# PYARE LAL BHARGAVA v. ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN

- **Citation:** [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 689
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1962
- **Bench:** H.J. Imam, K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/pyare-lal-bhargava-v-st-ate-of-rajasthan-2739
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Criminal Law--Thtft-Temporary deprivation of property,
if wrongful loss-Retracted
confession-EviJ.entary valueOorroboration-Rule of practict-Irulian Penal
OoJ.e,
1860
(Act 45 of 1860), ss.
37~, 379-Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(I of 1872), 88, 3, 24.
The appellant was convicted under s. 379 of the Indian
Penal Code. He was a Superintendent in the Chief Engineer's
office and got a file removed from the Secretariat
through a
clerk took it home and made it available to his friend, the
co-ac~used, who removed certain documents by substituting
others. The appellant returned the file to the office the next
day. He made a confession when th( Chief Engineer threatened
that if he did not disclose the truth the matter would be placed
in the hands of the Police. That confession was later retracted.
The three courts below were of the opinion that the statement
of the Chief Engineer did not amount to a threat in the cir·
cumstances of the case.
Htld, that s. 24 of the evidence Act waives the stringent
rule of proof as laid down by s. 3 of the Act and requires the
court to form a prima facie opinion on the evidence and
circumstances of the particular case whether a confession should
or should not be excluded as being involuntary. It is not
possible to lay down any inflexible standard and the Supreme
Court acting under Art. 136 of the Constitution would not
ordinarily differ from the concurrent findings arrived at by the
courts below.
A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and voluntarily
made.
As a general rule of practice, however, it is unsafe to
rely upon a confession, much less a retracted confession, unless
the court is satisfied that the retracted confession was true,
voluntarily made and corroborated in material particulars.
In the present case there could be no doubt that the
necessary ingredients constituting·the offence of theft were made
out.
Octob1r 22.
1962
Pp.ra Lal BhargaVll
v.
Slat1 of Rajosthan
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
To constitute theft the loss caused need not be permanent
Even temporary dispossession, though the person taking the
property intended to restore it, may constitute theft. Illustrations (b) and (1) of s. 373 of the Indian Penal Code clearly
show that a temporary deprivation of another person of his
property may cause wrongful loss to him.

## Text

I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
PYARE LAL BHARGAVA
v.
ST ATE OF RAJASTHAN
(H.J. IMAM, K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Criminal Law--Thtft-Temporary deprivation of property,
if wrongful loss-Retracted
confession-EviJ.entary valueOorroboration-Rule of practict-Irulian Penal
OoJ.e,
1860
(Act 45 of 1860), ss.
37~, 379-Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(I of 1872), 88, 3, 24.
The appellant was convicted under s. 379 of the Indian
Penal Code. He was a Superintendent in the Chief Engineer's
office and got a file removed from the Secretariat
through a
clerk took it home and made it available to his friend, the
co-ac~used, who removed certain documents by substituting
others. The appellant returned the file to the office the next
day. He made a confession when th( Chief Engineer threatened
that if he did not disclose the truth the matter would be placed
in the hands of the Police. That confession was later retracted.
The three courts below were of the opinion that the statement
of the Chief Engineer did not amount to a threat in the cir·
cumstances of the case.
Htld, that s. 24 of the evidence Act waives the stringent
rule of proof as laid down by s. 3 of the Act and requires the
court to form a prima facie opinion on the evidence and
circumstances of the particular case whether a confession should
or should not be excluded as being involuntary. It is not
possible to lay down any inflexible standard and the Supreme
Court acting under Art. 136 of the Constitution would not
ordinarily differ from the concurrent findings arrived at by the
courts below.
A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and voluntarily
made.
As a general rule of practice, however, it is unsafe to
rely upon a confession, much less a retracted confession, unless
the court is satisfied that the retracted confession was true,
voluntarily made and corroborated in material particulars.
In the present case there could be no doubt that the
necessary ingredients constituting·the offence of theft were made
out.
Octob1r 22.
