# PRINCIPAL, PATNA COLLEGE, PATNA, AND OTHERS v. KALYAl\i SRINIVAS RAMAN Septembu 24, 1965

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 974
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-05-14
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/principal-patna-college-patna-and-others-v-kalyal-i-srinivas-raman-septembu-24-3671
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

974
PRINCIPAL, PATNA COLLEGE, PATNA, AND OTHERS
A
v.
KALYAl\i SRINIVAS RAMAN
Septembu 24, 1965
IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCllOO, M. Hl!HYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH A!'ID S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
l'atna Univusity Act, 1951 (25 of 1951),
s. 3~(bl-RcguJanonJ
framed under-Rtgulation 4 requiring 75% cllttnJanct in /1ctures, tulorial.J
.and/or practicals in each suhjtct--Percentaie lvhtther 10 be taken to-
•
gether in all these or .Ypur,ue/y.
C
Certiorari-Jligh Court l1·/irn should interftV(' H'ith decision taken bv
<ducaJional authorities.
·
The respondent who was a student in the colleic of which the fi:1;t
appellant \\<'!S the Principal,
w:L~ declared non-eliJible to appear at 1he
B.A. Part I examination of the Patna Univer.1iry because his at1cndance
in Geography praclicals was oaly 24% whereas the perC'Cnta~c required
D
under Regulation 4 framed by the Academic Council of the Univcr11ty
was 75%. He filed a writ petition under Art. 226 and obtained from
the High Court interim orders directin~ the authorities to allow him to
appear at the examination. On the mems the High Coun held that Wider
Regulation 4 the ecrcentage of aucndancc in lecture.• tutorial-; and/or
practicals in a particular subject bad to he taken to11elher and not separately and ao taken the respondent'• percentage in the subject of Geography as a whole wa.< 66%. The shonage being leat than 15 9'. n wa•
E
open to the Vic~hancellor under Regulation 5 to condone it.
The
High Coun therefore by a writ
of certiorari quashed the order of the
int appellant declaring the respondent non..,ligible for appearing at the
examination, and directed the authorities 10 refer the question of c.ondonation ot ahortage in attendance to the Vice-<:han~llor and if it wa.• condoned to declare respondent's result.
The appellants came to thia Court
against thi' order by special Jeavc.
HELD: (i) The requirement of 75% attendance in lectures tutorial'>
and practicals has to be read di'junctively and not by taking them all
toeether. Otherwioe it will be possible for a student in certain subjects to
comple1.e the percentage required bv attending all the lecture.. and no
tutorials at all.
Thi! could not he 1he intcnrion in framing the- Regulation
and would not he in k~ping with the meth()dology of mo<le.rn education
\.\'hich lays great stre's on tutorial and practical work. [980 (;; 981 Tl
(ii) Jr is true that the second clnu.se of Regulath)n 4 rel1lli:-c' th.tt
the percentage in qucsrion shall he c:..ilcul~rcd on the total numhcr of lectures, tutorials and practic<il~ deli\'ered and provided durini; the "ession;
hut the provision is in the nature of a mere corollary to the main pr~
vision prescrihcd by Regulation 4, and if the requirement a.i to 75o/9
attendance has been prescribed separately in relation to lectures. tutorials
and/or practicals. the !;econd clause n1u..'\t .be read ~ccoa·di~f!IY.
Thu~ read
it onlv mean9 thJt when the percentage 1s determined WJth reference to
lecturCs, tutorials and practicals \\·hat ha'\ to be taken into ~tccount is the
total number of lectur~ delivered, or tutorials or practical!i held during
the sc.sion. [981 G, HI
'
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•
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PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
975
(iii) The petitioner filed hia petition under Art. 226 only on the evcnio: before the examination had to begin althou&h he could have filed
it earlier.
In the circumstances it would have been better if the High
Court had not passed interim orders, Even on the merits. where the
question is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic
Council of a Unive11ity the High Court should ordinarily be reluctaat to
issue a writ of cer1iorari whetre it is plain that a regulation is capable of
two coruitructions and it would generally not be expedient to re.verse a
dcci~ion of the educational authorities on the! ground that the construction
place<i by the said authorities on the 'relevant re,gulations appears to the
High Court less reasonable than the alternative constr

## Text

974
PRINCIPAL, PATNA COLLEGE, PATNA, AND OTHERS
A
v.
