac!missible
and can be acted upon under the provisions of the Evidence Act in every type
of case. if it is, after pr.oper scrutiny,. found to b~ reliable or wprthy of aC<'.eptance.
There 1s no presumpt10n that a witness deposing on oa:th m the witni~ss box
is -untruthful unless he is shown to be speaking the truth. The ordinary presumption is, that a witness deposing solemnly on oath before a judicial tribunal is a
Witness of truth unless the contrary is shown.
The evidence in an election
ff
petition cannot be equated with that of an accomplice in a criminal case~ whose
testimony has, according to a rule of practice, though not of law, to be corroborated in material particulars before it is relied upon.
[589D-E & FJ
A
B
c
D
E
F
.G
PRATAP SINGH v, RAJINDl!R SINGH (Beg, J.)
58 5
(b) It is not required by our law of evidence that a witness must' be proved
lo b~ a perjurer before h'B evidence is discarded. It rp.ay be enough, if his evidence appears to be quite improbable or to spring '.from such tainted or biased or
dubious a source as to be unsafe to be acted upon without corroboration from
evidence other than that of the witness himself. [589F]

## Text

584
PRATAP SINGH
A
v.
RAJINDER SINGI'l & ANR.
February 20, 1975
[M. H. BEG, Y. v. Cf-V\NDRACHUD AND A. c. GUPTA, JJ.]
Representation of the People Act, 1951-s. 123(5)-Corrupt pracliceB
When the Supreme Court appreciates oral evidence-Whether oral testimony ,
could not be accevted unless corroborated in material particulars-A witness ,,'
need not be proved to be a perju;er before his evidence is discarded--How a
court should evaluate evidence in a case of corrupt practice.
The respondent, in his election petition before the High Court, alleged a
number of ':orrupt practices hit by ,s. 123(4), (5) and (6) of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 against the appellant. who was the duly elected candidate
to the State Assembly.
The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the
C
e1ection. , On appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court overlooked the_ well established principle that the charge of corrupt practice must
be treated as quasi-criminal in character which has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Allowing the appeal and remitting the case to the High (:ourt,
HELD : (I )(a) The judgment of the High Court rests largely on appreciation
of 'oral evidence. It could not, therefore, be easily, disturbed by this OJ,urt even
D
in first appeal on facts in election cases.
[587B]
(b) But if the High Court overlooks serious infirmities in the
1~vidence
adduced to support the case accepted by it or misreads evidence or igr1ores tht:
principle that a charge of corrupt practice, in the course of an election, is a
grave one which, if established, casts a serious reflection and impose's a oisability upon the candidate l)eld guilty of it, so that the Court must be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt about its
veracity, this Court will not
hesitate to
E
interfere.
[587C]
In the instant case, the High Court did nothing more than to rather mechanically accept the oral_and documentary evidence given to support the cliarge of
corrupt practice.
There was no consideration or discussion of a number of
infirmities' both in the oral and docum~ntary evidence to support the charge.
This is so be1;ause the High Court has held the view that a mere consideration
of probabilities, withou,t applying a strict standard of proof beyond reasonable'
doubt to a charge of corrupt practice was enough. There is no· indication anyF
where in the judgment that the stricter standard of proof, which is applicable
to such charges, was kept in view by the High Court.
[588G-H]
,
Rahim Khan
v.
Khurshid Ahmed & Ors. [1974] 2 S.C.C. 660 @? 666,
followed.
2(a) It is difficult to accept the contention of the appellant that oral testimony could not be accepted in an allegation of corrupt practice unless it is
G
corroborated by other kinds of evidence in material particulars.
There is 'no
such general inflexible rule of Jaw or practice which could justify a wholesale
condemnation or rejection of a species of evidence which i~ legally ac!missible
and can be acted upon under the provisions of the Evidence Act in every type
of case. if it is, after pr.oper scrutiny,. found to b~ reliable or wprthy of aC<'.eptance.
There 1s no presumpt10n that a witness deposing on oa:th m the witni~ss box
is -untruthful unless he is shown to be speaking the truth. The ordinary presumption is, that a witness deposing solemnly on oath before a judicial tribunal is a
Witness of truth unless the contrary is shown.
