# PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK Ltd v. SRI RAM KANWAR, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL

- **Citation:** [1957] 1 S.C.R. 220
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954-04-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 134 of 1955
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/punjab-national-bank-ltd-v-sri-ram-kanwar-industrial-tribunal-1337
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

1956
H. H.Rqja
Harindd Singh
...
S. X arnail Singh
Ymkatarama
Ai1<11' ].
•
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1957}
largely to the effect that the appellant's men did election
work in the morning or in the evening, that is, out of
office hours. That shows that the work of the staff was in
addition to their normal duties, and on the principles
stated above, they could not be
held to have been
employed in
connection
with
the election.
As the
first respondent does not appear himself to have understood the true position under Rule 118 and has failed
to adduce evidence requisite for a decision of the question, he must fail, the burden being on him to establish
that that
Rule had been infringed.
In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the
Election Tribunal is set aside and the election petition
of the first respondent will stand
dismissed.
As the
parties have each succeeded on one issue and failed on
another, they will bear their own costs throughout.
A p~al allowed.
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK Ltd.
v.
SRI RAM KANWAR, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
DELHI.
(BHAGWATI,
VENKATARAMA
AIYAR,
B. P.
SINHA and
s. K. DAS JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Travelling and halting allowances to the
workerl representatives-Order of the
Tribunal directing employer
payment of such expenses pending adjudication proceedings-fun's·
diction-Practice of the Industrial Courts-Costs-Discretion of the
Tribunal-lndtutrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 11(1)
(7)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 35.
Sub-section
(7) of s. 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
as inserted by Act 48 of 1950, provides : "Subject to the rules
made under this Act, the costs of, and incidental to, any proceeding
before a Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that
Tribunal, and
the. Tribunal shall have full power to determine by and to whom
and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if aoy, such
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid, and such costs may, on application made to it by
the perpon entitled, be recovered as arrears of land revenue
or as
a public demand by the appropriate
Government."
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Industrial
Tribunal for the adjudication of a dispute between the appellant
Bank and its workmen, an application was
made by one of the.
representatives of the
workmen
praying
inter
alia
that the
appellant
should
be ordered . to
pay travelling
and
halting
allowances' for the representatives of the various
Unions coming
from different stations other than
Delhi to attend the hearing
before the
Tribunal at
Deihi, on the ground that the appellant
had branches all over
India and that there were several Unions
of its employees at those branches who were involved in the
dispute in question.
The
Tribunal while conceding that there
was no provision of law in support of the claim made by t~e respondents nevertheless made
the
order
relying on the general
practice of the
Industrial
Courts.
The appellant appealed
by
special leave and contended that the order was wholly without
jurisdiction and was also unjust, while the respondents supported
the order relying on s. 11 (7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 :
' Held, that the order of the Tribunal was without jurisdiction
and could not be supported either on the basis of the general practice
of the Industrial Courts or with reference to the provisions of s. 11
( 7) of the
Act, because (I) there was no uniform
or
consistent
practice in the matter and even if there was any such practice, it
was neither warranted by law nor by the principles of reason and
justice ; (2) on a proper construction of the . sub-section there was
no power in the
Tribunal to direct the payment of the costs of a
party in advance by the other party, irrespective of the final result
of the proceeding.
The discretion which is given to a
Tribunal under s. 11 (7) of
the Act is a judicial discretion and must be exercised according
to
the rules of reason a

## Text

1956
H. H.Rqja
Harindd Singh
...
S. X arnail Singh
Ymkatarama
Ai1<11' ].
•
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1957}
largely to the effect that the appellant's men did election
work in the morning or in the evening, that is, out of
office hours. That shows that the work of the staff was in
addition to their normal duties, and on the principles
stated above, they could not be
held to have been
employed in
connection
with
the election.
As the
first respondent does not appear himself to have understood the true position under Rule 118 and has failed
to adduce evidence requisite for a decision of the question, he must fail, the burden being on him to establish
that that
Rule had been infringed.
