# PURUSHOTHAMAN NAMBUDIRI v. THE STATE OF KERALA

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 753
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-07-31
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, N. RilAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/purushothaman-nambudiri-v-the-state-of-kerala-2571
- **Pages:** 77

## Headnote

.Agrarain Relations-Constitutional validity of enaetmentDi8solution of State A8'embly pending President's asBent-Re·
consideration of Bill by New Asseml,ly-Pandarvaka Verumapat·
tom and Puravaka l,a.nds-JJ amount to
estales-"Estate",
meaning of-Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1.960 ( Kerala 4
of 1961).-Constitution of India Arts. 31A, 172, 194(3), 196,
200, 201.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill was introduced in
the Kerala Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957,
and
was ultimately passed by it on June
JO,
1959.
It
wa• then reserved by the Governor of the State for the assent
of the President under Art. 200 of the Constitution of India.
Meanwhile, on July 31, 1959, the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was dissolved.
In
February 1960 fresh elections took place in Kerala and on
July 27,1960, the President for whose assent the Bill was pending sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative
Assembly to reconsider the Bill in the light of the amendments
suggested by him.
On October 15, 1960, the Bill as amended
in the light of the President's recommendations was pac;sed
by the A'8embly. It then received the assent of the President
on January 21, 1961, and became law as the Kerala Agararian
Relations Act, 1960. The petitioner challenged the validity
of the Act on the ground that the Bill which was pending
before the President for his assent at the time when the Lcgis·
lativc Assembly was dissolved lapsed in consequence of the said
dissolution and so it was not competent to the President to
give his assent to a lapsed Bill with the result that the said
assent and all proceedings taken subsequent to it were constitutionally invalid.
Ht!d,
that the Constitution of India radically departs
from the practice obtaining in the Parliament of the United
Kingdom under which Bilis not assented to before the dissolution of the Houses arc treated as having lapsed on that event
occuring. Under Art. 196 of the Constitution ": Bill which is
pending assent of the Governor or the Prestdcnt does not
lapse on the dis>olution of the Legislative Assembly of the
State.
IHI
December 1.
1161
l'urwhoth11m01t
N amhvdiri
v.
Tiu 81a11 of Kttala
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19fi2] SUPP.
~
Held, further, that the consideration of the remitted Bill
by the new Legis)ati\'e Assemhly diet not violate the provisions
of Art. 201 of the Con<titution.
Per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar. Wancboo and Das Gupta,
JJ.-(1) Clause (5) of Art. 196 of the Constitution of India
deals exhaustively with the circumstance-s under "·hich Bil1s
would lapse on the di,,olution of the
L·~islative Assembly of
a State, and all cases not faJJing within it~ scope are not ,
aubject to the doctrine of lapse of pending business on the
dissolution of the AS>embly.
\2) Under Ans. 200 and 201 th-.re is no time limit
within which the Governor or the President should reach a
decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent and those
Articles do not rrquire that th• mil which is sent back with
the message of the Governor or the Pn·sident should be to the
same House which had considered it in the first instance.
Per Ayyangar, J.-(1) A Bill before the
legistative
Assembly of a State ceasrs to be pending, uncfrr Art. 196(5)
when it has pa!!!ed through all the proe<dure pr.scribed for
its passage through the Home and bas been pa•sed by it, and
h not deemed as pendin~ beforr the Hou<e till the receipt of
the assent of the Governor or the President as the case may be.
(2) Though under Art. 172 each
Le~islative A"enihly
of a State is conceived of a• having' a life of Jimitecl duration,
in Art. 201 the expression "The House of the Legislature" .
used in the sense of a House regarded as a permanent body.'
Attom•y-Gmeralfor New South
Wal~• v. Pennie, [1896)
A.C. 376, relied on.
.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, I 960, was enacted
with the object of providing for the acq11isition of c.rtain types
of agricultural lands in the State beyond the 'pecific maximum
extents laid do

## Text

_Characters 0–39,511 of 154,553. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39511 for what follows._

•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPOR~
758
PURUSHOTHAMAN NAMBUDIRI
v.
THE STATE OF KERALA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RilAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
.Agrarain Relations-Constitutional validity of enaetmentDi8solution of State A8'embly pending President's asBent-Re·
consideration of Bill by New Asseml,ly-Pandarvaka Verumapat·
tom and Puravaka l,a.nds-JJ amount to
estales-"Estate",
meaning of-Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1.960 ( Kerala 4
of 1961).-Constitution of India Arts. 31A, 172, 194(3), 196,
200, 201.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill was introduced in
the Kerala Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957,
and
was ultimately passed by it on June
JO,
1959.
It
wa• then reserved by the Governor of the State for the assent
of the President under Art. 200 of the Constitution of India.
Meanwhile, on July 31, 1959, the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was dissolved.
