# PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, JABALPUR THROUGH REGISTRAR

- **Citation:** [1992] 1 S.C.R. 864
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1992-02-19
- **Case number:** Criminal Case No. 617 of 1980
- **Bench:** S. Ratnavel Pandian, K. Jayachandra Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pritam-pal-v-high-court-of-madhya-pradesh-jabalpur-through-registrar-11377
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950:
C
Articles 129 and 215-Contempt Jurisdiction-Power of Supreme
D
E
Court/High Court to punish for Contempt of itself-Whether could be curtailed or abridged by ordinary legislation or Rules-Procedure for contempt
proceedings being summary, power to be used sparingly-Procedure to be fair
and contemner to be given an opportunity of defending himself.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
Sections 2 (b }, 17 and 2()--Criminal Contempt-Advocate, practising at
High Court making libellous allegations against sitting High Court
Judge;--Whether amounts to inteiference with administration of justice and
affects the image, dignity and high esteem of office of judge of High
Court-Sentence of two months' simple imprisonment awarded by High
Court-Whether justified.
The appellant, an Advocate practising in the High Court was earlier
~
working in the .Defence Accounts Department, on re-employment, after
F
retiring from the Army. He had filed a Writ Petition before the High
Court, claiming certain benefits like pension, gratuity, pay and allowances
etc., pertaining to the service rendered by him in the Defence Accounts
Department and the Army. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition.
It also dismissed the appellant's review application. This Court also
G dismissed his Special Leave Petition against the High Court's order.
Thereafter, the appellant, moved a Contempt Petition under Section
16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 making some serious allegations
against the two Judges of the High Court, who dismissed his Writ Petition
and also the Review Petition. A Division Bench of the High Conrt snmH marily dismissed the contempt petition.
864
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P.
865
Meanwhile, the Registry of the High Court examined the allegations
made in the affidavit filed by the appellant under Rule 5 of the Roles
regarding contempts framed by the High Court. A Division Bench of the
High Court, before which the matter was placed on the order of the Chief
Justice, took cognizance of the criminal contempt and directed issue of
notice to the appellant directing him to s.how cause as to why he should
not be punished for contempt of Court. The appellant filed his reply
raising certain preliminary objections, contending that the notice was bad
A
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for the reasons that (1) the Section of the Act under which cognizance had
been taken was not specifically mentioned; (2) the notice did not show
sufficient cause as to why the words and expressions nsed in the offending
portions marked had been construed as contemptuous (3) the procedure c
followed by the High Court was contrary to the rules framed by it; and (4)
no consent of the Advocate General had been obtained,· and prayed for
discharge of the rule of contempt.
Meanwhile, on the basis of the High Court's Order, the appellant
inspected the Court records relating to this matter, and thereafter, he was
also informed that the proceedings were under the provisions of Article
215 of the ConstituJion of India.
After examining the remarks made by the appellant in his contempt
petition the High Court rejected the objections of the appellant/contemner
and held that the contemner was guilty of criminal contempt of not only
scandalising the Conrt and lowering its anthority bot also substantially
interfering with the due course of justice. Taking note of the defiant
attitude of the contemner who even did not think it necessary to apologise
bot tried to justify the aspersions;Jhe High Court sentenced the contemner
to suffer simple imprisonment for tllvo months.
In the appeal before this Court, the contemner who appeared before
the Court in person, contended that the order of the High Court should
be set aside on the ground of procedural irregularities in that (1) that
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the offending remarks had not been communicated to him as per Rules G
5 and 9 framed by the High Court; (2) that the cognizance of the criminal
contempt had not been taken in conformity with Section 15 of the Act;
(3) t

## Text

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PRITAM PAL
v.
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,
JABALPUR THROUGH REGISTRAR
FEBRUARY 19, 1992
[S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950:
C
Articles 129 and 215-Contempt Jurisdiction-Power of Supreme
D
E
Court/High Court to punish for Contempt of itself-Whether could be curtailed or abridged by ordinary legislation or Rules-Procedure for contempt
proceedings being summary, power to be used sparingly-Procedure to be fair
and contemner to be given an opportunity of defending himself.
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
Sections 2 (b }, 17 and 2()--Criminal Contempt-Advocate, practising at
High Court making libellous allegations against sitting High Court
Judge;--Whether amounts to inteiference with administration of justice and
affects the image, dignity and high esteem of office of judge of High
Court-Sentence of two months' simple imprisonment awarded by High
Court-Whether justified.