In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the
Election Tribunal is set aside and the election petition
of the first respondent will stand
dismissed.
As the
parties have each succeeded on one issue and failed on
another, they will bear their own costs throughout.
A p~al allowed.
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK Ltd.
v.
SRI RAM KANWAR, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
DELHI.
(BHAGWATI,
VENKATARAMA
AIYAR,
B. P.
SINHA and
s. K. DAS JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Travelling and halting allowances to the
workerl representatives-Order of the
Tribunal directing employer
payment of such expenses pending adjudication proceedings-fun's·
diction-Practice of the Industrial Courts-Costs-Discretion of the
Tribunal-lndtutrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), s. 11(1)
(7)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), s. 35.
Sub-section
(7) of s. 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
as inserted by Act 48 of 1950, provides : "Subject to the rules
made under this Act, the costs of, and incidental to, any proceeding
before a Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that
Tribunal, and
the. Tribunal shall have full power to determine by and to whom
and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if aoy, such
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid, and such costs may, on application made to it by
the perpon entitled, be recovered as arrears of land revenue
or as
a public demand by the appropriate
Government."
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Industrial
Tribunal for the adjudication of a dispute between the appellant
Bank and its workmen, an application was
made by one of the.
representatives of the
workmen
praying
inter
alia
that the
appellant
should
be ordered . to
pay travelling
and
halting
allowances' for the representatives of the various
Unions coming
from different stations other than
Delhi to attend the hearing
before the
Tribunal at
Deihi, on the ground that the appellant
had branches all over
India and that there were several Unions
of its employees at those branches who were involved in the
dispute in question.
The
Tribunal while conceding that there
was no provision of law in support of the claim made by t~e respondents nevertheless made
the
order
relying on the general
practice of the
Industrial
Courts.
The appellant appealed
by
special leave and contended that the order was wholly without
jurisdiction and was also unjust, while the respondents supported
the order relying on s. 11 (7) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 :
' Held, that the order of the Tribunal was without jurisdiction
and could not be supported either on the basis of the general practice
of the Industrial Courts or with reference to the provisions of s. 11
( 7) of the
Act, because (I) there was no uniform
or
consistent
practice in the matter and even if there was any such practice, it
was neither warranted by law nor by the principles of reason and
justice ; (2) on a proper construction of the . sub-section there was
no power in the
Tribunal to direct the payment of the costs of a
party in advance by the other party, irrespective of the final result
of the proceeding.
The discretion which is given to a
Tribunal under s. 11 (7) of
the Act is a judicial discretion and must be exercised according
to
the rules of reason and justice, not by chance or caprice or private
opinion or some fanciful idea of benevolence or sympathy.
feevan Textile Mills, Hyderabad (Deccan) v.
Their Workmen,
(1956) I L.L.J. 423, approved.
Cmain Banking Companies v. Their Workmen, (1952) 2 L.L.J.
54, in so far as it decided that the
Tribunal had power and jurisdiction under s. 11 (7) of the Act to direct the Banks to meet the
expenses of the workmen i.n a pending proceeding, disapproved.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRISDICTION: Civil
Appeal No.
134 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave
from the
order
dated
April 17, 1954, of Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal,
Delhi, made on an application filed on April 17, 1954.
1956
Punjab National
Bank Ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Kanwar,
Industrial
Tribunal,
Delhi.
Pur!}ab National,
Bank ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Kanwar,
lndustrial
Tribunal,
Delhi.
S. IC. Das J,
222
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
Ram Lal Anand and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
Y. Kumar, for respondent No. 13.
l.956. December 20. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
, S. K. DAs J.-The Punjab National Bank Ltd. is the
appellant before us.
Shorn of all details not necessary
for our purpose, the facts are these.
By its Order No.