KALYAl\i SRINIVAS RAMAN
Septembu 24, 1965
IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCllOO, M. Hl!HYATULLAH, J. C. SHAH A!'ID S. M. SIKRI, JJ.]
l'atna Univusity Act, 1951 (25 of 1951),
s. 3~(bl-RcguJanonJ
framed under-Rtgulation 4 requiring 75% cllttnJanct in /1ctures, tulorial.J
.and/or practicals in each suhjtct--Percentaie lvhtther 10 be taken to-
•
gether in all these or .Ypur,ue/y.
C
Certiorari-Jligh Court l1·/irn should interftV(' H'ith decision taken bv
<ducaJional authorities.
·
The respondent who was a student in the colleic of which the fi:1;t
appellant \\<'!S the Principal,
w:L~ declared non-eliJible to appear at 1he
B.A. Part I examination of the Patna Univer.1iry because his at1cndance
in Geography praclicals was oaly 24% whereas the perC'Cnta~c required
D
under Regulation 4 framed by the Academic Council of the Univcr11ty
was 75%. He filed a writ petition under Art. 226 and obtained from
the High Court interim orders directin~ the authorities to allow him to
appear at the examination. On the mems the High Coun held that Wider
Regulation 4 the ecrcentage of aucndancc in lecture.• tutorial-; and/or
practicals in a particular subject bad to he taken to11elher and not separately and ao taken the respondent'• percentage in the subject of Geography as a whole wa.< 66%. The shonage being leat than 15 9'. n wa•
E
open to the Vic~hancellor under Regulation 5 to condone it.
The
High Coun therefore by a writ
of certiorari quashed the order of the
int appellant declaring the respondent non..,ligible for appearing at the
examination, and directed the authorities 10 refer the question of c.ondonation ot ahortage in attendance to the Vice-<:han~llor and if it wa.• condoned to declare respondent's result.
The appellants came to thia Court
against thi' order by special Jeavc.
HELD: (i) The requirement of 75% attendance in lectures tutorial'>
and practicals has to be read di'junctively and not by taking them all
toeether. Otherwioe it will be possible for a student in certain subjects to
comple1.e the percentage required bv attending all the lecture.. and no
tutorials at all.
Thi! could not he 1he intcnrion in framing the- Regulation
and would not he in k~ping with the meth()dology of mo<le.rn education
\.\'hich lays great stre's on tutorial and practical work. [980 (;; 981 Tl
(ii) Jr is true that the second clnu.se of Regulath)n 4 rel1lli:-c' th.tt
the percentage in qucsrion shall he c:..ilcul~rcd on the total numhcr of lectures, tutorials and practic<il~ deli\'ered and provided durini; the "ession;
hut the provision is in the nature of a mere corollary to the main pr~
vision prescrihcd by Regulation 4, and if the requirement a.i to 75o/9
attendance has been prescribed separately in relation to lectures. tutorials
and/or practicals. the !;econd clause n1u..'\t .be read ~ccoa·di~f!IY.
Thu~ read
it onlv mean9 thJt when the percentage 1s determined WJth reference to
lecturCs, tutorials and practicals \\·hat ha'\ to be taken into ~tccount is the
total number of lectur~ delivered, or tutorials or practical!i held during
the sc.sion. [981 G, HI
'
G
H
•
--:
,-::~
•
•
•
A
B
c
D
PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
975
(iii) The petitioner filed hia petition under Art. 226 only on the evcnio: before the examination had to begin althou&h he could have filed
it earlier.
In the circumstances it would have been better if the High
Court had not passed interim orders, Even on the merits. where the
question is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic
Council of a Unive11ity the High Court should ordinarily be reluctaat to
issue a writ of cer1iorari whetre it is plain that a regulation is capable of
two coruitructions and it would generally not be expedient to re.verse a
dcci~ion of the educational authorities on the! ground that the construction
place<i by the said authorities on the 'relevant re,gulations appears to the
High Court less reasonable than the alternative construction \Vhich it is
pleased to accept. [985 B-F]
C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 743 of
1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
May 14, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction
Case No. 345 of 1965.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, R. N. Sinha and S. P.
Varma, for the appellants.
Basudev Prasad, K. Rajendra Chaudhri, and K. R. Chaudhuri,
for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gajendragadkar, C.J.