In
February 1960 fresh elections took place in Kerala and on
July 27,1960, the President for whose assent the Bill was pending sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative
Assembly to reconsider the Bill in the light of the amendments
suggested by him.
On October 15, 1960, the Bill as amended
in the light of the President's recommendations was pac;sed
by the A'8embly. It then received the assent of the President
on January 21, 1961, and became law as the Kerala Agararian
Relations Act, 1960. The petitioner challenged the validity
of the Act on the ground that the Bill which was pending
before the President for his assent at the time when the Lcgis·
lativc Assembly was dissolved lapsed in consequence of the said
dissolution and so it was not competent to the President to
give his assent to a lapsed Bill with the result that the said
assent and all proceedings taken subsequent to it were constitutionally invalid.
Ht!d,
that the Constitution of India radically departs
from the practice obtaining in the Parliament of the United
Kingdom under which Bilis not assented to before the dissolution of the Houses arc treated as having lapsed on that event
occuring. Under Art. 196 of the Constitution ": Bill which is
pending assent of the Governor or the Prestdcnt does not
lapse on the dis>olution of the Legislative Assembly of the
State.
IHI
December 1.
1161
l'urwhoth11m01t
N amhvdiri
v.
Tiu 81a11 of Kttala
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19fi2] SUPP.
~
Held, further, that the consideration of the remitted Bill
by the new Legis)ati\'e Assemhly diet not violate the provisions
of Art. 201 of the Con<titution.
Per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar. Wancboo and Das Gupta,
JJ.-(1) Clause (5) of Art. 196 of the Constitution of India
deals exhaustively with the circumstance-s under "·hich Bil1s
would lapse on the di,,olution of the
L·~islative Assembly of
a State, and all cases not faJJing within it~ scope are not ,
aubject to the doctrine of lapse of pending business on the
dissolution of the AS>embly.
\2) Under Ans. 200 and 201 th-.re is no time limit
within which the Governor or the President should reach a
decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent and those
Articles do not rrquire that th• mil which is sent back with
the message of the Governor or the Pn·sident should be to the
same House which had considered it in the first instance.
Per Ayyangar, J.-(1) A Bill before the
legistative
Assembly of a State ceasrs to be pending, uncfrr Art. 196(5)
when it has pa!!!ed through all the proe<dure pr.scribed for
its passage through the Home and bas been pa•sed by it, and
h not deemed as pendin~ beforr the Hou<e till the receipt of
the assent of the Governor or the President as the case may be.
(2) Though under Art. 172 each
Le~islative A"enihly
of a State is conceived of a• having' a life of Jimitecl duration,
in Art. 201 the expression "The House of the Legislature" .
used in the sense of a House regarded as a permanent body.'
Attom•y-Gmeralfor New South
Wal~• v. Pennie, [1896)
A.C. 376, relied on.
.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, I 960, was enacted
with the object of providing for the acq11isition of c.rtain types
of agricultural lands in the State beyond the 'pecific maximum
extents laid down in the statute.
'fhe petitioner who was
the owner of certain lands in Trichur of which 900 acres were
classified in the land records of the State as Pandar.lvaka
Verumpattom
lands
and the remaining were enttred as
Puravaka lands, claimed that the lands did not con5titute
estates under Art. 31A(2)1a) and, therefore, the Act wiu not
applicable
to them.
His ca<c wao
(!)
that as rrgards
Pandaravaka Verumpattom land" he wa~ paying rent to the
State calculated as a proportion of the gross yield of the
properties, that he held the lands under the State as a tenant
and
that
a5
he
WaJ
not
an
intermediary
between
the State and the tiller of the soil, the lands were not an
eata•e under cl. 2 (al of Art. 31A, and (2) that the Puravaka
lands were held under a Jenmi and that as they had within
it1 scope a particular form of ]and-holding known
as kanom
I
•
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
tenancy they were outside the purview of cl. 2 (a). It was not
disputed that the proclamation issued by the Ruler of Cochin
on March 10, 1905, was the relevant existing law for the purpose of deciding whether the prope1 ties of the petitioner, were
an estate under Art. 31A (2)(a). Under cl. 13 of the proclamation the holders of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure
acquired full rights t<;> the soil of the lands and held them
subject to the liability to pay the aS>essment to the State.
Clause 15 provided that in the ca" of Puravaka Lands the
J enmi was recognised as owning proprietorship in the land
and entitled to share the produce with the cultivator and the
State.
Held, that the lands held by the petitioner on Puravaka
tenure satisfied the test as to what constituted an estate under
Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution and,
therefor~, the provision of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, were applicable to them.
Held, further (Ayyangar, J., di88enting), that the basic
concept of the word "e1tate..-as used in Art. 31A(2){a) of the
Constitution is that the person holding the estate should be
proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with
the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted
in whole or in part.
If a term is used or defined in any existing law in a local area which corresponds to this basic concept of estate that would be the local equivalent of the word
''estate" in the area.