1962
Pp.ra Lal BhargaVll
v.
Slat1 of Rajosthan
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
To constitute theft the loss caused need not be permanent
Even temporary dispossession, though the person taking the
property intended to restore it, may constitute theft. Illustrations (b) and (1) of s. 373 of the Indian Penal Code clearly
show that a temporary deprivation of another person of his
property may cause wrongful loss to him.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 2 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated April 25, 1953 of the Raja~than High
Court Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in Criminal Revision
No. 237 of 1956.
S. P. Varma, for the appellant.
S. K. Kapur and P. D. Jlfenon, for the respon·
dent.
1962. October 22.
The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
s.u. R••, J.
SuBBA RAo, J. -This appeal by special leave
is directed against the decision of the High Court of
Rajasthan in Criminal Revision No. 237 of 1956
confirming that of the Sessions Judge, Al war, convicting the appellant under s. 379 of the Indian Penal
Code and sentencing hiqi. to a fine of Rs. 200/-.
To appreciate the questions raised in this appeal
the following facts, either admitted or found by the
High Court, may be stated. On November 24, 1945,
one Ram Kumar Ram obtained permission, Ex. PB,
from the Government of the former Alwar State to
supply electricity at Rajgarh, Khertal and Kherli.
Thereafter, he entered into partnership with 4 others
with an understanding that the licence would be
transferred to a company that would be floated by
the said pa,rtners~ip.. After the company was formed,
it put in an apphcat10n to the Government through
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
its managing agents for the issue of a licence in its
favour. Ex. P. W. 15/B is that application. On
the advice given by the Government Advocate, the
Government required Ram Kumar Ram to file a
declaration attested by a Magistrate with regard to
the transfer of his rights and the licence to the com -
pany. On April 8, 1948, Ram Kumar Ram filed a
declaration to that effect. The case of the prosecution
is that Ram Kumar Ram was a friend of the appellant. Pyarelal Bhargava, who was a Superintendent
in the Chief Engineer's Office, Alwar. At the
instance of Ram Kumar Ram, Pyarelal Bhargava got
the file Ex. PA/ 1 from the Secretariat through Bishan
Swarup, a clerk, before December 16, 1948, took the
file to his house sometime between December 15 and
16, 1948, made it available to Ram Kumar Ram
for removing the affidavit filed by him on April 9,
1948, and the application, Ex. P. W. 15/B from the
file and substituting in their place another letter Ex.
PC and another application Ex. PB.
After replacing
the said documents, Ram Kumar Ram made an
application to the Chief Engineer on December 24,
1948, that the licence should not be issued in the
name of the company. After the discovery of the
tampering of the said documents, Pyarelal and Ram
Kumar were prosecuted before the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Alwar, the former for an offence under
s. 379 and s. 4.65, read with s. 109, of the Indian
Penal Code, and the latter for an offence under
ss. 465 and 379, read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal
Code. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate convicted
both the accused under the said sections and sen ten.
ced them on both the counts. On appeal the Sessions
Judge set aside the conviction under s. 465, but maintained the conviction and sentence of Pyarelal
Bhargava under s. 379, and Ram Kumar Ram under
s. 379, read withs. 109, of the Indian Penal Code.
Ram Kumar Ram was sentenced to pay a fine of
Rs. 500/- and Pyarelal Bhargava to pay a fine of
Rs. 200/-. Against these convictions both the ace~
1962
Pyare Lal Bhargav.
v.
State of Rajaslh11
Suhba Rio, J.
1962
Jiart Lat Bh2rga1a
v.
Sl4t• of Rajrslhan
Suboa Rao, J.
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
filed revisions to the High Court and the High Court
set aside the conviction and sentence of Ram Kumar
Ram but confirmed those of Pyarelal Bhargava.