The appellant, an Advocate practising in the High Court was earlier
~
working in the .Defence Accounts Department, on re-employment, after
F
retiring from the Army. He had filed a Writ Petition before the High
Court, claiming certain benefits like pension, gratuity, pay and allowances
etc., pertaining to the service rendered by him in the Defence Accounts
Department and the Army. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition.
It also dismissed the appellant's review application. This Court also
G dismissed his Special Leave Petition against the High Court's order.
Thereafter, the appellant, moved a Contempt Petition under Section
16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 making some serious allegations
against the two Judges of the High Court, who dismissed his Writ Petition
and also the Review Petition. A Division Bench of the High Conrt snmH marily dismissed the contempt petition.
864
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P.
865
Meanwhile, the Registry of the High Court examined the allegations
made in the affidavit filed by the appellant under Rule 5 of the Roles
regarding contempts framed by the High Court. A Division Bench of the
High Court, before which the matter was placed on the order of the Chief
Justice, took cognizance of the criminal contempt and directed issue of
notice to the appellant directing him to s.how cause as to why he should
not be punished for contempt of Court. The appellant filed his reply
raising certain preliminary objections, contending that the notice was bad
A
B
for the reasons that (1) the Section of the Act under which cognizance had
been taken was not specifically mentioned; (2) the notice did not show
sufficient cause as to why the words and expressions nsed in the offending
portions marked had been construed as contemptuous (3) the procedure c
followed by the High Court was contrary to the rules framed by it; and (4)
no consent of the Advocate General had been obtained,· and prayed for
discharge of the rule of contempt.
Meanwhile, on the basis of the High Court's Order, the appellant
inspected the Court records relating to this matter, and thereafter, he was
also informed that the proceedings were under the provisions of Article
215 of the ConstituJion of India.
After examining the remarks made by the appellant in his contempt
petition the High Court rejected the objections of the appellant/contemner
and held that the contemner was guilty of criminal contempt of not only
scandalising the Conrt and lowering its anthority bot also substantially
interfering with the due course of justice. Taking note of the defiant
attitude of the contemner who even did not think it necessary to apologise
bot tried to justify the aspersions;Jhe High Court sentenced the contemner
to suffer simple imprisonment for tllvo months.
In the appeal before this Court, the contemner who appeared before
the Court in person, contended that the order of the High Court should
be set aside on the ground of procedural irregularities in that (1) that
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the offending remarks had not been communicated to him as per Rules G
5 and 9 framed by the High Court; (2) that the cognizance of the criminal
contempt had not been taken in conformity with Section 15 of the Act;
(3) that the procedure, after cognizance as prescribed under Section 17
of the Act had not been followed;
and (4) that Article 215 of the
Constitution of India did not prescribe any procedure to be followed. He H
866
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992] 1 S.C.R.
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also contended that he had not been given a fair and full hearing and
that the Judges had browbeaten and unjustly convicted him ignoring the
well settled principle that every person had an inalienable right of making
fair criticism, and that the order in question was pre-conceived and
pre-judged one. In his written statement also he made certain remarks
B about the Judges of the High Court, in attempting to justify his action
which had led to the initiation of proceedings for contempt of Court before
the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
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HELD : 1.1
The power conferred upon the Supreme Court and
the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and .215 of
the Constitution respectively, is an inherent power and the jurisdiction
vested is a special one not derived from any other statute, but derived
only from Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. Therefore,
D the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation including Contempt of Courts Act or abrogated or cut down. Nor
can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of
the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. The special feature of the
procedure to be followed in a contempt proceeding being summary
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procedure, which is recognised not only in India but also abroad, the
caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by
summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly, that ihe
procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should
be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. [883B-D]
Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the PEPSU
High Court, [1954] SCR 454; R.L. Kapur v. State of Madras, (1972] 1 SCC
651; Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, (1991] 4 SCC 406;
S.Mulgaokar, [1978] 3 SCC 339; Brahma Prakash Shamia and Others v. The
G State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1169; and D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan La~
[1988] 3 sec 26 relied on.
Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 743; Advocate General,
Bihar v. M.P.Khair Industries, [1980] 3 SCC 311; Ashr~m M. Jain v.
H. A. T.Gupta, (1983] 4 SCC 125 and M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and'.
PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P.
