# R. JEEVARATNAM v. TIIE STATE OF MADRAS

- **Citation:** [1966] 2 S.C.R. 204
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-10-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 232 of 1964
- **Bench:** K. SUBBA RAo, J. R. Mudholkar, R. S. Bachawat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r-jeevaratnam-v-tiie-state-of-madras-3527
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Disciplinary Proceedings-Inquiry-Same counsel representing appellant as some others-No confi1Ct of interest-Whether reasonable opportunity to defend given.
Dismissal Order-With retrospective effect-Effect of.
Disciplinary proceedings were started against the appellant, a Deputy
Tahsildar, and three of his subordinates on charge of accepting illegal
gratification. On May 20, 1949, he was placed under suspension and
relieved of his duties. The Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal directed
the consolidation and common hearing of the enquiries against the appellant
and the other three civil serYants. Although the Tribunal refused an
earlier application of the appellant for permission to engage counsel, at
the hearing of tlie enquiry on being told that he could engage the same
counsel who appeared for the other three civil servants, the appellant
engaged that counsel and was represented by him throughout the eniqury. The
Tribunal declined to grant a prayer of the appellant on June 13, 1949,
to grant an adjournment of the hearing and the enquiry was held on
June 13, 14 and 15. Upon the Tribunal recommending the appellant's
dismissal and after fie bad been served with a show cau90 notice and had
replied thereto, on October 17, 1950, the Government directed that
he be dismissed from service with effect from May 20, 1949.
The appellant then institnted a suit and sought a declaration that the
order dated October 17, 1950 was illegal and void. The trial court dismissed the suit and this decision was affirmed on appeal by the High,
Court.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that in view of the refusal
c
of the appellant's prayer to engage counsel of his own choice and of his
F
prayer for adjournment on June 13, he had been denied a reasonable
opportnnity to defend himself against the charges; and furthermore, that
the order of dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with
mrospectiv.e effect from the date of suspension
was
illegal and inoperative.
HELD : (i) The appellant had been given a reasonable opportunity
to defend himself against the charges.
(206 DJ
G
There was no conflict of interests between the appellant and the other
three civil servants; there was nothing to show that the counsel representing the other three was unable to conduct the appellant's defence.
properly.
(206 CJ
(ii) The order of dismissal as from October 17, 1950, was Talid
and effective. (207 A]
An order of dismissal with retrospective effect i~. ht substance, an
order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the superadded
direction that the order should operate as from an anterior date.
Th<\
.•
A
B
JEEVARATNAM v. STATE (Bachawat, J.)
205
two parts of the order are clearly severable, Assuming that the second
part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part of the
order should not be given the fullest effect. [207 G-H; 208 A]
Hemanta Kumar v. S. N. Mukherjee, (1953) 58 C.W.N. 1-referreu
to.
Abdul Hamid v. The District School Board, 24-Parganas (1957) 61
C.W.N. 880: Sudhir Ranjan Haldar v, State of W. Bengal A.LR. 1961
Cal. 626, 630 : disapproved.

## Text

R. JEEVARATNAM
v.
TIIE STATE OF MADRAS
October 13, 1965
(K. SUBBA RAo, J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
Disciplinary Proceedings-Inquiry-Same counsel representing appellant as some others-No confi1Ct of interest-Whether reasonable opportunity to defend given.
Dismissal Order-With retrospective effect-Effect of.
Disciplinary proceedings were started against the appellant, a Deputy
Tahsildar, and three of his subordinates on charge of accepting illegal
gratification. On May 20, 1949, he was placed under suspension and
relieved of his duties. The Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal directed
the consolidation and common hearing of the enquiries against the appellant
and the other three civil serYants. Although the Tribunal refused an
earlier application of the appellant for permission to engage counsel, at
the hearing of tlie enquiry on being told that he could engage the same
counsel who appeared for the other three civil servants, the appellant
engaged that counsel and was represented by him throughout the eniqury. The
Tribunal declined to grant a prayer of the appellant on June 13, 1949,
to grant an adjournment of the hearing and the enquiry was held on
June 13, 14 and 15. Upon the Tribunal recommending the appellant's
dismissal and after fie bad been served with a show cau90 notice and had
replied thereto, on October 17, 1950, the Government directed that
he be dismissed from service with effect from May 20, 1949.