Pyarelal Bhargava has preferred the present appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before
us three points, namely, (I) the High Court has
wrongly relied upon the confession made by the
accused before Shri P. N. Singhal, Officiating Chief
Secretary to the Matsya Government at that time,
as that confessicn was not made voluntarily and,
therefore, irrelevant under s. 24 of the Evidence Act;
(2) the said confession having been retracted by the
appellant, the High Court should not have relied
upon it as it was not corroborated in material particulars; and (3) on the facts found the offence of theft
has not been made out within the meaning of s. 379
of the Indian Penal Code.
Another
argument,
namely, that the statement
made by
Pyarelal
Bhargava before the Chief Secretary was not a confession in law, was suggested but not pursued and,
therefore, nothing need be said about it.
The first question turns upon the interpretation
of the provisions of s. 24 of the Evidence Act and its
application to the facts found in this case. Section
24 of the Evidence Act lays down that a con,fession
caused by inducement, threat or promise is irrelevant
in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances.
Under that section a confession would be irrelevant
if the following conditions were satisfied: (I) it should appear to the court to have been caused by any
inducement, threat or promise; (2) the said threat,
inducement or promise must have reference to the
charge against the accused person; (3) it shall proceed
from a person in authority; and (4) the court shall be
of the opinion that the said inducement, threat or
promise is sufficient to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable i!1 supposing that he would gain an advantage or avoid any
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. The crucial word in
the first
ingredient is the expression "appears". The appropriate meaning of the word "appears" is "seems".
It imports a lesser degree of probability than proof.
Section 3 of the Evidence Act says:
"A fact is said to be 'proved' when after considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon
the supposition that it exists.
Therefore, the test of proof is that there is such a
high degree of probability that a prudent man would
act on the assumption that the thing is true. But
under s. 24 of the Evidence Act such a stringent rule
is waived but a lesser degree of assurance is laid down
as the criterion. The standard of a prudent man is
not completely displaced, but the stringent rule of
proof is reiaxed. Even so, the laxity of proof permitted does not warrant a court's opinion based on pure
surmise.
A prima facie opinion based on evidence
and circumstances may be adopted as the standard
laid down. To put it in other words, on the evidence
and the circumstances in a particular case it may
appear to the court that there was a threat, inducement or promise, though the said fact is not strictly
proved. This deviation from the strict standards of
proof has been designedly accepted by the Legislature with a view to exclude forced or induced confessions which sometimes are extorted and put in when
there is a lack of direct evidence. It is not possible
or advisable to lay down an inflexible standard for
guidance of courts, for in the ultimate analysis it is
the court which is called upon to exclude a confession by holding in the circumstances of a particular
case that the confession was not made voluntarily.
ceed
The threat, inducement or promise must profrom a person in authority and it is a question
1962
P)'aTI Lal Bhariaua
v.
Stat1 of Raju1/u,.
SubbaR.,, /,
1962
.,)'are lat R!iargava
v.
StaJt of Rajasthan
Subha Rao, J.
694 SUPRE!v1E COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
of fact in each case whether the person concerned is
a man of authority or not.
What is more important
is that the mere existence of the threat, inducement
or promise is not enough, but in the opinion of the
court the said threat, inducement or promise shall be
sufficient to cause a reasonable belief in the mind of
accused that by confessing he would get an advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him: while the opinion is that of the court, the criterion is the reasonable
belief of the accused.
The section, therefore, makes
it. clear that it is the duty of the court to place itself
in the position of the accused and to form an opinion
as to the state of his mind in the circumstances of a
case.
In the present ca;e it was found that certain
documents in the Chief Engineer's Office were tampered with and certain pap~i·s were substituted. The
appellant was the Superintendent in the Chief Engineer's Office. On April 11, 1949, Shri P. N. SinghaI,
Officiating Chief Secretary to the Matsya Govern·
ment, was making a departmental inquiry in respect
of the missing documents.
The appellant, among
others, was questioned about the said documenls.
