# PRECISION STEEL AND El~GINEERING WORKS AND ANOTEER v. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL - **Citation:** [1983] 1 S.C.R. 498 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1982-10-07 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 209 . of 1981 - **Bench:** D.A. Dbsai, A.P. Sen, Baharul Islam - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/precision-steel-and-el-gineering-works-and-anoteer-v-prem-deva-niranjan-deva-8579 - **Pages:** 42 ## Headnote Delhi Rent Conlfol :Act, 1958-Sub-s. (5) of S. 258 read with Clouse ( e) of . . f' - proviso to S. 14( !)-Jurisdiction of Controller-Grant of leave to tenant to contest . landlord's application for eviction-Nature and scope of. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Sub-S. (I) of S. 31-Not attracted at the stage of considering affidavit of tenant seeking leave to contest under sub-s. (5) of s.2so: ' Code of CM/ Procedure, 1908-0. XXXV!l, rule 3(5) and De/ht Rent Control Act, 1958-S. 25B(5J~Jurisdiction to grant /eaVe-Comparison of., Re1tt restriction legislation-Approach to interpretation of. Laws of procedure-Approach to interprela!ion of. A landlord cab make an application for recovery of possession under Clause (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the ground that the premises let for residential purposes· are required by him bona fide for occupation as-a residence for himself or for any me(I!.ber of bis family dependent upon him, provided be has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Sub·s. (5) of s. 25B lays down that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application, if the affidavit filed by the tenant "discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining on order for recOvery of posstssion" of the premises on the ground specified in Cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1). The respondent, a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), filed a petition under Cl. (e) of proviso to s. 14(1) through the constituted attorney of its karta for an order for recovery of possession of the premises in question alleging that the premises had initially been given to the .appellant on leave and licence, that the landlord (the karta of the HUF) who had gone out of the country had since settled down in Delhi, that the landlord bad called upon the appellant 'in May, 1974 to vacate the l'remises as be had no otbcr suitable accommodation and that , . .. > • • PRECISION STEEL, V. PREM DEVA 499, the landlord bona fide required the same for hiS personal'occ~pation. The appellant SOU;ght leave 'tO cont~~t the petitioll and filed an affidavit denying the allegatioi;i that it bad entered the premises initially as a licensee and.contending that accbrding to cl. 6. of the lease agreement the premises Were let for residential as well as comme'rcial pufpose, that the landlord ·had been 'residing in a house as ¥' spa~ious as the demised premises and equa.lly spacious accommodation 1in an idehtical unit located at the back side of the demised premises was available to . hirh which had beeri let successively to three tenants during tho period 1970 to ' 197,6, each· time ~:Hsing the rent, and further-that .the landlOrd owned spacious acCommodation at. another place in Delhi. An affidavit in reply was filed on be'half of the landlord slating that the landlord had no interest in the building in · vAiich he was residing, that the identical· unit located on the back side of the ~cm.ised premises had been let to a tenant upto 19_81 and that the accommodation / ~ocated at anot~er place in Delhi and referred to by the appellant was only a t' . ; garage block. · The Controller decided all questions of fact t'aking the affidavits as unquestioned evidenc~ and· refu'sed to grant · teave to the appellant to contest thC petition and passed an order of ev'iction in favour of the landlord. The revision , . petition filed by the appellant against· the order was rejected by the High Court. · · ' The question before the court was : What is the jurisdiction of the Controller un~er Sub-s. (5) of.s.25B while dealing with. an affidavit of the tenant seeICing leave to contest an application fof eviction filed by a landlord under ·cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) · 1 · Allowing the appeal, HELD : (By the Full Court) Leave to contest the petition for evictiOn under ct: (e) of proviso to S.14(1) must be granted to the appellant under sub s. (5)'of sub-s. 25B 1 of the Delhi Rent . ' I Control Act, J958. ~ ( pttr Desa ## Text _Characters 0–39,949 of 110,999. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39949 for what follows._ A B E F G • JJ 498 PRECISION STEEL AND El~GINEERING WORKS AND ANOTEER v. .PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL October 7, 1982 [D.A. DBSAI, A.P. SEN AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.] Delhi Rent Conlfol :Act, 1958-Sub-s. (5) of S. 258 read with Clouse ( e) of . . f' - proviso to S. 14( !)-Jurisdiction of Controller-Grant of leave to tenant to contest . landlord's application for eviction-Nature and scope of. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958-Sub-S. (I) of S. 31-Not attracted at the stage of considering affidavit of tenant seeking leave to contest under sub-s. (5) of s.2so: ' Code of CM/ Procedure, 1908-0. XXXV!l, rule 3(5) and De/ht Rent Control Act, 1958-S. 25B(5J~Jurisdiction to grant /eaVe-Comparison of., Re1tt restriction legislation-Approach to interpretation of. Laws of procedure-Approach to interprela!ion of. A landlord cab make an application for recovery of possession under Clause (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the ground that the premises let for residential purposes· are required by him bona fide for occupation as-a residence for himself or for any me(I!.ber of bis family dependent upon him, provided be has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Sub·s. (5) of s. 25B lays down that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application, if the affidavit filed by the tenant "discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining on order for recOvery of posstssion" of the premises on the ground specified in Cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1). The respondent, a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), filed a petition under Cl. (e) of proviso to s. 14(1) through the constituted attorney of its karta for an order for recovery of possession of the premises in question alleging that the premises had initially been given to the .appellant on leave and licence, that the landlord (the karta of the HUF) who had gone out of the country had since settled down in Delhi, that the landlord bad called upon the appellant 'in May, 1974 to vacate the l'remises as be had no otbcr suitable accommodation and that , . .. > • • PRECISION STEEL, V. PREM DEVA 499, the landlord bona fide required the same for hiS personal'occ~pation. The appellant SOU;ght leave 'tO cont~~t the petitioll and filed an affidavit denying the allegatioi;i that it bad entered the premises initially as a licensee and.contending that accbrding to cl. 6. of the lease agreement the premises Were let for residential as well as comme'rcial pufpose, that the landlord ·had been 'residing in a house as ¥' spa~ious as the demised premises and equa.lly spacious accommodation 1in an idehtical unit located at the back side of the demised premises was available to . hirh which had beeri let successively to three tenants during tho period 1970 to ' 197,6, each· time ~:Hsing the rent, and further-that .the landlOrd owned spacious acCommodation at. another place in Delhi. An affidavit in reply was filed on be'half of the landlord slating that the landlord had no interest in the building in · vAiich he was residing, that the identical· unit located on the back side of the ~cm.ised premises had been let to a tenant upto 19_81 and that the accommodation / ~ocated at anot~er place in Delhi and referred to by the appellant was only a t' . ; garage block. · The Controller decided all questions of fact t'aking the affidavits as unquestioned evidenc~ and· refu'sed to grant · teave to the appellant to contest thC petition and passed an order of ev'iction in favour of the landlord. The revision , . petition filed by the appellant against· the order was rejected by the High Court. · · ' The question before the court was : What is the jurisdiction of the Controller un~er Sub-s. (5) of.s.25B while dealing with. an affidavit of the tenant seeICing leave to contest an application fof eviction filed by a landlord under ·cl. (e) of the proviso to s. 14(1) · 1 · Allowing the appeal, HELD : (By the Full Court) Leave to contest the petition for evictiOn under ct: (e) of proviso to S.14(1) must be granted to the appellant under sub s. (5)'of sub-s. 25B 1 of the Delhi Rent . ' I Control Act, J958. ~ ( pttr Desai a_nd Baharul Islam, JJ.) . ~. 1. (a) While examining the question whether leave to defend ought or ough not to be granted, the limited jurisdiction which the Controller enjoys is prescribed, within well defined limits. ·The langtiage of sub·s·. (5) of s. 2.SB casts a statutory duty on the Controller to give to the tenant leave to contest the application, the - only pre-cc;>ndition for exercise of jurisdiction b~ing that the affi.davi~ ff!Cd by the tenant discloses such facts as wOuld: diseiltitle the . landlord froni. obtaining an ·order (or the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground mentioned in s. 14(1)(e). The legislature has used. the expression ''t.he Controller shall give leave to the tenant to cqntest ·the applicaf.ion." When the 13.nguage of a statute is plain the principle that legislature speaks ''its mind in the plainest' language has to be given full effect. The legfslature bas used the plainest language na,mely \ •'facts,disclosttd in the affidavit of the tenant,. and av~ided th~ v,hraseolo~y of th,e \ A c D B G H 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1983] 1 S.C,ll. • A analogous provision in Order XXXVll, C.P.C., namely "substantial defence" and "vexatious and frivolous defence". [513 F; 514 E; 513 G,· 514 B-D] B c D E F G H (b) Undoubtedly, the rules of natural justice, apart ·from the adversary