# PRATAP SINGH v. THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH (NOW

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 509
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1956
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pratap-singh-v-the-state-of-vindhya-pradesh-now-1973
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
PRATAP SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH (NOW
MADHYA PRADESH)
JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. c. DAS GUPTA,
RAGHUBAR DAYAL and N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, JJ.
Criminal Procedure-Right of Appeal-Procedure when appellant in jail-If discriminatory-Finality of order on appeal-Code
of Criminal Procedure r898 (V of I898) ss. 420, 42I, 430-Constitution of India Art. r4.
The appellant filed an appeal while he was in jail which
was summarily dismissed on merits. Thereafter he filed a Memorandum of Appeal through a pleader which was rejected on the
ground that it was not maintainable owing to his appeal ,from
jail under s. 420 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having been
dismissed earlier. His review petition before the Judicial Commissioner was also dismissed but his prayer for certificate under
Art. 132(1) was granted.
The question was whether s. 421 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which enables a court to dismiss an appeal filed by a
convicted person, while he was in jail, without hearing him
offended against Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Held, that the Code of Criminal Procedure in giving the
right of appeal in Ch. XXXI based it on a classification which
was rational and reasonably connected with the object the
Legislature had iii view in enacting that chapter. The position
of a convicted person in jail, and therefore unable to present an
appeal either in person or through a pleader, was entirely different and distinct from that of a convicted person who was able to
do so. The Proviso to s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
in no way offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Held, also, that a second appeal from the same judgment of
conviction presented through a pleader was not maintainable
because the previous order dismissing the first appeal under
s. 420 presented from jail was lawful and final under s. 430 of the
Code.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION.
Criminal
Appeal No. 106 of 1956.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th
April, 1956, of the former Judicial Commissioner's
65
November r8.
· Pratap Singh
510
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Court, Vindhya Pradesh, Rewa in Misc. Ori. Application No. 70 of 1956.
v.
A. D. Mathur for the Appellant.
The State 0!
B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff for the ResponVtndhya Pradtsh d
t
· (Now Madhya
en .
Pradesh)
1960. November 18. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Imam].
IMAM, J.-The Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya
Pradesh granted a certificate under Art. 132(1) of the
Constitution of India as in his opinion the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Hence the present
appeal.
The appellant was convicted under s. 307, Indian
Penal Code and s. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act by
the Sessions Judge of Chatarpur. He was sentenced
to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 307,
Indian Penal Code and to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. He filed
an appeal while he was in jail which was summarily
dismissed on merits on October 28, 1955. Thereafter,
on October 31, 1955, he filed a Memorandum of Appeal
through a pleader which was rejected on November 1,
1955, on the ground that it was not maintainable
owing to his appeal from jail under s. 420 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure having been dismissed on October 28, 1955.
Thereafter, he filed a petition before the Judicial
Commissioner that the order dated Oct-0ber 28, 1955,
dismissing his appeal from jail should be reviewed
and his appeal should be reheard on merits. This
petition was also dismissed by the Judicial Commis-
~oner. The appellant had prayed for a certificate
under Arts. 132 and 134( c) of the Constitution. '!;he
Judicial Commissioner was of the opinion that no
ground had been established for grant of a certificate
under Art. 134(c) but a certificate should issue under
Art. 132(1).
The only question for determination in this appeal
is whether the case involves any substantial question

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
PRATAP SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH (NOW
MADHYA PRADESH)
JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. c. DAS GUPTA,
RAGHUBAR DAYAL and N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, JJ.
Criminal Procedure-Right of Appeal-Procedure when appellant in jail-If discriminatory-Finality of order on appeal-Code
of Criminal Procedure r898 (V of I898) ss. 420, 42I, 430-Constitution of India Art. r4.
The appellant filed an appeal while he was in jail which
was summarily dismissed on merits. Thereafter he filed a Memorandum of Appeal through a pleader which was rejected on the
ground that it was not maintainable owing to his appeal ,from
jail under s. 420 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having been
dismissed earlier. His review petition before the Judicial Commissioner was also dismissed but his prayer for certificate under
Art. 132(1) was granted.
The question was whether s. 421 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which enables a court to dismiss an appeal filed by a
convicted person, while he was in jail, without hearing him
offended against Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Held, that the Code of Criminal Procedure in giving the
right of appeal in Ch. XXXI based it on a classification which
was rational and reasonably connected with the object the
Legislature had iii view in enacting that chapter. The position
of a convicted person in jail, and therefore unable to present an
appeal either in person or through a pleader, was entirely different and distinct from that of a convicted person who was able to
do so. The Proviso to s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
in no way offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Held, also, that a second appeal from the same judgment of
conviction presented through a pleader was not maintainable
because the previous order dismissing the first appeal under
s. 420 presented from jail was lawful and final under s. 430 of the
Code.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION.
Criminal
Appeal No. 106 of 1956.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th
April, 1956, of the former Judicial Commissioner's
65
November r8.