The appellant first made a statement, Ex. PL, in
which he stated that he neither asked Bishan Swarup
to bring file No. 127, nor did he recollect any cau3e
for calling for that file on or about that date. As
Shri Singhal was not able to find out the culprit, he
expressed his opinion that if the whole truth did not
come out, he would hand over the inquiry to the
police. Thereafter, the appellant made a statement,
Ex. P.L. 1, wherein, in clear terms, he admitted that
about the middle of December 1948 Ram Kumar
Ram took file No. 127-P. W./48 regarding issue of
licence to the Bharat Electrical and Industrial Corporation Ltd., Alwar, from his residence to show it
to his lawyers, and that he took the file more than
once for that purpose.
He also added that this was
,.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
a voluntary statement.
Learned counsel
for the
appellant argued that the Chief Secretary gave the
threat that, if the appellant did not disclose the truth
he would place the matter in the hands of the police
and that the threat induced the appellant to make the
disclosure in the hope that he would be excused by
the authority concerned.
There is no doubt that the
Chief Secretary is an authority within the meaning of
s. 24 of the Evidence Act, but the simple question is
whether the alleged statement by the said authority
"appears" to the court to be a threat with reference
to the charge against the accused.
As we h11ve said,
under particular circumstances whether a statement
appears' to the court to be a threat or not is a question of fact.
In this case the three lower courts
concurrently held that in the circumstances of the
case the statement did not appear to be a threat
within the meaning of s. 24 of the Evidence Act, but
that was only a general statement which any person
who lost his property and was not able to find out
the culprit would make.. It may be that such a
statement under different circumstances may amount
to a threat or it may also be that another court may
take a diff~rent view even in the present circumstances of the case, but in exercising the powers under
Art. 136 of the Constitution we are not prepared to
differ from the concurrent finding given by the three
courts that in the circumstances of the present case
that the said statement did not appear to them to be
a threat.
The second argument also has no merits.
A
retracted confession may form the legal basis of a
conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and
was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a
court shall not base a conviction on such a confession
without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but
is only rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid
down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence
that under no circumstances such a conviction can be
1962
Pyare Lal Bhargaua
v.
State of Rajasthan
Subha Rat1, J.
1962
.r,,.,,Uzl Bharzava
v.
St«t• •f Rajasthan
Subba Ra~, J.
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
made without corroboration, for a court may, in a
particular case, be convinced of the absolute truth of
a confession and prepared to act upon it without
corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general
rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession, unless the
court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true
and voluntarjly made and has been corroborated in
material particulars. The High Court having regard
to the said principles looked for corroboration and
found it in the evidence of Bishan Swaroop, P.W-7,
and the entry in the Dak Book, Ex. PA. 4, and
accepted the confession in view of the said pieces of
corroboration. The finding is one of fact and there
is no permissible ground for disturbing it in this
appeal.
The last point is that on the facts found no case
of theft has been made out. The facts found were
that the appellant got the file between December
15 and 16, 1948, to his house .. made it available
to Ram Kumar Ram and on December 16, 1948,
returned it to the office.
On these facts it is contended that the prosecution has not made out that the appellant dishonestly took any movable property within
the meaning of s. 378 of the Indian Penal Code.
The said section reads :
"Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any
movable property out of the possession of any
person without that person's consent, moves
that property in order to such taking, is said to
commit theft.
The section may be dissected into its component parts
thus : a person will be guilty of the offence of theft,
(I) if he intends to cause a wrongful gain or a wrongful loss by unlawful means of property to which the
person gaining is not legally entitled or to which the
penon losing is legally entitled, as the case may be:
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
see ss.23 and 24 of the Indian Penal Code; (2) the
said intention to act dishonestly is in respect of movable property; (3) the said property shall be taken
out of the possession of another person without his
consent; and ( 4) he shall move that property in order
to such taking. In the present case the record was
in the possession of the Engineering Department
under the
control. of the Chief Engineer. The
appellaut was the Superintendent in that office; he
took the file out of the possession of the said engineer.
removed the file from the office and handed it over
to Ram Kumar Ram. But it is contended that the
said facts do not constitute the offence of theft for
three reasons, namely, (i) the Superintendent was
in possession of the file and therefore he could not
have taken the file from himself; (ii) there was no
intention to take it dishonestly as he had taken it
only for the purpose of showing the documents to
Ram Kumar Ram and returned it the next day to
the office and therefore he had not taken the said file
out of the possession of any person; and (iii) he did not
intend to take it dishonestly, as he did not receive any
wrongful gain or cause any wrongful loss to any other
person. \\i e cannot agree that the appellant was in
possession of the file.
