# PURUSHOTTAMDAS DALMIA v. THE STATE OF "WEST BENGAL

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 101
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** K. SUBBA RAO antl RAGUUBAR DAYAL
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/purushottamdas-dalmia-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-2124
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-]urisdiction--Court trying criminal conspiracy committed within its territvriul furisdiction, if can try offences
in pursuance of such conspiracy committed without - Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act V of 1898), ss. r77, 3.15· 337(a)--1ndian
Penal Code, r86o (Act XLV of r86o), ss. I20B, 466, 471,
The appellant was convicted by the Court of Session, High
Court, Calcutta, of offences under s. l20B read with s 471 and
s. 471 read with s. 466 of the Indian Penal Code in rPspect of an
import licence. His appeal against the order of conviction and
sentence passed by the trial Junge was summarily dismissed by
the High Court. Although the conspiracy was eut<'recl into at
Calcutta the offences of using the forged docume~ts as genuine
were committed at Madras. It was contended on behalf of the
appellant in this Conrt that the said offences having been comnci tted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta Courts,
they had no jurisdiction to try the offences under s. 471 read
with s. 466 of the Indian Penal Code, even !bough committed in
pursuance of the conspiracy and in course of the same transaction.
Held, that the desirability of trying all the overt acts
con1rnitted in pursuance of a conspiracy together is obvious and
ss. 177 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, properly
construed, leave no manner of doubt that the court which has
the jurisdictio~. t'? try the offence of criminal conspiracy hos
also the 1ur1st11ct1on to try all the overt acts <>1mmitted in
pursuance of it even though outsi<le its territorial jurisdiction.
]iban Banerjee v. State, A.LR. '959 Cal. 500, overruled.
Pritam Singh v, The State of Punjab, A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415,
referred to.
Babula! Choukhani v. The King Emperor, (1938) LR. 60 I.A.
158, relied on.
'
It is evident from the relevant provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that of the two types of jurisdiction of a
criminal court, namely, (r) that of trying a particular offence
and (2) its territorial jurisdiction, while the former go1•s to the
root of the matter and any transgrnssion of it renders the ent1r.c
trial void, the latte1 is not of a peremptory character and !ca''"
the place of trial open.
Assistant Sessions ]ttdge, North Arcot v. Ramaswami Asari,
(1914) I.LR. 38 Mad. 779, referred to.
Although ss. 235 and 239(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not expressly so provide, there can be no doubt that
April I9.
1961
Purtultoll••dcas
Doi-'"
f
l
~··'·~-'
:~,.·
::-.·-'-'-'",<I
v.
51111• of
W111 Blftt•l
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
they con template the joint trial of offences and perso11s mentioned therein in a court whether or not all the offences to be tried
~y ~tare r.om.mitted within its territorial jurisdiction, the only
hm1tatton bemg that the offences must have been committed in
the course of the same transaction. Section 177 ol the Code,
there fore, does not control s. 239.
No presumption as to the approval of the LegiJJature of a
particular construction of a statute can be draW11 from the
absence of any statutory modification of its provisiona unless
there is a consistent series of decisions in favour of that
construction.
Case-law discussed.
CRIMINAL
API'BLLATE
J~ISDICTION:
Criminal·
Appeal No. 51 of 1959.
Appeal by specie.I, leave from the judgment and
order dated May 16, 1958, of the Caioutt. High Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1958.
· . ·
.
·
A. S. R. Chari, K. C. Jain and B. P . .Maliefhwart, for
the e.ppella.nt.
N. C. Chat~rjee, II. R. Khaltna and D. Gupta, for
respondent.
1961. Aptil 19. The Judgment of the Court waa
delivered by
RAGHUBAB DAYAL, J.-Thia appeal, by special
leave, is from the order of the Calcutta. High Court
dated ~fay 16, 1958, summarily dismissing the appeal
of the appellant from the order of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court convicting him on jury
trial of offences under s. 120-B read with s. 471, Indian
Pena.I Code, and on two counts nnder s. 471 read with
8, 466, Indian Pena.I Code, with respect to two documents.

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
101
PURUSHOTTAMDAS DALMIA
v.
THE STATE OF "WEST BENGAL
(K. SUBBA RAO antl RAGUUBAR DAYAL, ,JJ.)
