# R. L. ARORA v. STATE OF U. P - **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r-l-arora-v-state-of-u-p-2586 - **Pages:** 40 ## Headnote Land Acquisition-Acquisition for Cf!mp<;iny-"Work likely w prove useful to the public", Meaning· of-Right of access w per.ans having business with company-Product of company being useful to the public-If satisfy requirement-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [1of1894], ss. 6, 40, 41. The Government acquired appellant's land for a company for setting up a textile manchinery parts factory. The entire compensation for the acquisitio11 was to be paid by the company. The Government was satisfied that the product of the company would be useful to the public and the agreement between the company and the Government provided that those who had business with the company shall have access to the land and works. The notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894, were issued showing that the land was acquired for the company. The appellant contended that the notification under: s. 6 was invalid as the acquisition was not for the construction of any work which was likely to prove useful to the public as contemplated by s. 40 (l)(b) read with cl. (5) of s. 41. Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupia and Ayyangar, JJ., Sarkar, J. contra), that the notification under s. 6 of the Act wa> invalid and the proceedings should be quashed. Section 40 (l)(b), which alone could apply to the case, provided that in case of acquisition for a company the Government could give its consent if the acquisition was needed for the construction of some work which was likely to prove useful to the public. For such cases cl. (5) of s. 41 provided that the agreement between the company and the Government shall state the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the works. These provisions had to be read together and required that the work should be directly useful to the public and that the agreement should contain a term as to ho\v the public shall have the right to use the work directly thernselves. The provision of access to the land or works to those having business with the company or the fact that the product of the con1pany would b~ useful to the public were not sufficient to bring the acquisition for a cornpany withir:t the meaning of the relevant \vords in ss. 40 and 4 l. The satisfaction of the <;;-overnment that the work was likely 1961 December 1. IHI B. L •Arora .. S<.11 of U.P. w--.J. 150 SUPREME ootmr REPORTS [1962) SUPP. to prove useful to the public upon a wrong COD1tructlon of s. 40 and s. 41 was not binding. The concluslvencu attached by s. 6(3) to the notification under s. 6( 1) wu only to thit CX· tent that the land was needed for the purposes of a company and this was not in dispute. Bahu Barlcya Thakur v. TM. Stale of Borrtbay, 11961! 1 S.C.R. 128 and Pandit Jllandu Lal v. Stat. of Ptmjab, 1961 2 S. C. R. 459, referred to. Per Sarkar, J.-The acquU!tion for the company to set up a textile machinery parts factory wiu for some work which wu likely to prove'· useful to the public and wu valid. The work contemplated in s. 40( I )(b) was work from which the public could in any way derive benefit, whether by dlrm use of the work or by enjoyment of tilt fruits of the activities carrird on therr or otherwise; it could not be confined to a cor.struction for philanthropic purpose or to such work u could be itself used by the public. The meaning could not be restricted by cl. (5) of s 41 aa that would defeat the intention of th• statute. The provisions in the agreement about tbe terms on which the public would be entitled to use the work were inapplicable to cases where the work was auch that the public could not use it. CzvIL AFP:&LLATB JumsDIOTION: Civil Appeal No. 446 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 30, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 202 of 1957. C. B. Aganrola andNauntt La/, for the Appel- !ant. G. S. Pathak, S. T. Duai and C. P. LGl for Repondents Nos. l to 3S. T. De8ai, Devemlm Swarup and J. P. Gogal for Respondent No. 4. 1961. December 15. The Judgmeni of Gajendragadkar, W ## Text _Characters 0–39,710 of 78,100. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39710 for what follows._ 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 149 .R. L. ARORA v. STATE OF U. P. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Land Acquisition-Acquisition for Cf!mp<;iny-"Work likely w prove useful to the public", Meaning· of-Right of access w per.ans having business with company-Product of company being useful to the public-If satisfy requirement-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [1of1894], ss. 6, 40, 41. The Government acquired appellant's land for a company for setting up a textile manchinery parts factory. The entire compensation for the acquisitio11 was to be paid by the company. The Government was satisfied that the product of the company would be useful to the public and the agreement between the company and the Government provided that those who had business with the company shall have access to the land and works. The notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894, were issued showing that the land was acquired for the company. The appellant contended that the notification under: s. 6 was invalid as the acquisition was not for the construction of any work which was likely to prove useful to the public as contemplated by s. 40 (l)(b) read with cl. (5) of s. 41. Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupia and Ayyangar, JJ., Sarkar, J. contra), that the notification under s. 6 of the Act wa> invalid and the proceedings should be quashed. Section 40 (l)(b), which alone could apply to the case, provided that in case of acquisition for a company the Government could give its consent if the acquisition was needed for the construction of some work which was likely to prove useful to the public. For such cases cl. (5) of s. 41 provided that the agreement between the company and the Government shall state the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the works. These provisions had to be read together and required that the work should be directly useful to the public and that the agreement should contain a term as to ho\v the public shall have the right to use the work directly thernselves. The provision of access to the land or works to those having business with the company or the fact that the product of the con1pany would b~ useful to the public were not sufficient to bring the acquisition for a cornpany withir:t the meaning of the relevant \vords in ss. 40 and 4 l. The satisfaction of the <;;-overnment that the work was likely 1961 December 1. IHI B. L •Arora .. S<.11 of U.P. w--.J. 150 SUPREME ootmr REPORTS [1962) SUPP. to prove useful to the public upon a wrong COD1tructlon of s. 40 and s. 41 was not binding. The concluslvencu attached by s. 6(3) to the notification under s. 6( 1) wu only to thit CX· tent that the land was needed for the purposes of a company and this was not in dispute. Bahu Barlcya Thakur v. TM. Stale of Borrtbay, 11961! 1 S.C.R. 128 and Pandit Jllandu Lal v. Stat. of Ptmjab, 1961 2 S. C. R. 459, referred to. Per Sarkar, J.-The acquU!tion for the company to set up a textile machinery parts factory wiu for some work which wu likely to prove'· useful to the public and wu valid. The work contemplated in s. 40( I )(b) was work from which the public could in any way derive benefit, whether by dlrm use of the work or by enjoyment of tilt fruits of the activities carrird on therr or otherwise; it could not be confined to a cor.struction for philanthropic purpose or to such work u could be itself used by the public. The meaning could not be restricted by cl. (5) of s 41 aa that would defeat the intention of th• statute. The provisions in the agreement about tbe terms on which the public would be entitled to use the work were inapplicable to cases where the work was auch that the public could not use it. CzvIL AFP:&LLATB JumsDIOTION: Civil Appeal No. 446 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 30, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 202 of 1957. C. B. Aganrola andNauntt La/, for the Appel- !ant. G. S. Pathak, S. T. Duai and C. P. LGl for Repondents Nos. l to 3S. T. De8ai, Devemlm Swarup and J. P. Gogal for Respondent No. 4. 1961. December 15. The Judgmeni of Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Du Gupta and Ayyangar JJ., waa deliver•d by Wanchoo, J, Sarkar J., delivered a separatll Judgment. WANOHOO, J.-Thia' iB an ap_peal on a oerti1lcate granted by the All~hab&d High Court. The appellant is the owner of. certain fanda In village Nauraiya Kher&. Out of\thoee lands, 16.5 acres , 2 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 151 were requisitioned by the Defence Department of the Government of India and are still in their possession and we are not concerned with that. Besides that, the appellant has 9 acres of land which he had purchased many years ago with the idea of erecting a factory thereon. The appellant got information in May 1956 that steps were being taken to acquire his nine acres of land for an industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the Collector of Kanpur in that connection. On June 25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act No. 1 of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that certain land which was specified as 11.664 acres in village Nauraiya Khera was required for a company for the construction· of textile machinery parts factory by .Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur (hereinafter called the Works). This was followed on July 5, 1956 by a notification under s. 6 of the Act, which was in terms similar to the notification under s. 4. The notification also provided for the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land forming part of the land mentioned in the Schedule to the notification immediately under the powers conferred by s. 17(1) of the Act. It is not in dispute that this notification was issued without taking any action under Part VII of the Act. On July 31, 1956, the Collector took possession of the land and handed it over to the Works along with the buildings standing on it. In the mean time the appellant had filed a writ petition in the High Court on July 31, 1956, praying that the notification of July 5, 1956, be quashed and had also applied for interim stay. As however possession had already been taken on July 31, 1956, the application for interim stay was infructuous. One of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of J μly 31, 1956 appears to hava been