# PROJECT, BHILAI v. STEEL WORKERS' UNION, BHOPAL AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1964] 5 S.C.R. 354
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-08-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 764 to 766 of 1963
- **Bench:** P.B. Ga.Jendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/project-bhilai-v-steel-workers-union-bhopal-and-ors-2980
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Standing Orders- Certification-Jurisdiction of
Certifying
Officer-The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, (Act
No. 20 of 1946)-The Madhya Pradesh Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act (M.P. Act No. 19 of 1959)-The Madhya Pradesh
Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act (M.P. Act No. 26 of 1961)
-The Madhya Pradesh Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders)
Act (M. P. Act No. 5of1962) The Madhya Pradesh Gel'leral Clauses
A.ct (M.P. Act No. 3 of 1958), s. 25-The C.P. & Berar Industrial
Disputes and Settlement Act (No. 22 of 1947).
The appellant submitted for certification draft standing orders
on June 9, 1960 to the Certifying .Officer under the: Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
The respondents
raised an objection that the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction
inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Workmen (Standing
Orders) Act, 1959 applied to this industry and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Overruling this objection
the Certifying Officer certified the draft standing orders on August
6, 1962. The respondents appealed to the Industrial Court, Madhya
Pradesh which upheld the objection and set aside the order of
certification as void, being without jurisdiction.
In appeal by
special leave:
t
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
Held: That though on June 9, 1960 when the draft standing
1963
orders were submitted to the Certifying Officer under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the Certifying Officer General Manager
had no jurisdiction to deal with them, the officer had acquired
Bhilai Steel
jurisdiction in the matter before August 6, 1962 when he passed
.
. .
the order certifying the standing orders. The Certification cannot Pro;ect, Bhzlai
be held to be void merely because on the date when the orders were
v.
submitted, the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction.
The applica- Steel Workers'
tion should be deemed to have been renewed immediately after Union Bhopal
the officer acquired jurisdiction in the matter and so that jurisdicand Others
tion having continued upon the date of the certification, the
certification also would be with jurisdiction and binding.
Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373, followed.

## Text

354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
the appellants have succeeded in respect of the retirement age and that an order of remand has been passed
Workmen of by us in their favour for a reconsideration of their
Balmer Lawrie claim as to revision of the wage scales, we direct
and Co.
that the respondent should pay the appellants their
1963
v.
costs in this Court.
Balmer Lawrie
and Co.
Gajendragadkar
J.
1963
November 8
A.ward partly set aside and case remanded.
GENERAL MANAGER, BHILAI STEEL
PROJECT, BHILAI
v.
STEEL WORKERS' UNION, BHOPAL AND ORS.
(P.B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO AND
K.C. DAS GUPTA JJ.)
Standing Orders- Certification-Jurisdiction of
Certifying
Officer-The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, (Act
No. 20 of 1946)-The Madhya Pradesh Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act (M.P. Act No. 19 of 1959)-The Madhya Pradesh
Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act (M.P. Act No. 26 of 1961)
-The Madhya Pradesh Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders)
Act (M. P. Act No. 5of1962) The Madhya Pradesh Gel'leral Clauses
A.ct (M.P. Act No. 3 of 1958), s. 25-The C.P. & Berar Industrial
Disputes and Settlement Act (No. 22 of 1947).
The appellant submitted for certification draft standing orders
on June 9, 1960 to the Certifying .Officer under the: Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
The respondents
raised an objection that the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction
inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Workmen (Standing
Orders) Act, 1959 applied to this industry and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Overruling this objection
the Certifying Officer certified the draft standing orders on August
6, 1962. The respondents appealed to the Industrial Court, Madhya
Pradesh which upheld the objection and set aside the order of
certification as void, being without jurisdiction.
In appeal by
special leave:
t
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
Held: That though on June 9, 1960 when the draft standing
1963
orders were submitted to the Certifying Officer under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the Certifying Officer General Manager
had no jurisdiction to deal with them, the officer had acquired
Bhilai Steel
jurisdiction in the matter before August 6, 1962 when he passed
.