867
Haryana, [1991] 3 SCC 600, referred to.
A
State of Bombay v. P. 1958 Born. Law Reporter, (60) Page
.
.
873, referred to.
C/emellls and the Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, [1877] 46
LJ.Ch. 375 page 383, Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307, 9 S.Ct. 77 80 (1888);
8
Matsusow v. United States, 229 F.2d 335, 339 (5th Cir.) 1956; Sukhdev Singh
Sodhi, C.K. Daphtary; Re Abdool v. Mahtab, (1867) 8 WR Cr. 32 page 33;
1900 (2) Q.B.36 at 40; Andre Paul v. Attorney General, AIR 1936 PC 141,
Attomey General v. Butterworth, (1963) l Q.B. 696; Reg. v. Odham's Press
Ltd., Ex parte A.G., (1957) 1 Q.B. 73; Morris, v. The Crown Office, (1970)
C
l All.E.R. 1079, 1081, Offutt v. U.S., [1954] 348 US II Jennison v. Baker,
(1972] l All ER 997 1006, referred to.
Be/chamber's Practice of the Civil Court, 1884 Ed. P. 241; Contempt of
Court. By Oswald and Ha/bury's Law of England (4th Edition) by Lord
Hailsham page 3, referred to.
D
1.2. In the instant case, the otTending criticism and the scandalising
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allegations made by the appellant/contemner are most fatal and dangerous
obstruction of justice shaking the confidence of the public in the ad·
minis!ration of justice and calling for a more rapid and immediate punitive action. These calculated contemptuous remarks and the sweeping
allegations are derogatory in character, not only to the dignity of the
Judges and casting aspersions on their conduct in the discharge of their
judicial functions but also wounds the dignity of the Court. It is highly
painful to note that the appellant/contemner who is none other than an
Advocate practising in the same highest Court of the State after having
failed to wrench a decision in his favour in his own cause wliich he
prosecuted as party in person has escalatingly scandalised the Court by
11\aking libellous allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, "vicious,
intimidatory, malacious and beyond condonable limit. Even a cursory
reading of the remarks made against the Judge of the High Court unam·
biguously show that the potentially prejucjicial utterances and the outG
rageous allegations rumbustiously and invectively made by the contemner
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.. with malicious design of attempting to impair the administration of justice
have struck a blow on the judiciary and also seriously sullied the image,
dignity and high esteem which the office of the Judge of the High Court
carried with it and thus impeded the course of justice by fouling its source H
868
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992] 1 S.C.R.
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and stream. The incident in question is a Oagra11t onslaug~t on the
independence of the judiciary, destructive of the orderly administration of
justice and a challenge to the supremacy of the Rule of Law. The maxim
'Salus populi suprema lex", that is, 'the welfare of the people is the supreme
law" adequately enunciates the idea oflaw. This can be achieved only when
B justice is administered lawfully, judicially, without fear or favour and
without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless
respect for it is fostered and maintained. [888E-H, 889A-C]
1.3. To punish an Advocate for Contempt of Court, no doubt, must be
regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve the proceedings of the
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Courts from being deflected or interfered with, and to keep the streams of
justice pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court, though
painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one can
claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or
conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is
calculated to obstructthe due course of justice. In view of the heinous type of
D scandalising the Court, the finding of the High Court thatthe appellant/contemner has made himself guilty of criminal contempt is confirmed. [889D-E]
1.4. As regards the sentence, it is clear from the' order of the High
Court that the appellant had adopted a defiant attitude and tried to justify
E
the aspersions made by him even without thinking it necessary to
apologise. Before this Court also, the appellant has neither expressed any
contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious allegations made
against the Judges of the High Court. Bot, on the other hand, he has
exhibited a dogged determination to pursue the matter, come what may.
A reading of his memorandum of grounds' and the written and signed
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arguments show that he has ventured into another bout of allegations
against the High Court Judges and persisted in his campaign of vilification. His conduct in this Court has aggravated rather than mitigating his
offence. [889F-H)
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1.5. Th.e/efore, liaving regard to the sentencing policy that punish- •
ment should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence, the sentence
of 2 months' imprisonment in no way calls for interference and is accordingly confirmed. [890Al
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Ho
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258 of 1981.
[
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. [PANDIAN, J.]
869
From the Judgment and Order dated 12th Feb. 1981 of the Madhya A
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 617 of 1980.