system.we foUow Must permit the la~dlord to contest the affidavit file~ by the tenant and he can do so by filing an' affidavit in reply. If the averments mad.e in the affidavit of the tenant are controverted by the landlord, that fact may be bom.e in mind but if the facts disclosed in 1the affidavit of the tenant are contested by way of proof or disproof or producing evide~ in the form of oth~r affidayits or documents that would not be permissible. The Controller has to confine him· self to the affidavit filed by. the tenant under sub-s. (4) of s. 2;B and the reply', if any and on perusing these, he has to pose to himself the only question : D6es the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts a_s would disentit1e the landlord froin obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the grpund specified in El: 14(l)(e) 1 On browsing through the affidavit of the tenant~ if there emerges averment of facts wh~ch, on a trial, if belie~ed would non-suit the landlord, leave ought to be granted. The Controller is not to record a fitlding on disputed questions Of facts or his preference of onl! set of affidavits against other set of affidavits as it is clear from the language of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B that be has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as Would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord-from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. It is wholly impermissible for the Controller to proceed to examine the rival contentions on the basis of affidavits untested by cross- , examinat4on and unproved documents. The regular trial required to be hC:ld by a Court of Stnall Causes as contemplated by sub-s. (6) read with srib-s. (7) of s.25B is not to be substituted by affidavits and counter.affidavits. The scheme of s. 258 ~ 'does· not introduce· a· trial for arriving at the truth at the stage of proceeding contemplated by sub-s. (4) of s. 25B. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are contr'6verted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come. Plausibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially di!fere~t from each other and ·one cannot bring in the concept of proof at the stage when plausibility has to be shown. [524 B; 523 H; 524 A; 515 G-H; 514 A; 516 A-C; 517 E-G; 518 B; 516-E] Santosh Kumar v. flhai Moo! Singh, [1958] S.C.R. 1211, rel!ed on. 1 ' S. Kanjibhai & Ors. v. Mohanraj Rajendra Kumar. A.LR. 1970,_Gujarat 32 ,.): and Kishan Singh v. Mo~d. Shafi & Ors., A.LR. 1964 J & K 39; approved. / . ' (c) 'Section 14(1) starts with a non obstante clause whi~h would necessarily imply that the Controller is precluded from passing an order for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord unless the case is covered by any of the clauses of the proviso. Upon a true construction of cl. (e) of the proviso t~ s. 14(1) it would appear that the burden is on th.e landlord to satisfy tbe Controller that the pren1ises are let for residential purpos~. that possession is required by him bona fide for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family and that he has no other reasOnably soi.table residential accommodation. · This burden, the-landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gets jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. On a combined reading of s. l4(1)(e) and sub~ss. (1) and (4) of s. 25B, the legal positiOn that emerges is that on a proper application being made iq the prescrib~d manner which i.s requir~d to be •, PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA 501 supported by an affidavit, unless the tenant obtains leave to defend as c~ntempla.' ted by s"ub-ss. (4) and (5) of s. 25B, the tenant is deemyd to have adfnitted all tJ:ie averrnents made in the petition filed by the landlord and the Controller "'oul.d act on the admission of the tenant presuming every averment in the petition of the landlord as uncha1lengable and truthful. This consequence itself is sufficient to liberally approach the prayer for leave to' contest the petition. [514 E-H; 515 D-E; 513 E] (d) The underlying thrust of all rent restriction legislation is to chCck profiteering by owners of property and to protect weaker sections. Their provisions are not to be so construed or interpreted as would make the protection conferred on the tenant illusory. [512 E'F; 510 E-F] Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Sabrat Das & Anr., [1969]' 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi & Ors. v. Shri K.L. Bansal, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048, Bega Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan & Ors., [1979] 2 S.C.R. I and Kewal Singh v. Lajwanli, [1980] !"S.C.R. 854 referred to. (e) A code of procedure is something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends. Our lawS of procedure are grounded on a principle of .natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard. Too technical a construction that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should be guarded against lest the very means deSigned .for the rurtheranCe or justice be used ·to frustrate it. The procedure prescribed in Chap. IIIA is harsh ~ and weighted agai~st the tenint. The Contro Iler is the final arbiter of facts. Once leave is refused no appeal is provided against the order refusing leave. No one should be in doubt about the narrow \.onstricted jurisdiction of the High Court While interfering with 'findings of facts in exercise of ieVisional jurisdiction. Wisdom, sagacity and the consequence of refUsal to grant leave coupled With limited scope of i_nquiry being confirled to facts disclosed in the affidavit of the tenant should guide the approach of the Controller. [527 B-C; 513 D; S27 _F-G-H; 528 A] A B c D . Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr., [1955] 2 S.C.R. I and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978} 2 S.C.R. 621\ referred to. -F J:· -~ In the instaOt case, the Controller had overJooked disclosure of important \. facts which put the bonafides of the landlord in issue and necessitated gra'.nJ of leave to the appellant: The leave and ~licence ag-reement had been renewed in 1972'and 1973 though the landlord had been in Delhi since 1972; the landlord had admitted that the identical unit at the back of the demisod Premises which .bad fallen vacant in 1973 had been Jet out to another tenant.; no actiOn had been taken till 1979 on the notice seeking- eviction served in 1974; every tirne a·fresh letting had been indulged into, it had been done after raising the rent; and the landlord who had sought possession 'for himself and was admittedly in Delhi had not stated a single word on oatQ. about his requirements and as to in what right be was occupying the premises ·in which he was staying. [529 B-H; 530 A·E] The High Court had adopted an incorrect approach as to how the matter · had to be ex:imine~ at the stage of $,rantipg or refusing to grant leave under s~~~ \ G H 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 1 S.C.R. A s. (5) of s. 25B. It had failed to ascertain as to when the licence bad been terminated and a contract Or lease entered into and what were the terms of the lease as alleged by the landlord and whether the rules of the local authority pern1ttted use of the premises for non~residential purposes. The High Court had dismissed the 'Contention that the landlord had othet suitable accommodation by an observation that the Controller had rightly come to the con:Iusion that the premises in which the landlord was residing belonged not to' the landlord but to his brother. This B approach was unjustified because the question was not whether the landlord was the owner of the premises occupied by him but the substantial question was in what right he was occupying it for a period extending. over 7 years and bow it had beeomo imperative for him to"vacate the same. [5.30 F-H; 531 A·H) c I D E F G H 2. The contention that the non obstante clause in sub-s. (7) of s. 25B excludes the application of sub-s. (2) of s. 37 but not. of s\Jb·s.(1) of s. 37 and therefore it was obligatory for fbe Controller to .not only hear the landlord but examine evidence at the stage of granting or refusing to grant leave to contest' cannot 'be accepted. Sub-s. (2) of s. 37 provides· that subject to any rules that may be made under the-Act, the Controller shalJ, while holding an inquiry in any proceedings before him, follow as fai' as may be, the practice and procedure of a "Court of Small Causes. including the recording of eVidence. The very fact that sub-s. (7) · of s. 25B provides that while holdins an inquiry in a proceeding to· which Chap. IIIA appiies, the Cbniroller has to ,follow the practice and procedure of a- Court of Small Causes including the recording of evidence i~di~ates the legislative intention of treating Chap. IIIA and especially s. 25B as a self-contained code and this conclusion·. is buttressed by· the provision in sub-s. (1) of s. 25B which · provictes that every application by· landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground speci{ied in cl. ,(e) of the proviso to. s. 14(]) shaU be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in s. 25B. That is why sub-s. (7) of s. 25B .opens with a non obstante clause. Any other section, including sub-s. (l) .of s. 37 p.rescribing procedure for disposal of an application covered by sub·s. (I) of s. 25B is therefore excluded . .The exclusion of s. 37(1) also necessarily follows. from the provision contained in sub-s. (10) of s. 25B which makes it .clear' that the procedure prescribed for hoiding a~ inquiry consequent upon the granting of -leave to contest shal-1 by the same as required to be followed · by the Controller for disposal of applications. Sub~s. (10) of s. 25B operates to · 'bring ins. 37(1) after leave tO contest is granted. If sub-s. (1) of s. 37 were to govern all proceedings including the application for leave to contest the proceedings, both sub-s. (7) and sub-s. (IO) of s. 25B w6uld be rendered redundant. [525 C; 0 524 E-F; 526 A·B; 525 A-B; 525 E-F-H) 3. Neither the argumer\t that the Scope arid ambit of sub~s. (5). of s. 25B of the Act in it~ comparison with 0. XXXVII, r. 3 sub-r. (5) C.P.C. is no more res integra in view of the decision in Busching Schmitz ( P) Ltd. v. P.T. Mengha'ni & Anr. nor the interpretation of t~e C1bservations therein to the effect that the scope for granting leave undef sub-s. (5) of s. 25B is narrower than the one under 0. XXXVII, r. 3-Can be accepted. It is not clear from the decision whether the Court took Dote of the whole of the re-structured r. 3 or it was keeping in veiw the unamended .r. 3 of 0. XXXVII. The provisoes to O. XXXVII, r. 3 make it clear that leave to defend shall not be refused unless· the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate thai he has ·a substantial (l~fen~ t<.