LR-100 (98) dated September 2, 1953, the
Government
of India,
Ministry of
Labour, appointed
Shri
Ram
Kanwar, respondent No. 1, as the Industrial
Tribunal
for the adjudication of a dispute which had arisen between the appellant and its workmen in respect of the
following matter :
·
"Absorption of Bharat Bank employees in the
Punjab National Bank Ltd., and their
service conditions."
On April 17, 1954, in the course of certain pfeliminary proceedings before respondent No. 1, an application was . made on behalf of the
All
India
Punjab
National Bank Employees' Federation, in which it was
stated that a number of other
Unions were involved
in the dispute in question, because the
appellant had
branches all over India and there were several Unions
of its employees at
those branches. It was
further
stated in the application that some of those Unions
had submitted their statements
when
the dispute in
question was referred
to
the
Industrial
Tribunal,
Bombay, with Shri Panchapagesa Shastri as its sole
member and Chairman; that
Tribunal did not, however, function
as
Shri
Panchapagesa
Shastri
was
appointed a member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal
of India.
Two substantial prayers were made
in the
application of April 17, 1954: one was that due publicity of the adjudication proceedings should be given
by issuirtg notices to all those Unions to participate in
the proceedings, and the · second prayer was that an
order should be made directing the appellant to pay
travelling and halting allowances to the representatives
of the various Unions so as to enable the latter to send
their representatives to
Delhi, the
place
where the
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
adjudication proceedings were pending. A list of fourteen
Unions and organisations was given along
with
the
application, with
the number of representatives
which each Union or organisation wished to send.
In the present appeal we are concerned only
with
the second prayer made in
the aforesaid
application,
and the order which respondent No. 1 made with regard
to that prayer, being the order impugned before us,
was in these terms :
"The management objects to the grant of any
T .A. or halting allowance to the representatives of the
Unions.
It is, no doubt, correct that there is no provision of law on this point in favour of the representatives, but the general practice of various Tribunals has
all along been to allow reasonable T.A. and halting
allowance to the representatives of the Unions, specially
in Banks' cases. It is, therefore, ordered that the representatives of the
Unions,
who put in
appearance
in the
Tribunal from stations outside
Delhi, shall be
paid 2! second class railway fares to and from
Delhi,
plus
Rs. 10/- per day as halting allowance,
by the
management of the
Bank.
The Bank is also requested to direct its respective
branches to pay travelling and halting allowances in
advance to the employees who intend to come to Court
as representatives."
It may be stated
here that out oi the fourteen
Unions and organisations which wanted to send their
representatives to take part in the adjudication proceedings, two have their offices in
Delhi.
Respondent
No. 1 directed the
payment of travelling
and halting
allowances to
the
representatives
of
the remaining
twelve
Unions and organisations, and fixed the number
of representatives to be sent by each Union or organisation.
The plea of the appellant was that the order passed
by respondent No. 1 was wholly
without
jurisdiction
and was also unjust, involving as it did an expenditure
of Jll>t less than Rs. 2;500/- for each
day of hearing in
1956
Punjab National
Bank Ltd.
"·
Sri Ram Kanwar,
Industrial
Tribunal,
D1fhi
S. K. Dtu J.
Vi
Sri Ram Kanwar,
lndrulrial
Trib .. al,
Delhi.
S.K.Da1 J.
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
P957l
the course of the proceedings before respondent No. 1.
On that plea the appellant
moved . the
Punjab High
Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari or such other
writ as might be
appropriate,
for the
purpose
of
quashing the order of respondent No. 1.
The Punjab
High Court, however, dismissed the
petition
of the
appellant
in limine on May 14, 1954.
The appellant
then asked for and obtained special leave
from this
Court on October 18, 1954.
The question for decision is a very short one.
The
respondents appearing before us have sought to support
the impugned order on the strength of the
provisions
of sub-s. (7) of s. 11 of the
Industrial
Disputes Act,
1947 (XIV of 1947), hereinafter
referred
to as the
Act.