It is not necessary that there must be
an intermediary in an estate before it can be called an estate
within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a).
Shri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, (1959]
Supp. l S.C.R. 489, Atma Ram v. 8tate of Punjab, [1959)
Supp. I S.C.R. 748, 8hri Mohadeo Paikoji Kolhe Yavatmal v.
State of Bombay, (1962] l S.C. R. 733 and The State of Bihar,
v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382.
relied on.
The holder of lands held on Pandaravaka Verumpattom
tenure was a proprietor of the lands and held the lands subject to the liability to pay the a55essment to the State and
therefore, Pandaravaka Verumpattom could be regarded a• a
loacal equivalent of an estate under cl.2(a) of Art. 31A. 382.
Per Ayyan~ar, J.-(l) The word "estate" in sub ch.(a) and
(b) in Art. 31 A(2) has the same meaning and signifies lands
held by an intermediary who stood between the State and the
actual tiller of the soil an~ also the interests of those in whose
favour there had been alienation of the right to revenue.
IHI
l'urushothaman
Naml·11!liri
••
1k Stall of Kerala
1Hl
PwMJliothoman
.Nambuti&11
v.
TM Start of KnolO
756
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
(2)
The First Amendment to the Constitution did not
bring within the definition of an <Slate ht Art. 31A(2)(al the
holding of pe1sona other than intrrmeciiarics or tho~e who held
land under grants on favourable tenurCi from Covl:'rnmr:nt.
(3)
lands held hy a ryotwari proprietor other than
thooe in 'estates' would not Le an estate within sub-cl. (a) of
Art. 31.'\(2), nor the interest of such ryot in his holding an
'interest in an estate' v.:ithin sub-cl. (b).
(4)
The word 'inrludrs' in Art
31A(2)(b) is used in
the sense of 'means and includrs
1
•
(5)
The holdrr ('f Pandaravaka Vmimpatt<·m tenur.e
was in the position of a ryotwari pattadar, and, thcreforr., hts
lands were not an estate withi~ the meaning of Art. 31A(2).
(6) The lands held by the p•titioner on Puravaka tenure
were within Art. 31A(2) b<came they -..ere lands b<longing
to a Jcnmi and so covered by thr: definition of an estate as
amended bv virtue of the
Fourth Amendment to the
Constitntion'.
ORIGINAL Jl'RISillCTION : Petition No. 105 of
1961.
P1>tition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the cnforc~ment of Fundam,..ntnl Right!'.
A. V. ViM~·anatlia Sastri, ,'If. K. B. Xamburdripal and llf. R. K. Pillai, for the petitioner.
M. C. S-.talvad AU-0rmy.{]encral of India, K. K.
Mathew, Advor.ate Genera.I for the State of Kerala,
Sardar Bahadu.r, George PwJi.,sary and V. A. Scyid
Muhammad, for the respond.,nt.
l!J6l. December 5.
T.~P. .Judgment of P.B.
Gajondragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, 1(. N. Wanchoo and
K. C. D8.8 Gupta., JJ., was delivN"d by Gajendragadkar, J.. N. Rajagopa.la Ayy.rngar, J., delivered
a separate judgmt>nt.
GAJllNDRAGADKAR, J. -
'!'his
pctiliun
has
been file<l under Art. ;~2 of the Cc>nstitut.irm and it
seeks to challenge the validity of the Kenda Agrarian ltela.tions Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 196 l) (hereafter
called the Act).
Tho petitioner owns about I, 250
nr res
of land in the Kera la State. These lands
wr·re originally situated within the t•n;t.while State of
Cochin which now forms part of the Kera.la State.
•
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
Out of the lands owned by the petitioner nearly
900 acres are classified in the land records maintained by the State as Pandaravaka. holdings while
the remaining lands are cle.ssified as Puravaka holdings. By his petition the petitioner claims a declaration that the Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional and prays for a writ of certiorari or other
-appropriate writ, order or direction against the
respondent, the State of Kerala, restraining it from
implementing the provisions of the Act. It appears
that a notification has been issued by the respondent
on February 15, 1961, directing the implementation of ss. l to 40, 57,58,60, 74 to 79 as well as ss. 81
to 95 of the Act from the date of the notification.
The petitioner contends that the notification issued
under the Act is also ultra vires, unconstitutional
and illegal and as such he wants an appropriate
writ or order to be issued quashing the said notification. That in brief is the nature of the reliefs
claimed by the petitioner.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill which has
ultimately become the Act was published in the
Government Gazette of Kerala 011December18,1957,
and was introduced in the Kerala Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957, by the Communist
Government which was then in power. The bill was
discussed in the Assembly and was ultimately
passed by it on June 10, 1959. It was then reserved
by the Governor of the State for the assent of the
President under Ait. ZOO of tlie Constitution. Mean·
while, on July 31, 1959 the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was
dissolved. In February 1960 mid-term general elections took place in Kerala and as a result a coali.
tion Government came into power. On July 27,1960,
the President for whose assent the bill was pending
sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative Assembly to reconsider the bill in the light
of the specific amendments
suggested
by him.
