# PRITAM SINGH v. THE STATE

- **Citation:** [1950] 1 S.C.R. 453
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1949-11-23
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950
- **Bench:** Saiyid Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, Das
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pritam-singh-v-the-state-133
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 136 (1)-Special leave to appealGranting of leave-Guiding principles-Final hearing-Nature of.
The Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal
under Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and
grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents
features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
appealed against.
The view that once an appeal has been admitted by special
leave, the entire case is at large and the appellant is free to contest
all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised
in the High Court is wrong. Only those points can be urged at
the final · hearinl( of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the
preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for.
Ibrahim v. Rex ([1914] A. C. 615) referred to.
APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at
East Punjab : Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950.
This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for
the Province of East Punjab at Simla (Falshaw and
Soni JJ.) dated the 23rd November, 1949, in Criminal
Appeal No. 367 of 1949 upholding the conviction of
the appellant on a charge of murder and confirming
a sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions
Judge .of Ferozepore.
]ai Gopal Sethi (H.]. Umrigar, with him) for the
appellan.t.
Basant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East
Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.
1950. May 5. The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
FAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam
Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab
at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of
1950
May S
Fazl AliJ.
1950
Prit111n Si11gh
v.
T'111 State
. Fazl A?i J.
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
murder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence
of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of
Ferozepore. The prosecution case, which has been
found to be substantially true by both the trial judge
and the High Court may be shortly stated as follows .
On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had
made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra
Chamar, who had been brought into the village by
Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.
Buta Singh, on learning of this incident, spoke to
Pritam Singh, but finding that his attitude was uncompromising, he advised Kakarra to go to the police
station to report the matter.
On the next day, while
Kakarra was going to the police station, Mal Singh,
the first prosecution witness m the case, brought him
back telling him that Pritam Singh had apologized
and the matter shoulc1 ncit be pursued.
On the 30th
December, at about 5 p.m., just when Buta Singh came
out of his house, Pritam Singh came up with a double
barrelled 12-bore gun an.d shot him in the abdomen,
and Buta
Singh died
a short time thereafter.
Shortly
after
the
occurrence,
Punjab Singh
and Na! Singh, who had both witnessed the occurrence,
went
to the
police
station at Abohar,
which is at a distance of 13 miles from the place of
occurrence, and lodged th~ first information report
regarding the murder. In this report, Punjab Singh
reported the facts as already stated, but he also added
that Pritam Singh was drunk when he fired the gun
and his younger brother, Hakim Singh, who was also
drunk was standing at a short distance from him and
shouting "Kill, don't care." None of the other witnesses however supported Punjab Singh as to the part
attributed by him to Hakim Singh or as to the
drunken condition of the appellant or Hakim Singh,
and the police after due investigation of the case
sent up a charge sheet against the appellant only. The
appellant was thereafter put on his trial before the
Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The learned Sessions
Judge, after hearing the prosecution witnesses, of whom
five were eye-witnesses, viz., Punjab Singh, his brother
Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
PRITAM SINGH
v.
THE STATE
[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MUKHERJEA and DAS, JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 136 (1)-Special leave to appealGranting of leave-Guiding principles-Final hearing-Nature of.
The Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal
under Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that
exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and
grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents
features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
appealed against.
The view that once an appeal has been admitted by special
leave, the entire case is at large and the appellant is free to contest
all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised
in the High Court is wrong. Only those points can be urged at
the final · hearinl( of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the
preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for.
Ibrahim v. Rex ([1914] A. C. 615) referred to.
APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at
East Punjab : Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950.
This was an appeal by special leave from a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for
the Province of East Punjab at Simla (Falshaw and
Soni JJ.) dated the 23rd November, 1949, in Criminal
Appeal No. 367 of 1949 upholding the conviction of
the appellant on a charge of murder and confirming
a sentence of death passed on him by the Sessions
Judge .of Ferozepore.
]ai Gopal Sethi (H.]. Umrigar, with him) for the
appellan.t.
Basant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East
Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.
1950. May 5. The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
FAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam
Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab
at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of
1950
May S
Fazl AliJ.
1950
Prit111n Si11gh
v.
T'111 State
. Fazl A?i J.