Criminal Trial-]urisdiction--Court trying criminal conspiracy committed within its territvriul furisdiction, if can try offences
in pursuance of such conspiracy committed without - Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act V of 1898), ss. r77, 3.15· 337(a)--1ndian
Penal Code, r86o (Act XLV of r86o), ss. I20B, 466, 471,
The appellant was convicted by the Court of Session, High
Court, Calcutta, of offences under s. l20B read with s 471 and
s. 471 read with s. 466 of the Indian Penal Code in rPspect of an
import licence. His appeal against the order of conviction and
sentence passed by the trial Junge was summarily dismissed by
the High Court. Although the conspiracy was eut<'recl into at
Calcutta the offences of using the forged docume~ts as genuine
were committed at Madras. It was contended on behalf of the
appellant in this Conrt that the said offences having been comnci tted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta Courts,
they had no jurisdiction to try the offences under s. 471 read
with s. 466 of the Indian Penal Code, even !bough committed in
pursuance of the conspiracy and in course of the same transaction.
Held, that the desirability of trying all the overt acts
con1rnitted in pursuance of a conspiracy together is obvious and
ss. 177 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, properly
construed, leave no manner of doubt that the court which has
the jurisdictio~. t'? try the offence of criminal conspiracy hos
also the 1ur1st11ct1on to try all the overt acts <>1mmitted in
pursuance of it even though outsi<le its territorial jurisdiction.
]iban Banerjee v. State, A.LR. '959 Cal. 500, overruled.
Pritam Singh v, The State of Punjab, A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415,
referred to.
Babula! Choukhani v. The King Emperor, (1938) LR. 60 I.A.
158, relied on.
'
It is evident from the relevant provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that of the two types of jurisdiction of a
criminal court, namely, (r) that of trying a particular offence
and (2) its territorial jurisdiction, while the former go1•s to the
root of the matter and any transgrnssion of it renders the ent1r.c
trial void, the latte1 is not of a peremptory character and !ca''"
the place of trial open.
Assistant Sessions ]ttdge, North Arcot v. Ramaswami Asari,
(1914) I.LR. 38 Mad. 779, referred to.
Although ss. 235 and 239(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not expressly so provide, there can be no doubt that
April I9.
1961
Purtultoll••dcas
Doi-'"
f
l
~··'·~-'
:~,.·
::-.·-'-'-'",<I
v.
51111• of
W111 Blftt•l
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
they con template the joint trial of offences and perso11s mentioned therein in a court whether or not all the offences to be tried
~y ~tare r.om.mitted within its territorial jurisdiction, the only
hm1tatton bemg that the offences must have been committed in
the course of the same transaction. Section 177 ol the Code,
there fore, does not control s. 239.
No presumption as to the approval of the LegiJJature of a
particular construction of a statute can be draW11 from the
absence of any statutory modification of its provisiona unless
there is a consistent series of decisions in favour of that
construction.
Case-law discussed.
CRIMINAL
API'BLLATE
J~ISDICTION:
Criminal·
Appeal No. 51 of 1959.
Appeal by specie.I, leave from the judgment and
order dated May 16, 1958, of the Caioutt. High Court
in Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1958.
· . ·
.
·
A. S. R. Chari, K. C. Jain and B. P . .Maliefhwart, for
the e.ppella.nt.
N. C. Chat~rjee, II. R. Khaltna and D. Gupta, for
respondent.
1961. Aptil 19. The Judgment of the Court waa
delivered by
RAGHUBAB DAYAL, J.-Thia appeal, by special
leave, is from the order of the Calcutta. High Court
dated ~fay 16, 1958, summarily dismissing the appeal
of the appellant from the order of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court convicting him on jury
trial of offences under s. 120-B read with s. 471, Indian
Pena.I Code, and on two counts nnder s. 471 read with
8, 466, Indian Pena.I Code, with respect to two documents. L. N. Ka.lya.na.m, who was also tried e.t the
same trial and convicted of the offcnooe under s. 120-B
rt>e.d with R. 4,71, Indian Pena.I Code, two counts under
8, 466, Indian Penal Code, and of the offence under
8 • 109, read with s. 471, Indian Pen&l Code, did not
appeal age.inst his conviction.
The brief fa.eta of the prosecution ce.se &re that the
appell:J.nt Purushotte.mda.s Da.h11ia. was one of the partners of the firm known e.s Laxmine.ra.ye.n Gourishe.nka.r whioh had its head office e.t Gaye. &nd .branch e.t
Calcutt&. The Calcutta. bra.neh was looaf.fid a.t 19,
~-.