On August 2, 1960, the Governor returned the bill
Pur1lJh;Jtha~nan
Nambudiri
v.
The State of KnaltJ
GcJenclratadkar J.
I
'· ..
1961
Purushothamon
Nambutliri
••
The Stat~ of K1rala.
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
remitted by the President with his message and
the
amendments suggested by him to the new
Assemblv for consideration. On September
26,
1960, the amendments suggested by the President
·
.. w. ere taken up for consideration by the Assembly
Gajmdragadk111 J. ·
b
1
'and ultimately on Octa. er 15, 1960, the bi 1 as
amended in the light of the President's reeommen-
.--· dations was passed by
the Assembly. It then
received tho assent of the President on January 21,
,/
1961, and after. it thus became law the impugned
notification was issued by the respondent on February 15, 1961. On March 9, 1961, the present writ
. petition was filed.
' Broadly st'lted three pol~ts fall to ·be considered in this petition. The petitioner
challenges
tho validity of the Act on the preliminary ground
that the bill which was pending before the President
for his afsent at the time when the Legislative
Assembly was dissolved lapsed in conspquence of
the said dissolution and so it was not competent to
the President to give his assent to a lapsed bill
with the result that the said assent and all proceedings taken subsequPnt to it are constitutionally
invalid. If this preliminary point is upheld no
further question would arise and the petition will
have to be allowed on that ground alone. If however, this preliminary challenge to the validity of
the bill does not succeed the respondent raises its
· . preliminary objection that the Act is protected
. under Art. 31 A (l) (a) and as such its validity
cannot l:e challenged on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away, or abridges, any of the
rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31.
This point
raises the question as to whether the properties
owned and possessed by the petitioner are an
"estate" within the meaning of Art. 31 A (2) (a).
If this question is answered in the affirmative then.
the Act would be protected under Art. 31 A (1) (a)
and the challenge to its validity on the ground
that it is inconsistent with Arts. 14,19 and 31 will not
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
survive. If, however, it is held that the whole or
any part of the properties with which the petitioner
is concerned is outside the purview of "estate" as
described by Art. 31 A (2) (a) the challenge to the
validity of the Act on the merits would have to be
considered. The
petitioner contends that the
material provisions of the Act contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 (I) (f}
and 31 of the Constitution. That is how three
principal points would call for our decision in the
present writ petition.
Let us first examine the argument that the
bill which was pending the assent of the President
at the time when the legislative Asse1?bly was dissolved has lapsed and so no further proceedings
could have been validly taken in· rPspect of it.
In support of this argument it is urged that wherever the English parliamentary form of Government ·
prevails the words "prorogation" and. "dissolution"
have acquired the status of terms of art and their
significance and consequence are well settled. The
argument is that if there is no provision to the
contrary in our Constitution the English convention with regard to the consequence of i;lissolution
should be held to follow even in India. There is
no doubt that, in England, in addition to bringing
a session of Parliament to a close prorogation puts
an end to all business which is pending consideration before either House · at the time of·
such
prorogation ; as a
result . any proceedings either in the House or in any Committee
of the house lapse with the session Dissolution
of
Parliament
is
invariably ·
preceded
by
prorogation, and what is true about the
result of prorogation is, it is said, a fortiori true
about the result of dissobtion ('). · Dissolution
of Parliament is sometimes described as "a• civil
death of Parliament " (2). Ilbert, in his work on
(I)
Vitk : Ridge•s "COnstitutional Law," 8th ed .• p. 39 ; Earl
Jowitt'a "The Dictionary of Enaiisb Law"' p. 1427.
(2) Wharton's "Law ~xicon," p. 336.
111111
Puruahotham an
Nombutfiri
v.
Tht Stat• of K '1ala
G.jentlra1adkar J.
1961
PJ1t1Uholh1MU1n
Nrmibudiri
v.
%'ht Slo~ of Kiral.
760 SUPREME COURT RE"POR'fS [1962) SUPP.
'Parliament', bas obsl•rved that "prorogation means
the end of a session (not of a Parliament)"; and
adds that "like dissolution, it kills all bills which
have not yet passed". Ho also describes dissolution
as an "encl of a Parliament (not merely of a
~rs
sion) by royal procl~mation", and observes that
"it wipes the slate cle11n of all uncompleted bills or
other procec<lings".
Thus, the petitioner contends
that the inP.vitable conventional conseq1H'nee of
<lissolution (!f Parliament is that there is a civil
death of Parliam<mt. and all uneomplef cd business
pending before Parliament lapses.