This appeal raises a short question
E
about the construction of Regulation 4 of the Regulations framed
by the Academic Council of appellant No. 3, the Patna University,
under s. 34(b) of the Patna University Act, 1951 (Bihar Act
XXV of 1951). The respondent Kalyan Srinivas Raman was
a student who appeared at and passed the test examination held
by the Patna College for sending up students for the University
F
examination B.A. Part I.
His name was shown in the list of
candidates who were eligible to appear for the said University
Examination and this list was published on March 26, 1965 by
the college authorities.
On March 29, 1965, however, a notice
was put up on the notice-board by appellant No. 1, the Principal
of the Patna College, indicating that the respondent was
not
G eligible to be sent up for the said University Examination, 1965
and that his roll number had been included in the list published
earlier due to a clerical mistake.
The respondent felt aggrieved
by this notice and filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court
on Sunday, the 18th April, 1965 and presented it to the learned
Chief Justice of the High Court at his residence.
By this writ
H
petition, the respondent prayed for a writ of mandamus, or for
any appropriate order or direction for quashing and cancelling
the notice issued by appellant No. 1 on the 29th March, 1965;
976
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[1966) I S.C.R.
he further prayed for an appropriate order or direction to appelA
!ant No. 1; the Vice-Chancellor of the Patna University, appellant No. 2; and appellant No. 3 to permit him to appear at the
said University Examination.
The learned Chief Justice received the writ
petition
and
directed that the !aine should be heard by a Bench of two Hon'ble
B
Judges of the said High Court at night.
Accordingly, the Division Bench heard the said writ petition at the residence of one ot
the two learned Judges and passed an interim order admitting
the writ petition and directing that pending its hearing, the respondent should be pennitted to appear at the said Exainination,
but that his result should not be published until disposal of his
C
application.
It appears that the writ petition itself had not been
sworn to and no vakalatnarna had been filed when it 11•as presented to the learned Chief Justice and was subsequently admitted
by the Division Bench. After passing the interim order, the Division Bench directed that the respondent could get the affidavit
sworn and vakalatnama filed the next day.
D
In obedience to
the sais{ interim
order.
appellant No. 1
forwarded the respondent's application to appellant No. 3, though
he made it clear that the respondent had not attended adequate
number of practical classes and his record of practical work was
not satisfactory and as such, he did not fulfil the requirements
E
of the relevant Regulations.
As a consequence, the respondent
was allowed to appear at the said Examination.
The appellants then appeared before the High Court
and
resisted the respondent's claim. They urged that the relevant
R.egulations did not justify the respondent's contention that he F
was eligible to appear at the said Examination and they contended that the impugned notice issued by appellant No. I was
fully justified.
The learned Judges who heard the writ petition have. however, rejected the contentions raised by the appellants in regard
to the eonstruction of the relevant regulations and have held that
G
under the said regulations, it was obligatory on appellant No. 2
to have considered the question whether the deficiency in the
respondent's attendance in the practicals of Geography should be
condoned or not. That is why the High Court has directed that
a writ in the nature of certiorari should be issued to quash the
impugned notice, and that a writ in the nature of mandamur
should be issued to the appellants directing them to act in accordance w-ith regulation 5 in the light of the construction placed
II
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PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar, C.l.)
977
A
by the High Court on the said regulation. The High Court has
also ordered that if the shortage in the respondent's attendance
was condoned by appellant No. 2, the respondent's result in the
examination which he had taken under the interim order of the
Court will be published; otherwise his appearance at the said
examination will have to be ignored.
It is against this order
B that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave; and
so, the principal point which arises for our decision in the present
appeal is whether the High Court has properly construed Regulation 4.
c
D
The relevant facts
are not in dispute.
In Geography, the
respondent attended 73 out of 93 lectures, 15 out of 20 tutorials,
and 6 out of 25 practicals. His percentage of attendance taken
separately was 75, 75, and 24; but if the said percentage was taken
together, it would come to 66.
The respondent's case was that
under Reg. 4, he is required to keep at least 75 per cent attendance at lectures, tutorials and· practicals all taken together, and
that the requirement of 7 5 per cent attendance has not to be
satisfied disjunctively by reference to lectures, tutorials and practicals.
