# PREM CHAND v. DISTRICT JUDGE, DEHRADUN & ANR

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 170
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-11-23
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1043 of 1976
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, P. K. Goswami, S. M. Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/prem-chand-v-district-judge-dehradun-anr-7021
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act
1972, s. 21 (1) Explanation (iv), presumption of bonafide requirement when
applicable-Whether shop run in residential building converts it into 11011-rcsidentia/.
The appellant was a tenant occupying two rooms in the residentbl house
of respondent No. 2.
He used one room for living purposes and the other
as a tailoring shop. The landlady brought a suit for his eviction on the ground
of personal requirement. but the same was dismissed by the District Magistrate.
An appeal to the District Judge Dehradun was allowed, and Explanation (iv)
to s. 21 (1) of the U.P. Urban Buildiniis (Regulation of Letting, Ren-! and Eviction) 'Act, 1972 was held applicable. The view was upheld by the High Court
in petition filed by the appellant who contended that due to his shop the house
under tenancy had ceased to be a residential building
and
that Explanation
(iv) was not applicable.
The High Court rejected the petition.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court.
HELD : Explanation (iv) provides a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption of bona fide requirement once the conditions mentioned therein are est&·
blished.
The tests for application of Explanation (iv) are a.; follows
(1) The building should be a residential building; and
(2) The landlord must be in occupation of a part of the building for
residential purposes, the other part being in the occupation of the
tenant.
If the a,bove two tests are fulfilled in a case, there is no need for the landlord to establish any other requirement. [172F-H]
(2) The fact that a tailoring shop is run in one of t~e room~ is ~ot suf!ic!ent
to convert what otherwise to all intents and purposes 1s a res1dential bmldmg,
into a non-residential building. [172E-F]