that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not been complied with: It seems that thereafter steps were 19GJ R. L. Arora v. State o.f U.P. Wanchoo J. 1161 R, L. Arora .. ' Siii" of U. P, w""""'° ./. )52 SUPRlWE CX>URT REPORTS (1962] SUPP. taken hy the State Government 'tc comply with the provisions of ss. 38 to 42 of the Act, An agreement was entered into between the Government and the Works on August 5, 1956 and was published in the Gazette· on August 11, 1956; but this was done without making an inquiry either under e. 5A or s. ·IO of the Act. Therefore, on Sept.ember 14, 1956, an enquiry was ordered by the Government under s.40. The enquiry was accordingly made and the inquiry submitted his report on October 3, 1956. This wa11 followed by a fresh agreement between the Government and the Works on December 6, 1956. On December 7, 1956, a fresh n~ification was issued under s. 6 of the Act after the formalities provided under es. 38 to 42 had been compieted. Thereupon the appellant filed another writ petition on January 29, 1957, challenging the notification of Decemb<•r 7, 1956 on various grounds. It is not ne006Sary to give in detail the ground& on which the notification of Deoomber 7, 1956 WM attacked. It is enough to say that one of the grounds was th:i.t the notification wa.s invalid as it was not in compliance with s.40(l)(b) of the Act read with the fifth clause of the matter to be provided in the agreement UDder s. 41. The leiirned Single Judge however held that the agreement was in accordance with the provisions of ss. 40 and 41. He also held that there was no force in the other contentions raised on behalf oi the appellant and dismissed the petition: The appellant then went in appeal which was di~missed. He then applied for a oortit'ica.to to enable him to appeal to this Court, which was granted; and that is how the matt.er has come up before us. The only question that haa been urged on behalf of the appellant before us is that the consent of the Government is being sought to be given to an acquisition for a company which is not in accordance with s. 4lJ (1) (b) read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in tho 2S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT.3 153 agreement under s. 41 and therefore the notification of December 7, 1956 is invalid To determine the question raised by the appellant it is necessary to look into the scheme of the Act. The preamble to the Act shows that it is an amending Act enacted for the purpose of "acquisition of land needed for public purposes and for Companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such acquisition." Section 3(e) defines the expression "company." The expression "public purpose" is given an inclusive definition in s. 3(f). Then comes s. 4 which provides for the issue of a preliminary notification to the effect that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. On the issue of such notification steps are taken to survey the land and take all other action necessary to decide whether the la.nd is fit for the purpose for which it is needed and in that connection s. 5A provides for objections by any person interested in the land, ,and the Collector hears the objector and submits his report to Government for appropriate action. Then comes a. 6 which is in these terms :- "(l) Subject to the prov1s1ons of Part VII of this Act when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under s. 5A, 1ub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declara· tion shall be made to that. effect under the signature of a. Secretary to such Govern· ment or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders : Provided that no such declaration shP JI be made unless the Compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by the Company, or 1961 R. L. Arora v. Stae ojU.P. fVanclwo J, '"' R:L.~tDTO v. Si.1, of U. P. Waehoo J. 15i SUPREME URT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. (2) x x x x x (3) The said deolaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the e&11e may be; and after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appl'aring." Where however land is to be acquired for a company no notification under s. 6 can be iseued till the provisions of Part VII of the Act are complied with, for action under s. 6 for acquiring land for a company is subject to the provisions of Part VII. Thie is made further clear by s. 39 which lays down that "the provisions of sections 6 to 37(both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the Company ehalI have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned." Before therefore the machinery provided for acquisition of land under as. 6 to 37 (both inclusive) of the Act is put into force for acquiring land for a company two conditions precedent must be fufilled, namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate Goverment has been obtained and (ii) an agreement in the terms of s. 41 has been executed by the company : (see Baba Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay) ('). In that case the notification under s. 4 of the Act was challenged as it did not 11ay that the land was required for a public purpose as provided therein but only said that the land was required for a company. Thie Court however pointed out that- " though it muy appear on the words of the . .