# ' , PRATAP SINGH v. ST A TE OF JHARKHAND AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2005] 1 S.C.R. 1019
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2005-02-02
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 210 B of 2005
- **Bench:** N. Santosh Hegde, S.N. Variava, B.P. Singh, H.K. Sema, B S.B. Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pratap-singh-v-st-a-te-of-jharkhand-and-anr-20305
- **Pages:** 46

## Headnote

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986-Sections 2(h), 3, 18, 26 and 32
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Sections C
2(k), 20 and 69.
Juvenile offender-Age-Determination-Reckoning date-Held: The
reckoning date for determining the age of the Juvenile offender is the date of
offence and not the date when he is produced before the Authority/Court.
D
2000 Act-Applicability of-To the cases initiated under 1986 Act,
pending on the date of enforcement of 2000 Act-Held: The Act of 2000
would be applicable to such cases only when the accused had not attained 18
years of age on the date of its enforcement-Model Rules framed by Central
Government-Rule 62-United National Standard Minimum Rules for E
Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985.
The questions for determination in the present appeal before the
Constitution Bench were :
1. What would be the reckoning date in determining the age of p
juvenile offender, viz., date when produced in a Court, as had.been held
by this Court in Amit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 or the date
on which the offence was committed as had been held in Umesh Chandra
v. State of Rajasthan, (1982( 2 SCC 202?
2. Whether Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, G
2000 would be applicable to the case, proceeding whereof was initiated
under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and was pending on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2000?
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
1019
H
A
B
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2005) I S.C.R.
HELD : Per Sema, J. (for himself N Santosh Hegde, S.N Variava and
B. P. Singh, JJ.) :
1.1. The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the
juvenile is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced
before the Authority or in the Court. ( 1039-G I
1.2. The whole object of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 is to provide for the care, protection, treatment,
development and rehabilitation of neglected delinquent juveniles. It is a
beneficial legislation aimed at to make available the benefit of the Act to
C the neglected or delinquent juveniles. The interpretation of the Statute of
beneficial legislation must be to advance the cause of legislation to the
benefit for whom it is made and not to frustrate the intendment of the
legislation. l 1031-0-E I
1.3. The distinction between the definition of 'delinquent juvenile'
D under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 is that in 1986 Act "juvenile in conflict with law"
is absent. The definition in 1986 Act is referable to an offence said to have
been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in conflict
with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent Authority
and or Court he has not committed an offence on that date, but he was
E brought before the Authority for the alleged offence which he has been
found to have committed. Therefore, what was implicit in 1986 Act has
been made explicit in 2000 Act. (1031-F-AJ
F
1.4. It cannot be said that the use of the word is in two places of
Section 32 of 1986 Act suggests that for determination of age of juvenile
the date of production would be reckoning date as the inquiry with regard
to his age begins from the date he is brought before the Court and not
otherwise. The definition of delinquent juvenile means a juvenile who has
been found to have committed an offence. The word is employed in Section
32 is referable to a junnile who is said to have committed an offence on
G the date of the occurrence. The word is has been used in more than one
place in Section 18of1986 Act also. Often than not, an offender is arrested
immediately after an offence is alleged to have been committed or some
t;me even arrested on the spot. This would also show that the arrest and
release on bail and custody of juveniles, the reckoning date of a juvenile
is the date of an offence and not the date of production. Furthermore,
H Section 32 of 1986 Act also does not envisage the produ

## Text

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' ,
PRATAP SINGH
A
v.
ST A TE OF JHARKHAND AND ANR.
FEBRUARY 2, 2005
[N. SANTOSH HEGDE, S.N. VARIAVA, B.P. SINGH, H.K. SEMA AND B
S.B. SINHA, JJ.]
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986-Sections 2(h), 3, 18, 26 and 32
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000-Sections C
2(k), 20 and 69.
Juvenile offender-Age-Determination-Reckoning date-Held: The
reckoning date for determining the age of the Juvenile offender is the date of
offence and not the date when he is produced before the Authority/Court.
D
2000 Act-Applicability of-To the cases initiated under 1986 Act,
pending on the date of enforcement of 2000 Act-Held: The Act of 2000
would be applicable to such cases only when the accused had not attained 18
years of age on the date of its enforcement-Model Rules framed by Central
Government-Rule 62-United National Standard Minimum Rules for E
Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985.