454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
murder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence
of death passed on him by the Sessions Judge of
Ferozepore. The prosecution case, which has been
found to be substantially true by both the trial judge
and the High Court may be shortly stated as follows .
On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had
made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra
Chamar, who had been brought into the village by
Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.
Buta Singh, on learning of this incident, spoke to
Pritam Singh, but finding that his attitude was uncompromising, he advised Kakarra to go to the police
station to report the matter.
On the next day, while
Kakarra was going to the police station, Mal Singh,
the first prosecution witness m the case, brought him
back telling him that Pritam Singh had apologized
and the matter shoulc1 ncit be pursued.
On the 30th
December, at about 5 p.m., just when Buta Singh came
out of his house, Pritam Singh came up with a double
barrelled 12-bore gun an.d shot him in the abdomen,
and Buta
Singh died
a short time thereafter.
Shortly
after
the
occurrence,
Punjab Singh
and Na! Singh, who had both witnessed the occurrence,
went
to the
police
station at Abohar,
which is at a distance of 13 miles from the place of
occurrence, and lodged th~ first information report
regarding the murder. In this report, Punjab Singh
reported the facts as already stated, but he also added
that Pritam Singh was drunk when he fired the gun
and his younger brother, Hakim Singh, who was also
drunk was standing at a short distance from him and
shouting "Kill, don't care." None of the other witnesses however supported Punjab Singh as to the part
attributed by him to Hakim Singh or as to the
drunken condition of the appellant or Hakim Singh,
and the police after due investigation of the case
sent up a charge sheet against the appellant only. The
appellant was thereafter put on his trial before the
Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The learned Sessions
Judge, after hearing the prosecution witnesses, of whom
five were eye-witnesses, viz., Punjab Singh, his brother
Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
Singh), and Mst. Phoolan, mother of the deceased,
came t<t-the conclusion, in agreement with 4 assessors
who were present at the trial, that the version given by
the prosecution witn~sses was substantially true. In
support of his conclusion, he referred to the following
facts among others:- (1) that the· first information
report had been lodged at the police station without
any delay, (2) that the names of at least 4 of the
alleged eye-witnesses were mentioned in the report,
and (3) that no sufficient reason had been shown as to
why the prosecution witnesses should have conspired -
to falsely implicate the accused in a murder case, if he
had been innocent. The High Court on appeal agreed
with the Sessions Judge, and the learned Judge who
delivered the judgment of the High Court observed as
follows in ,the concluding part of his judgment :-"I
have given the case every consideration and I have
come to the conclusion that the learned Sessions Judge
was right in holding that the case against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt."
The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to
appeal to this Court, and Mr. Sethi, the learned counsel
appearing for him, has in support of the appeal,
addressed to us very elaborate arguments to show that
the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is 'not
correct. He has argued that the alleged eye-witnesses
were intimately connected with each other and with
the deceased, that they and the accused belonged to
two mutually hostile factions, that these witnesses had
made discrepant statements as to the respective places
from where they claimed to have seen the occurrence,
some of them making discrepant statements about
their own position before the police officer who drew up.
the plan of the scene of occurrence and before the trial
Court and also making discrepant statements about
the position of the other witnesses, and that they
should not be held to be tru.thful witnes5es inasmuch
as they had denied certain previous statements made
by them either before the police or before the Committing Magistrate. Mr. Sethi also put forward the theory,
which has been discredited by both the Courts below
on grounds which prima Jacie do not appear to be
1950
Pritam Singh
v.
The State
Fllzl AJiJ.
1950
Pritam Singh
~-
The State
F .. lAUJ.
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
unreasonable, that the occurrence must have taken
place· late at night, that there were probably no
eye-witnesses to identify the real assailant and that
the appellant had been falsely implicated on account of enmity.
The obvious reply to all these arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, is
that this Court is not an ordinary Court of criminal
appeal and will not, generally speaking, allow facts to
be reopened, especially when two Courts agree in their
conclusions in regard to them and when the conclusions of fact which are challenged are dependent on
the credibility of witnesses who have been believed
by the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing
them and hearing their evidence. In the present case,
the story for the prosecution, which is neither incredible nor improbable, is supported by no less than 5
witnesses including the mother of the deceased, and
their evidence, in spite of its infirmities, has impressed
4 assessors and the two Courts below, who, in appraising its reliability, have given due weight to certain
broad features of the case which, according to . them,
negative the theory of conspiracy or concoction. In
thes{! circumstances, it would be opposed to all principle~ and precedents if we were to constitute ourselves into a third Court of fact and, after re-weighing
the evidence, come to a conclusion different from that
arrived at by the trial Judge and the High Court.