\<:t contained in Part II, which contains the operative portions of the proooedinge 11) Ll961) IS. C.R. 128. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S 155 leading up to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for a Company may or may not be for a public purpose, the provisions of Prat VII make it clea! that the appropriate Government cannot permit the bringing into operation the effective machinery of the Act unless it is satisfied as aforesaid, namely, tliat the purpose of acquisition is to enable the Company to erect dwelling houses for workmen employed by it or for the provision of amenities directly connected with the Company or that the land is needed for construction of some work of public utility. These requirements indicate that the acquisation for a Company also is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch as it cannot be seriously contend that constructing dwelling houses, and providing amenities for the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of some work of public utility do not serve a public purpose." Therefore, though the words "public purpose" in ss. 4 and 6 have the same meaning, they have to be read in the restricted sense in accordance with s. 40 when the acquisition is for a company under s. 6. In one case, the notification under s. 6 will say that the acquisition is for a public purpose, in the other case the notification will say that it is for a company. The proviso to s. 6(1) shows that where the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation haa to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Where however the acquisition is either for a company, the compensation would be paid wholly by the company. Though therefore this distinction is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or for a company, there is. not a complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the two purposes and it cannot be m~intained that where 1961 R.L.Arora v. State ~r U.1'. Wanchoo J. 1961 R. L ..41010 •• 81411 of U. P1 Woncllo. J. 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. the acquisitiqn is primarily for a company it muet always be preceded by action under Part VII and compensation must always be pa.id wholly by the company. A third class of cases is p011sible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the Sil.me timo for a public purpose and the whole Ol' part of compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlli-d or m;rnag )d by a local authority. In such a case though the acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a oompa.ny it will be covered by that pa.rt of s. 6 which lays down that acquisition may ho ma.de for a public purpose if the whole or part of the oompensa.tion is to be paid out of the public revenues or P.ome fund cotrollcd or managed by a local authority. Such wae the case in Pandit Jhandu Lal, v. The State of Punjab('). In that case the acquiHition was for the construction of a labour colony under the Government Mponsored housing scheme for the industrial workers of the Thapa.r Industries Co-operative Housing Society Limited and pa.rt of ihe compensati0n was to be paid out of the public funds. In such a case this Court held that "an acquiaition for a company may also be made for a public purpose within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the oost of acquisition is met by public funds" and therefore it wae not necessary to go through the procedure preacribed by Pa.rt VII. It is only where the acquisition is for a oompany and its cost is to be met entirely by the company itself that tho provisions of Pa.rt VII apply. In the present case it ia not the oaae of the respondents that any part of the oompensa.tion is to be paid out of what may be called public funds. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provi8ion of Pa.rt VII would apply to the present case; and it is in this backgrolllld that (II [1961) 2 S. C.R. 459. • -11 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 157 we have to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. We have already pointed out that s. 39 as well as the opening words of s. 6 make it clear that the operative provisions of the Act for the purpose of acquiring land for a company will only apply when two conditions precedent have been satisfied, namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate government has been given to the acquisition, and (ii) the company has entered into an agreement as provided in the Act. This takes us to ss. 40, 41 and 42 of the Act. Section 40 lays down when the consent of the appropriate government can be given. Section 41 lays · down the terms which must be incorporated in the agreement. Section 42 then provides that every such agreement shall be published in the official gazette and shall thereupon so far as regards the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work have the same effect a~ if it had formed part of the Act. Now s. 40(1) lays down that such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate government is satisfied either on the report of the Collector under s. 5A (2) or by an inquiry held as hereinafter provided (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of a work, 3.nd that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. The Government therefore cannot give consent to the acquisition of land for a company unless it is satisfied about one or other of the two conditions mentioned ins. 40(1). We are in the present case not concerned with cl. (a) of s. 40(1) and need not refer to it further. The case of the respondents is that the Government was satisfied as to cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and that is why it gave the R, L . .Aror• v. State of U. P. Wanchtx1 .J. IHI B. L . .Ar,,,• v. Stall of U.P. W-.