In this eonncetion it would be relevant to see
how Parliament is prorcgurd. This is bow prnrogation is deti('ribed in May's "Parliami;ntary Practice":
"If Her l'l-!ajeoty attends in pcrnou to prorogue
Padiament at the end of tho sesoion. the same
ceremonies arc obsernd as at the 01wniug of Parliament: the attendance of the Commons in 1 he House
of Peers i~ commanded; and, on their iLrrival at the
bar, the Speaker addresses Her MajcHty, on presenting the supply bills, and ad\·eits to the lll'>Ft important measures that have receive<! the ~anction of
Parliament during the ses8ion.
The royal aBBcnt is
then gi\•en to the bills which aro awaiting that sanction, and Hrr Majesty's speech is read to both
Houses of Parliament by herself or by her Chancellor; after which the Lord Chancellor, h'lving received directions from Her Majesty for that purpose,
addresaeR both Houses in this manner: "My Lords
and Members of the House of Commons, it is Her
llajesty'H royal will and pleasure that this Parliament be prorogued (to a certain day) to be then
here holden; a.nd this Parliament is accordingly
prorogued" (').
According to May, the effect of
prorogation is at once to strnpend all busineBS until
Parliament shall be summoned again. Not only are
tho proceedings of Parliament at an end but all
proceedings pending at the timo arn quashed except
(l> May's "Parliamenlary Practice,'' 1Glh ed., p. 214.
II
..
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
impeachment by the Commons and appeals before
the House of Lords. Every bill must therefore be
rdnewed after prorogation as if it had never been
introduced. To the same effect are the statements
in Halsbury's "Laws olf England" (Vide: Vol. 28,
pp. 371, 372, paragraphs ti48 to 651).
According
to Anson, "prorogation ends the session of both
Houses simultaneously and terminates all pending
bu~iness. A bill which has passed through some
stages but which is not ripe for royal assent at the
<late of prorogation must begin at the eariiest stage
when Parliament is summoned again and opened
by a speech from the throne" (1). It would thus he
seen that under Engli~h parliamentary practice
bills which have passed by both Houses and are
awaiting assent of the Crown receive the royal assent
before the Houses of Parliament are prorogned. In
other words, the procedure which appears to be
invariably followed in proroguing and dissolving
the Houses shows that no bill pending royal assent
is leff outstanding at the time of prorogation or
dissolution. That is why the question as to whether
a bill which is pending assent lapses as a result of
prorogation or dissolution does not normally arise
in England. Thus, there can be no doubt that in
Ene;land the dissolution of the Houses of Parliament kills all b11siness pending before either House
at the time of dissolution. According to the petitio·
ner, under our Constitution the result of dissolution
should be held to be the same; and since the bill in
question did not receive the assent of the President
before the Assembly was dissolved it 8hould be held
that the said bill lapsed.
This argument ·has taken another form.
The
duration of the Legislative Assembly is prescribed
by Art. 172( l ), and normally at the end of five
years the life of the Assembly would come . to an
end.
Its life could come to
an
end even
before
the
expiration
of the
said
period
{l) Anson's "Law and Custom of The Constitution," Vol. 1, 5th ed:, p.73.
1961
Purusl.othtJman
J{ambudiri
Y.
The Staf1 of Ktrala
Gaj1nd,agadkar J.
/YU
Pllft1sltotliaman
N ambwliri
..
TJ,, S1of1 of K "°'"
Gojtndrogodkar J.
762
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
of five years if during the e&id five yea.rs the Presi·
dent acts under Art. 356.
In any case there is no
continuity in th<' personality of the Assembly where
th<> life of one ABBPmbly comes to an end and an·
other AAsembly is in due course elected. ff that
he so, a bill paAsed by "ne Assembly <',imnot, on
well recognised principles of d<'mocratic govern·
ment. be brougl1t back to th"e successor Assembly
as though a change in t.he
personality of the
Assfmbly had not taken place. The scheme of the
Constitution in regard to the duration of the life of
State Legislative Assembly, it is urged, supports the
argument that with the dissolution of the i\ssembly
all businf'ss pending before the Assembly a\. tbe date
of diBBolution must lv.pse.
This posit ion would bo
consonant with the well recognised principles l•f
democratic rule. The Assembly derives it8 sovereign
power to legislate essentially because it represents
the will of the citizens of the State, and whPn one
Assembly has been dissolved .'J.nd another has been
elected in its place, the successor Assembly cannot
be required to carry on with the business pending
before ita predecessor, because that would assume
continuity of personality which in the eyes of the
C»nstitution does not exist. Therefore, sending
the bill back to the successor Assembly with the
message of the President would be inconsisk•nt with
this basic principle of democracy.
It is also urged that in dealing with the
effect of the relevant. provi8iuns of the legislative
procedure
prescribed
by
Art.