That sub-section which was added by
Act 48 of
1950 and which
we shall presently
read,
lays down,
inter alia, that t11e costs of, and incidental to, any prcr
ceeding before a
Tribunal shall be in the discretion
of
that Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall have full power
to determine by and to whom and to what extent and
subje~t to what conditions, if any, such costs are to be
paid and to give all necessary
directions for
the
purposes aforesaid.
The question
is whether respondent.
No. 1 had power, in the exercise of his discretion under
the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 11, to direct the payment of costs in advance by one of the parties to the
dispute to the
other parties in a pending proceeding,
irrespective. of the final result of that proceeding.
In our opinion, the
question admits of only one
answer.
Sub-section (3) of s.
11
enumerates certain
powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure,
and says
that every
Board,
Court and
Tribunal under the
Act shall have those
powers ; the
last enumerated power is in general terms, being "in
respect of such other matters as
may be prescribed."
No rules made under the
Act bearing on. the question
of costs
have been brought to our notice; therefore,
all that can be said, with regard to the effect of sub-s.
(3) of s. 11, is that
except the
enumerated powers,
other powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of
Civil Procedure have not been
given to the Board,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
225
Court or Tribunal under the Act.
The Act, however,
contains a separate provmon in the matter of costs
and that is sub-~1 (7) of s. 11.
That sub-section reads
(we are quoting it as it
stood at the relevant time
prior to the amendment of 1956) :
"Subject to the
rules made under this
Act, the
costs of, and incidental to, any
proceeding
before a
Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that Tribunal,
and the Tribunal shall have full power_
_to determine
by and to whom and to
what extent
and subject to
what conditions, if any, such costs are to be paid, and
to give all
necessary directions
for
the
purposes
aforesaid, and such costs may, on application made to
it by
the person entitled, be recovered as arrears of
land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate
Government."
A comparison of the sub-section with s. 35 of the Code
of Civil Procedure shows
that the sub-section
is in
terms similar to those of s. 35 of the
Code of Civil
Procedure except for the
concluding
portion
of the
sub-section
which relates to the
recovery
of costs as
arrears
of
land
revenue.
There
is also
another
difference in tl1at sub-ss. (2) and
(3)
of s. 35 of the
Code of
Civil Procedure do not find place in the Act.
On a plain reading of the sub-section, it is manifest
that (1) the
expression "costs
of any
proceeding"
means costs of the entire proceeding as determined on
its conclusion and not costs in a pending
proceeding,
nor costs to be incurred in future by a party ; and (2)
the expressioμ "costs incidental
to any
proceeding"
similarly meafis
costs
of
interlocutory
applications
etc.-such costs as have been
detetmined thereon, at
the conclusion
of the
hearing.
Neither of the two
'expressions has
any reference to · costs payable
in
advance or to be incurred in future
by a party ; far
less do they refer to halting and travelling allowances
to be incurred by a party while attending the
Court
on his
own behalf. Respondent
No.
1
correctly
appreciated the legal position, and said that there was
no provision· of law in support of the claim made by
1956
Purlfah N aJional
Bank I.ta.
v.
Sri Ram KanUJar,
Industrial
Tribunal,
De/Ai
S. K. Das J.
1956
l'llnjab NalilJnal
Bank Lid.
v.
Sri Ram Kanwar,
loduslrial
Tribunal,
DtlAi
S. IC D., ].
226
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19571
the respondents.
He reli~d, however, on the
general
practice of
Industrial
Courts, particularly in
B:i,nks'
cases.
V./ e doubt if there was any such ·general
or
consistent
practice ; nor
do
we
think
that such
practice, if any, is
legally justified.
But
we shall
advert to this matter when considering such of
the
decisions of Industrial
Tribunals as have been placed
before us.
Learned counsel for the respondents has not relied
on practice, but on the terms of the sub-section.
He
has submitted
that the toncluding portion of the subsection which states that "such costs
may, on application made to it by the person entitled, be recovered
as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand
by
the appropriate Government"
shows
that
costs may
be granted in advance in a pending proceeding.