The appellant then institnted a suit and sought a declaration that the
order dated October 17, 1950 was illegal and void. The trial court dismissed the suit and this decision was affirmed on appeal by the High,
Court.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that in view of the refusal
c
of the appellant's prayer to engage counsel of his own choice and of his
F
prayer for adjournment on June 13, he had been denied a reasonable
opportnnity to defend himself against the charges; and furthermore, that
the order of dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with
mrospectiv.e effect from the date of suspension
was
illegal and inoperative.
HELD : (i) The appellant had been given a reasonable opportunity
to defend himself against the charges.
(206 DJ
G
There was no conflict of interests between the appellant and the other
three civil servants; there was nothing to show that the counsel representing the other three was unable to conduct the appellant's defence.
properly.
(206 CJ
(ii) The order of dismissal as from October 17, 1950, was Talid
and effective. (207 A]
An order of dismissal with retrospective effect i~. ht substance, an
order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the superadded
direction that the order should operate as from an anterior date.
Th<\
.•
A
B
JEEVARATNAM v. STATE (Bachawat, J.)
205
two parts of the order are clearly severable, Assuming that the second
part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part of the
order should not be given the fullest effect. [207 G-H; 208 A]
Hemanta Kumar v. S. N. Mukherjee, (1953) 58 C.W.N. 1-referreu
to.
Abdul Hamid v. The District School Board, 24-Parganas (1957) 61
C.W.N. 880: Sudhir Ranjan Haldar v, State of W. Bengal A.LR. 1961
Cal. 626, 630 : disapproved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 232 of
1964.
Appeal from the Judgment and order dated the 23rd October,
1960 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 237 of 1958.
c
R. Thiagarajan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellant.
D
E
F
A. Ranganadham Chetty and A. V. Rangam, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
. Bacbawat J. The appellant held the post of Deputy Tahsildar
in the Revenue Department of the Government of Madras. Disciplinary proceedings were started against him on twelve charges
of acceptance of illegal gratification during his office as Special
Loans Deputy Tahsildar, Cuddalore, South Arcot District. Disciplinary proceedings were started against three of his subordinates
also on similar charges.
On May, 20, 1949, he was placed under
suspension and relieved of his duties.
The Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal directed the consolidation and common hearing of
the enquiries against the appellant and the other three civil servants.
The appellant asked for permission to engage a counsel
at the enquiry.
By an order dated May 31, 1949, the Tribunal
refused to give the permission.
The enquiry was held on June
13, 14 and 15. At the hearing, the other three civil servants
were represented by counsel, Sri. Kalyanasundaram.
On June
13, the appellant prayed for an adjournment.
The Tribunal declined to grant the adjournment and told the appellant that he
G was at liberty to engage Sri. Kalyanasundaram as his counsel. The
appellant thereupon availed himself of the services of Sri.
Kalyanasundaram, and was represented by him throughout the
enquiry. On June 30, the Tribunal submitted a report stating that
the charges against the appellant were proved and recommending
H
his dismissal.
On September 16, the Government issued a notice
to him asking him to show cause why he should not be dismissed
from service.
On November 12, 1949, he submitted his written
representation.
On October 17, 1950, the Government directed
206
SUPREME COURT l.llPOll.TS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
that he be dismissed from service with effect from May 20, 1949.
The apellant instituted the suit asking for a declaration that the
order dated October 17, 1950 dismissing him from service is
illegal and void.
The trial Court dismissed the suit, and this
decree was affirmed on appeal by the High Court of Madras. The
appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave.
Counsei for the appellant submitted that in view of the refusal
of the appellant's prayer for engaging a counsel of his own choice
and his prayer for adjournment of the hearing on June 13, 1949,
A
B
the appellant had been denied a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself against the charges.
We are not inclined to accept this
submission.
There was no conflict of interests between him and C
the other three civil servants.