On the other hand, the appellants argued that the requirement of about 7 5 % attendance has to be satisfied by a candidate
in reference to lectures, tutorials and practicals taken separately,
and not collectively; and unless that requirement is satisfied. the
E student does not become eligible to appear for the examination.
subject to this that the shortage in attendance may be condoned
as provided by the relevant regulations and in that case, the
student may be permitted to appear at the examination. It is
common ground that if the interpretation for which the appellants
F
G
contend is accepted, the notice issued by appellant No. 1 would
be valid; on the other hand, if the interpretation for which the
respondent
contends
is
upheld,
the
order
passed
by
the High Court could not seriously be challenged, because on
the construction suggested by the respondent and accepted by
the High Court, the shortage in attendance, which
is
proved.
could have been condoned by the Vice-Chancellor if he thought
it fair and reasonable to do so; and it is not disputed that the
matter about condoning the shortage in attendance of the respondent was not referred to the Vice-Chancellor and he has not
decided the question as to whether the said shortage should be
condoned.
H
Let us, therefore, proceed to construe Regulation 4.
The
Academic Council of appellant No. 3 is an authority whose powers
and duties have been defined by s. 22 of the Patna University
Act; these include the power of superintendence and control over
LS Sup. C. l.'65~ 19
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[1966] I S.C.R.
maintenance of standards of instruction and education.
The said
Council is authorised by s. 34 to make regulations about the
conditions under which a student shall be admitted to the Degree
or Diploma Course and to the examinations of the University and
shall be eligible for Degrees and Diplomas.
It is in pursuance
of the powers thus conferred on the Academic Council that the
relevant Regulations have been framed. These Regulations were
brought into force on the 23rd January. 1961.
Regulation 1 deals "ith lectures. tutorial instruction and pr ac·
tical work.
It provides that a college or a University Department
or an Institute shall provide for the delivery of at least so many
lectures and so many periods of tutorial instruction and practical
work as may be fixed by the Academic Council from time to
tmrc for students \\ho arc admitted in that Colicgc or the Cniscr-
'ity Department or the Institute.
Proviso (l)(d) to the said
Rc~ulation lays down that in the Faculties or Arts. Science and
Commerce, in any subject in which practical examination
has
been prescribed. there shall be at least one practical class of two
periods' duration in the Pre-University class.
For the R.A. and
B.Sc. examinations in which practical examiiiation is prescribed.
there shall be in each year two practical classes per week each
oi' two periods' duration.
Proviso ( 4) to Reg. I requires that
except as provided in (I) (a) & (d) of this Regulation, in all
Faculties in subjects in which practical work is prescribed, every
student shall be required to do practical work prescribed hy the
Academic Council, regularly and under proper supervision and
the mrmbcr of lectures and hours of practical work for each
subject shall be fixed by the Academic Council after considering
the recommendations of the Faculty concerned.
This Regulation
clearly brings out th~ fact that the Academic Council attaches
comiderablc importance to the practical work and the tutorials
alone with the lectures. and provides that the student has to attend
not ;)n!y the lectures delivered. but has to do the practical work
'1nd to attend tutorials.
Regulation No . .+ which falls to be construed in the present
Jppeal reads thus :-
"Ewry candidate, presented
by
a College or a
University Department at any University e~amination
shall be required to complete the regular course of study,
prescribed by these regulations, in each subject which
he offers for the examination.
No student shall he
considered to have
completed the regular course of
study in any subject unless he has attended
at least
A
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PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar, C.J.)
979'
seventy-five per cent of the lectures, tutorials and/ or
practicals, as the case may be, delivered or prov!ded. in
that subject, in one or more colleges or Umvers1ty
Departments admitted in that subject, and has devoted
due attention to that part of the course which consists
of tutorial instruction or practical work.
The percentage, specified above, shall be calculated on the total number of lectures, tutorials and
practicals (felivered or provided during the session".
Regulation No. 5 deals with the question of condoning shortage
in attendance; it reads thus :-
"In case of serious illness or other unavoidable
circumstances,
a shortage of attendance at lectures,
tuto~ials and practicals to the extent of fifteen per cent
may be condoned.
Shortages up to five per cent shall be considered
and may, in suitable circumstances, be condoned by
the Principal or a College or the Head of a University
Department or the Director of the Institute or the Head
of the Institution concerned.
Shortages exceeding five per cent but not exceeding
E
fifteen per cent shall be considered and may, in suitable
circumstances,
be
condoned
by
the
ViceChancellor".