· Pratap Singh
510
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Court, Vindhya Pradesh, Rewa in Misc. Ori. Application No. 70 of 1956.
v.
A. D. Mathur for the Appellant.
The State 0!
B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff for the ResponVtndhya Pradtsh d
t
· (Now Madhya
en .
Pradesh)
1960. November 18. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Imam].
IMAM, J.-The Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya
Pradesh granted a certificate under Art. 132(1) of the
Constitution of India as in his opinion the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Hence the present
appeal.
The appellant was convicted under s. 307, Indian
Penal Code and s. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act by
the Sessions Judge of Chatarpur. He was sentenced
to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 307,
Indian Penal Code and to 3 years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act. He filed
an appeal while he was in jail which was summarily
dismissed on merits on October 28, 1955. Thereafter,
on October 31, 1955, he filed a Memorandum of Appeal
through a pleader which was rejected on November 1,
1955, on the ground that it was not maintainable
owing to his appeal from jail under s. 420 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure having been dismissed on October 28, 1955.
Thereafter, he filed a petition before the Judicial
Commissioner that the order dated Oct-0ber 28, 1955,
dismissing his appeal from jail should be reviewed
and his appeal should be reheard on merits. This
petition was also dismissed by the Judicial Commis-
~oner. The appellant had prayed for a certificate
under Arts. 132 and 134( c) of the Constitution. '!;he
Judicial Commissioner was of the opinion that no
ground had been established for grant of a certificate
under Art. 134(c) but a certificate should issue under
Art. 132(1).
The only question for determination in this appeal
is whether the case involves any substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
had been urged before the Judicial Commissioner that
s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which enar960
Pratap Singh
bled a court to dismiss an appeal filed by a convicted
v.
person, while he was in jail, without hearing him
The state of
offended against Art. 14 of the Constitution as it dis- Vindhya Pradesh
criminated between him and a convicted person who
(Now Madhya
Pradesh)
presented his appeal either in person or through a
pleader.
Before we consider whether s. 421 of the Code offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution it is desirable to set out shortly the scheme of
appeals under Chapter XXXI of the Code of Criminal
Procedure before its amendment which came into
force in 1956. Section 404 expressly states that no
appe;i.l shall lie from any judgment or order of a
criminal court except as provided for by the Code or
by any other law for the time being in force.
This
provision is in accordance with the general principle
that no appeal lies as a matter of right unless the right
of appeal is conferred by law. There are various provisions in Chapter XXXI providing for an appeal
from various orders and sentences passed by the Criminal courts. Section 410 enables any person convicted
at a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional
Sessions Judge to appeal to the High Court. The
Court of Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh,
was a High Court for the purposes of the Code. The
appeal of the appellant from jail against his conviction and sentence by the Sessions Judge therefore lay
to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Under
s. 418 an appeal may lie on a matter of fact as well as
a matter of law, except where the trial was by jury,
in which case, the appeal would lie only on a matter of law, except ,in a case where a person had been
sentenced to death, his appeal would lie on a matter
of fact as well as a matter of law alt.hough he was
tried by a jury. The section also enables any other
person convicted at the same trial with a person so
sentenced to appeal on a matter of fact as well as a
matter of law. Section 419 enjoins that every appeal
shall be made in the form of a petition in writing presented by the appellant or his pleader and every such
Imam].
512
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
i96o
petition shall, unless the court to which it is prePYatap Singh
sented otherwise directs, be accompanied by a copy
v.
of the judgment or order appealed against and in cases
The State of
tried by jury a copy of the heads of the charge recordVindhya Pradesh ed under s. 367.
Section 420 enables a person who is
(Now Madhya in jail to present his petition of appeal and the copies
Pradesh)
accompanying the same to the Officer-In-charge of the
Imam j.
jail who shall thereupon forward such petition or copy
to the proper Appellate Court. Under s. 421 on receiving the petition and copy under s. 419 or s. 420 the
Appellate Court shall peruse the same and if it considers that there are no sufficient grounds for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily. There is
a proviso to this section which states that no appeal
presented under s. 419 shall be dismissed unless the
appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same. The only
other section for the purpose of this appeal, to which
reference need be made, is s. 430 which states that
judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court
upon appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in s. 417 and Chapter XXXII.
It will be seen from these provisions of the Code
that a convicted person, in cases where an appeal is
provided for by the Code, may file a petition of
appeal in writing presented by him or his pleader and
that if he is in jail he may file his petition of appeal
through the jail authorities who arc obliged to forward the petition to the Appellate Court concerned.
Whether an appeal is filed under s. 419 or under s. 420
of the Code, the Appellate Court has been expressly
authorized, after perusing the petition of appeal and
copies of the judgment or charge to the jury, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interference, to dismiss the appeal summarily. In the present case, the appellant was in jail and he presented
his petition of appeal to the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner under s. 420 through the jail authorities. It was summarily dismissed on merits on October 28, 1955. If that order was lawfully made the
decision of the Appellate Court was final under s. 430
of the Code. Consequently, the appeal presented by
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
the appellant through his pleader on October 31, 1955,
was patently not maintainable.