\oo J, 158 SUPRJWI: OOU'RT BDORTS [1962) SUPP. consent required under s, 39. The main dispute before us is as to the meaning to be given to cl. (b) of B. 40(1). We are of opm1on that it. is not poasible to interprets. 40(l)(b) in isolation and by itself; it has to be interpreted in the context of what is provided in s. 41 about th!i agreement to be entered into between the Government and the company which agreement hecomes a part of the Act under s. 42 so far as regards the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. Now s. 41 provides that if the appropria,te government is 11atisfied that the purpose of tho proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith or that the proposed acquisition is netlded for the construction of a work and thnt such work is likely to prove useful to the public, it shall require the company to enter into an agreement with it, providing to the satiafaction of the appropriate government for the following matters, namely- ( I) the payment to the appropriate Government of the cost of the acquisition; (2) the transfer, on ~uch payment, .of the land to the company; (3) the terms on which the land shall be held by the company; (-1) where the acquisition ii for the p1o1~ pose of eree~ng dwelling ho~ or the prov11ion of amenities connected therewith, ihe time within which, the oonditiona on whioh and the manner in which the dwelling houses or amenitile •hall be erected or provided; .and (5) Where the acquisition is for the construction of l\lly other work, the time within which and the conditions on which the work 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 159 shall be executed and maintained, and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. It will be clear from the above that the fifth term is directly related to s. 40 (l)(b) and there can be no doubt that in finding out what is meant by s. 40 (l)(b) we must take into account the fifth term in a. 41 and it is only by reading the two together that it will be possible to find out the intention of the legislature when it provided for acquisition of land for a company through the machinery of the Act. We may here eet out the contentions on either side as to the interpretation of these provisions. It is contended for the appellant that though the words of s. 40 (l)(b) are wide in amplitude and provide for acquisition of land for construction of some work which is likely to prove useful to the public, these words do not carry the meaning that if the product of the company which constructs the work is useful to the public, land can be acquired for it. It is urged that on this interpretation the Government will be turned into a sort of agent for acquiring lands for all companies which produce something which may be used by the public. It is therefore contended that when s. 40 (I )(b) says that acquisition may be made for the construction of some work which is likely to prove useful to the public, it is not the product of the, work which should be useful to the public _but the work itself should be of direct use to the public; and it is further urged that this interpret'1tion of s. 40 (l)(b) is confirmed if one looks at the fifth term to be provided in the agreement acoording to s. 41. That requires that the agreement should provide for the terms o.n which the public shall be entitled to use the work. It is urged that this means that the public should be entitled to use the work as such and not merely the product of the work. 1961 R. L. Aroro v. State of U. P. WllnchooJ. 1951 R, L. Aroora v. St.u of U .P. Wnchoo J, 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP· On the other band it is contended for the respondenta that the words in s. 40(1Xb) are of wide amplitude and land can he acquired under the Act for any company when the work set up by the company !s likely to prove useful to the public. It is urged that thiR means that the work itself may be useful to the public or the product of the work ma.y be useful to the public; a.nd so in either case the work would be useful to the public and therefore land can be acquired for it. It is also urged that the fifth term in s. 41 should not be held to cut down the wide amplitude of the words used in s. 40( l)(b) and should be read in the samo vide manner and the public should be held to be entitled to use the work if it is allowed (say) to go to the work for business purposes. The respondents rely on Ezra v. The Secretary of Stale (') in support of their interpretation of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. In that case the Bank of Bengal, a Company which was incorporated under Act XI of 1876, was anxious to extend its premises for the purpose of providing a.ecommoda.tion for the Public Debt Office. The Bank was unable to acquire the premises required by it by private treaty and therefore approached the Goviimment to acquire the land for it under the Land Acquisition Act. Action wa~ consequently taken under Part VII of the Act for acquisition of the premises for the oompany and the agreement provided that the public, subject to the Act constituting and the bye-laws regulating the Bank, Rha.ll be entitled to uso the said building or buildings in relation to the said Government 1->usiness so far as the sa;ae might bo utilised by the Bank for the purposes of such business. It was urged before the High Court tha.t this was not sufficient compliance with the fifth term of the agreement provided bys. 41 The High Court repelled this contention on the ground, firstly 11) [1903] IL. R, 30, Cal. 36. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 161 that the Government was vested with absolute discretion in this matter and was the sole custodian of the public interllst in this country, and secondly that the rights of the public generally were dependant upon the Government business and the Government had considered the conditions therein inserted as .sufficiently safeguarding its interests. It was further held that that Court had no power to enter ripon a consideration of the question how far that provisions sufficiently safeguarded the interests of the Government or of the public, of which it was the custodian (see pp. 79-80).. The problem that has been posed before us does not appear to have been posed before the High Court in that form. Further the High Court seems to have thought that as the sections provided for the satisfaction of the Government there was no power in a court to enter upon a consideration of the question how far that provision safeguarded the interests of the Government or of the public. This decision seems to suggest that the Government's decision as to the terms is completely final and as the Government was satisfied by the terms it had imposed in that case the matter was no longer open before the court. All that we need say about this case is, as already pointed out, that the question was not raised before the High Court in the manner in which it has been raised before us and that mav account for the view. taken by the High Court. ·It is also well. to remember that in that case premises were required for the Public Debt Ojfice of the Government which was then under the management of the Bank of Bengal and that may have h public, that being a matter entirely for tho satisfaction of the Government. But as the mattl>r was not conaidtred by the High Court from the point of view from which it has been argued before us, this ca.ae cannot be treated as a decision on the interpretation of the relevant words in sa. 40 and 41 merely by implication. In any case, if by implication the said ded~ion supp._orts the rospondents' contention, it does not correctly represent the true legal position in that behalf. In our opinion tho interpretation of tho material terms in s. 40( I l(b) and the fifth term of the agreement provided ins. 41 read together is and must always be within the jurisdiction of th~ court. Turning now to the oppoeing contentions as to the meaning of tho relevant words in 88. 40 and 41, we have already said that the two provisioI!I' of SB. 40 and 4:1 must be read together to find out the intention of the legislature when it provided for acquisition of land for a company through the agency of government. It seems to us that it could not be the intention of the legislature that the Government should be made a general agent for companies to acquire lands for them in order that the owners of companies may be able to carry on their activities for private profit. If that was the intention of the logislature, it was entirely unneceasary to provide for the restrictions contained in ea. 40 and 41 on the powers of the Government to acquire lands for companies. If we were to give the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the respondents on the relevant words in es. 40 and 41 it would amount to holding that the legislature intended the Government to be a sort of general agent for companies to acquire lands for them, ao that there owners may make profits. n can hardly be denied that a company whioh will satisfy the definition of that word in s. 3 (e) will be producing somethini: or other which will be ueeful to the 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 163 public and which the public ma.y need to purchase. So on the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the respondents, we must come to the conclu iion that the intention of the legislature was that the Government sh·ould be an agent for acquiring land for all companies .for such purposes as they might have provided the product intended to be produced is in a general manner useful to the public, and if that is so there would be clearly no point in providing the restrictive provisions in ss. 40 and 41. The very fact therefore that the power to use the machinery of the Act for the acquisition of land for a company is conditioned by the restrictions in ss. 40 and 41 indicates that the legislature intended that land should be acquired through the coercive machinery of the Act only for the restricted purpose mentioned in ss. 40 and 41, which would also be a public purpose for the purpose of s. 4. We find it. impossible to accept the argument that the intention of the legislature could have been that individuals should be compelled to part with their