His
argument has proceeded on these lines : firstly, he has
submitted that an
Industrial
Tribunal becomes functus
officio with the submission
of the award ;
secondly,
the concluding portion of the sub-section
sho.ws that
an application
for recovery of costs can be made to
"it" (that is,
the
Tribunal);
therefore,
the
application must be
made
before the
Tribunal
becomes
functus officio ; that is, at a stage when the proceeding
is still
pending. In
our opinion, this
argument is
wholly fallacious and proceeds on a mis-reading of the
sub-section.
The expression "it" in
the
concluding
portion of the sub-section refers
to the appropriate
Government and not to the
Tribunal ; thus the very
basis of the argument disappears and it is unnecessary
to
consider if the
Tribunal becomes functus officio
with the submission
of its award-a proposition regarding which we express no opinion.
It is not disputed that sub-s. (7) of s. 11 of the Act
gives a discretion to the
Tribunal, and it has full
power to determine by and to whom and to what
extent and subject to what
conditions,
if any, the
costs are to be paid.
It is clear, however, that the
discretion is a judicial discretion and must be exercised
according to the
ru!es of reason and
justi~e--not by
chance or caprice or private opinion or some fanciful
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
idea of benevolence or sympathy.
It is a negation
of
justice and reason to direct the appellant to pay in
advance the costs of the respondents
irrespective
of
the final result of the proceeding. The general rule is
that costs follow the event unless the
Court, for good
r,easons, otherwise orders.
Respondent No. 1 gave no
reasons
for
his
order except
that
of
practice-a
practice, assuming there be any such practice,
which
is neither legal nor just.
It may be conceded that the
jurisdiction of an Industrial
Tribunal is not invoked
for the
enforcement of mere contractual rights and
liabilities of the parties to the dispute referred to the
Tribunal
for adjudication;
its jurisdiction
in
the
matter of adjudication of an industrial dispute is wider
and more flexible.
All the same, it is not an arbitrary
jurisdiction
it
may
be readily conceded
that an
employee is as much entitled to a fair deal
as an
employer and he must be protected from victimisation
and unfair labour
practice,
but 'social
justice'
does
not mean that reason and fairness must always yield
to the convenience of a
party-convenience
of the
employee at the cost of the employer as in this casein an adjudication
proceeding.
Such
one-sided
or
partial view is really next of kin to caprice or humour.
Lord Halsbury L. C. put the matter in
characteristically forceful language when he said : ". . . . 'discretion'
means when it is said
that something is to be done
within the discretion
of the
authorities
that
that
something is to be done according to the rules of
reason and justice, not according to private opinion :
Rooke's Case (1 ) ; according to law, and not humour. It
is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful,
but
legal
and regular."
(Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield) ( 1 ).
There ar.c special cases where in a pending proceeding some costs may have to be borne by ·a party to a
litigation; for example, sub-r (4) of r. 4 of 0. XXXII,
Code of Civil
Procedure, says that where there is no
other person fit and willing to act as guardian of a
minor for the suit, the
Court may appoint any of its
officers to be such guardian, and may direct
that the
(1) 5 Rep. 100, a.
(2) [18 91) A. C. 173, 179.
1956
PUlfiab Na1ional
BanA;Ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Ir-or,
Industrial
Tribvnal,
Delhi
S. Ir. Dos J.
1956
Punjab National
Bank Ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Kanwar,
Industrial
Tribunal,
Delhi
S. K. Das J.
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
costs to be incurred by such officer in the performance
of his duties
as such guardian shall be borne either by
the parties or by any one or more of the parties to the
suit.
Section 35 of the Code is not only subject to such
conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, but is
also subject to the provisions of any law for the time
being in force.
Under the
Matrimonial
Causes Rules,
1950, the practice in English Courts is that after the
registrar's certificate
for
trial
has been granted, or,
with le'ave, at an earlier stage of the cause, a wife who
is a petitioner and has asked for costs or who has filed
an answer, may apply for security for her costs of the
cause up to the hearing, and of and incidental to the
hearing (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol.