The questions for determination in the present appeal before the
Constitution Bench were :
1. What would be the reckoning date in determining the age of p
juvenile offender, viz., date when produced in a Court, as had.been held
by this Court in Amit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 or the date
on which the offence was committed as had been held in Umesh Chandra
v. State of Rajasthan, (1982( 2 SCC 202?
2. Whether Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, G
2000 would be applicable to the case, proceeding whereof was initiated
under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and was pending on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2000?
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
1019
H
A
B
1020
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2005) I S.C.R.
HELD : Per Sema, J. (for himself N Santosh Hegde, S.N Variava and
B. P. Singh, JJ.) :
1.1. The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the
juvenile is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced
before the Authority or in the Court. ( 1039-G I
1.2. The whole object of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 is to provide for the care, protection, treatment,
development and rehabilitation of neglected delinquent juveniles. It is a
beneficial legislation aimed at to make available the benefit of the Act to
C the neglected or delinquent juveniles. The interpretation of the Statute of
beneficial legislation must be to advance the cause of legislation to the
benefit for whom it is made and not to frustrate the intendment of the
legislation. l 1031-0-E I
1.3. The distinction between the definition of 'delinquent juvenile'
D under Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2000 is that in 1986 Act "juvenile in conflict with law"
is absent. The definition in 1986 Act is referable to an offence said to have
been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in conflict
with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent Authority
and or Court he has not committed an offence on that date, but he was
E brought before the Authority for the alleged offence which he has been
found to have committed. Therefore, what was implicit in 1986 Act has
been made explicit in 2000 Act. (1031-F-AJ
F
1.4. It cannot be said that the use of the word is in two places of
Section 32 of 1986 Act suggests that for determination of age of juvenile
the date of production would be reckoning date as the inquiry with regard
to his age begins from the date he is brought before the Court and not
otherwise. The definition of delinquent juvenile means a juvenile who has
been found to have committed an offence. The word is employed in Section
32 is referable to a junnile who is said to have committed an offence on
G the date of the occurrence. The word is has been used in more than one
place in Section 18of1986 Act also. Often than not, an offender is arrested
immediately after an offence is alleged to have been committed or some
t;me even arrested on the spot. This would also show that the arrest and
release on bail and custody of juveniles, the reckoning date of a juvenile
is the date of an offence and not the date of production. Furthermore,
H Section 32 of 1986 Act also does not envisage the production of a juvenile
j
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND
1021
in the Court. 11032-E-F; 1033-D-Fl
1.5. A conjoint reading of Sections 3 and 26, preamble, aims and
objects of 1986 Act leaves no matter of doubt that the legislature intended
to provide protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of
neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication thereof.
Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982( 2 SCC 202, affirmed.
Amit Das v. State of Bihar., (20001 5 SCC 488, overruled.
A
B
2.1. The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in
any Court/ Authority initiated under the l 986 Act and is pending when C
the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years
of age as on the date of enforcement of 2000 Act. (1039-H; 1040-Al
2.2. Although the 1986 Act was repealed by the 2000 Act, anything
done or any action taken under the 1986 Act is saved by sub-section (2)
of Section 69 of 2000 Act, as if the action has been taken under the D
provisions of the 2000 Act. (1036-D-El
2.3. Section 20 of 2000 Act deals with the special provision in respect
of pending cases and begins with non-obstante clause. The proceedings in
respect of a juvenile pending in any Court referred to in Section 20 is
relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and E
which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "an;
court" would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a
"juvenile" under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in
criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy
had crossed 16 years or girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section F
20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the
1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending
case shall continue in that Court as if the 2000 Act has not been passed
and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall
record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the
juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders G
in respect of that juvenile. Section 16 of the 2000 Act is identical to Section
22 of the 1986 Act. Similarly Section 15 of the 2000 Act is in pari materia
with Section 21 of the 1986 Act. Thus, such an interpretation does not
offend Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India and the juvenile is not
subjected to any penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted H
1022
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005) I S.C.R.