In arguing the appeal, Mr. Sethi proceeded on the
assumption that once _an appeal had been admitted
by special leave, the entire case was at large and the
appellant was free to contest all the findings of fact
and raise every point which couid be raised in the
High Conrt or the trial Court.
This assumption is,
in our opinion, entirely unwarranted. The misconception involved in the argument is not a new one and
had to be dispelled by the Privy Council in England
in Ibrahim v. Rex(') in these words:-" ....... .
the Board
has
repeatedly treated applications
for leave to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals
(!) [19U] A.C. 615.
S.C.R. _
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
1950
as being upon the same footing: Riel's Case; Ex-parte
Deeming. The Board cannot give leave to appeal
•
Pritam Si1rgh
where the grounds suggested could not sustam the
appeal itself; and, conversely, it cannot allow an
appeal on grounds that would not have sufficed for the
grant of permission to bring it."
The rule laid down by the Privy Council is based
on sound principle, and, in our opinion, only those
points can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal
which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when
leave to appeal is asked for, and it would be illogical
to adopt different standards at two different stages of
the same case.
It seems also necessary to make a few general
observations relating to the powers of this Court to
gra1,t special leave to appeal in criminal cases.
The
relevant articles of the Constitution dealing with the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are articles
132 to 136. Article 132 applies both to civil and
criminal cases and under it an appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court from any judgment, decree ...... or final
order ofa High Court, whether in a civil, criminal or ,
other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the
case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution. Article 133 deals
with the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in civil
matters only, and it has been drafted on the lines of
sections 109 and 1 IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
Article 134 constitutes the Supreme Court as a Court
of criminal appeal_ in a limited class of cases only, and
clearly implies that no appeal lies to it as a matter of
course or right except in cases specified therein. Article
135 merely provides that the ;;upreme Court shall have
jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to
wl.Jich the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do
not apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that
matter- were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
under any existing law. The last article, with which
we are concerned is article 136 and it runs thus :-
" 136. {l) Notwithstanding anything in this
Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
v.
The State
Fazl Ali J.
458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950J
1950
Prifa11t Singh
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,
decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause
or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in
the territory of India,
v.
Tile State
Faz! Ali J.
(2) .................. "
The points to be noted in regard to this article
are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined
merely to criminal cases, as is evident from the words
"appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order"
which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide·
range of matters; secondly, that the words used in
this article are "in any cause or matter," while those·
used in articles 132 to 134 are "civil, criminal or other
proceeding," and thirdly, that while in articles 132 to
134 reference is made to appeals from the High Courts,
under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or
tribunal in the terr1tory of India.
On a careful examination of article 136 along with
the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide
discretionary power with which this Court is invested
, under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional
cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special
leave in the wide range of matters which can come up
before it under this article.
By virtue of this article,
we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal
c8ses, in income-tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of
other cases. The only uniform standard which in our
opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that
Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those
cases where special circumstances are shown to exist.
The Privy Council have ttied to lay down from time
to time certain principles for granting special leave in
criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal
Court in Kapildeo v. The King.
It is sufficient for
our purpose to say that though we are not bound to
follow them too rigidly since the reasons, coru;titutional
and administrative, which sometimes weighed with
the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of
those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases
~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court
in granting special leave.
Generally speaking, this
Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown
that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that
substantial and grave injustice has been done and that
the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed
against. Since the present case does not in our opinion
fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere w.ith
the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be
dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: S. P. Varma.
Agent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta.
THE BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI
v.
EMPLOYEES OF THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,
DELHI
and
THE BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,
DELHI
UNION OF INDIA: INTERVENER.
(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,
PATANJALI SASTR,I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
and M UKHERJEA J J.]
Conititution of In&ia, A.rt. 136-Siiprc~ Court-Appellate
Jurisdiction-Award of Industri~ Tribw1al-Whether appealablel950
Pritam Singh
V;
The Stal<J
Fa:t .UiJ.
1950
May 26.