F
G
H
The last regulation to which reference must be made is regulation No. 7; it reads thus :
"Every candidate for each University Examination
shall produce a certificate from the Principal of the
College, the head of the University Department or the
Institute concerned of (a) good conduct, (b) completion of the regular course of study, ( c) having fulfilled
the prescribed requirements regarding attendance at
lectures, tutorials and practicals,
and ( d) satisfactory
record of tutorial and/or practical work".
In dealing with Reg. 4, it is necessary to bear in mind two·
broad considerations. The first consideration is that the modern
methodology of education in all civilised countries
attaches
considerable importance to the tutorials and the practical work
done by the student in addition to attending lectures. The tendency in modern times is to bring the students into direct per-
SUPREME
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[1966] 1 S.C.R.
ro'nal contact with the tutors so as to enable the tutors to guide
and coach the students individually as far as may be possible.
For tJ:l!lt. purpose, small groups of st~dents are formed who are
placed under different tutors for different subjects.
The importance of practicals Iias also been well-recognised and education
does no longer depend merely upon lectures as it used to do at
-0ne time in our country.
The second consideration which may
not be irrelevant is that ever since the present regulations were
brought into force in 1961, appellant No. 3 and colleges within
its jurisdiction appear to have consistently interpreted Reg. 4 in
the manner suggested by appellant No. 3.
It is of course true
!hat the two considerations to which we have just referred cannot
materially govern the construction of the regulation; that must
inevitably depend upon the words used by the regulation itself;
but in interpreting the words, these two considerations may not
be treated as irrelevant.
The appellants contend that the High Court was in error
in holding that the requirem~nt of about 7 5 3 attendance had to
!be considered collectively by taking the lectures, tutorials and/ or
practicals together.
Their case is that the said requirement
applies to lectures, tutorials and/or practicals separately.
It is
plain that the words "and/ or" have been used in the regulation,
becai.Jse in some· subjects both tutorials and practicals are pres-
<:ribed; whereas in some others either tutorials or practicals are
prescn'bed; and so, the effect of the words "and/ or" is that where
tutorials and practicals are both prescribed, the requirement of
75% attendance has to be satisfied in reference to each one of
them; where, however, either tutorials or practicals are prescribed,
the said requirement has to be satisfied by reference to either
the tutorials or the practicals whichever may have been prescribed
in a given subject.
The High Court has, no doubt, made an
emphatic finding that the relevant words used in this regulation
admit of only one construction, and tliat is that the requirement
of 753 attendance has to .be judged by reference to lectures,
tutorials and/or practicals all taken together.
We are unable to
agree. It seems to- us that in the context, it is more reasonable
to hold that the said requirement must be read disjunctively; and
FO, it must be satisfied by the student .by reference ,to lectures,
1 utorials and/ or practicals as the case inay be.
A
B
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In construing Reg. 4, we must have regard to the fact that
the last part of the Regulation requires that the student must have
,H
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J
devoted due attention to that part of the course which cortsists of
{
tutorial instruction oi' ·practical work; and this requirement ·~ecesI
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PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar, C.l.)
981
A sarily postulates that the student has to do some practical work
and has to receive tutorial instruction.
The requirement of Reg. 7 also emphasises the fact that every
student who can be said to have completed the regular course of
study as prescribed by Reg. 4, must satisfy the requirement as
B
to attendance at lectures, tutorials and practicals and must claim
satisfactory record of tutorial and/or practical work. Reg. 7(d)
which we have already cited, emphasizes, as does the last portion
of Reg. 4, that every student has to do tutorials and/ or practical
work. as the case may be. In other words, where tutorials and
practicals are both prescribed, the student must not only do tutoC
rials and practicals, but must have satisfactory record in that
behalf.
Where tutorials or practicals are prescribed, a similar
test has to be satisfied.
Jn view of this position, it seems somewhat difficult to accept
the correctness of the conclusion reached by the High Court that
D the requirement of about 753 attendance must be taken collectively.
It is clear that if the said requirement is read collectively, a
student may be entitled to claim to have completed the regular
course of study without attending any single practical or tutorial,
as the case may be, if he has attended all the lectures in a given
E
subject.
Take, for instance, the case of English,
History, or
Political Science in the group for which the respondent was studying.
It is not disputed by Mr. Basudev Prasad that in these subjects theoretically, it would be open to the student to attend the
maximum number of lectures and not to do any tutorial at all.