A on him under the 1986 Act. 11038-B-EJ
2.4. Rule 62 of Model Rules framed by Central Government also
indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that the provisions of
the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided, the date on which
the 2000 Act came into force, the person was a "juvenile" within the
B meaning of the term as defined in the 2000 Act i.e. he/she had not crossed
18 years of age. 11039-CI
Upendra Kumar v. State of Bihar; Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar, [1997)
8 SCC 720; Gopinath Ghosh v. State of WB., [1984) Supp. SCC 228; Bhoop
C Ram v. State of U.P., [1989) 3 SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar v. State ofU.P.,
[1995) Supp. 4 SCC 419, referred to. [1039-D-F]
Per Sinha, J (Partly dissenting) :
I.I. In terms of the 1986 Act, the age of the offender must be
D reckoned from the date when the alleged offence was committed. Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection o.f Children) Ace, 2000 is not only a
beneficient legislation, but also a remedial one. The Act aims at grant of
care, protection and rehabilitation of a juvenile vis-a-vis the adult
criminals. Having regard to Rule 4 of United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, it must also be borne in
E mind that the moral and psychological components of criminal
responsibility was also one of the factors in defining a juvenile.
[1052-H; 1053-A; 1063-H; 1064-AJ
1.2. The meaning of the exp·ression 'Juvenile' used in a statute by
reason of its very nature has to be assigned with reference to a definite
F date. The term 'Juvenile' must be given a definite connotation. It was,
having regard to the constitutional and statutory scheme, not necessary
for the Parliament to specifically state that the age of juvenile must be
determined as on the date of commission of the offence. The same is inbuilt in the statutory scheme. The statute must be construed having regard
G to the Scheme and the ordinary state of affairs and consequences flowing
therefrom. [1053-B-DJ
1.3. Only because his age is to be determined in a case of dispute by
tile competent Court or the Board in terms of Section 26 of the Act, the
same would not mean that the relevant date therefor would be the one on
H which he is produced before the Board. If such an argument is accepted,
'" .
-
' .....
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND
1023
the same would result in absurdity as, in a given case, it would be open to A
the police authorities not to produce him before the Board before he ceases
to be juvenile. If he is produced after he ceases to be juvenile, it may not
be necessary for the Board to send him in the protective custody or release
him on bail as a result whereof he would be sent to judicial or police
custody which would defeat the very purpose for which the Act had been B
enacted. Law cannot be applied in an uncertain position. Furthermore,
the right to have a fair trial strictly in terms of the Act which would include
procedural safeguard is a fundamental right of the juvenile. A proceeding
against a juvenile must conform to the provisions of the Act. (I 054-E-G I
Dilip Saha v. State of West Bengal, AIR(1978) Calcutta 529, referred C
to.
1.4. The statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make
it effective and operative on the principle of Vt res magis valeat quam
pereat. The courts lean strongly against any constructions which tend to
reduce a statute to a futility. When two meanings, one making the statute D
absolutely vague, wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless and the
other leading to certainty and meaningful are given, in such an event the
latter should be followed. (1055-C-D)
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. ltd v. State of Assam and Ors., ( 1989) 3
SCC 709; Andhra Bank v. B. Satyanarayana and Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 657 E
and Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2003)
7 sec 589, referred to.
1.5. The court in an appropriate case is not powerless to pass an
order as is contemplated under the statute if the situation so demands but
only because a person is produced before the Court after he attains F
majority either on his own volition or by reason of machinations adopted
by the investigating agency, the same would not be determinative of the
fact that the said person is to be differently dealt with. Law favours strict
adherence of the procedures subject to just exceptions. (1055-G-HI
Amit Das v. State of Bihar, 120001 5 SCC 488, overruled.
1.6. The definition of 'Juvenile' under the 1986 Act, of course refers
to a person who has been found to have committed offence but the same
G
has been clarified in the 2000 Act. The provisions of 1986 Act, sought to
protect not only those juveniles who have been found to have committed H
1024
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] 1 S.C.R.
A an offence but also those who had been charged therefor. In terms of
Section 3 of the 1986 Act as well as 2000 Act when an enquiry has betn
initiated even if the juvenile has ceased to be so as he has crossed the age
of 16 and 18 as the case may be, the same must be continued in respect of
such person as if he had continued to be a juvenile. Section 3 of the 1986
B Act therefore cannot be given effect to if it is held that the same only
applied to post delinquency of the juvenile. 11055-E-FI
2.1. The 2002 Act will have a limited application in the cases pending
under the 1986 Act. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not
juvenile could be tried in any Court. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 takes
C care of such a situation stating that despite the same the trial shall continue
in that Court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is
found to be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall
be recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing
any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the
Board which shall pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the
D Act as if he has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed
-
the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said provision. A
+ .·
legal fiction must be given its full effect although it has its limitations.