: .. '•'"
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
103
Sambhu Mallick Lane. On April 26, 1952, the appelr96r
lant applied for a li?lek.nce for im
0
poMrting
2
rnp
9
ees on
1
e Puntshottamdas
crore worth of art s1
yarn.
n
ay , 1 52, t ie
Dalmia
Joint Chief Controller of Imports, Calcutta, issued a
v.
provisional licence. In accordance with the rules, this
State of
licence was to be got confirmed within two months by
West Bmgal
the Deputy or Chief Controller of Imports and on
such confirmation it was to be valid for a period of
~.~:;bj~
one year. The licence was to be treated as cancelled
in case it was not got confirmed within two months of
the date. of issue. This provisional licence was not
confirmed within two. months. The appellant was
duly informed of the refusal to confirm the licence.
The appellant's appeal against the refusal to confirm
the licence was dismissed in September 1952. The
provisional licences issued were returned to the appellant. The letter communicating the dismissal of the
appeal and the return of the licence was issued from
th.e office of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports on
September 26, 1952.
The letter dated September 29, 1952, from the ofuce
of the Chief Controller of Imports, New Delhi, informed the appellant with reference to the letter
dated September 4, 1952, that instructions had been
issued to the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports, Calcutta, for re.consideration of such cases
and that he was advised to contact that authority for
further action in the matter. The appellant rightly,
did not appear to take this letter to mean that the
order of rejection of his appeal was still under further
consideration. He did not take any steps to contact
the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports on
the basis of this letter. Instead, he applied on Octo-
. her 7, 1952, for the return of correspondence. That
correspondence was returned to him on October 9, 1952.
Nothing happened up to March 31, 1953, on which
date the appellant wrote to the Chief Controller of
Imports, New Delhi, a long letter expressing his grievance at the action of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Calcutta, and requesting for a sympathetic decision. The Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports, by his letter dated April 20, 1953, informed the
Purushottamdas
Dalmia
v.
State of
West Bengal
Raghubar
Dayal ].
104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
appellant that the order of the Joint Chief Controller
of Imports and Exports could not be revised for the
reasons mentioned in that letter. This letter gave
the wrong number of the appellant's firm. It mentioned its number as '16' instead of the correct number '19'. In other respects the addreBs of this letter
was correct. The appellant states that he did not
receive this letter.
In August 1953, the appellant met Kalyanam at
Calcutta. Kalyanam told the appellant that he could
get the licence validated through the good offices of
one of his acquaintances, Rajan by name, at Delhi.
Both these persons came to Delhi in August, 1953, and
visited Rajan. The appellant made over the file containing the licences to Kalyanam who in his turn
made over the same to Rajan. Two or three days
later Kalyanam returned the licences containing the
alleged forged endorsements to the appellant. The
forged endorsements related to the confirmation of the
licence and its re-validation till May 2, 1954. The
confirmation endorsement was purported to be dated
July 2, 1952, and the re-validating one purported to
be dated April 25, 1953.
Thereafter, orders were placed on the basis of the
re-validated licence and when the goods arrived attempt was made to clear them at Madras. The clearing office at Madras suspected the genuineness of the
confirmation and re-validating endorsements and finding the suspicion confirmed, made over the matter to
the Police. As a result of the investigation and preliminary enquiry, the appellant and Kalyanam were
committed to the High Court for trial.
Eight charges were framed. The first charge related to the criminal conspiracy between the two accused
and was as follows:
"That the said (1) Purushottamdas Dalmia and (2)
L. N. Kalyanam along with the person or persons
name or names unknown between the months of
April and December one thousand nine hundred and
fifty three at Calcutta, Howrah, Delhi, Madras and
other places were parties to a criminal conspiracy
to commit an offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for two years or upwards, to wit, an
f
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
105
offence of forgery by certificate or endorsement of
r96r
confirmation and an endorsement of validation of
-
C
1 L,
b .
l'
Purushottamdas
the Import Trade
ontro
wence
emg ICence
Dalmia
no. 331913/48 (the Exchange Control Copy whereof
v.
is Ext. 5 and the Customs Copy whereof is Ext. 6)
State of
purporting to be made by public servant, to wit, the
West Bengal
officers and staff of the Chief Controller of Imports
and Exports and/or the offence of fraudulently or
i;;;:zb;.
dishonestly using the aforesaid licence containing
the aforesaid forged certificates and endorsements
as to the confirmation and validation thereof knowing or having reason to believe the same to be
forged documents and thereby they the said (1)
Purushottamdas Dalmia and (2) L. N. Kalyanam
committed an offence punishable under Section 120-B
read withs. 466 and/or section 471 read withs. 466
of the Indian Penal Code within the cognizance of
this Court."