The evidence in an election
ff
petition cannot be equated with that of an accomplice in a criminal case~ whose
testimony has, according to a rule of practice, though not of law, to be corroborated in material particulars before it is relied upon.
[589D-E & FJ
A
B
c
D
E
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PRATAP SINGH v, RAJINDl!R SINGH (Beg, J.)
58 5
(b) It is not required by our law of evidence that a witness must' be proved
lo b~ a perjurer before h'B evidence is discarded. It rp.ay be enough, if his evidence appears to be quite improbable or to spring '.from such tainted or biased or
dubious a source as to be unsafe to be acted upon without corroboration from
evidence other than that of the witness himself. [589F]
(c) There are no golden rules for i!f.Praising hnman te&timony. The extraction of what should constitute 11'.e credible foundation of judicially sound judgment i~ an art which nothing except S(IUDd common sense and prudence combined
with ·:xperience can tea·:h.
(5890]
·
(d > In judging the evidence of a grn•;c charge, prudence dictates that belief
in its ool'T~tness should form t~o basis of a judicial verdict of guilt 0Dly if
that belief reaches a convictiOn beyond reasonable doubt. [S90BJ
I
.
(c) In deciding whether the stricter standard of proof is satisfied in a case
of alleged corrupt practice, resting •1pon oral evidence only; the Courts should
b~ particularly astute and not omit to examine falrly the effect of every existing
>ub~tanti<~I ground which •:ould introduce a reasonabTe doubt in a case. [590C]
In the i'lstant case the appellant's contention that the motor drivers would
b~ prepared to commit· perjury at the instance of the respondent who was the
Jefeated Minister and that because the respondent had been welcomed and
garlanded by the President of the Motor Truclc Drivers' Union, the evidence
of motor drivers was easily available to him cannot be accepted either as a
general rule in election cases, or, on the facts of this particuhr case. It is not
reo.sonable to carry a suspicion to the extent of attribl'ting to every witness
~·rrcaring in support of' the respondent's case a tendency or desire to ·:ommit
perjury. The law does not discriminate against or frown
upon
a former
Minister or \iew every witness produced by him with 6Uspicion because he
had been a Minister.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to believe that a
rerson who haq occupied the responsible position of a Ministec would be less
inclined to suborn witnesses or conspire to produce perjured evidence. [S90E-G]
Rahim Klin11 v. K/iurshid Ahmed & Ors. [1974] 2 S.C.C. 660 @ 666,
··followed.
·
(f) Where the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of a witness are
most unsatisfactory the 1:Cibuna1 is not powerless in the preformance of its duty
to ascertain the truth. There is not only s. 165 of the Evidence Ai:t. which
~nables the Court to put any question it likes to a witness, but there are also
provisions of O.XVI, r. 14 CPC. The High Court adopted a standard of proof
which is not strict enough in appraising the worth of evidence produced to
·'UPPOrt a charge of corrupt practice.
(5920-H]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Criminal
Appeal
No.
808 of 1973.
From the judgment and order dated the 30th March, 1973 of the
Punjab & Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 14 of 1972.
R. K. Garg, S. C. Aganvala, V. J. Francis an(! R. C. K. Kaushik,
for the appellant.
T. :s'. Krishnamurthi Iyer, K. C. Agarwa/a, M. M. L. Sriraslava
and 'E. C. Agarwala, for respondent No. 1.
A. T. M. Sampath, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
BEG, J.-Pritam Singh, the appellant before us under Section ll6A
ot the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred .
to as 'the Ad), was elected at an election held on 11-3-1972 for the
Haryana State Legislative Assembly, the result of which was declared ' ·
7-470SCl/75
586
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.n.
on 12-3-1972. The Respondent Balbir Singh questioned this election
by means of an election petition alleging that the election wa> void
as the appellant had committed corrupt practices hit by Section 123.