(1057-D-F(
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2003]
E 2 SCC 111; /TW Signode India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (2003) 9
SCALE 720; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2004] 3
SCC I and Mis Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal (C.A. No. 2946 of 2002
decided by Supreme Court on 25. 1.2005), referred to.
F
2.2. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a juvenile,
has to be treated to be one by the Board for the purpose of sentencing
which takes care of a situation that the person although not a juvenile in
terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000
Act for the said limited purpose. The Act provides for beneficent
consequences and, thus, it is required to be construed liberally.
G
(1057-H; 1058-A]
2.3. A beneficent legislation should not be construed liberally so as
,._ '
to bring within its fore a person who does not answer the statutory scheme.
Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
H Baroda, ]2004] 5 sec 385, referred to.
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKl-IAND
1025
2.4. Section 20 of the Act of 2000 would, therefore, be applicable A
when a person is below the age of 18 years as on the date of enforcement
of Act of2000. For the purpose of attracting Section 20 of the Act, it must
be established that : (i) on the date of coming into force the proceedings
in which the petitioner was accused was pending; and (ii) on that day he
was below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of the said Act, both the
aforementioned conditions are required to be fulfilled. 11058-D-EI
B
2.5. The embargo of giving a retrospective effect to a statute arises
only when it takes away vested right of a person. By reason of Section 20
of 2000 Act no vested right in a person has been taken away, but thereby
only an additional protection has been provided to a juvenile.
C
(1058-H; 1059-AI
Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, (19641 7 SCR 676; Basheer alias N.P.
Basheer v. State of Kera/a, (200413 SCC 609; life Singh v. State of Haryana
and Ors., JT (2004) 8 SC 589 and Dayal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, JT
(2004) Supp.I SC 37, referred to.
D
Attorney General's Reference (No.2of2001) (2004) 2 AC 72 and R.
(on the application of Uttley) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
(2004) 4 All ER I, referred to.
2.6. Interpretation of a statute depends upon the text and context E
thereof and having regard and object with which the same was made. The
provision of the 2000 Act is furthermore a remedial statute. They are, thus,
required to be given liberal construction. A remedial statute applied in a
pending proceeding would not mean that thereby a retrospective effect
and retroactive operation is being given thereto. (1061-E-FI
Principles of Statutory interpretation, by G.P. Singh Ninth Edition, 2004,
page 733, referred to.
2. 7. In a case where an additional protection had been granted
pursuant to or in furtherance of the international treaties and keeping in
view of the experience which had been gathered by the Parliament after
F
G
coming into force of the 1986 Act, it should be read in such a fashion so
that the extended benefit can be granted even to the juvenile under the
2000 Act. Furthermore, sub-section (2) of Section 69 provides that all
proceedings shall be deemed to have been held under the new Act. This is
also suggestive of the fact that the new Act would, to the aforementioned H
1026
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
A extent, apply to a pending proceeding which was initiated under the 1986
Act. 11061-G-H; 1062-AI
3.1. The age of the delinquent juvenile cannot be determined in terms
of the Model Rule 62. Any law mandating the court to take into
consideration certain documents over others in determining an issue, must
B be provided for only by law. Only a validly made law can take away the
power of the court to appreciate evidence for the purpose of determination
of such a question in the light of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872. It cannot be done by the Central Government in exercise of the
executive power. (1062-F-G)
C
Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, 120041 2 SCC 510; State of U.P. v.
Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714; Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR
(1988) SC 1796 and Sushi/ Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, 120031 8 SCC 673,
referred to.
3.2. The Model Rules cannot be agreed to as the same have not been
D framed in terms of the provisions of the Act so as to attract the principles
that rules validly framed are to be treated as part of the Act. The Central
Government is a statutory functionary. Its functions are circumscribed
by Section 70 of the Act only. It has not been authorized to make any rule.
Such rule making power has been entrusted only to the State. The Central
E Government has, thus, no say in the matter nor can it exercise such power
by resorting to its power 'to remove difficulties'. (1062-B-DI
Chief Forest Conservator (Wildlife) and Ors. v. Nisar Khan, [2003) 4
SCC 595 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Ors., (20041
3 sec 297, distinguished
F
Mis Ja/an Trading Co. Private Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha, AIR (1967)
SC 691 at 703, referred to.