Jn other words, the construction placed by the High Court upon
Reg. 4 leads to this unreasonable consequence that attendance
}'
at the lectures alone may, in a given case, entitle a student to
appear for the examination, though he may have done no tutorial
at all.
Jn our opinion, this could not have been the intention of
the regulation. It is true that the second clause of Reg. 4 requires
that the percentage in question shall be calculated on the total
number of lectures, tutorials and practicals delivered or provided
G during the session; but this provision is in the nature of a mere
corollary. to the main provision prescribed by regulation 4, and
if the requirement as to 75% attendance has been prescribed
separately in relation to lectures, tutorials and/ or practicals, the
second clause in question must be read accordingly.
Thus read.
H
it only means that when the percentage is determined in reference
to lectures, tutorials and practicals, what has to be taken into
account is the total number of lectures delivered, or tutorials and
practicals held during the session in question.
We have carefully
982
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(1966] 1 S.C.R.
considered the reasons given by the High Coun in support of its
conclusion, but we are not satisfied that those reasons justify the
construction which the High Court has placed on the material
words used in Reg. 4.
The High Coun appears to have taken the view that its conclusion about the effect of Reg. 4 is supported by the old regulation which was superseded in 1961.
The old regulation was
lr7): it read thus :-
"I. A College or a University Department admitted
in any L'.nivcrsity c.samination shall provi'l'ic for the
delivery of at least so many lectures and for at least so
many periods of tutorial instruction and practical work
:1' may he !ixcd hy the Academic Council from time
to ti111c l<>r studcnh who take up that suhje-:t, provided
that-
( 7) in order to qualify to appear at any of the
University examinations
in any Faculty a candidate
shall be required-
( i) to attend at least 75 per cent of the
lectures
delivered in each subject offered
by him for
such University examination,
I ii) to attend in each subject at least 75 per cent of
the tutorials classes,
of the Moot Courts and
of the practical classes, as the case may be;
(iii) in the case of I.A., I.Sc., I.Com., B.A., B.Sc.,
and B.Com. examinations, to secure marks not
less than 25 per cent out of the total marks of
3 periodical examinations in each subject within
two years. subject to the condition that a candidate should secure 20
per cent of the marks
allotted for the practical examination.
Regulation 5 of the said old
Regulations reads
thus:-
.. ( I) No student shall be considered to have completed the regular course of study in any subject for
the I.A., I.Sc., I.Com., B.A., B.Sc., and B.Com. exaA
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PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar, C.J.) 983
minations unless he has satisfied the conditions laid
down in clause 7 of regulation 1 of this Chapter and
for examinations other than these,
unless he has
attended at least 75 per cent of the lectures, tutorials
and practicals,
as the case may be, delivered in that
subject, in one or more Colleges or University Departments admitted in
that subject, and has devoted due
attention to that part of the course which consists of
tutorial instruction or practical work;
(2) The percentage, specified in clause (1), shall
be calculated on the total number of lectures delivered
during the prescribed session".
It would be noticed that under Reg. 1 (7) read with Reg. 5
of the old Regulations, the position was that with regard to the
examinations specified in the first part of Reg. 5(1), the requirement as to 7 5 % attendance was expressly specified separately in
reference to the lectures. tutorial classes, Moot Courts, and the
practical classes, as the ~ase may be. Sub-clauses ( i) & (ii) of
cl. ( 7) of Reg. J are quite clear and unambiguous in that behalf.
With regard to the other examinations falling under the latter
part of Reg. 5 (1), however, the position was that Reg. 1 (7) was
not made applicable to them just as it was made applicable to
the examinations mentioned in the first part; and so, Reg. 5 ( l)
compendiously prescribes the requirement as to 75 % by putting
the lectures. tutorials and practicals all together.
The context
shows that the requirement as to 75 % attendance by reference to
the lectures, tutorials and practicals which is prescribed for this
latter category of examinations, was not of a different character
at all.
This requirement had to be satisfied by reference to each
one of them, riz., the lectures, tutorials and practicals as the
case may be. Instead of repeating sub-clauses ( i) & (ii) of Reg.
1 (7), Reg. 5 (1) merely for the sake of convenience, has compressed the said two clauses into one clause; and so, we think
the High Court was in error in assuming that under the old regulations with regard to this latter class of examinations, the requirement as to 7 5 3 attendance was in any way different from the
same requirement in regard to the examinations mentioned in the
first part of the said regulation.