!!)()
it would he neceBSary
to
bear in
mind that
the powers of the legislature which arc recognised in England will also be available to the State
Legislature under Art. 194 (3). The argument is
that whether or not a. successor Legislati1•e AB<lem·
bly can carry on with the business pending before
its predcceB<!or at the time of itA dissolution is really
-
•
(1) S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i63
a matter of the power of the Legislature and as
such the powers of the Legislative
Assembly
shall be "ouch as may from time to time be defined
by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined,
shall be those of the House of Commons of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its Members
and Committees, at
the commencement of this
Constitution". In other words, this argument. assumes that the oonventional position with regard to
the effect of dissolution of Parliament which
prevails in England is expressly saved in India by
virtue of Art. 194(3) until a definite law is passed
by the State Legi~lature in that behalf to the
contrary. It would be
no.ticed that this argument
purports
to
supply
a
constitutional
basis for the contention which we have already set
out that the word "dissolution" is a term of art
and its effrct should be the same in India as it is
in England. It may incidentally be pointed out
that the corresponding provisions for our Parliament are contained in Art. 104(3).
As we have already mentioned there is no
doubt that dissolution of the House of Parliament
in England brings to a close and in that souse kills
all business pending before either House at the
time of dissolution; but, before accepting the broad
argument that this must, inevitably be the consequence in every country which has adopted the
English Parliamentary Corm of Government it would
be necessary to enquire whether there are any provisions made bv our Constitution whieh deal with
the matter; and if the relevant provisions of our
Constitution provide for the solution of the problem
it is that solution which obviously must be adopted.
This position is not disputed. Therefore, in determining the validity of the contentions raised by the
petitioner it would be necessary to interpret the
provisions of Art. 196 and determine their effect.
The corresponding provisions in regard to the
1'61
Purushothaman
Nambudi•i
v.
7 ht State of K1rala
Gajendragadkar J,
1961
Pruushoth1.trttn
Nambudiri
v.
7 ht S/att of Ktrola
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
legislative procedure of Parliament are contained
in Art. 107.
Tho argument base<l on the provisions of Art.
l94(:J) is, in our opinion, €'ntirely misconceived.
The powers, privileges and immunitit•S of StnteLcgiBlnturcs and thdr Dl< rnhe1s with which th11
said Article deals have no refHencc or relevance
r o the l<;gislalive procedure which is the subject·
matter of the provitiions of Art. 196. In the context,
the wor<l 'powers' Utied in Art. 194(3) must be considered along with the words "pr.ivileges and immunities,. to which the said clause refers, and thore can
be no doubt that the s.1id word can have no reference to the effect of dissolution with which we
arc concorncd.
The powers of the House of the
Legislature of a State to which reference is ma<le
in Art. 194(J) may, for instance, refer to the powers
of the House to punish cont<.>mpt of the House.
The two topics are entirely different and distinct
and the provisions in respect of one cannot be
invoked in regard to the other. Therefore, there is
no constitutional basis for the argument that unl<•ss
the J:..Cgislaturo by law has made a contrary provision the English convention "with regard to the
effect of dissolution shall prevail in this country.
What then is the roault of the provisions
of Art. HJ6 which deals with the legislative
procedure an<l
makes provisions
in rcgar<l to
the introduction and pas,ing of bills? Befur.: dealing with this question it may be useful to refor to
,_
some relevant provisions in regard to the State
Legislature under the constitution. Article 168 provides that for every State there shall be a Legislature which shall consi~t of the Governor and {a) in
the States of Bihar, Bombay, .Madhya Pradesh,
Madras, :\1ysore, Punjab, l.Jttar Pradesh and West
Bengal, two Houses, al.Id (b) in other States, one
House. In the present petition we a1 e concerned
with tho State of Kerala which has only one House
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
Article 168 (2) provides that where there a.re two
Hous~s of the Legislature of a Stato, one shall be
known as the Legisl<itive Council and the other as
the Legislative Assembly, and where there is only
one House, it shall be· known as the J,egi•lative
Assembly. Article 170 deals with the composition
of the Legisla.tiva Assembly. a'1d Art. 171 with that
of the Legislative Council. Article, 172 provides for
the duration of the State Legislatures. Under Art.
172( l) the normal period for the life of the Assembly
is five years unless it is sooner dissolved. Article
172(2) provides that the L~gislative Council of a
State shall not be subjected to dissolution, hut as
nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof
shall retire as soon as may be on the expiration of
every ~econd year in accordance with the provisions
made in that behalf by ParliamPnt by law. It
would thus be seen that under the Constitution
where the State Legislature is bicameral the Legislative Council is not subject to dissolution and this
is a feature which distinguishes the State Legislatures from the English Houses of Parliament. When
the Parliament is dissolved both the Houses stand
dissolved, whereas the position is different in India.
In the States with bicameral Legislature only the
Legislative Assembly can be dissolved but not the
Legislative Council. The same is the position under
Art. 83 in regard to the House of the People
and the Council of Sti1tes. This material distinction has to be borne in mind in construing the
provisions of Art. 196 and appreciating their
effect.
Article 196 reads thus :
"196. (1) Subject to the provisions of
Articles 198 and 207 with respect to Money
Bi[];, cmri other financial Bills, a Bill may
originate in Pit.her House
of· the Legis1 .. ture of a State which has a Legislative
Council.