Charges Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were with respect to the false
andorsements on the copy of the licence Ext. 5. The
second charg? was under s. 466, Indian Penal Code,
against Kalyanam alone and charges Nos. 3 and 4
were against the appellant for abetting the offence of
forgery by Kalyanam and of using the forged document as genuine. Charges 5, 6 and 7 related to corresponding matters with respect to the licence copy
Ext. 6.
The eighth charge was against Kalyanam
alone and was for his abetting the appellant in his
committipg the offence of fraudulently and dishonestly
using as genuine the Customs Copy of the said licence,
Ext. 6.
The jury returned a verdict of 'not guilty' with
respect to charges Nos. 3 and 6 and also with respect
to the charge of conspiracy under s. 120-B read with
s. 466, Indian Penal Code. The jury returned a
verdict of 'guilty' against the appellant on the charge
of conspiracy under s. 120-B read withs. 471, Indian
Penal Code and the other charges Nos. 4 and 7.
It is not disputed, and cannot be disputed, that
forgeries were committed in the two documents Exts.
5 and 6.
The following points were raised by learned
counsel for the appellant:
14
Purushottanidas
Dalmia
v.
State of
rv est Bengal
Raghubar
Dayal].
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
(i) The offences of using the forged documents as
genuine were committed at Madras and therefore the
Courts at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try these
offences under s. 471 read withs. 466, Indian Penal
Code.
(ii) Alternative conspiracies could not be charged as
they must be the result of different agreements between the conspirators.
(iii) The learned Judge misdirected the jury in putting certain matters before it in the form he had done.
The chief criticisms in this connection were that (a)
the accused must have known from the ante-dating of
the confirmation endorsement that the re. validation of
the licence was a forgery; (b) even if the proper officer
of the Department had signed the re-validation, it
would still be a forgery when it was ante.dated; (c)
the letter of the Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports dated April 20, 1953, though wrongly addressed, must have reached the appellant; (d) the learned
Judge expressed his opinions strongly and this could
have unduly affected the mind of the jury and forced
it to come to the same conclusions.
The jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court to try
an offence of criminal conspiracy under s. 120-B,
Indian Penal Code, is not disputed. It is also not
disputed that the overt acts committed in pursuance
of the conspiracy were committed in the course of the
same transaction which embraced the conspiracy and
the acts done under it. It is however conte,nded for
the appellant, in view of s. 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Court having jurisdiction to
try the offence of conspiracy cannot try an offence
constituted by such overt acts which are committed
beyond its jurisdiction and reliance is placed on the
decision in Jiban Banerjee v. State (1).
This case
undoubtedly supports the appellant's contention. We
have considered it carefully and are of opinion that it
has not been rightly decided.
The desirability of the trial, together, of an offence
of criminal conspiracy and of all the overt acts committed in pursuance of it, is obvious. To establish
the offence of criminal conspiracy, evidence of the
(1) A.l.R. 1959 Cal. 500.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
107
overt acts must be given by the prosecution. Such
evidence will be necessarily tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused. The Court will have
to come to a decision about the credibility of such
evidence and, on the basis of such evidence, would
determine whether the offence of criminal conspiracy
has been established or not.
Having done all this,
the Court could also very conveniently record" finding of 'guilty' or 'not guilty' with respect to the
accused said to haye actually committed the various
overt acts. If some of the overt acts were committed
outside the jurisdiction of the Court trying the offence
of criminal conspiracy and if the law be that such
overt acts could not be tried by that Court, it would
mean that either the prosecution is forced to give up
its right of prosecuting those accused for the commission of those overt acts or that both the prosecution
and the accused af'l put to unnecessary trouble
inasmuch as the prosecution will have to produce the
same evidence a second time and the accused will
have to test the credibility of that evidence a second
time. The time of another Court will be again spent
a second time in determining the same question.
There would be the risk of the second Court coming
to a different conclusion from that of the first Court.