## Text

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170
PREM CHAND
v.
DISTRICT JUDGE, DEHRADUN & ANR.
November 23, 1976
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND S. M. FAZAL ALI, JJ.]
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act
1972, s. 21 (1) Explanation (iv), presumption of bonafide requirement when
applicable-Whether shop run in residential building converts it into 11011-rcsidentia/.
The appellant was a tenant occupying two rooms in the residentbl house
of respondent No. 2.
He used one room for living purposes and the other
as a tailoring shop. The landlady brought a suit for his eviction on the ground
of personal requirement. but the same was dismissed by the District Magistrate.
An appeal to the District Judge Dehradun was allowed, and Explanation (iv)
to s. 21 (1) of the U.P. Urban Buildiniis (Regulation of Letting, Ren-! and Eviction) 'Act, 1972 was held applicable. The view was upheld by the High Court
in petition filed by the appellant who contended that due to his shop the house
under tenancy had ceased to be a residential building
and
that Explanation
(iv) was not applicable.
The High Court rejected the petition.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court.
HELD : Explanation (iv) provides a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption of bona fide requirement once the conditions mentioned therein are est&·
blished.
The tests for application of Explanation (iv) are a.; follows
(1) The building should be a residential building; and
(2) The landlord must be in occupation of a part of the building for
residential purposes, the other part being in the occupation of the
tenant.
If the a,bove two tests are fulfilled in a case, there is no need for the landlord to establish any other requirement. [172F-H]
(2) The fact that a tailoring shop is run in one of t~e room~ is ~ot suf!ic!ent
to convert what otherwise to all intents and purposes 1s a res1dential bmldmg,
into a non-residential building. [172E-F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1043 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment
9-3-1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil
6938/74.
-
and Order dated
Misc., Petn.
No.
K. P. Kapur and A. L. Trehan, for the appellant.
S. C. Agrawal and M. M. D. Srivastava, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GoswAMI, J.-This appeal by special leave is by the tenant (to
be described hereinafter as the appellant) and is directed aginst the
judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in a writ petition at his
PREM CHAND v. DISTT. JUDGE (Goswami,!.)
171
instance which was dismissed.
The District Judge, Dehra<lun, who
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had earlier dismissed his appeal, has been impleaded as respondent
No. 1.
The facts may briefly be stated :
The appellant is admittedJy the tenant under the 2nd respondent
(to be described herinafter- as the respondent) in respect of two rooms·
of House No. 11, Rajpur Road, Dehradun.
This house has
four
rooms of which only two rooms are in occupation of the appellant.
The other two rooms are in occupation of the respondent whose two
sons stay there; the elder one living with his wife. The respondem is
an old lady with an ailing husband and wants to have vacant possession of the two rooms so that the entire family can reside at the same
place. With that end in view, on June 22, 1972, the respondent filed
an application under section 3 of the United Provinces (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. III of 1947)
for permission to bring a suit against the appellant for his eviction on
the ground of bona fide personal requirement.
During the pendency
of this application before the Rent ControJ and Eviction Officer, the
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act
1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter to be referred to as
the Act) came into force with effect from July 15, 1972, repealing the
earlier Act of 194 7 with certain savings as mentioned in section 43 of
the Act. As a consequence of enforcement of the Act the proceedings
under section 3 that were pending under the earlier Act converted into
one under section 21 of the new Act (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972).
The prescribed authority (The Additional District Magistrate) rejected
the application.
The respondent then preferred an appeal to
the
District Judge, Dehradun, who allowed the same on the ground of
boniJ. fide requirement relying on the sole ground that Explanation (iv)
to section 21 (1) of the Act was applicable to the facts of the case.
The appellant being aggrieved by the order of the District
Judge
preferred a writ ;lpplication before the High Court which, as stated
earlier, was disallowed.
Before we deal with the question of law raised in this appeal we
may note the findings of fact reached by the District Judge.
The
District Judge found as follows :-
"It will appear that the house in question is a residential
building. It has been built for residential purposes ;i.nd is
being primarily used therefor. Simply because the tenant is
also carrying on the business of tailoring in one of the rooms
will not convert it into non-residential building. The landlady is admittedly occupying the remaining portion thereof."
Even the prescribed authority at the first instance had observed as
follows in his order :-
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"I have inspected the. demised premises situated at 11,
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Rajpur .Road, Dehradun in the presence of both the parties.
On inspection it was found that disputed house is one building in which one portion is in the possession of the respondent-
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172
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
tenant. The one portion of the building is in the occupation
of the applicant for residential purposes.
The respondent
has two small rooms and a very small courtyard. Out of
those two rooms each one is about 8' wide and 8' long, there
is a tailoring shop of the respondent.
The other room is
being used for residential purposes. The applicant has two
rooms of the same size a·nd one additional courtyard."
The question that arises for consideration is whether Explanation
(iv) of clause ( 1) of section 21 of the Act has been correctly held to
be applicable by the District Judge and the High Court to the facts
as found. Explanation (iv) of section 21 (1) reads as follows
"In the case of a residential building-
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(iv) the fact that the building under tenancy is a part of
a building the remaining part whereof is in the occupation of the landlord for
residential purposes,
shall be conclusive to prove that the building is bona
fide required by the landlor.d."
It is submitted by the appellant that the building under tenancy is
not a residential building and, therefore, the condition precedent to
the application of Explanation (iv) is absent in this case. According
to counsel since the tenant is admittedly running a· tailoring shop in one
of the two rooms under his occupation the house ceases to be a residential building.
We are unable to accept this submi~sion. The appellant has only
two small rooms in which he resides with his wife, two young sons
and one daughter and although he may have a tailoring shop in one
of his rooms ft is not unlikely that that very room is utilised as bed
room for one or two members of his family at night. The fact that he
runs a tailoring shop in one of the rooms is not sufficient to convert
what otherwise to all intents and purposes is a residential building into
a non-residential building.
The tests for application of Explanation
(iv) are as follows :-
(1) the building should be a residential building; and
(2) the landlord must be in occupation of a part of the
building for residential purposes. the other part being
in the occupation of the tenant.
If the above two tests are fulfilled in a case it will furnisJ1 under the
law a conclusive proof that the building is, bona tide, required by the
landlord.
There is no need for the landlord to establish anv other
requirement. Explanation (iv) provides a conclusive and irrebuttable
presumption of bona fide requirement once the conditions mentioned
therein are established. The two tests are fulfi.J.led in this case on the
findings of fact as noted above.
We are of opinion that the District
•
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PREM CHAND v. DISTT. JUDGE (Goswami, J.)
173
Judge was right in his finding that Explanation (iv) of section 21 (1)
'Yas applicable which view was also la_ter upheld by the High Court.
The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ application.
We may observe that we are not required· to consider, in this appeal,
the effect of the Amendment Act 28 of 1976, which came into force
on July 5, 1976, whereby Explanation (iv). was omitted; nor has any
argument been advanced in that connection.
There is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed.
We will,
however, make no order as· to costs. The appellant may continue in
possession of the suit premises till 30th- April, 1977. He shall hand
over vacant and peaceful possession thereof on May 1, 1977, to the
respondent.
M.R.
Appeal dismissed ..
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