> rajse qr t~~t che defence intended tp be put up by the defendant is , " I PRECISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA 503 frivolous or vexatious. On the other hand. sub·s. (5) of s. 25B makes it obligatory upcn 1hc Controller, by u~e of mandatory Ja~guage, to give leave · if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would· diSentitle the ·landlord from Qbtaining an order for recOvery of posseision. Under 0. XXXVII, r. 3,.defenCe has to be sllbstantial before leave can be obtained. fyferC disclosure of facts is the ,sine qua non under sub s. (5) of s. 25B. Further, the Court can grant 1conditional leave or leave limited to the issue under 0. XXXVII, r. 3; no· such power is conferred on the Controller under sub·s. (5) of s. 25B. Assuming that O. XXXVIJ, r. 3 (5) confers wider discretion on the Court, that, by mere comparison, cannot cut down 9r narrow or limit the power coupled with the duty conferred On the Contro'Uer under sub s. (5) of s. 2SB. , [519 D-H; 520 A·G; 519 A-B; 521 Fl I " ... . Busching Schmitz (P) Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani & Anr., [1977] 3 S.C.R. 312;. B.N .. Mutta & Anr: y. T.K. Nandi, [1979] i S.C.R. 409; Charan Dass DUffgal v. Brahma Nand (C.A. No. 179/82 decided OD 11-1-1982) and Om Prakash S~lu}" v. Smt. Saraswati Devi (C.A. No. 527/82.~ecided OD 8-2-1982), referred to. · Sa~~a.n. Singh & Anr; v. Kasturilal, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 421, distinguished. Mohan/al v Tirath Ram Chopra. & Anr. 22 (1982) Delhi Law Times !, disapproved. (per Sen, J., disSenting) 1. (a) ·There is a definite public purpose behind ·enactment of Chap. IIIA and sub-s. (5) of s. 25B musl be construed in a Sense whiCh. would carry out that purpose. I s.' 1"4A was eii~Cted to ensure that all government servants to whom residen.tial accommodation had been a Hotted by . the Government vacated such accommodation if they had any, house of their oWn in the Union Territory or· Delhi 1 and the section conferred upon them the right" to recover immediate possession of their own houses. Further, experience in the past had shown. thit landlords who were in bpnafide requirement of thCir accommodation( · for residential purpose under cl. (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 14 were being pUt tO great hardship due to the dilatory procedure of the suit. The object behind enactment of Chai). IllA was that these two classes of landlords should not be at the mercy of law's delays but there s,hould be a quick and ~>-...i._~, expeditious re_medy ava.ilable1to them agai!lst their" own tenants. The provisions 'fri Chap. IIJA confer a real, effective and immediate right to obtain possession by confining the trial only to such 'cases where the tenant bas such a defence ·as 1 would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order fof eviction under s:t4(l)(e) or under. s. 14A. Chap. Ill A seeks _to stiike a balance ·betwee,n the competing needs of a . 1andlord and a tenant and has therefore provided that the tenant· shall have a right to apply" for leave to contest. The words ''if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fe clear, specific and~positive. The defence must also be ·bona fide and if true, must result iii the dismissal of landlord's. application. Defences of negative char_acter which are intended to put the landlord to proof or are vague, or are raised ma/a.fide only to gain time and protract the proceedings, are not of the kind which will entitle the tenant to the grant of leave. The Controller cannot set down the ff . application for bearing without n1aking an order in terms of sub-s. (5) of s. 25B •. ·The tdal must be confined only to such grounds as would disentitle the land·. lord to any relief. [538 C-F] ' 1 \ , • .. .;.> Pil.ECISION STE~L v. PREM DEVA (Desai, 1.) 505 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 209 . of 1981. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 8th December, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No. 317 of 1980. ' . Dr. Y.S. Chitale, K:K. Mancha.nda and C.N. Murty for the , Appellant. \ D.V. Patel U.R. La/it, Pramod D"yal; Rajesh Mitra and S.K. Gupta for the Respondent.· ·The following Judgments were delivered ' DESAI, J. A provision conferring power enacted to mollify slogans chanting public opinion of speedy justice, if not wisely· interpreted. may not only prove counter-productive but disastrous.