It .may also be possible to urge in the second Court
that it is not competent to come to a different conclusion in view of what has been said by this Court
in Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab (1):
"The acquittal of Pritam Singh Lohara of that
charge was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the possession of
the revolver Ex. P-56 by him. The possession of
that revolver was a fact in issue which had to be
established by the prosecution before he could be
convicted of the offence with which he had been
charged. That fact was found against the prosecution and having regard to the observations of Lord
MacDermott quoted above, could not be proved
against Pritam Singh Lohara. in any further proceedings between the Crown and him."
(1) A.LR. 1956 S.C. 415, 422.
Purushottamdas
Dal1nia
v.
State of
H'est Bengal
Raghubar
Dayal ].
r96r
Purusholtamdas
Dallnia
v.
Stats of
West Bengal
ilaghubar
Dayal j.
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
In these circumstances, unless the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure admit of no other construction than the one placed upon them by the
Calcutta High Court, they should be construed to give
jurisdiction to the Court trying the offence of criminal
conspiracy to try all the overt acts committed in pursuance of that conspiracy. We do not find any compelling reasons in support of the view expreRsed by
the Calcutta High Court.
·
It is true that the Legislature tren,'ts with importance the jurisdiction of Courts for the trial of offences.
Jurisdiction fff Courts is of two kinds. One type of
jurisdiction deals with respect to the power of the
Courts to try particular kinds of offence8. That is a
jurisdiction~vhich goes to the root of the matter and
if a Court not empowered to try a particular offence
uv<;' try it, the entire trial is void. The-other jurisdiction i8 what may be ca!ll)d territorial jurisdiction.
Similar importance is· not attached to it. 1'.l;iis.is clear
from the provisions of ss. 178, 188, 197(2) and 531,
Criminal Procedure Code. Sect.ion 531 provides that:
"No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal
Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that
the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course
of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in
a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or
other local area, unless it appears t.hat such error
bas in fact occasioned a failure of justice."
The reason for such a difference in the result of a
case being tried by a Court not competent to try the
offence anc;I by a Court competent to try the offence but
having no territorial jurisdiction over the area where
the offence was committed is understandable. The
power to try offences is conferred on all Courts accordin" to tht1 view the Legislature holds with respect to
th~ capability and responsibility of those Courts. The
higher the capability and the sense of responsibility,
the larger is t·he jurisdiction of those Courts over the
various offences.
Territorial jurisdiction is provided
just as a matter of co.qveniencE1, keeping in mind the
admini8tmt.ive point o( view with respect to the work
of a partic1Jlar Court, the convenience of the accused
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
109
who will havo to meet the oha~ge levelled againt him
and the convenience of the witnesses who have to
appear before the Court. It is therefore that it is provided iri s. 177 that an offence would ordinarily be
tried by a Court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction it is committed.
It was said in Assistant Sessions J.udge, North Arwt
Y. Ramaswami Asari (1):
"The scheme of chapter XV, sub-chapter (A) in
which sections 177 to 189 appear, seems to ine to be
intended to enlarge as mnch as· possible the ambit
of the sites in w;hich the trial of an offence might
bo held and to minimise as .much as possible the
inconvenience which would he caused to the prosecution, by the success of a technical plea that the
offence was not committed within the local limits
of the jurisdiction of the trying_ Conrt."
It is further significant to notice-t-he ,difference in
the language of s. 177 and s. 233. Sect.ion 177 simply
says that ordinarily every offence would be tried by a
Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it
was committed. It does not say that it would be tried
by such Court except in the cases mentioned in ss. 179
to 185 and 188 or in cases specially provided by any
other provision of law. It leaves ti}e place of trial
open. Its provisions are not peremptory. Them is
no reasoμ why tho provisions of ss. 233 to 239 may
not also provide exceptions. to s. 177, if thoy do permit the trial of a particular offence along with others
in one Court. On the other hand, s. 233, dealing with
the trial of offences, reads: ·
"For every distinct offence of which any person
is accused there shall be a separate charge, and
every such charge shall be tried separately, except
in the cases mentioned in ss. 234, 235, 236 and 239."
The language is very peremptory. There is a clear
direction that there should be a separate charge for
every distinct offence and that any deviation from
such a course would b!i~-only in cases mentioned in
ss. 234, 235, 236 and 239.
,
It is true that ,.i.~~§ not stated in express terms
(I) ('9•-t) i.L R. 3~· 779, 782.
(1,
Purusholla1ndas
Dolinia
v.
State of
West Ee;lgal
Ilaghubar
Dayal j.
Purushotta,ndas
l>aln1ia
v.
Slate cf
West H111gal
Ra.r:liufiar
Da1·al .].