Liverpool and London S.P. and I Association Ltd. v. M. V. Sea Success
I and Anr., (20041 9 SCC 512, referred to.
G
Regina (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2001) 2
AC 532; S. v. Makwanyane, (1995) 3 SA 391; (Reference re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [19871 1 SCR 313; (Presumption of
Innocence and the European Convention on Human Rights (1987) BverfGE
74, 3580; Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, (1994) 2 NZLR 257; United
Kingdom Pratt v. Attorney-Genera/for Jamaica, (1994) 2 AC I; Atkins v.
H Virginia, (2002) 536 US 304; Lawrence v. Texas, (2003) 539 US 558; Hamdi
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SEMA, J.)
1027
.).
v. Rumsfeld, (2004) 72 USLW 4607; Russel v. Bush, (2004) 72 USLW 4596; A
Rumsjieldv. Padi/a, (2004) 72 USLW 4584; In re Frank C., 70 N.Y. 2d 408;
Alfreda v. Superior Court 849 P. 2d 1330 (Cal. 1993); Robinson v. Texas,
707 S.W. 2d 47 and Illinois v. Stufflebean, 392 N.E. 2d 414, referred to.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 210
B
of 2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.9.2001 of the _Jharkhand High
Court at Ranchi in Crl.R.No. 98 of 200 I.
Amarendra Sharan, Additional Solicitor General, P.S. Mishra, Alok
Kumar, Manu Shankar Mishra, Tathagat Harsh Vardhan, Sishir Pinaki, c
Amitesh Chandra Mishra, Upendra Mishra, Dhrub Jha, Himanshu Shekhar,
Ansul, Krishnanand Pandeya, Devashish Bharuka, Mrs. Sudha Gupta, Ms.
Maharukh Adenwala, Trideep Pais and Nikhil Nayyar for the Appearing
parties.
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
D
+
H.K. SEM~, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 10.9.2001
passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Revision No.
98 of 2001.
E
Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeal are
as follows :
First Information Report was lodged before the police in Bokaro city
registered as P.S. case No.1/99 dated 1.1.1999 for the offence under Sections F
-
.~
364A, 302/201 !PC read with Section 120B !PC to the effect that on 31.12.1998
J
the appellant was alleged as one of the conspirators to have caused the death
of the deceased by poisoning. On the basis of the FIR the appellant was
arrested and produced before the C.J.M. Chas on 22.11.1999. On production,
-
the learned CJM assessed the age of the appellant to be around 18 years old.
On 28.2.2000, a petition was filed on behalf of the appellant claiming that he G
was a minor on the date of occurrence i.e. 31.12.1998, whereupon the learned
i
.1
CJM transmitted the case to the Juvenile Court. The appellant was produced
in the Juvenile Court on 3.3.2000. On his production the Juvenile Court
assessed the age of the appellant by appearance to be between 15 and 16
years and directed the Civil Surgeon to constitute a Medical Board for the H
1028
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
A purpose of assessing the age of the appellant by scientific examination and
submit a report. No such Medical Board was constituted. Thus, the learned
ACJM asked the parties to adduce evidence and on examining the school
leaving certificate and mark sheet of Central Board of Secondary Education
came to the finding that the appellant was below 16 years of age as on
B 31.12.1998 taking the date of birth of the appellant as 18.12.1983 recorded
in the aforesaid certificate. The appellant was then released on bail.
Aggrieved thereby the informant filed an appeal before the I st Additio:ial
Sessions Judge, who after referring to the judgment of this Court rendered in
Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, [2000] 5 SCC 488, disposed of the appeal on
C 19.2.2001 holding that the Juvenile Court had erred in not taking note of the
fact that the date of production before the Juvenile Court was the date relevant
for deciding whether the appellant was juvenile or not for the purpose of trial
and directed a fresh inquiry to assess the age of the appellant. Aggrieved
thereby the appellant moved the High Court by filing Criminal Revision
Petition. The High Court while disposing of the Revision has followed the
D decision rendered by this Court in Arnit Das (supra) and held that reckoning
date is the date of production of the accused before the Court. and not the date
of the occurrence of the offence.
The High Court held that for determining the age of juvenile, the
E provisions of 1986 Act would apply and not 2000 Act. The High Court,
however, took the view that the date of birth, as recorded in the school and
the school certificate, should be the best evidence for fixing the age of the
appellant. High Court was also of the view that any other evidence in proof
of age would be of much inferior quality. As the enquiry is pending, we need
not delve into this question.