Applellant in person.
Uma Nath Singh for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. The appellant, Mr. Pritam Pal Dhingra
is a practising Advocate in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur,
having joined the Bar on 4.2.1979. Earlier to joining the Bar, he was
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serving in the Army and retired on 23.12.65.
Thereafter, he was reemployed in the Defence Accounts Department on 7.2.1966 as U.D.C.
(Auditor). On 29.2.76, the appellant served three months' notice of resignation upon the departmental authorities for the reasons mentioned in the
said notice and also requested to pay him the contributory provident fund D
benefits for his 10 years service though the date of his superannuation in
the said post was 30.9.1986. The Department not only refused to accept
his resignation but also did not relieve him even after the expiry of three
months. According to the appellant, there was neither any departmental
enquiry pending nor contemplated against him during those three months
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i.e. between 29.2.76 and 31.5.76. However, a charge sheet dated 21.12.76
for imposing a major penalty on a complaint by Jt. C.D.A. Vehicle Factory
was served on him to which he submitted his written statement. Then he
served a final quit notice w.e.f. 8.1.77. Though on the basis of the show
cause notice, an enquiry was started, nothing came out of it. Therefore,
the appellant moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by
filing Writ Petition M.P.No. 786 of 1978 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sworn on 27.11.78 requesting several prayers inclusive of
issuance of directions to the respondent therein (the departmental
authorities) to accept his resignation so as to enable him to take any other
profession of his liking and to declare the retention of his service against
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his will after 31.5.1976 as illegal and ma/afide and to re'imburse pay and
allowances for the period of his enforced absence after the expiry of three
months notice period etc. The High Court issued show cause notice to the
respom;lents 1 to 3 in the Writ Petition. The respondent No. 3 thereafter
accepted the resignation dated 29.2.76 of the appellant w.e.f. 15.1.79 by H
870
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 1 S.C.R.
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which time the appellant claims to have completed'31 years of combined
military and civil service i.e. from 29.11.47 to 15.1.79. Meanwhile, the
departmental enquiry initiated against him was dropped. Then the appellant submitted suppfomental applications praying that his resignation
should be converted into one of voluntary retirement and that his military
B services should be counted with civil service and that he should be given
all service benefits like pension, gratuity ·etc. as well as consequential
benefits on account of the delay in acceptance of his resignation. Two
applications being I.A. No. 908/79 and I.A. No. 4246/78 were filed by the
•
appellant, they being one for amendment of the petition and the other for
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taking some additional grounds.
Both applications were allowed by a
Division Bench of the High,Court comprising of Mr. Justice J.S.Verma (as
he then was) and Mr. Justice U.N. Bachawat, as the counsel for the
respondents had no objection and granted one week time for incorporating
the amendments in the petition. At the request of the counsel for the
respondent, Shri RP.Sinha, the Court granted two weeks time to file the
D additional return by order dated 16.3.79. The case was listed for further
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hearing on 2.4.79 on which date the writ petition was dismissed. The
appellant then on 16.4.79 moved an application to review the order dated
2.4.79. The application was registered as M.C.C.No. 209 of 1979. This
application was too dismissed on 23.4.79 with the following observation:
"The grievance of the petitioner in this review petition is that
the writ petition (M.P.No. 786/78) was dismissed in motion
hearing without hearing the petitioner. The substance of the
order dismissing the Writ Petition in motion hearing as stated
earlier indicates that this averment made by the petitioner is
not correct. We also distinctly recollect that the petitioner was
heard fully on the question of admission and it was only
thereafter that the petition was dismissed by dictating that
order in the Court in the presene of the petitioner. We would,
therefore, reiterate that this grievance of the petitioner that he
was not heard at the time of motion hearing is wholly incorrect.
The submissions made by the petitioner in support of this
review application are (1) that there is error apparent on the
face of the record because the writ petition was dismissed in
motion hearing without hearing the petitioner; (2) that, sum-
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. [PANDIAN, J.]
871
marily dismissal of the writ petition was arbitrary because after
· notice had been issued to the respondents 1 to 3 show cause
why ihe petition be not admitted, it was incumbent on the Court
to admit the writ petition and hear both sides at length before
passing any order; and (3) that, on account of above position,
the petitioner was not given.a fair deal before dismissing the
writ petition in motion hearing.