12, para. 765 at p. 358). When such security is ordered,
unless the husband elects to pay the amount into the
registry and gives notice to the wife's solicitor, a bond
is required from him.
Such cases stand on' a special
footing and are governed by special
statutory provisions.
They have no application in the present case
and
afford no justification for the
order impugned
before us.
We now turn to the question of practice in the
Labour Courts.
The earliest decision which has
been
brought to our notice is Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Their
Workmen(.1 ). That was a case in which one of the
demands for adjudication was the demand
for travelling and other expenses of the workers' representatives,
when such representatives were required to go
out at
the instance
of any
duly
constituted
authority
or
Court in respect
of
any industrial
matter.
It was
observed : "The demand according to
the
company
amounted to financing the administration of the Union
and was therefore
objectionable even on psychological
grounds."
The
Tribunal directed that the travelling
and other expenses to be incurred in connection
with
the
Union work must be paid out of the
Union funds
and the employer could not be required to contribute
the sum.
(•) [•95•) 2 L. L. J. 557·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
In the well-known case, Certain Banking Companies
v. Their
Workmen( 1 ), the
question of facilities for
effective representation of their cases on behalf
of the
employees was raised and considered at some length.
The decision given was that
the
Tribunal had power
and jurisdiction, under sub-s. (7) of s. 11 of the Act, to
direct the
Banks to meet the reasonable
expenses of
the workmen in a pending proceeding in order to ensure.
a fair and effective hearing.
The grounds on which the
decision was based were these : ( 1) the Banks were well
organised and
their managements were in possession
of resources ; (2) the adjudication by a Labour Court
or Industrial Tribunal was a compulsory adjudication in
the interests of the public, and as disputes relating to
Banking companies, with establishments in more than
one State, were referred to the Tribunal by the Central
Government, the
circumstance that various workmen
residing in various States were compelled to submit to
an adjudication by a Central Tribunal was sufficient to
justify an order for the
payment of
their travelling
and halting allowances ; (3) there was nothing in the
Act to preclude the exercise of such power on the part
of the Industrial Tribunal as was required to carry on
the fundamental object of ensuring a proper
hearing
for the two parties to the
dispute, and the
weaker
party,
namely,
the
comparatively
unorganised,
numerous and scattered workmen employed in different
branches, needed
assistance to present their case ; ( 4)
prior to
the addition
of sub-s. (7) of s. 11 in 1950,
various Industrial
Tribunals used to pass similar orders
and it was ih recognition
of the necessity
of such
orders that the statutory provision in the sub-section
was made ; and '5) the principles
of
natural
justice
required that a real opportunity should be given
to the
workmen to present their case by asking the employer
to pay for their expenses.
In our opinion, not one of
the aforesaid grounds is
really
sustainable, either in
law or on the
principle
of justice, equity and good
conscience.
The circumstance that the
Banks are well
organised and their managements
are in possession
of
II) [1952] 2 L. L. J. 54·
1956
Punjab National
Banlc Ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Kanwar,
Industrial
Tribunal,
Delhi
S. JC D,,. J.
Punjab N alional
Ba..! Ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Jr anwar,
1"4wtrial
TribwW,
Delhi
S. K. Das J.
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
resources cannot be a ground for making them pay for
the expenses of the other party ; if that is the principle
to be applied, then in every case the richer party must
be made to pay
the
expenses of the weaker party,
irrespective of the ultimate result of the dispute, even
in a dispute raised
by
the
workmen which may be
ultimately found to be devoid of all merit, the employer
must be made to finance the workmen.
Such a principle will merely encourage frivolous and unsubstantial
disputes and will run counter
to the object and purposes of the
Act, namely, the promotion
of industrial
peace in the
interests
of
the
general public.
The
second circumstance
that
the
adjudication is a compulsory adjudication applies
equally to both parties.