F
G
H
Having noticed the conflicting views in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar,
[2000] 5 SCC 488 and Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982] 2 SCC
202, this matter has been referred to the Constitution Bench by an order
dated 7.2.2003. It reads :
"The High Court in its impugned judgment has relied on a two-Judge
bench decision of this Court in Arl(it Das v. State o/Bihar, [2000] 5
SCC 488. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that in Arnit Das (supra), the decision of this Court in Umesh Chandra
V. State of Rajashtan, [1982] 2 sec 202, was not considered. The
point arising is one of the frequent recurrence and view of the law
taken in this case is likely to have a bearing on the new Act, that is,
+
.. \ +
)
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.]
I 029
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000 also, the matter A
deserves to be heard by the Constitution Bench of this Court. Be
placed before the Hon.Chief Justice of India, soliciting directions."
This is how the matter has been placed before us.
The dual questions which require authoritative decision are :
B
(a) Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for
determining the age of the alleged offender as Juvenile offender
or the date when he is produced in the Court/competent authority.
(b) Whether the Act of2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding
initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was C
enforced with effect from 1.4.200 I.
Question (a)
Whether the date of occurrence will be the reckoning date for determining
the age of the alleged offender as Juvenile offender or the date when he is D
produced in the Court/competent authority.
Mr. Mishra submits that the decision in Umesh Chandra (supra) rendered
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the correct law and a
two-Judge Bench decision in Amit Das (supra) cannot be said to have laid
down a correct law. Mr. Mishra also submits that the decision in Amit Das E
(supra) has not noticed the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Umesh Chandra
(supra). Mr. Mishra also referred to the aims and objects of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the 1986 Act) and submits that
the whole object is to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile for the offence he
is alleged to have committed and if the date of offence is not taken as F
reckoning the age of the juvenile, the purpose of the Act itself would be
defeated. In this connection, he has referred to Sections 18, 20, 26 and 32 of
the Act. Per contra Mr. Sharan refers to the aims and objects of the Act and
various Sections of the Act and particularly emphasized the word is employed
in Section 32 of the Act and submits that cumulative reading of the provisions
as well as of the scheme of the Act would show that the reckoning date for G
determining the date of juvenile would come into play only when a juvenile
appears or is brought before the authority/court and not the date of an offence.
We may at this stage notice the preamble as well as object of the 1986
Act:
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005] I S.C.R.
"An Act to provide for the care, protection, treatment, development
and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the
adjudication of certain matters relating to, and disposition of,
delinquent juveniles.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty-seventh Year of the
B
Republic of India as follows :
c
D
Prefatory Note-Statement of Objects and Reasons.- A review of the
working of the existing Children Acts would indicate that much greater
attention is required to be given to children who may be found in
situations of social maladjustment, delinquency or neglect. The justice
system as available for adults is not considered suitable for being
applied to juveniles. It is also necessary that a uniform juvenile justice
system should be available throughout the country which should make
adequate provision for dealing with all aspects in the changing social,
cultural and economic situation in the country. There is also need for
larger involvement of informal systems and community based welfare
agencies in the care, protection, treatment, development and
rehabilitation of such juveniles.
2.
In this context, the proposed legislation aims at achieving the
following objectives :
E
(i) to lay down a uniform legal framework for juvenile justice in the
country so as to ensure that no child under any circumstances is
lodged in jail or police lock-up. This is being ensured by establishing
Juvenile Welfare Boards and Juvenile Courts;
F
G
H
(ii) to provide for a specialized approach towards the prevention and
treatment of juvenile delinquency in its full range in keeping with the
developmental needs of the child found in any situation of social
maladjustment;
(iii) to spell out the machinery and infrastructure required for the
care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of various
categories of children coming within the purview of the juvenile
justice system. This is proposed to be achieved by establishing
observation homes, juvenile homes for neglected juveniles and special
homes for delinquent juveniles;
(iv) to establish norms and standards for the administration of juvenile
justice in terms of investigation and prosecution, adjudication and
+
\.
PRAT AP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.]