As earlier stated, the petitioner was heard fully at the end o\
motion hearing and so also the counsel for respondents Nos.
1 to,3, Shri R.P.Sinha. The main averment on the basis of which
all the aforesaid submissions are based, i.e.lack of full opportunity to the petitioner is, therefore, wholly non-existent. We
are constrained to observe that in making these submissions,
the petitioner who is now enrolled as an Advocate, has not been
fair to the Court. The petitioner who is now enrolled as a
lawyer was expected to exhibit at least the minimum decorum
and sense of responsibility whi~h is expected from a members
of this noble profession. We are pained to observe that the
petitioner took a very unreasonable attitude and exhibited a
behaviour which could not be appreciated even by the member
of the Bar who were present when this order was being dictated
in the Court room after the hearing. However, taking into
account the fact that the petitioner is a new entrant in the Bar,
we have chosen not to take serious notice of the conduct of the
petitioner in the hope that the petitioner having now become
a member of the Bar will try to follow the high traditions of
the Bar which he has chosen to join.
There is no merit in this Review application. It is summarily
dismissed.
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On being aggrieved by the above order of dismissal dated 2.4.79, the
appellant filed Special Leave Petition No. 570 of 1979 before this Court G
but was not successful as the SLP was dismissed on 25.7.79.
The appellant on being disturbed by the dismissal of his Writ Petition
moved a Contempt Petition on 16.4.80 under Section 16 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') making some H
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 1 S.C.R.
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serious allegations against the two Hon'ble Judges of the High Court who
dismissed his Writ Petition on 2.4.79 and thereafter the Review Petition on
23.4.79 and also impleaded Shri R.P. Sinha as the third respondent in that
petition. According to the appellant, the contempt petition was registered
as M.C.C. No. 136 of 1980 and placed before a Division Bench on 29.4.1980
B which after hearing the appellant summarily dismissed the contempt petition.
While it was so, the Registry of the High Court examined the
allegations made in the affidavit filed by the appellant in M.C.C.No. 136/80
under Rule 5 of Rules regarding contempts framed by the High Court
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(Notification No. 8958 - Nagpur dated the 24th October, 1953) and placed
the matter before the learned Chief Justice of the said High Court who on
that motion/reference passed an order on 2.5.1980 to place the matter
before a Division for further action. The Division Bench before which the
matter was plac~d took cognizance of criminal contempt and directed issue
D of notice on 13.5.80 to the appellant directing to show cause as to why he
should not be punished for contempt of Court to which the appellant filed
bis reply raising certain preliminary objections stating that the notice was
bad for the reasons, namely, (1) The Section of the Act under which
cognizance had been taken was not specifically mentioned; (2) Though the
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offending portions are marked the notice does no_t show sufficient cause as
to why the words and expressions used therein have been construed as
.contemptuous; (3) T_he procedure followed by the High Court was contrary to the rules framed by it; and ( 4) No consent of the Advocate General
has been obtained. The appellant, on the basis of the above objections
prayed to discharge the rule of contempt.
On 11.7 .80 when the case came up for hearing, the learned Advocate
General filed his reply to the preliminary objection and served a copy of
the same to the appellant. On the same day, the High Court passed an
order reading thus :
" ........... The Government Advocate further gives notice to the
respondent that the contempt proceedings are under Art. 215
of the Constitution.
Let the respondent take inspection of. the original record in
case he would like to know the offending portions marked both
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. [PANDIAN, J.]
873
underlined and side marked and let him file his reply on merits
within 15 days."
Admittedly, the appellant inspected the Court records relating to this
matter.
Even thereafter when the appellant persistently requested as
under what Section of the Act he has been charged, he was informed that
the proceedings were under the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of India. ·
For the proper understanding of the issue "in question, we feel that
it would be necessary to reproduce the offending words and passages as
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appearing in the contempt petition. They are as follows:
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io->"
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"7. That on 2.4.79, when the case came up for hearing, the
judicial process required that it was the non-applicant, Shri
R.P. Sinha who should have been heard in the first instance
and he should have been asked by the Court whether he has
filed the addition return but on account of misfortune of the
petitioner and misconduct of the Presiding Judge, Justice Shri
J.S.Verma that he while coming out of the chamber and ocupying the seat in the temple of justice called out the petitioner
D
and told him that after the acceptance of the resignation, the
petition had become infructuous as such he was dismissing it E
summarily. The petitioner was shocked to witness the most
illegal and unconstitutional legal process adopted by the
Hon'ble Judge ............. , .................................................................... .