. .
the order certifying the standing orders. The Certification cannot Pro;ect, Bhzlai
be held to be void merely because on the date when the orders were
v.
submitted, the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction.
The applica- Steel Workers'
tion should be deemed to have been renewed immediately after Union Bhopal
the officer acquired jurisdiction in the matter and so that jurisdicand Others
tion having continued upon the date of the certification, the
certification also would be with jurisdiction and binding.
Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373, followed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals
Nos. 764 to 766 of 1963.
Appeals by special leave from the order dated
November 16, 1962, of the Industrial Court Madhya
Pradesh at Indore in Appeals Nos. 2/E.S.0./1962,
3/E.S.0./1962 and 4/E.S.0./1962 respectively.
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, Y. Kumar
and R.H. Dhebar, tor the appellants.
I.N. Shroff, for respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No.
746/63).
M.K. Ramamurthy, R.K. Garg, S.C. Agarwal
and D.P. Singh, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No.
•
756/63).
~
November 8, 1963. The Judgment of the Court
•
was delivered by
DAS GUPTA J.-These three appeals are directed
Das Gupta J .
against an order of the Industrial Court Madhya
Pradesh, in three appeals from an order' made by
one Mr. LB. Sany.al, who was the Certifying Officer,
under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, !946, hereinafter referred to as "the Central
Standmg Orders Act." By thi.s order made on August
6, 1962, Mr._ Sanyal had cer!Ified the draft standing
orders su_bm1tted by the General Manager, Bhilai
Steel ProJe.ct, ~adhya Pradesh. On behalf of the
several Umons, mcluding the three Unions, who are
the respondents before us, an objection was raised
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
that Mr. Sanyal had no jurisdiction to certify the
-
Standing Orders inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh
GeneralM~n~gerindustrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act, 1959
PSt~el Bhi/~, . applied to this industry and not the Central Standing
ro;ect, Bhilai Orders Act. Mr. Sanyal overruled this objection
v.
, and passed his order, as already stated, on August
Sted Workers 6, 1962 certifying the draft standing orders. The
Union, Bhopal Industrial Court, Madhya Pradesh, to which the Unions
and Others
appealed against the order of certification has however
held that Mr. Sanyal had no jurisdiction to certify
Das Gupta J. the Standing Orders and it was the Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, who was competent to
certify these.
Allowing the appeals the Industrial
Court set aside the order of the Certifying Officer
as void, being without jurisdiction. It is against
this order that the present appeals have been filed after
obtaining special leave of this Court.
Before us, it is no longer disputed that on June
9, 1960 when the draft standing orders were submitted
to the Certifying Officer under the Central Standing
Orders Act that Officer had no jurisdiction and the
Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, had jurisdiction to certify them. It has however been urged
before us that long before the date on which Mr.
Sanyal made his order certifying the standing orders
the Central Standing Orders Act had become applicable to this industry to the exclusion of the Madhya
Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)
Act, and so, the certification could not be held to be
without jurisdiction. We have no doubt that if
before the actual date of certification Mr. Sanyal
as the Certifying Officer under the Central Standing
Orders Act had acquired jurisdiction the certification
cannot be held to be void merely because on the date
when the orders were submitted before him be had
no jurisdiction. (vide Municipal Board, Pushkar v.
State Transport Authority, Rajasthan & Othersc 1i.
The position in law 1s that the application for certification of the standing orders, though invalid at
the time it was made because the officer had no
(1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373.
'
•
,
'
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
jurisdiction to deal with them, became a valid applica1963
tion when he did acquire junsd1ction. To put the
-
matter in another way, the application should 're General.Manager
deemed to have been renewed immediately after the . Bh'.laz Ste~/
officer acquired jurisdiction in the matter and so, Pro;ect, Bhzlat
that jurisdiction having continued up to the date
v.
of the certification, the certification also would be Steel Workers'
with jurisdiction and binding. The question that Union, Bhopal
requires examination therefore is:
whether before
and Others
the date of certification i.e., August 6, 1962, the Certifying Officer under the Central Standing Orders Das Gupta J.