If it is a compulsory adjudication for the employees, it
is equally so for the employer and we can see no reason
why that circumstance should involve the imposition of
a penalty on one of the parties to the dispute and not
on the other. \Ve have already pointed out that on a
proper construction of
the sub-section,
there
is no
power in the Tribunal to direct the
payment of the
costs of a
party in
advance
by the other
party,
irrespective
of the final result of the proceeding, and
the view expressed by the
Bank
Disputes
Tribunal
as to the construction of the
relevant
sub-section is
manifestly erroneous ; nor are we satisfied that
prior
to the addition of the sub-section, there was any consistent or uniform practice in the matter, so as to lead
to the inference that the provisions of the sub-section
gave statutory recognition to the practice. It is difficult to understand how the principles of natural justice
can be invoked in aid of an order which penalises one
party to a dispute by making it pay for the costs of the
other party in advance, irrespective of the result of the
proceeding.
We can only say that such
an order is
neither natural nor has any element of justice in it.
In a later decision, Associated Cement Companies Ltd.,
· Dwarka Cement Works, Dwarka v. Workmen Employed
under it ( ), it was observed: "If, therefore, the Union's
r_epresentatives
thought it proper to
attend on the
{1) (1953] I. C.R. Bom. 292 at 307.
.-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
231
various dates before the Tribunal, it is the Union who
should bear the costs."
In a still later decision, /eevan
Textile ·Mills, Hyderabad (Deccan) v. Their Workmen('),
the question
was again considered at some
length.
With regard to sub-s. (7) of s. 11 it was
observed :-
"Although s. 11 (7) is worded in a very wide way and
the power to order the payment of costs granted
under
it to industrial tribunals is made comprehensive and is
not even fettered
by a provision like s. 35 (2) of the
Code of Civil
Procedure, requiring the
tribunal to
state its reasons if costs are not ordered to follow the
event, orders for costs can only be made, even by
industrial tribunals,
on well-recognised
principles and
not on any abstract ideas as to what,
irrespective
of
such principles, should be
considered as desirable in
any particular case: vide
United
Commercial Bank
Case(•)". We are in agreement with the view expressed
above.
It would appear from what we have stated
above
that there was no uniform or consistent practice in the
matter, and we
are further of the view that if there
was any
such practice, it was neither warranted
by
law nor by the
principles
of reason and justice. In
Ex parte Snorv In 1'e
Slzerwell( ), an application was
made to review a taxation of costs and the appellant,
who was a
Barrister-at-law and resided at
Liverpool,
claimed his
travelling
expenses from
Liverpool
to
London and back, on the
ground
that
by arguing
his own appeal he
had
saved
the
expense
of
engaging
counsel
to which he
would
have
been
entitled.
The claim was dismissed as "preposterous and
unheard of".
As we began, so we end : there is only 011e answer
to the question and that
answer is that
respondent
No. l had no power, in the
exercise of his discretion
under sub-s. (7) of section 11 of the
Act, to direct the
appellant in this case to pay the travelling and halting
allowances
of the representatives
of the
Unions
in
a pending proceeding and
irrespective
of
its
final
(1) [1956) I L. L. J. 4~3.
(~) [1952] 2 L. L. J. 1.
(3) [1879] Weekly Notes 22.
r956
Punjab J( atioul
Bank Ltd.
"·
SriRmnK-,
Industrial
Trilnaud,
Delhi
S. K.DM J.
Punjab JVational
Bank Ltd.
v.
Sri Ram Kanwar,
lndustriai
Tribrmal,
Delhi
S. K. Das J.
232
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1957]
result.
For the reasons given, this appeal is allowed
with costs, and the costs must be paid by the contest·
ing respondents.
The order of respondent
Net 1, sO
far as it relates to the payment in a pending
proceed·
ing of travelling and halting allowances to the representatives of the various
Unions,
must be, and is
hereby, set aside.
Appeal allowed.
G!Plll-SV-76 S. C. lnJia/59-22-7°60-1000.