......... When the petitioner started arguing his case that his
Fundamental Rights were infringed, the Hon'ble Presiding
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Judge not only stopped the petitioner from arguing his case but
threatened him for dire consequences in case the petitioner
argued any more. This amounts to desacrilege the sanctity of
his own Court by the Judges.
8.
9.
. ................ The Review Petition was heard by the same
Bench in utter disregard of judicial cannon since no person
against whom serious allegations have been levelled (against)
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can be a Judge in his own case. The Review Petition wa5 also H
874
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 1 S.C.R.
rejected summarily repeating the false averments more in explicit terms that they heard the petitioner as well as the counsel
for the respondents thus super-imposing the seal o( truth over
the falsehood.
GROUNDS
1. The petitioner charges the Hon'ble Court especially Justice
J.S.Verma for adopting a most illegal and unconstitutional
judicial process in utter disregard of cannons and principles of
adjudication, for showing rude behaviour towards the
petitioner. This amounts to desacrilege the sanctity of his
Court.
2. That when the attention of Justice Verma was drawn on
2.4.79, that he was violating the legal process, he misbehaved
with the petitioner without any valid reason which amounts to
misconduct of the Judges.
3. That again on 23.4.1979 when the Review Petition was being
argued, he thteat~ned the applicant/petitioner for dire consequences for no valid reasons.
4. That the High Court is a Temple of Justice and the Judges
who occupy the seat of justice are just like Dharamraj.
Dharamraj's are not supposed to utter falsehood atleast while
occupying this sacred seat of Justice. The Hon'ble Judges have
not only uttered falsehood in their order dated 2.4.79 (Annexure 'B') but super.- imposed their false averments in their
order dated 23.4.79 in which they stated that they distinctly
recollect that the petitioner as well as the counsel for the
respondents were heard. The petitioner's charge that they do
no( remember as to what they heard. . .................................. .
5. ·································································································
6.
The charge against Justice U.N.Bachawat (the associate
Judge)
is that he silently witnessed the proceedings
throughout. He never uttered a single word or intervened when ·
his senior faltered out and succumbed to the false averments
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. [PANDIAN, J.]
875
of the Presiding Judge as if was not an independent Judge but
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serving faithfully and obediently to his master.
7.
8.
That the petitioner avers that both the contemn er Judges
have acted in bad faith and have fouled the seat of justice by
clear malafides act of theirs and as such no protection can be
extended to them under cover of a bonafide act done in good
faith as Judges.
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9. That both the Judges have violated the sanctity attached to
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the seat of Justice and have committed· a Contempt of their
own Court. Both have acted 'malafidely in bad faith.
PRAYER
It is, therefore, prayed that Contempt Proceedings under Section 16 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, may be initiated
against Justice J.S.Verma and Justice U.N. Bachawat of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court on the aforesaid grounds."
D
The High Court after examining the above scandalising remarks
E
made by the appellant in his contempt petition rejected the objections of
the appellant/contemner holding that the cognizance of the criminal contempt was taken by it on suo moto, that the contemner was informe~ that
the Court was invoking its jurisdiction under Article 215 of Constitution of
India to punish him for contempt, that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
does not confer any new jurisdiction by its authority, that in a suo moto
action by the High Court, consent of the Advocate General was not
necessary, that non quoting of the provisions of the Section in the notice
is immaterial and that the contemner had full notice of the charge of
contempt levelled against him and concluded, "We see no defect in the
notice served upon the contemner, nor do we find defect in the procedure
followed."
Then after referring to certain decisions of this Court in Perspective
Publications v. State of Maharashtra, [1969] 2 SCR 779; CK. Daphtary v .
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.,,.
O.P.Gupta, [1971] 1 sec 626 and Baradakanta Mishra V. Registrar of H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 1 S.C.R.
A Orissa High Court, [1974] l SCC 374, the High Court made the following
observation with refercnoe to the facts of the case:
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"16. The offending portions in paras 7 and 9, and repeated in
grounds 1,2,3 and 4, 8 and 9 attribute to Mr. Justice J.S. Verma
(a) improper motive, (b) unfairness and undue basis in dealing
with the case, ( c) being a Judge who administers justice in a
cursory manner without gi,ing thought to the points involved,
( d) of being intemperate in language, impatient and unjust, ( e)
who would arise false proceedings and when falsity has been
brought to his notice, would have the audacity to stick to the
. falsehood.