But assuming for the sake of argument that the said requireH
ment was different in regard to the latter category of examinations, it is not easy to see how that can support the conclusion
that the present Reg. 4 has assimilated all the examinations to the
said latter class of examinations in Reg. 5 (1) by prescribing that
984
I
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[1966] 1 S.C.R.
7 5 % attendance need not be in relation to the lectures, tutorials
and practicals separately, but should be in relation to all the three
taken collectively.
In our opinion, having regard to the context,
it would be morie reasonable to hold that the present regulation
prescribes the requirement as to 75 % attendance in
lectures,
tutorials and/ or practicals separately in relation to al! the examinations.
Mr. Basudev Prasad has sought lo rely on regulation 9 contained in Chapter VI of the Examination Regulations '}'hicii deal
with B.A. Part I Examination of the Three-Year Degree Course in
Arts.
The said regulation provides that in_ order to pass
the
Degree Part I examination, a candidate must obtain not less than
30 per cent of the total marks in each subject and 33 per cent in
A
B
c
the aggregate.
He argues that the provision of Reg. 9 would
support the respondent's case that it could not have been the intention of Regulation 4 to require that the regular course of study
contemplated by it pos"tulates 75 per cent attendance at lectures,
D
tutorials and/or practicals taken severally arid not conjointly. We
are unable to see how the provision made by ],'leg. 9 dealing with
the exaniinf!tions can be 111aterial in construing the words used
in Reg. 4.
Thetefore, we do not think Mr. Basudev Prasad is
right in contending that Reg. 9 of the· Examination Regulations
supports the respondent's case.
It appea_rs that before the writ petition was filed by the respondent in the present case, his father Mr. C. K. Raman, I.C.S.,
wrote a long letter on April 11, 1965 to appellant No. 1 inviting
him to recoμsider his decision in,the case of his son and to allow
his son to take the University examination in question.
In this
long communication which is ar(lumentative,
the respondent's
father has adopted a tone which indicates that he attempted to
throw his weigh,t about in persuading appellant -No. 1 to cancel
the impugned notice.
Appellant No. l .promptly replied to the
said communication and informed tile respondent's father that he.
had referred tile case of the respondent to .tile Vice-Chancellor
with a statement of his attendance together with hi~ letter for such
action as he thought best under .the circumstances.
Appellant
No. 1 added that the Vice-Chancellor had decided tllat it was not
possible to accept the request made by t!ie respondent's father
as the University regulations did not permit the same.
It would be recalled tllat tile impugned notice was published
on March 29, 1965, and the letter written by the respondent's
father on the 11th April was replied by appellant No. 1 on the
'
E
F
G
H
•
A
B
c
D
1
E
F
G
PATNA COLLEGE v. RAMAN (Gajendragadkar. C.J.)
985I 2th April.
Even so, the respondent did not file his writ petition
until Sunday, the 18th April; and as we have already mentioned,
the writ petition was presented at the bungalow of the Chief
Justice and was heard for admission and interim orders on Sunday night. It is true that if justice demands that the Court should
receive a petition even on Sunday, the Court should and ought
to accept the petition; but having regard to the fac: that the
petitioner postponed
the filing of the application until Sunday
(18-4-1965) night, and other relevant circumstances to which we
have already adverted, we think it would have been better if the
High Court had not passed an interim order on the said night as
it has done.
It is hardly necessary to emphasise that in dealing
with matters relating to orders passed by authorities of educational
institutions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the High Court
should normally be very slow to pass ex parte interim orders,
because matters falling within the jurisdiction of the educational
authorities should normally be left to their decision, and the High
Court should interfere with them only when it thinks it must do
so in the interests of justice.
Even on the merits, we think we
ought to point out that where the question involved is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic Council of a University, the High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a
writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question -
is capable of two constructions, and it would generally not be
expedient for the High Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the construction placed by
the said authorities on the relevant regulation appears to the High
Court less reasonable than the alternative construction which it
is pleased to accept.
The limits of the High Court's jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari are well-recognised and it is, on the
whole, desirable that the requirements prescribed by judicial
decisions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction in dealing with such·
matters should be carefully borne in mind.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the
High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed.
Under the unusual circumstances of this case,
we direct that the respondent should pay the costs of the appellants
throughout.
Appeal allowed..