'
llO
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
either in s. 235 or s. 239, that their pro'l'isions wouk
justify the joint trial of offences or of persons mentioned th<'rein in a Court irrespective of the fact whether the offences t-0 be tried were committed within
the jurisdiction of that particular Court or not.
But
such, in our opinion, should be the interpretation of
the provi,;ions in those two sections. The sections do
not expressly state that all such offences which can be
<"ha.rged and tried toguther or for which various persons can ho charged and tried together must ta.ke
place within the jurisdiction of the Court trying them.
The provisions a.ro in genera.I terms. Sub-sections (1)
to (3) of H. 235 provide for the offences being charged
with and tried e.t one trial a.nd therefore provide for
the trial of those offences at one trial in any Court
which has jurisdiction (Jver •~ny of the offences committed in the coursr of the same transaction. The
illustrations to s. 235 a.lso make no reference to the
places where t.be offences wern committed.
In particular, illustration (r) can apply even when the oliences refPrr1'd to therein were committe1! at μla.cps within th" territorial jurisdiction of diff~n'nt. Courb. Similarly, s. 239 provides for the various persons being
charged and tried tugetht>r for the ~ame offoncc romrn itt{'d in the course of the same 11'.lnsn.ction a.re
accuse1! of differ1•nt ofT1•nc!.'s committed in the course
of the su.mo tranA:tction.
Such offenceR or persons
would not be tried together if some of the offences a.re
committed by some of them outside the jurisdiction
of the Court which can try the other offences, if the
contention for the appellant be a.ccepte<l an<l tha.t
would .Ut1ount to providing, by construction. an exception for t hesc sections.
As ss. 235 and 239 of the Code arl• enabling sections, thP Legislature, rightly, did not use the expression which would h.we made it incumbent on the
Court to try, a. person of the various offences at one
trial or to t.ry various persons for the different offences
committed in the courHc of the same transaction together.
The omission to make such peremptory
provision does not nC'cessarily indicate the intention
of the legislature that the Court having jurisdiction to
try certain offences cannot try a.n offence committed
\
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
111
in the course of the same transaction, but beyond its
jurisdiction.
No definite conclusion about the approval of the
legislature to the interpretation put on the provisions
of ss. 235 and 239, Criminal Procedure Code, by the
Calcuttn, High Court in Bisseswar v. Emperor (') or by
the Madras High Court in In re; Dani (2) and in Sachidanandam v. Gopala Ayyangar (') can be arrived at
when it is found that there had been some cases which
expressed the contrary view.
The case law having a
bearing on the question under determination is, however, meagre.
In Gurdit Singh v. Emperor (') the conspiracy to
murder a person was entered into in the district of
Montgomery in Punjab and the attempt to murder
that person in pursuance of that conspiracy was made
within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Roorkee
in the United Provinces.
Broadway, J., said:
"It appear8 that, rightly or wrongly, an allegation has been made that the abetment by conspiracy or by instigation took place in the Montgomery District, ai;id thJJ.t, therefore, the case can be
tried either at Roorkee or in Montgomery.
Section
180, Criminal Procedure Code, is clear on this point
and no further discussion is needed."
In In re: Govindaswami (') a person murdered A
and B, one after the other, in the same night. The
houses of A and B were divided by a street which
formed the boundary between two districts. The
accused was sent up for trial for the murders of A and
B to the various Courts having jurisdiction to try the
offences of the murder of A and of the murder of B.
The learned Judges said:
"There is a further aspect of the case on which
we would like to make some observations. These
two cases of alleged murder by the same appellant one after the other that same night brought
as they were into the same confession should
obviously have been tried by one and the same
(1) A.I.R. 1924 Cat 1034.
(2) A.LR. 1936 Mad. 317.
(3) (1929) LL.R. 52 Mad. 991, 99..
(4) (1917) 13 Cr!. L.J. 514, 517.
(5) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 372, 373·
1-'ur u.shottamdas
Dalmia
v.
State of
H'esl Bi:ngal
Raghul.iar
Dayal,).
Pio ushottamdas
JJal11iia
v.
Stale of
TVest llengal
RagJiubar
Dayal j
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Sessions Judge. The street between the houses of
Govindan Servai and l\falayappa Konan appears
however to have been a boundary between the dis.
tricts of Tiruchirapalli and Tanjore and one murder
was committed in the jurisdiction of the Sessions
division of ·Tirnchirapalli and the other in the
jurisdiction of the Sessions dfrision of Tanjore. This
appears to have been the only reason why two
separate charge sheets were laid, in respect of these
murders. The learned Public Prosecutor agrees
that there was no impediment to the two murders
being tried together under s. 234( 1 ), Cr. P. C., and
it is indeed obvious that one Court should have
doalt with J:ioth these murders."