17.
If the words have this import, the inevitable effect is
undermining the confidence of the public in tbe judiciary. The
person who has indulged in scurrilous abuse of the .I 'dge, must
suffer in pttnishment."
On the basis of the above observations, the High Court recorded its
finding thus:
"2ll. In our reading of the offending portions duly marked in
paras 7, 9 and grounds l, 2, 3 and 4, 8 and 9 of the application
dated 16.4.1980 in th~ context in which they have been written,
there are imputations of malafides, bias and prejudice against
Mr. Justice J.S. Verma. The contempt involved in these passages is grossly scandalous.
21. Coming to the allegations in (,round No. 6 relating to Mr.
Justice Bachawat, it was said that "he silently witnessed the
proceedings. He never uttered a single word or intervened
when his senior faltered and succumbed to false averments of
the Presiding Judge as if he was not an independent Judge but
serving faithfully and obediently his master."
Finally, the High l "urt held that the contemner, Mr. Pritam Lal is
guilty of criminal contem(lt · ,f not '•nly scandalising the Court and lowering
its authority but also substant<.• ·' interfering with the due course of justice.
Coming to the question of sentence, the High Court taking note of the
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rH defiant attitude of the contemner who even did not think it necessary to
Y
PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. (PANDIAN, J.]
877
apologise but tried to justify the aspersions, sentenced the contemner to A
suffer simple imprisonment for two months. Hence the present appeal.
The contemner, Mr. Pritam Lal appeared before us in person and
advanced his arguments which are similar to the submissions made before
the High Court; inter a/ia contending that the impugned order of the High
Court should be set aside with costs and suitable compensation on the
ground of procedural irregularities in that (1) that the offending remarks
have not been communicated to him as per Rules 5 and 9 framed by the
High Court; (c) that the cognizance of the criminal contempt has not been
taken in conformity with Section 15 of the Act; (3) that the procedure
after cognizance as prescribed under Section 17 of the Act has not be~n
followed; and ( 4) that Article 215 of the Constitution of India does not
prescribe any procedure to be followed: According to him he has not been
given a fair and full hearing but on the other hand, the learned Judges have
browbeaten and unjustly convicted him ignoring the well settled principle
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that every person has got an inalienable right of making fair criticism. He D
has further added that the impugned order was pre-conceived and prejudged one. In addition to the oral arguments, he has filed detailed written
arguments, signed on 15.11.88 citing a number of decisions which in our
view, do not have any relevance to the facts of the case. In the written
subrriissions also, he has again made certain outrageous and contemptuous
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remarks about the Judges of the High Court, in attempting to justify his
action which has led to the initiation of the proceedings of contempt of
Court before the High Court.
As rightly pointed out by the High Court, these contentions in our
opinion do not merit any consideration since every High Court which is a
Court of Record is vested with 'all powers' of such Court including the
power to punish for contempt of itself and has inherent jurisdiction and
inalienable right to uphold its dignity and authority.
F
Whilst Article 129 deals with the power of the Supreme Court as G
Court of Record, Article 215 which is analogous to Article 129 speaks of
the power of the High Court in that respect.
Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was held that the High
'r Court has inherent power to deal with a contempt of itself summarily and H
878
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 1 S.C.R.
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to adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a fair and reasonable
opportunity to the contemner to defend himself. But the procedure has
now been prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of the powers
conferred by Entry 14, List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
Though the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High
B Court can be regulated by legislation by appropriate Legislature under
Entry 77 of List I and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the
Parliament has enacted the Act 1971, the contempt jurisdiction of the
Supreme f:ourt and the High Court is given a constitutional foundation by
declaring to be 'Courts of Record' under Articles 129 and 215 of the
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constitution and, therefore, the inherent power of the Supreme Court and
the High Court cannot be taken away by any legislation short of constitutional amendment.
In fact, Section 22 of the Act Jays down that the
provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts. It necessarily
follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
D High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in
the Act of 1971. The above position of law has been well settled by this
Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. 17ie Chief Justice and Judges of the PEP SU
High Court, [1954] SCR 454 holding thus:
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"In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court itself is
concerned, 3.s distinct from one of a subordinate Court, the
Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, so no Act
of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it
afresh by virtue of its own amhority."