· And that is the only raison d'etre for this judgment because in the course of hearing at the stage of granting special leave Mr. D.V. Patel, leamed counsel for the respondent straightway conceded that . ' this is such a case in whic1l-1eave to defend could ·never have been refused. Unfortunately, however, not a 'day passes without the routine refusal of leave, tackled as a run of mill case by the High Court in revision with one won! judgment 'rejected', has much to our discomfiture impelled u; write to this short judgment. 'First the brief narration of facts .. Respondent M/s. Piem Deva Niranjan Dava Tayal (Hindu Undivided Family) through Prem Deva Tayal, constituteil attorney of Niranjan Deva Tayal (landlord) moved the C,ontroller having jurisdiction by a petition under section 14 (1) proviso (e) [for short 's. 14 (e)'] read with section 25B of the Delhi. Rerlt Control Act, 19 58 ('Act' for short), for an order for recovery of possession of the premises being, front portion of premises bearing No. B,44, Greater Kailash Part I, New Delhi, 'on the ground that the premises were let out for residential purpose and are now required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself and the members of his family dependent on him and that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. To this petition he impleaded M/s. Precision Steel & Engineering Works (tenant), a firm and Shri B.K. Beriwala cons- . titutcd attorney of the firm. Landlord alleged in his petition th;it . ----·--- - A B c D E F G H ' ,, A B c D E F G H \ SiJl>iUJM~ COURT REPORTS [ 1983 I 1 S.C,R. the premises in question were first given on leave and license and subsequently relationship of lessor and lessee was established and that the tenant is in possession since Octpher I, 1971. Landlord further alleged that he now requires the premises for himself and the members of his family consisting of himself, his wife and two school going children. He admitted that he has been; employed in India ~ince 1965 .but was posted at Bombay in 1970 arid returned to Delhi in 1972. He went to Saudi Arabia and has now returned to India. It was alleged that on May I, 1974, he called upon the tenant to vacate the premises but the ro;quest has fallen on deaf ears. It was specifically alleged that as tl:ie landlord has now taken up a job and has settled down'in Delhi and that he has no other suitable accommodation, and accordingly he bonafide requires possession of the demised premises for his personal' occupation. It. was allege(! that M/s. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal (HUF) is the owner of the 1 suit premises and Shri Niranjan Deva Tayal is the Karla of the · HUF and second notice dated June 22, 1979 was given under instructions by the constituted attorney Prem Deva Tayal. Even though the landlord who sought possession of tire premises for his personal requirment was in Delhi at the relevant time, i.e. in 1979, the petitioh' was also filed through the constituted attorney and Niranjan Deva Tayal who seeks p°Ossession for his use being in Delhi and available is conspicuous by his absence throughout the pNceedings. On the petition being lodged the Controller directed summons· to be ser.ved in the prescribed form. On service of the summons the tenant being a firm M/s. Precision Steel & Engineering Works, and its constituted attorney Shri B.K. Beriwala appeared and filed an affidavii seeking leave to contest eviction petition. Io the affidavit teriant contended that respondent I, i.e. M/s Precision Steer & Engineering Works is the tenant and respondent 2 does not claim any interest in the premises in question in his personal capacity and ought not to have been impleade\! as ·a respondent. While denying that there is any undivided family styled as Prem Deva· Niranjao Deva Tay al it was contended that. the petitioner is not entitled to file a petition ,under section 14 (1) (e) because the purpose'o( letting · was not residential alone but combined purpose of residence-cumbusiness. It was denied that the tenant entered the premises as a licensee and subsequently the conrract of lease was entered into and it was submitted that the tenant entered the premises as tenant • . PRECISION STEEL· v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.) 507 effective from September 13, 1971, and .the lease was for residentialcum-commercial purpose. A specific agreement was pleaded that the tenant which is a partnership was entitled to use the premises for the residence of the director and/or partner as also for. the office purpose. Reliance was placed on clause 6 of the License agreement, which was really and substantially according to the tenant a contract of lease. Jt was also alleged that since the inception of the tenancy the preJ!lises have been used both. for residence and business purposes · to the knowledge of liindlo,rd and local authorities and no objection · has been raised in this behalf. It was emphatically denied that the premises were required by the landlord for his .personal use as ' well as for .the use of the members of his family and it was also denied· that the landlord has not in hi.s possession reasonably suitable aecommodation in Delhi. It