sub. s.4. 5 al1.d 6 of the Act. The petition was allowed by a learned
Judge of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, solely on the ground
that the corrupt practice, provided for as follows, in Secfr.:m 123(5)
of the Act, was committed by the appellant:
"123(5). The hiring or procuring, whether on payment
or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his
agent or by any other person with the C'Onsent of a candidate
or his election agent, or the use of such vehicle or vessel
for the free c0nvcyance of any elector (other than the candidate himselr, the members of his family or his agent) to or
from any po1ling station provided under section 25 or a place
c fixed under sub-section (I) of section 29 for the poll :
Provided that. the hiring of a vehicle or vessel by an elector or by several electors at their joint costs for the purposes of conveying him or them to and from any such polling 3tation or place fixed for the poll shall not be ·deemed
to be a corrupt practice under this clause if the vehicle or
vessel so hired is a vehicle or vessel not propelled by
mechanical J)owcr :
Provided further that the use of any
public transport
vehicle or vessel or any tramcar or railway carriage by any
elector at his own cost for the purpose of going to or coming
from any such pQlling station or place fixed for the poll shall
not be deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause".
The appellant assails the judgment of the High Court
on
th.:
following main grounds with which ·.··c will deal scriatim :
1. That, the High Court em:d in relying upon legally unproved
.:ntrics in what is called a Pukar book or register showino: both the
11iring out and then payments for the use of certain trucks on 11-31972, the date of election, for purposes of election.
2. That~ the Register itself is inadmissible in evidence under a1w
provisicn of the Evidence Act.
-
3. That, the entries in the Pubr Register arc suspicious indicating that the Register itself, or, atleast, the entries involved were
not contemporaneous but fabricated after the election was over.
4. That, the High Court erred in relying upon the evidence of
d13llans by the· police on 11-3-1972 of drivers oi trucks said to have
been u~ed by tl:c appellant when the best evidence in th!.! possession of
the police relatmg to :hese challans was not forthcoming so that the
cha~ans a~pcarcd to have been manouvcred for the purpose 'Of supportmg a talse case.
:i. That, the High Court erred in relying upon merely uncorroborated oral testimony of Motor u·uck drivers in acccptit1~ the respondent's case which was not r~ally cormborated as the alleged C..'rrnborative evidence was nt · cvi<lcnce at all in the eye of law.
A
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PRATAP SINGH v. RAJI~DER SINGH (Beg, J.)
587
6. That, the High Court overlooked the well established principle
that the charge of a corrupt practice in the course of an election must
be treated as quasi-criminal in character which has to be proved beyond reasonable· doubt.
We will deal with these objections in the reverse order, starting
with the last mentioned ground of attack on the High Court's judgment. The judgment rests largely on appreciation of oral evidence. It
could not, therefore, be easily disturbed by us as has been repeatedly
pointed out by this Court even in first appeals on facts in election
cases. If the High Court overlooks serious infirmities in the evidence
adduced to support the case accepted by it or misreads evidence· m
ignores the principle that a charge of corrupt practice, in the coursl.!
of :.\fl election, is a grave one which, if established, casts a seriousreflection and imposes a disability upon the candidate held guilty <•f
it, so that the Court must be satisfl.cd beyond reasonable doubt about
its veracity, this Court will not hesitate to interfere.
Learned Counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decisi·on of
this Court in Rahim Khan
v.
Kh11rshid Ahmed & Ors.,(') whm:
Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for this Court, said (at p. 666) :~
"An election once held is not to be treated in a lighthearted manner and defeated candidates
or
disgruntled
electors should not get away with it by filing election petitions on unsubstantial grounds and irresponsible evidence,
thereby introducing a serious element of uncertainty in the
verdict already rendered by the electorate. An election is a
politically sacred public act, not of one person or of one
official, but of the collective will of the whole constituency.
Courts naturally must respect this public expression secretly
wri•tcn and show extreme reluctance to act aside or declare
void an election which has already been held unless clear
and cogent testimony compelling the Court to uphold the
corrupt practice alleged against the
returnecl candidate is
adduced. Indeed, election petitions where c'0rrupt practices
arc imputed must be rr.gar<lcd as proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature wherein strict proof is necessary. The burden is
therefore heavy on him who assails an election which has
been concluded".
In Rahim Khan's case (supra) our learned brother Krishna Iyer
also warned us in the words of Sydney Harris (at p. 666):
"Once we assuage our conscience by calling something a
·necessary evil', it begins to look more and more necessary
and Jess and less evil".
He then proceeded to observe (at p. 666) :
"For this very reason the Court has to be stern so as
induce in the canclidatcs, the parties and workers that temper and truthfulness so appropriate to the process ........ "
I
·-.