1031
disposition, and care, treatment and rehabilitation;
(v) to develop appropriate linkages and co-ordination between the
formal system of juvenile justice and voluntary agencies engaged in
the welfare of neglected or socially maladjusted children and to
specifically define the areas of their responsibilities and roles;
(vi) to constitute special offences in relation to juveniles and provide
for punishments therefor;
(vii) to bring the operation of the juvenile justice system in the country
in conformity with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rule for
A
B
the Administration of Juvenile Justice.
C
3.
As its various provisions come into force in different parts of the
country they would replace the corresponding laws on the subject
such as the Children Act, 1960 and other State enactments on the
subject."
Thus, the whole object of the Act is to provide for the care, protection,
treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected delinquent juveniles.
It is a beneficial legislation aimed at to make available the benefit of the Act
, to the neglected ot delinquent juveniles. It is settled law that the interpretation
D
of the Statute of beneficial legislation must be to advance the cause of
legislation to the benefit for whom it is made and not to frustrate the intendment E
of the legislation.
We may also, at this stage, notic:e the definition of delinquent juvenile.
Sub-section (e) of Section 2 of the 1986 Act defines the delinquent juvenile
as :
(e) "delinquent juvenile" means a juvenile who has been found to
have committed an offence;"
Sub-section (I) of Section 2 of 2000 Act defines "juvenile in conflict
F
with law" means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence. The G
notable distinction between the definitions of I 986 Act and 2000 Act is that
in 1986 Act "juvenile in conflict with law" is absent. The definition of
delinquent juvenile in I 986 Act as noticed above is referable to an offence
said to have been committed by him. It is the date of offence that he was in
conflict with law. When a juvenile is produced before the competent authority H
1032
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2005 J I S.C.R.
A and or court he has not committed an offence on that date. but he was
brought before the authority for the alleged offence which he has been found
to have committed. In our view, therefore, what was implicit in 1986 Act has
been made explicit in 2000 Act.
Section 32 of the 1986 Act deals with the presumption and determination
B of age, which reads :
"32. Presumption and determination of age. - (I) Where it appears to
a competent authority that a person brought before it under any of the
provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving
C
evidence) is a juvenile, the competent authority shall make due inquiry
as to the age of that person and for that purpose shall take such
evidence as may be necessary and shall record a finding whether the
person is a juvenile or not, stating his age as nearly as may be.
(2) No order of a competent authority shall be deemed to have become
D
invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the person in respect of
whom the order has been made is not a juvenile, and the age recorded
by the competent authority to be the age of the person so brought
before it shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the true
age of that person."
E
Mr. Sharan stressed heavily on the word is used in two places of the
Section and contended that the word is suggests that for determination of age
of juvenile the date of production would be reckoning date as the inquiry
with regard to his age begins from the date he is brought before the Court
and not otherwise. We are unable to countenance this submission. We have
F already noticed that the definition of delinquent juvenile means a juvenile
who has been found to have committed an offence. The word is employed
_.
in Section 32 is referable to a juvenile who is said to have committed an
offence on the date of the occurrence. We may also notice the provisions of
Section 18 of the 1986 Act. Section 18 provides for bail and custody of
G juveniles. It reads :
H
18. BAIL AND CUSTODY OF JUVENILES. (\) When any person
accused of a bailable or non-bailable offence and apparently a juvenile
is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Juvenile
Court, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law
for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety
PRATAP SINGH v. STA TE OF .IHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.]
1033
but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for A
believing that the release is likely to bring him into association with
any known criminal or expose him to moral danger or that his release
would defeat the ends of justice.
(2) When such person having been arrested is not released on bail
under sub-section (I) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, B
such officer shall cause him to be kept in an observation home or a
place of safety in the prescribed manner (but not in a police station
or jail) until he can be brought before a Juvenile Court.
(3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (I ) by C
the Juvenile Court it shall, instead of committing him to prison, make
an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety for
such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding him as may
be specified in the order."
It will be noticed that the word is has been used in more than one place D
in this Section also. Often than not, an offender is arrested immediately after
an offence is alleged to have been committed or some time even arrested on
the spot.
This would also show that the arrest and release on bail and custody of
juveniles, the reckoning date of a juvenile is the date of an offence and not E
the date of production.
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Act heavily relied upon by the counsel
for the respondent does not envisage the production of a juvenile in the
Court.
We may also usefully refer to Sections 3 and 26 of the Act 1986.