Act had become competent to certify the standing
orders for the Bhilai Steel Project.
The answer to this question depends on whether
on that date, i.e., August 6, 1962 the Central Standing
Orders Act or the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act applied to the Bhilai Steel
Industry. The Central Act, the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946, came into force
on April 23, 1946. Shortly after this the C.P. &
Berar Industrial Disputes & Settlement Act, 1947
was enacted.
It extended to the whole of Madhya
Pradesh. Sections 2 to 61 of the Act came into force
in all the industries of Madhya Pradesh except certain
industries specified in the notification that brought
these sections into force. This notification was dated
November 20, 1947.
By a further notification dated
July 22, 1958 this first notification was amended. The
consequence of the amendment was that ss. 2 to 61
of the Act became applicable with effect from August
1, 1958 to the Steel Industry at Bbilai. In 1959
the Madhya Pradesh Legislature passed a separate
Act,. Act No .. XIX of 1959 dealing with matters re·
ga~dmg standmg orders for industrial workmen.
TJ?s repealed s. 30 of the C.P. & Berar Industrial
Disputes & Settlement Act, 1947. The result was
!hat from the date on which Act XIX of 1959 came
mto force, i.e., J?ece~ber 31, 1960, s. 30 of the C.P.
& Berar lndustnal Disputes & Settlement Act 1947
was no longer in force in Madhya Pradesh.
'
'
358
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
The provisions of Act XIX of 1959 as regards
-
the certification of standing orders were also not
Gene~al.Manager applicable to Bhilai because s. 1, sub-s. 3 of this
Bh'.laz Steel . Act while laying down that the Act applied to every
Pro1ect, Bhzlaz industrial establishment wherein 20 or more workmen
v.
were employed and to such class or classes of other
Steel Workers' industrial establishments as the State Government
Union, Bhopal might by notification specify was made subject to
and Others
a proviso in these words:-
Das Gupta J.
"Provided that it shall not apply except with
the consent of the Central Government to
an industrial establishment under the control
of the Central Government or a Railway Administration or mines or oil-fields."
Admittedly, this consent of the Central Government was not given to the application of this Act,
the Madhya Pradesh Act XIX of 1959, to Bhilai
At the same time, it is not open to dispute before
us that the Steel Inoustry at Bhilai was an industrial
establishment under the control of the Central Government. There was a faint attempt on the part of the
learned counsel, who appeared before us on behalf
of the respondents, to suggest that the Steel Industry
at Bhilai was not under the control of the Central
Government. No such point appears to have been
raiicd either before Mr. Sanyal or the Industrial
Court. So, we did not permit the respondents to
raise this point for the first time here. It may also
be mentioned in this connection that in the very
notification made by the Madhya Pradesh Government on July 22, 1958, that Government made
the definite statement
that the
Steel
Industry
at Bhilai was carried on under the authority of the
Central Government. We think it reasonable to
presume for the purpose of these appeals that this
statement made by the Government of Madhya
Pradesh was correct. It follows therefore that the
Bhilai Steel Industry was an industrial establishment
under the control of the Central Government within
the meaning of the proviso to s. 1, sub-s. 3 of Act
XIX of 1959 and consequently in the absence of the
r.
•
5S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
359
consent of the Central Government it did not apply
1963
to the Bhilai Steel Industry. On and after December
-
31, 1960, therefore neither s. 30 of the 1947 Act nor General Manager
Act XIX of 1959 applied to the Bhilai Steel Industry.
Steel Bhilai
There is no escape therefore from the concluaion that Project, Bhi/ai
on and after December 31, 1960, the Bhilai Steel
v.