(1) 1974 2 sec p. 6<io@ r. 666.
58&
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975J 3 S.C.R.
After poiliting out the difficulty of laying down any ~ast iron or rigid
rules for testing the veracity of witnesses, this Court said (at p. 672)
there:
"We regard it as extremely uJisafe, in the present climate of kilkenny-cat election co:npetitions and partisan witnesses wearing robes of veracity, to upturn a hard won eke-
. toral victory merely because lip se:rvicc to a corrupt practice
has he<!il. rendered by some sano:timonious witnesses. The
Court must look for serious assurance, untying circumst2.nces or tJnimpeachablc documents to uphold grave charges of
corrupt practice which might not merely cancel the clccti1)n
result, but extinguish many a man's public life".
In that case, this Court found the charge of a corrupt practice to be
established upon oral and documentary evidence given to support it.
In . the case before us, we find that the High Court accepted the
evidence of Uggar Sain, P.W. 24, because, i11ter a/ia, it was supported by a "Pukar Register" kept by the Union of truck drivers of trucks
hired in the order said l!o be determined by their places in the Register. It relied on this evidence despite certain serious objections to the
entries in the Register showing payments for the trucks said 1:1 have
been used by the appellant. The High Court, however, held that the
testimony of Uggar Sain found sufficient corroboration not only from
_ the entries in Pukar Register but also from the testimony of Khandu
Ram, P.W. 25, Harish Lal, P.W. 26, Jai Gopal, P.W. 27, Chokba
Namad, P.W. 28, Gurbachan Singh, P.W. 37 and Rajindcr Si1 ;i1, P.\V.
38, each of whom had deposed that he was paid a sum of Rs. 150/-
on 10-3-1972 for performing election duty for the appellant for carrying voters on 1 l-3-1972. The learned Judge observed about these
drivers:
"None of them is shown to be interested in the petit.ioncr
or ngainst the returned candidate nor was the deposition of
any one of them shaken in cross-examination and I do 11ot
see any good reason for discarding their sworn word.
As
would be seen later, they actually plied their trucks for the
returned candidate on the 1 lth of March, 1972 ... a fact
which clinches the matter against him".
The denial of the returned candidate were rejected
by the
lear:ned Judge on the groWld that these were made by a highly interested party. After having been taken through the judgment we are not
satisfied that the learned Judge did anything more than to rather
mechanically accept the oral and documentary evidence given to support the charge. We cc:rtainly do not find there any consideration or
cli5¢ussion of a number of infirmities which have been placed before
us both in the oral and documemary evidence adduced to support the
charge. We think that this is so bccai:ise the learned Judge seems to
have held the view that a mere consideration of probabilities without
applyt.lg d strict standard of proof beyond reasonable do~bt to a
. cha<ge of corrupt practice was enough here.
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PRATAP SINGH v. RAJINDER SINGH (Beg, I.)
~s 9
After going through the evidence relating to the use of each truck,
and repeating, rather mechanically, that this evidence on. behalf of
the petitioner was acceptable in each instance given, the learned Judge
concluded :
"As a result of the discussion of the evidence under this
issue, I hold that the retumed candidate hired and used trucks ·
Nos. HRR 5155, HRR 5161, HRR 5077, HRR 5013, and
HRR 597, for the free conveyance of electors to V'arious polling stations and thus committed the corrupt practice defined
in clause ( 5) of scctio•,1 123 of the Act".
We find no indication anywhere in the judgment th_at the stricter
standard of proof, which is ap~licable to such charges, was kept in
view by ~e learned Judge.
\
;
The fifth ground of objection set out above seems to proceed on
the erroneous assumption· that oral testimony cannot be accepted when
a corrupt practice is set up to assail an election unless it is corrob<J..
rated by other kinds of evidence in material particulars. We are not
aware of any such general inflexible rule of !•aw orpractice which could
justify a wholesale condenmation or rejection of a species of evidence
which is legally admissible and can be acted upon under the provisions
of Evidence Act in every type of case if it is, after proper scrutiny
found to be reliable or worthy of acceptance. There is no presumption,
either in this country or •anywhere else, that a witness, deposing on oath
in the wiraess box, is untruthful unless he is shown to be, indubitably,
speaking the truth.