Purushathaman
Nambudiri
v,
Tiu State of Ker 1la
Gajenirngndkar J.
19~1
l'uroJhothaman
Namhudiri
v.
Tiu Stote of Kerala
Gajmdragadk.ir J. .
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
(2). Subject to the provision of articles
197 and 198, a Bill shall not be deemed to
have been passed by the Houses of the Legis-
· 1ature of a State having a Legislative Council
unless it has been agreed to by both Houses,
either without amendment
or with such
amendments only as are agreed to by both
.Houses. .
·
.
(3) A Bill pending in the Legislature of
a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the ~ouse or Houses thereof.
(4} A Bill p~nding in the· Legislative
Council of a State which has not been passed
by the Legislative Assembly shall not lapse
on a dissoluHon of the Assembly.
(5) A Bill which is pending in the
Legislative Assembly of a State, or which
having been passed by the Legislative Assembly is pending in the Legislative Council,
shall lapse on a. dissolution of the Assembly".
With the first two clauses of this Article we are not
directly concerned in the present petition. It is
the last three clauses that call for our examination
Under cl. (3) a Bill pending in the Legislature of
a State will not lapse by reason of the prorogation
of the House or Housrs thereof. Thus, this clause
marks a complete departure from the English
· convention inasmuch as the prorogation of the
House or Houses does not affect the business pending . before the Legislature at the time of prorogation. In considering the effect of dissolution on
pending business it is therefore necessary to be.i.r
in mind this significant departure made by the
Constitution in .regard to the effect of prorogation.
Under this clause the pending bueiness may be
pending either in the Legislative Assembly or in
the Legislative Council or may be pending the
assent of the Governor.
At whicheTer stage the
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
pen-ling bnsinr,ss may stand, so long as it is pending before the L~gislature of a state it shall not
lapse by the prorogation of the Assembly.
Thus,
there can be no doubt that 1rnlik1J in En;.;l:tnd prnrogation does not wipe out the pewling busineRs.
Clause (4) deals with a c1tse wh;;re a Bill is
pending in the Legislative Council of a State an<{ the
same has not been passed by the Legislative
As~embly ; and it provides that such a bill pending
before the Legislative Council of a State shall not
lapse on the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
It would be noticed that this clause deals with
the case of a Bill which has originated in the
Legi~latimi Council and has yet to reach the
Legislative Assembly ; and so the Constitution
provides that in regard to such a Bill which has
yet to reaeh, and be dealt with by, the Legislative
Assembly the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly will not affect its further progress and it will
not lapse despite such dissolution.
That takes us to cl. (5).
This clause deals
with two categories of cas·es. The first part deals
with Bills which are pending before the Legislative
Assembly of a State, and the seoond with Bills
which having
been passed by the Legislative
Assembly are pending before the Legislative Council.
The Bills falling under both the clauses lapse
on the dissolution of the Assembly.
The latter
part of cl. ( 5) deals with Cl.ses of Bills which are
supplemental to the cases covered by cl. ( 4 ).
Whereas cl.\4) dealt with Bills which had originated
in the Legislative Council the latter part of cl. (5)
deals with Bills which, having originated in the
Legislative Assembly, have bsen passed by it and
are pending before the Legislative Council. Since
cl. (4) had provided that Bills falling under it shall
not lapse on diRsolution of thi:i Assembly it was
thought necessary to provide as a matter of precaution that Bills falling under tj1e latter part of cl. (5)
•hall lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly.
1981
Pururlwtharnan
.Nambudiri
..
The Stale of."; era/a
G 'dendragcdkar J,
lHl
PunuhutJwman
A'ambudiri
••
Tht Start of K~rJa
Gaitntbagadkar J,
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
That leaves pa.rt l of cl. ( 5) to be considered. This
part may cover three classes of oases. It may include a Bill which is pending before the Legislative
Assembly of a State which is unicameral and that
is the case with which we are concerned in the
present proceedings.
It may also include a case
of a Bill which is pending before the Legislative
ABBem bly of a state which is bicameral ; or it may
inolurle a case of a Bill which has been passed by
the Legislative Council in a bicameral State and is
pending before the Legislative Assembly. In all
these cases the dissolution of the Assembly leads
to the consoqU<mce that the Bills lapse. It is significant that whereas cl. (3) deals w,ith the case of a
Bill pending in the Legislature of a State, cl. (5)
deals with a Bill pending in the Legislative Assembly of a State or pending in the Legislative Council;
and that clearly means that a Bill pending 8.88ent
of the Governor or the President is outside cl. ( 5).