The two cases could not be tried by any one of the
two Sessi~ns Courts if the provisions of s. 234, Criminal Procedure Code, were- subject to the provisions of
ss. 177 l9 188 with respect tO the territorial jurisaiction of Criminal Courts.
In 8achidanandam v. GopalaAyyangar (')Odgers,.[.,,.,,~
relying on thfl case reported as Bisseswar v. Emperor (') held that unless the a.betmtlnt of an offence
took place within its territorial jurisdiction, a Court
could not avail itself of the provisions of s. 239 to try
·such abctment along with the principal offence. He
observed:
"I am doubtful about the matter, I must say;
but giving the best consideration I can to it, and
with this expression of opinion of the Calcutta High
Court, I am inclined to thin!!: that jurisdiction, being
the foundation of the charge, is to be imported or
understood as present in all the subsequent procedure set out in the Code; a~1d if that is so, it clearly
must govern s. 239."
The approval of the Legislature of a particular
construction put on the provisions of an Act on
account of its making no alter\)-tion in those provisions
is presumed only when there had b(len a c.onsistent
series of cases putting a certain construction on certain provisions.
(1) (1929)'1.L.R. 52 Mad. 991, 994·
{2) A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 1034.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
113
Lastly, an implied support to the view we are inclined to take is to be obtained from the observations
of the Judicial Committee in Babulal Choukhani v.
The King Emperor (1):
"Nor is there any limit of number of offences specified in s. 239(d). The one and only limitation there
is that the accusation should be of offences 'committed in the course of the same transaction'.
Whatever scope of connotation may be included in
the words 'the same transaction', it is enough for
the present case to say that if several persons con·
spire to commit offences, and commit overt acts in
pursuance of the conspiracy (a circumstance which
makes the act of one the act of each and all the
conspirators}, these acts are committed in the course
of the same transaction, which embraces the conspiracy and the acts done under it. The common
concert and agreement which constitute the conspiracy serve to unify the acts done in pursuance of
it."
This indicates that the only limitation on the jurisdiction of the court to charge and try together various
persons in pursuance of the provisions 01
,. ' ·1f
s. 239, Criminal Procedure Code, is that the accusation
against those persons should be of offences committed
in the course of the same transaction. It cannot be
disputed that the accusation against the accused with
respect to the overt acts committed by them in pursuance of a conspiracy is with respect to offences committed in the course of the same transaction and that
therefore persons accused of these offences can be tried
together at one trial in pursuance of the provisions
of cl. (a) of s. 239.
We therefore hold that the Calcutta Court had jurisdiction to try the appellant of
the offences under s. 471 read with s. 466, Indian
Penal Code, even though those offences, in pursuance
of the conspiracy, were committed at Madras.
The second contention for the appellant is really to
the effect that the appellant was charged with two
conspiracies in the alternative and that such a charge
(I) (1938J L.R. 65 l.A. 158, 175, 176,
•s
1961
f'111usl1 ittumdas
naimia
v.
C\tat!' of
H'est Hengal
l\.:ig/,ubar
lJayal J.
Purushottamdas
Dalmia
v.
Slate of
West Bengal
Raghubar
Dayal].
114
SUPREME COtJR'.1' REPOR'l'S
[1962)
is unwarranted by law. This, however, is not the
correct interpretation of the charge of conspiracy
framed against the appellant. The charge was one of
conspiracy, it being a conspiracy to commit an offence
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for two years
or upwards. The particular offence to be committed
was described in the alternative. One was to commit
an offence of forgery and to use the forged document
and the other was the offence of fraudulently or dishonestly using the licence containing the forged certificates and endorsements. The expression 'and/or' in
the first charge simply meant that the offences they
had conspired to commit consisted either of the
offence to commit forgery and subsequently to use the
forged document as genuine or the object was merely
to use the licence with forged endorsements even
though there was not any conspiracy to commit forgeries in the licences. In other words, the charge
was that the appellant and Kalyanam entered into a
conspiracy to commit offences punishable with rigorous imprisonment for two years or upwards and that
the offences contemplated to include the offence of
using the licence with forged endorsements and may
also include the offence of forging the licence. Thus
there was no case of two alternative conspiracies.