On the other hand, the ordinary presumption is
that a witness deposing solemnly on oath before a judicial tribunal is
a witness of truth unless the contrary is show:i.
It is not required by our law of evidence that a witness must be
proved to b.:! a perjurer before his evidence is discarded. It may be
enough if his evidence appears to be quite improbable or to spring
from such tainted or biased or dubious a· source as to be unsafe to be
acted i..pon without corroboration from evidence other than that of the
witness himself.
The evidence of every witness in an election case
cannot be dubbed as intrinsically suspect or defective.· It cannot be
equated with that of <an accomplice ii,1 a criminal case whose testimony has, according to a rule of practice though not of law, to be corroborated in material particulars before it is relied upon.
TI1is Court pointed out in Rahim Khan's case (supra) that there
arc no golden rules for <appraising human testimony. In assessing its
worth Judges can err honestly just as witness ca',1 make honestly mistaken statements under oath. The extraction of what should constitute the credible foundation of judicially sound judgment is an art which
nothing except sound common sense and prudeace combined with
experience can teach. A sound judgment must disclose a fair attempt
to "separate the grain from the chaff" as it has often been said.
· Section 3 of the Evidence Act lays down :
"A fact is said to be proved when after considering the
matters before it, the Court either believes it to c;xist or ~on-
590
SUPRD!E COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s,c.R,
;
sidcrs its existence so probable that a prudent man ought,
under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon
the supposition that it exists".
Hence it has sometimes been argued that the same standard of .
proof applies to all types of cases. Such a contention seems plausible.
Hut, what has to be borne in mind is that, i'.1 judging the evidence o[
a grave charge, prudence dictates that the belief in its correctness
should form the basis of a. judicial verdict of guilt only if that belief
r1~aches a convU:tion beyond reasonable doubt. If prudence is the real
tc!st, it prescribes differing standards of proof in differing circumstances.
Its requirements preclude any Procrustcwa bed
of uniformly
rigid
rules for each type of case.
The circumstances under whic~ reasonable doub.t may or may not
.::~ist in a case cannot possibly qc exhaustively catalogued. All that
one can say is that in deciding whether the stricter stand•ard of proof
is satisfied in a case of alleged corrupt practice, resting upon oral evidence only, the Courts should be particularly astute and not omit
to examine fairly the effect of every existing substantial ground which
could introduce a reasonable doubt in a case. In doing so, the Court
has also to beware of bare suspicion, based on popular prejudices
o:r belief sought to be introduced merely to bias the Court against a
witness or a partly of a particular type.
In the case before us, we find that the learned Counsel for the
;1ppcllant has repeatedly referred to the fact that the respondent, whose
cllcction petition succeeded before the learned J udgc, was a defeated
former Minister of the ruling Congress party. Learned Counsel wanted
us to infer that, because the respondent had been welcomed and garlanded by the President of the Motor Truck Drivers' Union of Ganaur,
the evidence of motor drivers was easily available to him. In other
words, we were asked to assume that the motor drivers would be
prepared to conunit perjury, at tne instance rf the President of the
Motor Truck Drivers' Union, only to please a former defeated Minister.
We do not think that: it is reasonable to carry such a suspicion
to the extent of attributing; to every witness appearing in support of
the respondent's case a tendency or desire to commit perjm y.
The
law docs not discriminate against or frown upon a former Minister,
belonging to any party, whether in or out of power, so that it must
view every witness produced by him with suspicion simply because he
had been a Minister. On the! other hand, we think that it would not be
unreasonable to believe that a person who has occu!Jied the responsible
position of a Minister will be less inclined to suborn witnesses or conspire to produce perjured evidence just because he is defeated in an
election which is not the only test of a person's worth or resoectab;litv
in society. We think that a person who has held a responsible office
will be. acting _imprud~ntly if he spoils his public image by deliberately
producmg pequrcd evidence.
We are not pr~pared to uphold the 5th
contention of the appellant that, eit1er as a general rule. in election
cases, or on the :facts of this par•icular case, the evidence of the motor
drhcrs must be ,necessarily rejected simply berruse it is oral tcstimonv
of drivers of trucks who had formed a Union which had once invited
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II
PRATAP SINGH r. R,\JINDER SINGH (Beg,}.)
591
aod garlanded the rcspo,ndent.