If the Constitution-makers had intended that a Bill
pending a~Pcnt should also lapse on the dissolutfon
of the Assembly a specific provision to that effect
would undoubtedly have been made. Similarly, if
the Constitntion makers had intended that the dissolntion of the Assembly should lead to the lapse
of all pending business it would have been unnecessary to make the provisions of cl. (5) at all. The
cases of Bills contemplated by cl. (5) would have
been governed b:v the English convention in th•lt
matter and wonld have lapsed without a specific
provision in that behalf. Thflrefore, it seems to us
that the <'ffoct of cl. (5) is to provide for all cases
where the principle of lapse on diBSolution should
apply. lf that be so, a Bill pending &BBent of the
Governor or PreRident is outside cl. (5) and
cannot be said to lapse on the dissolution of the
Assembly.
It is however, contended by the petitioner
that if cl. (5) was intended to deal with all oases
..
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS
,69
where pending business would lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly it was hardly necessary to
make any provision by cl. (4). There is no doubt
in force in the contention; but, on the other hand
it may ha.ve been thought necessary to make a
provision for Bill pending in the Legislative Council
of a State because the Legislative Council is a continuing body not subject to dissolution and the
Constitution wanted to wake a specific provision
based on that distinctive chara.cter of the Legislative Council. Having made a provision for a Hill
originating and pending in the Legislative Council
by cl. (4) it was
thought necessary to deal
with a different category of cases where Bills
have been paBBed by the Legislative Assembly and
are pending in the Legislative Council; and so the
latter part of cl. (5) was included in cl. (5). On
the other hand, if the petitioner's contention is
right els. (3) and (4) of Art. 196 having provided
for cases were business did not lapse it was hardly
necessary to have made any provisions by cl. (5)
at all.
In the absence of ol. (5) it would have
followed that all pending business, on the analogy
of the English convention, would laps on the
dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. It is true
that the question raised before us by the present
petition under Art. 196 is not free, from difficulty
but, on the whole, we are inclined t© take the view
that the effect of cl. (5) is that all cases not falling
within its scope are not subject to the doctrine of
lapse of pending business on the dissolution 0 r the
Legislative Assembly. In that sense we read cl.
(5) as dealing exhaustively with Bills.which would
lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. If that
be the true position then the argument that the Bill
which was pending assent of the President lapsed on
the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly cannot
be upheld.
In this connection it is necessary to consider
Arts. 200 and 201 which deal with Bills reserved
for the assent of the Governor or the President.
Purwhot/wmml
No.mbudifi
••
The Stale of Kerala
Gaj"""•1adkar J.
1961
Prirwhothtzm•ll
;Varr..~rt./iri
Y,
TA, Stot1 •f Ir"°"'
Ottjmdt4g44ar J,
770 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
Article 200 provides, inter alia, that when a Bill
has been passed by the Legislative ABBombly of a
State it shall be presentrd to the Governor, and
tho Governor shall declare either that he assents
to the Bill or that ho withholds assent therefrom or
that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of
the President. The proviso to this Article requires
that the Governor may, as soon as possible after
the presentation to him of the Bill for &BBent,
return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together
with a mel!l!age requesting that the House or Houses
will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions
thereof and, in partiou Jar, will consider the deeir&·
bility of introducing any such amendments as he
may recommend in hie message and, when a Bill
is so returned the House or Houses shall reconsider
the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill ia pas1ed
a.gain by the House or Houees with or without
amendment and presented to the Grovernor for
assent the Governor ahall not withhold
aBSent
therefrom. 'rhe Second proviso deals with ca.see
where the Governor shall not assent to but
shall reserve for the consideration of the President
any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor
would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers
of the High Court as to endanger the position which
that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.
Article 201 then deals with the procedure which
has to be adopted when a Bill is be assented to
by the President.
Undtr the said Article the
President shall declare either that he assents to
the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom.
The proviso lays <lown, inter alw, that the Presi·
dent may direct the Governor to return the Bill to
the House together, with such meBBage as is
mentioned in the first proviso to Art. 200, and
when a Bill is so returned the House shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months
from the date of receipt of such message, and if it is
a.gain
passed by the House with or without
amendment it shall be presented a.gain to the
President for hie consideration. The provisions of
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
these two Articles incidentally have a bearing on
the decision of the question as to the effect of Art.
196. The corresponding provision for Parliamentary
Bill is contained in Art. lll.
It is clear that if a Bill pornlin::r tho asRent of
the Governor or the Presid<.'nt iR hrl<l tn lapse on
the dissolution of the Assembly it is not unlikely
that a fair number of Bills whfoh may have been
passed by the Assembly, say during the last six
months of its existence, may be exposed to the
risk of lapse consequent on the dissolution of the
Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution. If we look
at the relevan~ provisions of Arts. 200 and 201
from this point of view it would be significant that
neither Article provides for a time limit within
which the Governor or the President should come
to a decision on the Bill referred to him for his
assent. Where it appeared necessary and expedient
to prescribe a time limit the Constitution has made
appropriate provisions in that behalf ( vide : Art.
197 (l)(b) and (2)(b)).