was positively averred that Niranjan Deva Tay al who claims to be the owner of the premises· and for~ ·whose pers~nal requirement the eviction petition, has been filed · has been residing at · 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi and that · is the address of the landlord set out in cause title or' the petition filed by the attorney. Dimension of the premises in possession of the landlord was gi~en out as.2-1/2 storey building built on a plot of 1000 sq. yards. It was averred that the building now in possession of the lail~lord is divided into four blocks or units, each block consisting of four bed rooms, three bath rooms, one kitch~n, one ·living room and one ctrawing-cuoi-dinfog room. It was in terms stated that the whole of the house is in occupation and possession of petitioner landlord and he has been residing all along in the house much.prior to the beginning of tenancy and.·he is in possession' of' the· same. It was further averred that the petitioner has concealed the fact that petitioner is the owner of another building at ·52 Anand Lok, New Delhi, ~hich building is equally big. One other a~erment of which notice may be taken is that the petitioner has been managing both the buildings and whenever blocks fair vacant he lets · ·~. them out at higher rent. It was· specifically stated· that front portion of the building at B-44, Greater Kailash Part I has the same accom- ) modation as the building which the landlord has in his possession 'at present. In order to point out' that the petitioner landlord when he comes inio possessio11 of premises vacated by tenants lets out the :same at higher rent thereby .contravening law and obtains unlawful enrichment, It was averred that the premises of identical size and nature situated at the back of the demised' pr~mises were taken on rent ,bY M/s. Kirloskar Company during the period .1970-73 and when ·A c .o E G H A B 0 D E • ll G H 508 • StJPkEME COURT REPORTS [ 1983 I t s,c.k. vacated by the tenant the same was let out to Food Corporation of India from 1974·1975 and after getting the same. vacated the same was let'oqt in 1976 to Yash Mahajan and on each such opportunity rent was enhanced. It was accordingly_ alleged that the petition is malafide and the claim of bona fide requirement ii' utterly un· tenable. . A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the landlord to the · affidavit seeking leave to defend reiterating what was averred in \he main petition, namely, that Prem Deva Niranjan De~a Tay al (HUF) is the owner of the property and · that Niranjan Deva Tayal is the Karla of the same. It was stated that the landlord bona fide required the . premises for his own 11se. With reference to 'the building situated at 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi, it was stated that Niranjan peva Tayal has no interest in the property and that the petitioner Niranjan Deva Tayal has no other suitable residential accommodation in Delhi. It was claimed that the property d{ 32, Anand Lok, New Delhi, belongs to one K.D. Tayal. .The dimension of the house was also disputed. With reference to the premises at 52, Anand Lok, . it was stated that the building is not being used as residential premises but is only a garage block. It was further averred that Niranjan Deva Tayal was serving in Saudi Arabia and, therefore, the premises were given on leave and license but now that the petitioner has returned to India and has perma· nently settled down he requires the premises for his own use. A further averment was made to the effect that the block at the back of the demised premises is at present in occupation of M/s. Coronation Spinning· Co., Dadra, and the ·occupant is entitled to occupy the premises till 1981. ' / ' Frankly, in appeal by special leave under Article 136 it was not necessary to set out the pleadings in detail.. However, as the question before this Court is whether leave to contest the petition ought not to be granted and that is clearly relatable and wholly dependent upon the averments in the pleadings and the disputed questions· of facts arising therefrom and that is the apology for detailed narration of rival contentions. And now to law. Section 14 (I) (e) of the Act reads as under: ' ' , ' PRBCISIO~ STEEL' v. PREM i>BV~ (Desai, J.). 509 "14 (1) )'lotwithstanding anything to •the contrary contained in any other law or ·contract, no order ·or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made ·by any court or Controller in favour of the land' lord against a tenant ; Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed· manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or ;,ore ·of the following grounds only, namely :-.. (e) that the . premises let for residential · purposes are required bona' fide by the landlord for occupation .as · .a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if·he is the owner therecf, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person. llas no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; A B c D Explanation : For the purposes of this Clause, "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commero cial or other purposes;" E' Section 25B which forms part of Chapter IIIA was introduced in the Act by Amending Act 18 of 1976 with effect from December 1, 1975. ' The fasciculus of sections is headed 'Summary Trial of Certain Applications'. 