The file was in the Secretariat
of the Department concerned, which was in charge
of the Chief Engineer. The appellant was only one
of the officers working in that department and it
cannot, therefore, be said that he was in legal possession of the file.
Nor can we accept the argument
that on the assumption that the Chief Engineer was
in possession of the said file, the accused had not
taken it out of his possession.
To commit theft one
need not take movable property permanently out of
the possession of another with the intention not to
return it to him. It would satisfy the definition if
he took any movable property out of the possession
of another person though he intended to return it
later on.
\Ve cannot also agree with learned counsel
that there is no wrongful loss in the present rast:.
1962
Pya" Lal Bhar1,r1r1a
v.
Statt af RojaJth~n
Sub be Rao, J.
1962
P )1irt "uzt Bha g®a
v.
Slalt of RaJasthan
Subba Rao, J,
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
Wrongful loss is loss by unlawful means of property to
which the person losing it is le,gally entitled. It cannot
be disputed that the appellant unauthorisedly took the
file from the office and handed if over to Ram Kumar
Ram. He had, therefore, unlawfully taken the file
from the department, and for a short time he depriv·
ed the Engineering Department of the possession of
the said file. The loss need not be caused by a permanent deprivation of property but may be caused even
by temporary dispossession, though the person taking
it intended to restore it sooner or later. A temporary
period of deprivation or dispossession of the property
of another causes loss to the other. That a person will
act dishonestly if he temporarily dispossesses another
of his property is made clear by illustrations (b) and
(1) of s.378 of the Indian Penal Code. They are :
(b}.
(l ).
A puts a bait for dogs in his pocket, and
thus induces Z's dog to follow it. Here,
if A's intention be dishonestly to take the
dog out of Z's possession without Z's
consent, A has committed theft as soon as
Z's dog has begun to follow A.
A takes an article belonging to Z out of
Z's possession without Z's consent, with
the intention of keeping it until he obtains money from Z as a reward for its
restoration.
Here A takes dishonestly;
A has therefore committed theft.
It will be seen from the said illustrations that a
temporary removal of a dog which might ultimately
be returned to the owner or the temporary taking of
an article with a view to return it after receiving
some reward constitutes theft, indicating thereby
that temporary deprivation of another person of his
property causes wrongful loss to him. We, therefore,
hold that the facts found in this case clearly bring
them within the four comers of s. 378 of the Indian
i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
.Penal Code and, therefore, the courts have rightly
held .that the appellant had committed the offence
of theft.
No other point was pressed before us.
In the
result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY CITY I, BOMBAY
v.
AMARCHAND N. SHROFF, BY HIS HEIRS
AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
(]. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. C.
SHAH, JJ.)
Income ]'ax-Liability to tax of income of deceased personS'Uch income in hands of the legal representatives-Income of
the previo'Us year-Indian income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922),
s. 24.B.
Sub-section
(~) of s. 24B of the Indian Income-tax Act,
1922, provided that where a person dies his heirs and legal
representatives ate liable to pay out of the estate of the deceased
the tax assessed as payable by the deceased or any tax which
would have been payable under the Act by the deceased if he
had not died.
A who was one of the three partners in a firm of solicitors
died on July 7, 1949, and thereafter the partnership was carried
on by the other two partners till December 1, 1949, when R,
son of A, joined the firm as the third partner. After the death
of A the arrangement between the various partners in regard
to the realisations of the old outstandings was thal in respect
of the work done up to the death of A the realisations were to
be divided between A and the other two partners. The firm
1962
P;·are Lal Bhargava
v.
State oj Rajasthan
SubbtJ. Rao, J.
1962
Octohlr, 23.