Pratap Singh
We come now to the question whether s. 421
v.
offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the ConThe state of
stitution which states that the State shall not deny to Vindhya Pradesh
any person equality before the law or the equal pro-
(Now Madhya
tection of the laws within the territory of India. This
Pradesh)
Court has decided in many cases what are the matters
to be considered in order to determine whether a
particular pie,ce of legislation is discriminatory and
consequently in contravention of the provisions of
Art. 14. It is unnecessary to refer to them. The
object of Chapter XXXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure was to make provisions for appeals against
conviction in certain cases. Where no appeal is provided by th.is Chapter no further question arises
because no one can claim that he has a right to appeal
from any decision of a criminal court. Every person
convicted at a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an
Additional Sessions Judge has been given the right to
appeal to the High Court by virtue of the provisions
of s. 410 of the Code. The right to appeal having
been so given the Code provided the manner in which
such appeal should be presented which is to be
found in ss. 419 and 420 of the Code. These two
sections contemplate various possibilities (1) that a
convicted person who is not in jail presents his petition of appeal in person; (2) that a convicted person
though unable to present his petition of appeal personally owing to various reasons, inclucVng his being in
jail, can present it through his pleader and (3) where
the convicted person is in jail and thus unable to present his petition in person, and is unable to engage a
pleader to present his petition of appeal, can present
it through the jail authorities. Where the convicted
person presents his appeal in person or through a pleader under s. 421 his appeal shall not be dismissed summarily unless he or his pleader is given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in support of his petition.
No such consideration arises in the case of a convicted
person who is unable to present his petition in person
or through a pleader. There is a rational basis for
Imam J.
514
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
'960
making the classification mentioned above which has
Pratap Singh
a reasonable connection with the object of the legislav.
tion providing for appeals under Chapter XXXI.
The state of
Under s. 410 there is no discrimination as any person
Vindhya Pradesh convicted at a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an
(Now Madhya Additional Sessions Judge may appeal to the High
Pradesh)
Court. 'Vhere the convicted person is able to present
Imam J.
his petition of appeal in pereon his position is entirely
different from a person who is unable to do so because
he is in jail. Similarly, a convicted person whether
in jail or not who can present his petition through a
pleader is in a different position from a convicted person who is in jail and is unable to present his petition
through a pleader. The Code intended in the case of
a convicted person who presents his petition of appeal
while in jail that his petition and the judgment of the
court which convicted him must be considered by the
Appellate Court before it is summarily dismissed,
otherwise the right of appeal conferred on such a person under s. 410 would be meaningless. In the case
of such a person no question could arise of his being
heard in person because he has not presented the
appeal in person nor could there be any question of
his pleader being heard because no pleader had been
engaged by him to present the appeal. Different considerations arise in the case of a convicted person who
presents his petition of appeal in person or through
a pleader in which case he or his pleader mtrnt be
heard before the appeal is summarily dismissed.
There is, therefore, a rational basis for making the
classification into three categories which has a reasonable connection with the object of tho Code. It could
not therefore be said that the proviso to s. 421
offends againr;t the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It was, however, contended that although an
appeal filed under s. 420 may have been dismissed
summarily a subsequent appeal filed through a pleader ought tu have been heard and the Judicial
Commissioner erred in holding that the appeal did
not lie.
The appeal could not have been summarily rejected without the pleader having been
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
heard. From that point of view the provisions of
r96o
s. 421 had not been complied with. It is sufficient to
Pratap Singh
say that if the order dated Octobe.r 28, 1955, dismisv.
sing the appellant's appeal under s. 420 was lawful,
The State of
a second appeal from the same judgment of convic- Vindhya Pradesh
tion presented through a pleader was not maintain-
(Now Madhya
able because the previous order of the High Court
Pradesh)
dismissing the appeal was final under s. 430 of the
Imam J.
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Certain cases were
relied upon to which reference has been made by the
Judicial Commissioner. Those cases can be distinguished from the present case. In none of them was
it decided that where an order dismissing the appeal
is lawful a subsequent appeal filed through a pleader
was maintainable. In our opinion, there is no substance in this point, once it is held that the order
dated October 28, 1955, was a lawful order which, we
think, it was, as in our opinion the proviso to s. 421
in no way offends against the provisions of Art. 14
of the Constitution. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
KEKI BEJONJI AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY.
(JAFER IMAM, K. SUBBA RAO and
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Search-Recovery of articles-Denial of -all
knowledge of articles recovered-No questions put on articles recovered-accused, if prejudiced-Presumption-Servant in premises
of master-Whether in possession of master's goods-·Code of Criminal Procedure, z898_(V of I898), s. 34z-Bombay Prohibition Act,
I949 (Bom. z5 of z949), ss. 65(b), 65(f), 66(b).
During the search of the premises of the appellant No. I
a complete working still was found which was being worked by
the appellant No. I and his servant, appellant No. 2. The
Presidency Magistrate was satisfied that a working still and
November z8.