We, however, think that tho evidence had to be more carefully scrutinized than the High Court wa!'.
disposed to do it.
As was pointed out in Rahim Klu111's case (supra),
evidence considerc';J unsafe to be acted upon by a judicial Tribunal
r.ccd not be necessarily false.
·
'
Turning to the 4th ground of objection, relating the prosecutions
of truck drivers by the Police for alleged offences said to have taken
place on 11 . 3 . 1972, we find that the High Court accepted the allc ·
gation that the drivers were challancd on 11. 3. 19n without commeriting on some conflicting evidence as to the date on which the motor
drivers were challaned. In reply, it has been contended that witnesses
who could have given more evidence on this question were not only
given up by the petitioner respondent but also by the appellant as.
the date of chal!ans was accepted or not questioned on behalf of the
;;ippcllant. Our attention is invited to a Miscellaneous application No.
216-E/72 dated 19.10.1972 where learned Counsel for the appellant
not merely stated that he did not want to examine either the Mohrir
Constable of Police Station Ganaur or a Clerk of the office of the
Superintendent of Police, Rohtak, but prayed that "the above two wit·
ncsses may kindly be informed telegraphically not to appear on
23. 10. 72".
It is, therefore, argued, not without force, that the date of the
challans was not seriously disputed by the appellant before the High
Co~Jrt so that this question should not be allowed to be argued before
us.
It was also contended on behalf of the respondent that there had
been some tamperin_g with the record in the Magistrate's Court which
explained the contrary evidence given bv Subash Chander, P.W.11,
the Ahalmad of a Magistrate's Court, showing that the chaltan was
dated 17-3c 1972. It was orally prayed that \VC should summon and
.:xamine, at this stag;c, the original record from the Court of the
Magistrate concerned,
However, as no argument appears to have
been addressed on this questicn in the High Court we think that this
as a matter which the High Court can and should itself examine after
summoning the record from the Magistrate's Court as we propose to
send the case back to it for reconsideration after taking some further
evidence.
It has been argued on behalf of the respondent that there ~s enough
evidence of the motor truck drivers and of the voters carried as weil
as documentary evidence, i,ncluding a log book of a driver, to show
that the truck used on behalf of the respondent were carrying V'1ters
to the election booth, and were, therefore, challaned 0,1
11-3-1972
because carrying of passengers in truck was not permitted.
It was admitted that no entry was made in the general diary of
Ganaur Police Station, according to the rules, but this, it was contended for the respondent, is not conclusive as relevant entries relating
to some petty offences are often missing. These arc, however some
of the matters which the High Court can and should consider.
'
It appears to us that a number of points, on the worth of various
items of evidence, which have been raised for tht' 1st time t6 question
592
SUPRUIE COURT REPORTS
(1975) 3 S.C..R.
the authenticity of the evidence relating to the prosecution of driver~
of trucks, said to have been carrying voters for the appellant were
not advanced before the High Court.
We think that we ought tt1
have the benefit of scrutiny of the whole evidence on this question by
the High· Court and its findings thereon.
We are not prepared to
proceed on the assumptio!l that the respondent could easily get evidence
fabri.cated as he had been n minister.
·
We may now deal with the first three grounds cif objection, all
relating to what is called the Pukar Register.
A
8
It is true that Uggar Sain, P.W. 24, who was called to prove the
Pukar Register, did not actually depose in whose handwriting the
entries in it were made or what could or could not be properly ente:rcd
here. The trend of cross-examination, however, shows that it proC
cee<led on the assumption that Uggar Sain, P.W. 24, was actual!v
making entries in it.
But, neither this fact was proved in the cxamina:tion-in-chief nor was the course of business, according to which
entries could be made in the Register, including entries of alleged
payments by the respondent, proved.
A number of question raised
before us, throwing some suspicion on the authenticity of the entries
in this Pukar R1!gister and the dates on which they could be or were
D
made seem to us to be entirely new.
They were not suggested to
P.W. 24, Uggar Sain, who might have had some explanations for
these suspicious features.
Nor do all these defects seem to have been
mentioned in the course of arguments before the High Court. For
example, the truck numbers of trucks said to have been sent to the
appellant do not appear against the name of the appellant but seem
inserr.ed afterwards above the place where they would be expected to
E
be found.