Industry waa governed as regards the matter of stand- Steel Workers'
ing orders by the Central Standmg Orders Act of Union, Bhopal
1946.
and Others
This continued to be the position till November
25, 1961 when Act XIX of 1959 was repealed and was
replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Act XXVI of 1961,
Madhya Pradesh Industrial Establishment Standing
Orders Act, 1961. It would seem that this Act was
applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry as it did not
contain any provision similar to the one in section
1, sub-s. 3 of the 1959 Act. The Madhya Pradesh
Act No. XXVI of 1961 was however amended in
1962 by the Madhya Pradesh Act 5 of 1962. This
Amending Act added to sub-s. 1 of s. 2 of the 1961
Act the following provision:-
"Provided that it shall not
apply to
an
undertaking carried on by or under the authority
of the Central Government or a railway administration or a mine or an oil field."
The effect of this was that Act XXVI of 1961
which became applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry
on .N?vember 25, 1961 ceased to be applicable to the
Bh1la1 Steel In.dustry on and from April 29, 1962,
when th7 President ass7i;ited to the Amending Act.
Aft~r this 9ate t~e pos1t10n again became the same
as it was tmmediate!y before the Madhya Pradesh
Act 26 of 1961 came mto force. That is, none of the
Madhya .Pradesh Acts about the standing orders
was applicable to the Bhilai Steel
Industry.
So,
the field was oi;ien for the Central Standing Orders
Act to operate m respect of the Bhilai Steel Industry
on and from the date when the Madhya Pradesh
Act V of 1962 came into force.
We ~ave therefore reached the concl~sion that
for sometune before August 6, 1962 when the order
Das Gupta!.
360
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
of certification was passed, the Certifying Officer
under the Central Go•1ernment Standing Orders Act
General Manager had become competent to certify the standing orders
Bhilai Steel
for the Bhilai Steel Industry.
1963
Project, Bhilal
v.
·Steel Workers'
Union, Bhopal
and Others
Das Gupta J.
The Industrial Court took note of the position
that on the matter of the standing orders the .1947
Act was repealed by the 1959 Act with effect from
December 31, 1960.
It was however of opinion that
there being no specific saving clause in the Act of 1959
as regards the notification of July 22, 1958, the Act
of 1947 applied to the Bhilai Steel Industry and that
notification not having been superseded by any subsequent notification it continued to be effective in
respect of the Bhilai Steel Industry under s. 25 of the
Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act. On this view
.of the effect of s. 25 of the Madhya Pradesh General
Clauses Act it based its conclusion that the State Act
continued to be applicable to the Bhilai Steel Indus·
try.
We are of opinion that s. 25 of the Madhya
Pradesh General Clauses Act could not save the
notification in question after the 1947 Act was repealed .
. That section provides:-
"Where any enactment is repealed and reenacted by a Madhya Pradesh Act with or without
modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly
provided, any appointment, notification, order,
scheme, rule, regulation, form or bye-law made
or issued under the repealed enactment shall,
so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions
re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed
to have been made or issued under the provisions
so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded
by any appointment, notification, order, scheme,
rule, regulation, form or bye-law made or issued
under the provisions so re-enacted."
It appears clear to us that the effect of the proviso
to s. 1, su_b-s. 3 of Act XIX of 1959 being that this
new Act-the re-enacted legislation-did not apply
to Bhilai the notification already issued under the
,
t
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
old Act was clearly inconsistent with the new legisla1963
tion.
Section 25 of the Madhya Pradesh General
-
Clauses Act was therefore of no avail and could not General Manager
save that notification.
Bhilai Steel
For the reasons mentioned above, we have
come to the conclusion that though on June 9, 1960,
when the draft standing orders were submitted to the
Certifying Officer under the Central Standing Order;
Act the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction to deal
with them, the Officer bad acquired jurisdiction in
the matter before August 6, 1962, when he passed
the order certifying the standing 0rders.
We, therefore, set aside the order of the Industrial
Court, Madhya Pradesh, but as that Court has not
considered the other objections raised by the Unions
in their appeals against the certification of the standing
orders, we direct that the appeals be heard by the
Industrial Court and disposed of in accordance with
law after deciding the objections raised on merits.
The appeals are accordingly allowed.
Jn the
special circumstances of the case, we order that the
parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
Appeals allowed.
Project, Bhilai
v.
Steel Worker.t'
Union, Bhopal
and Others
Das GuptaJ.