'Section 25B (!), (ii) and (5) are, material for the present purpose. They read as under : "25B (I) ' Every application by a l~ndlord for the' recovery of . possesion of any premises on the ground specified in. clause (e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (I) of section 14 or under section l 4A, shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section. (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served F G (whether in the ordinary way or by registered' post) in H the form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for evictiO!l from the premises unless A .B c F G H 510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) l s.C.R. he files an affidavit stati0g the ·grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction. and obtains leave from controller as hereinafter provided; and in defa~lt of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement . made by the landlord· in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an otder for eviction on the ground aforesaid. (5) The Controller shall give to· the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under sec. 14A." • The increased tempo of industrialisation since the independence resulted in mass migration of .population from rural to urban areas. This urbanisation process resulted in phenomenal demand for housilig accommo~ation. Harsh economic law of demand and supply 'operated with full vigour to the disadvantage of the under privileged. To checkmate the profiteering by the owners of property and to protect the weaker sections,' most of the States in our country enacted legislation for the protection of tenants of premises situated in urban and semi-urban areas.· These legislations have been enacted with the avowed object of putting a fetter on the unrestricted right of re-entry enjoyed by the ,landlords with a view to protecting the tenants assuring security of tenure. This avowed object and purpose for enacting legislation must always inform and guide the interpre- '· ' tative process 'Of such socially oriented beneficial legislation. But the language of the statute·. bas to be kept in view to determine the width and ambit· of protection. Normally in all such statutes a provision is inserted· pre.scribing 'enabling provision under which landlord can recover possession and thereby restricted the unfettered right of re-entry. One such provision normally to be found in all such statutes is the one which enables a landlord to recover possession if he bona fide requires the same. for occupation by himself or for the use of the members of the family dependent .on him. If the landlord seeks possession bona fide for his personal requirement, Ii~ ' ' ._/ PREOISION STEEL v. PREM DEVA (Desai, J.) Sil must co1i1mence.the action by filirg a petition and the tenant' would. be entitled to appear and defend the action. While defending the action in an adversary system the tenant would file his written statement raising contentions which ·in terms would focus the attention of the court on questions of facts in dispute on .the basis of which issues on which parties are at variance would be framed. Both the 'parties would lead evidence· and ultimately on evaluation of evi4ence the court/Controller would determine the issues on the principle of preponderance of probability and answer the issues one way ·or the 'other determining the fate of the petition. That was the position under the Act. On the introduction of Chapter IHA a notable departure has been made in the Act with regard to the procedure for trial of actions brought · under section · 14A and 14(l)(e). ·When a petition is brought before the Controller under section l 4(l)(e) a summorts Ms tO be issued to tlie tenant and when the sum.mans is served the tenant cannot straightway proceed to contest the petition for evi«ti\lll from the premises but either he must surrender possession or seek leave tQ contest the peti" tion. While seeking leave be must file an affidavit setting out the grounds on which he se~ks to contest the application for eviction. ' . . This is the Scheme of s~ction 25B(l) and ( 4). Then comes section 25B(5) which provides that the Controller is under a statutory dutynote the expression "shall give leave to the tenant to contest the application"-'-to grant leave if the ''\ffidavit filed by the tenant dis; · closes such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession' of the premises on the ground mentioned in section 14(l)(e), i.e. bona fide requ'irement for his personal use or the use of the members of his family. Let us recall the procedure for obtaining a ·decree'or order for· eviction agai.nst. a tenant entitled to protection of Rent Act other . than Delhi .Rent Act. What would the court expect the lalidford to prove before he seeks to recover possession from the tenant on the ' B E ground that he bo.na fide requires possession· for his.