Counsel representing the other
three civil servants was allowed by the Tribunal also to represent
him.
The enquiry continued for three days.
It is not proved
that counsel was unable to conduct the defence properly.
Even
in his written representation dated November 12, 1949, the appelland did not allege that he was prejudiced in his defence. We are
D
satisfied that the appellant had reasonable opportunity to defend
himself against the charges.
Counsel for the appellant next contended that the order of
dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with retrospective effect is illegal and inoperative.
Counsel for the resE
pendent submitted ( 1) the order of dismissal with retrospective
effect as from the date of the suspension is valid in its entirety,
and (2) in any event, the order is valid and effective as from
October 17, 1950.
The High Court accepted the first contention,
and declined to express any opinion on the second contention. In
our opinion, the second contention of the respondent is sound, F
and in this view of the matter, we decline to express any opinion on
the first contention.
Counsel for the appellant conceded that if
the respondent's second contention is accepted, the appeal must
fail.
The order dated October 17, 1950 directed that the appellant G
be dismissed from serVice with effect from the date of his suspension, that is to say, from May 20, 1949.
In substance, this order
directed that (1) the appellant be dismissed, and (2) the dismissal
do operate retrospectively as from May 20, 1949.
The two parts
of this composite order are separable. The first part of the order H
operates as a dismissal of the appellant as from October 17, 1950.
The invalidity of the second part of the order, assuming this part
to be invalid, does not affect the first part of the order. The order
..
'
-
\
J!!EVARATNAM v. STAT!! (Bachawat, J.)
207
A
of dismissal as from October 17, 1950 is valid and effective. The
appellant has been lawfully dismissed, and he is not entitled to
claim that he is still in service.
We may now notice the cases relied on by counsel for the
appellant. In Hemanta Kumar v. S. N. Mukherjee('), the Calcutta
B
High Court had occasion to consider an order dated April 29, 1952
by which a civil servant had been placed under suspension with retrospective effect from January 16, 1951. While holding that the
order of suspension for the period, January 16, 1951 up to April
28, 1952 was invalid and should be quashed, the Court held that
the order of suspension was valid and effective as and from April
C
29, 1952 and this part of the order should be upheld.
As a
a matter of fact, the validity of the suspension as from April 29,
1952 was not even questioned by counsel for the parties. Far
from supporting the appellant, this decision is against him
on the point under consideration.
In Abdul Hamid v. The
District School Board, 24-Parganas(2 ), the Calcutta High Court
D
had occasion to consider an order dated April 18, 1952 discharging a teacher employed by a District School Board from service with
effect from July 15, 1951, the date on which he had been arrested
in connection with a pending criminal case against him.
While
holding that the dismissal from the period from July 15, 1951 up
E
to April 17, 1952 was invalid, the High Court also held that the
order of dismissal was entirely bad and was not effective even
from April 18, 1952. The High Court observed :
F
"It appears to me that when the real intention of the
Board was to discharge the petitioner with effect from
the date when he was put under arrest it is not within the
jurisdiction of the Court to substitute a different intention and maintain the order of discharge in a modified
form.
The order must stand or fall in toto. In this
view of the matter it appears to me that the order of discharge as passed by the Board cannot stand."
G
Our attention is drawn to similar observations irt Sudhir Ranjan
Haldar v. State of West Benga/(8 ). With respect, we are unable
to agree with this line of reasoning.
An order of dismissal with
retrospective effect is, in substance, an order of dismissal as from
the date of the order with the superadded direction that the order
should operate retrospectively as from an anterior date. The two
H
parts of the order are clearly severable. Assuming that the second
(t} (1953) SS C.W.N. 1.
(2) (1957) 61 C.W.N. 880.
(3) A.J.R. 1961 Cal. 626,630.
208
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[ 1966] 2 S.C.R.
part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part A
of the order should not be given the fullest effect.
The Court
cannot pass a new order of dismissal, but surely it can give effect
to the valid and severable part of the order.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order
B
as to costs. The appellant is exempted from paying court fees.
Appeal dismissed .
•