The conspiracy was one and it being doubtful what
the facts proved would establish about the nature of
offences to be committed by the conspirators, the
charge illustrated the offence in this form. In his
charge to the jury the learned Judge said at page 14:
"In this case from the circumstances, it may not
be very clear whether they actually made an agreement among themselves to do or cause to be done
forgery of the document or whether they merely
agreed to use it as a genuine document knowing
that it was a forged document. Therefore, the
charge is in the alternative that either they agreed
among themselves to do or cause to be done the
forgery of this document or rather, the forgery of
the endorsements of confirmation or revalidation;
or in the alternative, they agreed among themselves
regarding user of such a forged document knowing
'
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
115
that it is forged. So both 'and/or' is mentioned in
'96
the charge, either they agreed to commit forgery or Purusho.,amd•s
they agreed to use it knowing it is forged or they
Dalmi•
agreed to do both, both to commit forgery and use
v.
it knowing it to be a forged document."
State of
Such a charge is justified by the provisions of s. 236
West Bengal
of the Code.
We are therefore of the opinion that
Raghubar
the charge of conspiracy does not suffer from any
Dayal f.
illegality.
We have carefully considered all that has been said
in connection with the alleged misdirections in the
charge to the jury and are of opinion that the charge
does not suffer from this defect. The Judge has at
places expressed in unequivocal language what appears to him to be the effect of certain pieces of evidence. But that, in our opinion, has not been in such
a setting that it be held that the jury must· have felt
bound to find in accordance with that opinion. The
Judge has, at various places, stated that the jury was
not bound by his opinion, that it had to come to its
own conclusion on questions of fact and that it was
the function of the jury to decide all questions of fact.
There is nothing wrong in telling the jury that even
if the endorsements had been· ma.de by the proper
departmental officer and they were ante-dated, forgery would have been committed. That is the correct
proposition of law. The ante-dated document would
be a false document. Knowledge of ante-dating the
endorsements, naturally conveyed knowledge of the
commission of forgery.
The mistake in the letter dated April 20, 1953, from
the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, is not
such as to lead to the conclusion that the letter could
not have been delivered to the proper addressee. The
appellant's firm is located at 19, Sambhu Mallick
Road and the address of this letter gave the number
as 16. Shop No. 16 could not have been at much
distance from Shop No. 19. The postman delivering
letters at the two shops must be the same. Postmen
get to know the regular addressees by their names and
ordinarily locate them even if there be some slight
error or even omission in the address. The letter
Pur11slintlttmdaJ
l>almitt
v.
Slttle of
W esl Rengal
Ragltubar
D•y•I ] .
April i9.
116
SUPRE..'1E COURT REPORTS
[1962]
addressed to the appellant's firm is not proved to have
returned to the dead-letter office or to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. If it was delivered by
the postman at the Shop Xo. 16, ordinary courteRy
requires that that shop would have Rent over the
letter to thl' neighbouring Shop Xo. 19. The appell1int's conduce in not ta.king any action to find out
w'ia.t was the result of his rrprcsentation to the Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports is consistent with
the view that he did receive the reply of the Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports.
In the l'ircumstance8, an expression of opinion t}rn.t. t lie let tor would
have reached the appt•llant cirnnot. b,. said to amount
to a misdirection.
Tho learner! Judge is perfectly justified to ask the
jury to take into consideration the probabilities of a.
case, whore no definite evidence, in connection with
an incidental matter, exists.
We do not consider that the contentions raised do
a.mount to misdirections.
In view of the above, we see no force in this appoal
a.nd accordingly dismiss it.
Appr.al dismi.ised.
L. N. MUKHERJEE
t'.
THE STATE OF MADRAS
(K. SuB!lA RA.o and ltao1n:llAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Criminal Trial- Jurisdiction-Court having jurisdictio>t to
tr1: offences cammitted in pursua11ce of conspiracy, •f can try the
oJJence of criminal conspiracy-Code of Cmnii:al Proctdure, 1898
(V of 1898), ss. 177, 239-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act X LV of
1860). ss. 120-B, 420, 463.
The appellant was committed to the Court of Session at
~iadras for trial under s. 120-B read with s. 420 of the Indian
Penal Code and for committing the offence o! forgery in pursuance of that conspiracy. The Criminal conspiracy was alleged
to have been cvmmitted at Calcutta, while the other offences in
' ' ..
I