The exact meaning or effect of such a feature could. only
have been brought out by cross-examination of Uggar Sain, P.W. 24
on behalf of the appellant.
As regards the admissibility of the Pnkar Register and evidence
of prosecution of the truck drivers, we are unable to accept the submission that these are inadmissible under the Evidence Act.
Even
F
though the course of business under which the Pukar Register was kept
was not proved, we think that documents, such as the Pukar Regis1tcr
all,d those -relating to the prosecutions of the drivers, who were said
t() be ~ami11t voters on 11. 3 .1972, could be proved under section 11
of the E~
Act.
We think that, in view of the importance of the evidence Ugg,ar
G
Sain, P.W. 24 both his examination-in-chief and his cross-examination
are must unsatisfactory.
We may here observe that the election Trib1,mal is not powerless in such cases in the performance of its duty to
ascertain the truth.
There is not only Section 165 of the Evidence
Act which enables the Court to put any question it likes IQ a witness.
but there are also the provisions of order XVI, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code which lay down :
H
"Subject to the provisions of this Code as to attendance
and appearance and to any law for the time being in force,
·.A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
.; PRATAP SINGH 1·. RAJL'IDER SINGH (Beg, J.)
. 593
where the Court at any lime thinks it necessary to examine
. any person other than a ·party to the suit am! not called as a
witness by a party to the suit, the Court may, of its own
motion, cause such person to be summoned as a witness t<i
give evidence, or to. produce any dcicument in his possessiOn,
on a dav to be appointed, and may examine him as a v.itncss
or require hini to produce such document".
We think. that the ascertainment of a numb~r of essential facts
relating to the· charge was n.eithcr regular nor sufficiently detailed in
the case now before us.
We find that the High Court proceeded on
the assumption that facts which ought to have been technically proved
had been sufficiently prqved.
It too 'readily accepted the evidence,
both oral and documenL'lry, without examining all the. defects of it
. which have been sought to be placed before us.
We are left with
an unavoidable impression that important aspects of the case were
neither satisfactorily brought out clearly by the evidence in the case
nor examined by the High Court despite the voluminous evidence led
by the parties and the lenithy judgment delivered by the T'ibunal. ·
We also find that t~.e Court adopted a standard of proof which is
not strict enough in appraising the worth of evidence produced to
support a charge of corrupt' practice. As it is not the practice of this
Court to reassess evidence or to perform the duties of the Trial Court,
even in election first appeals, un!ess no other course is left open to
it, we think that this is a fit case in which we should send back the
·case for reconsideration by the High Court
after recalling
such
witnesses as may be considered necessary by it, ';ind, in particular,
Uggar Sain, P.W. 24, so that at least !he Pukar Register, assumed to
have been duly proved, may be proved in accordance with law.
We
think that the objections to the proof of this. document, and of entries
in it <lo not go beyond objections to the mode of proof.
The entries
in it could be accepted as sufficiently r~li~ble on1¥ after a much more
rigorous examination of their maker than the parties or the Court
subjected him to.
W~ think that we should noil give a finding upon
the reliabili~ of these entries before the ,allegedfy suspicious features
have been specifically put to P.W. 24, Uggar Safn, who was assumed
to have made the entries without even asking ·'him whether he did
make them.
!
. . Jn the result,. we set aside the judgment .md order of the HighCo~rtt.!oo,,we t~~d the case to it f?r dispoShl in accordance with
law after adtluctJo'!./lf such further evidence as may be necessary in
the intereslO"bf:iustice, In view of our order remanding the case to
···-~· .. ···- ., . .,.
.--·
the High Court it is unnecessary to consider the three Civil Miscel-
"
•
- ·•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 3 s.c.R.
laneous Petitions for urging addition grounds, for
condonation
o{
delay in filing the application for urging additional grounds, and for
rcrmission to file a ct:rtified copy of the summary register for
2 !·3-1972 and 22-3-197'.?. of the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st
CJ.ass, Sonepa.t. These applications are, therefore, dismissed. Parties
may, however, make appropriate applications in the High Court. 'fl1c
costs of this litigation in the High Court as well as in this Court
will abide the result. The appellant will continue to function as an
elected member subject to the result of the Election Petition.
P. It R.
Appeal allowed
B