Sections 3 and 26 of the Act reads :
"3. Continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has ceased to
F
be a juvenile. - Where an inquiry has been initiated against a juvenile G
and during the course of such inquiry the juvenile ceases to be such,
then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other
Jaw for the time being in force, the inquiry may be continued and
orders may be made in respect of such person as if such person had
continued to be a juvenile".
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"26. Special provision in respect of pending cases. - Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile
pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes
into force in that area, shall be continued in. that court as if this Act
had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has
committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of
passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile
to the Juvenile Court which.shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile
in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied·
on inquiry under this Act that the juvenile has committed the offence."
C
The legislative intendment underlying Sections 3 and 26 read with the
preamble, aims and objects of the Act is clearly discernible. A conjoint reading
of the Sections, preamble, aims and· objects of the Act leaves no matter of
doubt that the legislature intended to provide protection, treatment,
development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for"
D the adjudication thereof. Interpretation of Sections 3 and 26 of the Act are no
more res-integra. Sections 3 and 26 of the 1986 Act as quoted above are in
pari materia with Sections 3 and 26 of the Raja~than Children Act, I 970
(Raj. Act 16 of 1970). A three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra
(supra) after considering the preamble, aims and objects and Sections 3 and
26 of the Rajasthan Act, held that the Act being a piece of social legislation
E is meant for the protection of infants who commit criminal offences and,
therefore, such provisions should be liberally and meaningfully construed so
as to advance the object of the Act. This Court then said in paragraph 28 at
210 sec: ·
F
G
"28. As regards the general applicability of the Act, we are clearly of
the view that the relevant date for the applicability of the Act is the
date on which the offence takes place. Children Act was enacted to
protect young children from the consequences of their criminal acts
on the footing that their mind at that age could not be said to be
mature for imputing mens rea as in the case of an adult. This being
the intendment of the Act, a clear finding has to be recorded that the
relevant date for applicability of the Act is the date on which the
offence takes place. It is quite possible that by the time the case
'
comes up for trial, growing in age being an involuntary factor, the
~ '
child may have. ceased to be a child. Therefore, Sections 3 and 26
H
became necessary. Both the sections clearly point in the direction of
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF .IHARKHAND [SEMA . .I.]
1035
the relevant date for the applicability of the Act as the date of A
occurrence. We are clearly of the view that the relevant date for
applicability of the Act so far as age of the accused, who claims to
be a child, is concerned, is the date of the occurrence and not the
date of the trial. "
(emphasis supplied) B
As already noticed the decision rendered by a three-Judge bench of this
.. ._,
Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) was not noticed by a two-Judge bench of
+
this Court in Arni/ Das (supra). We are clearly of the view that the law laid
down in Umesh Chandra (supra) is the correct law and that the decision
rendered by a two-Judge bench of this Court in Arn it Das (supra) cannot be C
said to have laid down a good law. We, accordingly, hold that the law laid
down by a three-Judge bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra (supra) is the
correct law.
Question No.(b) :
Whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in the case a proceeding
is initiated under 1986 Act and pending when the Act of 2000 was
enforced with effect from 1.4.2001.
D
On this point, we have heard Mr. P.S. Mishra, learned senior counsel
for the appellant, Ms. Maharukh Adenwala, counsel for the intervener and E
Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned ASG for the State of Jharkhand. In fa,,t
counsel for the intervener has adopted the arguments of Mr. Mishra. Mr.
Mishra would submit that any proceeding against any person pending under
the 1986 Act would be covered by the 2000 Act and would extend the benefit
of being a juvenile as defined under the 2000 Act, if at the time of the F
commission of the offence he was below the age of I 8 years. To buttress his
point counsel heavily relied upon the provisions contained in Section .20 of
the Act and Rules 61 and 62 framed by the Central Government. Per contra
Mr. Sharan counsel for the respondent would contend that the 1986 Act has
been repealed by Section 69( I) of the 2000 Act and, therefore, the provisions G
of 2000 Act would not be exiended to a case/inquiry init!ated and pending
under the provisions of 1986 Act, the Act of 2000 being not retrospective.
To answer the aforesaid question, it would be necessary to make a
quick survey of .the definitions and Sections of 2000 Act, relevant for the
purpose of disposing of the case at hand.
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As stated hereinabove the whole object of :he Acts is to provide for the
care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of juveniles. The
Acts being benevolent legislations, an interpretation must be given which
would advance the cause of the legislation i.e.