lands for private pr9fit of others who might be owners of companies through the Government, simply because the company might produce goods which would be useful to the public. If therefore the legislature intended by the provisions of ss.40 :i,nd 41 that there should be restrictions on the power to acquire land for companies it can only be given effect to by putting the narrower meaning on the words used in ss. 40 and 41, as contended for by the appellant. Further, reading s.40 ( l\ :bl and the fifth term of the agreement as provided in s. 41 together (as they must in our opinion be read together in order to find out the real intention of the legislature) there can be no doubt that the only meaning to be given to these provisions read together is, as contended for on behalf of the appellant. In this connection we ought to add that as we shall presently point out the material words of the fifth term in the 1~61 R. L. Arora v. State of U. P. Wanchoo J. 1661 R. L Arora v .. Bl•ll of U. I'. Wane~eo J. 164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. agreement provided in s. 41 a.re reasonably incapable of the construotion suggested by the respondents. Let us therefore turn to the words of s. 40 (l)(b), which says that acquisition should be for some work which is likely to prove useful to the public. Now if the legislature intended these words ~o mean that even where the produrt of the work is uteful to the public, land can be ac11uired for the company for that purpose, the legislature could have easily used the words "the product of" before the worilli "such work". The very fact that there is no reference to the product of the work in s. 40( l)(b) shows that when the legislature eaid that the work shoud be likely to pro~e useful to tho public it meant that the work should be directly useful to the public through the public being able to use it instead of being indirectly useful to the public through the public being a.hie to use it.a product. We have no doubt therefore that when s. 40(l)(b) says that the work should be useful to the public it means that it should be directly useful to the public which should be able to make use of it. This meaning in our opinion is made perfectly clear by what is provided in the fifth term in s. 41. Before the machinery of the Act ca.n be put into operation t.o acquire land for a. company, the Government has to take an agreement from the company, and that agreement must provide, where acquisition is needed for the construction of some work and that work is likely to prove useful to the public, the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. These works oan only mean that the public should have a right to use the work itself and not the product of it; and it is the duty of the Government when it takes an agreement under s. 41 to see that the public is so entitled to use the work. To say that the public is entitled to.use the work because the public can go to the work in the wa.y of business is in our opinion not giving any right to the public to use the work 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPO~TS 165 directly as such. All that the agreement has pro. vided in the present case is that "the public will have such right of access to and use of the land/ works herein and before specified as may be neces. sary for the transaction of their business with the firm." This in our opinion is not what is meant by the words "the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work" in the fifth term of the agreement as provided in s. 41. Such use for business is implicit in every bu8'ness, even if the Government does not acquire land for it, for no company can carry on for a moment its business with any profit if it does not allow those with whom it has business to come to its premises. Therefore, when the fifth term provides for the use of the work by the public as of right it cannot possibly envisage the use only by tho~e . who have business with a factory (for example) and their going there to transact business; such use would in any case have to be permitted by the owner of the company, as otherwise it will not be worth his while to run the company at all. Therefore, when the fifth term provides that "the public shall be entitled to use the work" it means that the public shall be entitled to use the work directly and as of ri~ht for its own benefit and does not mean that those who have business with the company can go upon the work . for that business. Reading therefore s. 40 (l)(b) and the fifth term of the agreement provided in s. 41, there is in our opinion no doubt that the intention of the legislature was that land should be acquired only when the work to be constructed is directly useful to the public and the public shall be entitled to use the work as such for its own benefit in accord-· ance with the terms of the agreement which under s. 42 are made to have the same effect as if they form part of the Act. We are of opinion that this is the only interpretation of the relevant 1961 R. L. Arora v. State of U. P. Wanchoo J. llfl R.L.Ar1Wa v. St.U of U. P. W-J. 166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. words of se. 40 and 41, and the legislature could not have intended otherwise. Let us now turn to some of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents against the clear intention of the legislature which is deducible from the interpretation of the words used in 18. 