•
It has been further observed:
"The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own
procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair
and that, the contemner is made aware of the charge against
hiil_l and given a fair and reas.onable opportunity to defend
··himself.
11
In R.L. Kapur v. State of Madras, [1972] 1 SCC 651 a question arose
did the power of the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself
arise under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 so that under Section 25 of•
H the General Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and
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PRITAM PAL v. HIGH COURT OF M.P. (PANDIAN, J.]
879
the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply.
This question was answered by this Court in the following words:
"The answer to such a question is furnished by Article 215 of
the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952 themselves. Article 215 declares that every High
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of
such a court including the power to punish for contempt of
itself. Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High
Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of
record, or whether the article confers the power as inherent in
a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising
or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the
Code of Criminal Procedure."
After giving the above answer to the query raised, this Court has
reiterated the view held in the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi (referred
supra).
The view expressed in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi and followed in
R.L.Kapur has been referred with approval in a recent decision in Delhi
Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, [1991] 4 SCC 406, holding
that the view of this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi is "that even after the
c.odification of the law of contempt in India, the High Court's jurisdiction
as a Court of Record to initiate proceedings and take seisin of the matter
remained unaffected by the contempts of Courts Act, 1926."
Beg, CJ. in Re S.Mulgaokar, [ 1978] 3 SCC 339 has explained the
special power of the Supreme Court under Article 129 stating, "This Court
is arm~d, by Article 129 of the Constitution, with very wide and special
powers, as a Court of Record, to punish its contempts."
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In Delhi Judicial Service Association case (supra), it has been pointed G
out as follows:
"Article 129 provides that the Suprnme Court shall be a court
of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 contains H
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[1992] 1 S.C.R.
similar provisions in respect of a High Court.
Both the
Supreme Court as well as High Courts are courts of record
having powers to punish for contempt including the power to
punish for contempt of itself.'"
Yet another question whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure are applicable to such Proceedings, has been negatively
answered by this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi case (supra) stating thus:
"We hold therefore that the Code of Criminal Procedure does
not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court.
The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own
procedure. All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair
and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against
him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend
himself.'"
See also Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh, [1953) SCR 1169.
From the above judicial pronouncements of this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being
the Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively
cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including
the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their inherent power is
elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. It would be appropriate,
in this connection, to refer certain English authorities dealing with the
power of the superior Courts as Courts of Record.
The 1884 edition of Belchamber's Practice of the Civil Court says at
page 241 that -
"Every superior court of record, whether in the United
Kingdom, or in the colonial possessions or dependencies of the
Crown has inherent power to punish contempts, without its
precincts, as well as in facie curiae ................ .''
In 9 Ha/sbury's Law of England (4th Edition) by .Lord Hailsharn at
page 3 under the caption "Criminal Contempt", the following passage is
H found:
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PRITAM PAL i•. HIGH COURT OF M.P. (PAND!AN, J.J
881
11The superior courts have an inherent jurisdiction to punish
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criminal contempt .....
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It is further stated at page 3 itself that the power to commit by
summary process is arbitrary and unlimited, but that power should be
exercised with the greatest caution.
In Re Clements and the Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, 11877] 46
L.J.Ch. 375 at page 383, Lord Jessel, M.R. said:
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" ......... this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and C
carefully watched, and exercised .. ., "
Reference also may be had to a decision of the Devision Bench of
the Bombay High•Court in State of Bombay v. P., 1958 Born. Law Reporter,
(60) Page 873 wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction which each
Judge of the High Court possesses and uses as constituting a Court of D
Record is a jurisdiction which is inherent in the Court itself for punishment
~
for contempt of Court, whether it is ex facie the Court or otherwise and
that for the exercise of that jurisdiction it is not necessary to refer either
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to the Letters Patent or the Rules framed by the Court thereunder and that
it is a jurisdiction which is being exercised in the same -manner as was
exercised in the Court of King's Hench Division in England.
The special feature of the procedure to be followed in a contempt
proceeding is the summary procedure which i~ recognised not only in India
but also abroad.
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It is an outstanding characteristic of the law of contempt both in
England and Scotland that it makes use of a particular and summary
procedure which is unknown to any other branch of those countries. In
England, this summary procedure began to be adopted by the common law
Courts inspite of trial by jury and that the trial by jury for contempt has G
steadily declined and has now fallen entirely into disuse.