40 and 41. It is urged in the first place that ss. 40 and 41 both providti for the satisfaction of the Government and it i~ the Government which has to be satisfied that the work is likely to prove useful to the public and further that it is the Government which has to be satisfied that the terms contain a provision as to how the public shall be entitled to use the work. It is further urged that as the Government in this case was satisfied that the Works was useful to the public and was also satisfied as to the terms in the agreement on which the public shall be entitled to uee the Works, the oourt ha.e no further say in the matter. We are of opinion th$t this argument is entirely fallacious. It is true that it is for the Government to be satisfied that the work to be constructed will be useful to the public; it is also true that it ie for Uie Government to be satisfied thlit there is a term in the agreement providing that tile public shall be entitled to nae the work; but this does not mean that it is the Government which has tho right to interpret the words need in ff, 40(l)(b) or in the fifth term of the agreement ins. 41. It iethe court which has to interpret what those words mean. After the rourt has interpreted these wcrds, it is the Government which ha.s to carry out the object of. 88. 40 and 41 to ite satisfaction. The Go~ernment cannot say that as. 40 and 41 mean this and further say that they are satinfied that the meaning they have given to the relevant words in these sections bas been carried out in the terms of the agreement provided by them. It ill for the court to say what the words in 88. 40 and 41 mean though it ill for the Government 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 167 to decide whether the work is useful to the public and whether the terms contain provisions for the manner in which the public shall be entitled to use the work. It is. only in this latter part that the Government's satisfaction comes in and if the Government is satisfied that satisfaction may not be open to challenge; but the satisfaction 'bf the Government must be based on the meaning given. t;o the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 by the court. The Government cannot both give meaning to the words and also say that they are satisfied on the meaning given by them. The meaning has to be given by the court and it is only thereafter that the Government's satisfaction may not be open to challenge if they have carried out the meaning given to the relevant words by the court. The argument therefore that it is the Government's satisfaction which is required both by s. 40 and s. 41 is of no help to the respondents, for it is for t.he court to say what these words mean and then see whether the Government are satisfied according to the mean· ing given to these words by the court. We have already indicated what these words mean and if it plainly appears that the Government are satisfied as a result of giving some other meaning to the words, the satisfaction of the Government is of no use, for then they are not satisfied about what they should be 'satisfied. In the present case the Government seems to have taken a wrong view that so long as the product of the Works is useful to the public and so long as the public is entitled to go upon the Works in the way of business, that is all that is required by the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. We have held that this is not the meaning of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 and therefore the Government's satisfaction on this meaning cannot be binding and would be worthless. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied on certain American decisions and pointed R. L. Arora v. State of U. P. WanchooJ. ]~] R.L.Arora v. BW.ojU.P. w ...... J. 168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. out that the trend in the United States of Amorica these days was to give a wide meaning to the power of eminent domain contained in the fifth amendp:ient to the Constitution of the United States. The fifth amendment lays down as follows in this respect:- "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." It seems that there has been eontroversy in America as to the meaning of the words "public use" u~ed in the above amendment and there are two views prevalent. The older view was, and it is still held in some States, that "public use" means "use by the public-that is, public employment-and consequently that to make a use vublio, a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be & right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on beha.lf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned". The later view is that "public use" means "public advantage, convenience," or benefit, &nd that anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and pro- ...aote the productive power of ~my considerable number of the inhabitantB of a section of the State, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resouroes for the employment of capital and labour oontributee to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community and giving the Constitution a broad and comprehensive interpretation, constitutes a public use" (see American Jurispmdenoe. Vol. 18. pp. 661-62).