# R. L. ARORA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS - **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 137 of 1962 - **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, J. C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r-l-arora-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-others-3220 - **Pages:** 30 ## Headnote Land Acquisition Act-Acquisition for company engaged in industry for public purpose-Provision if hit by Ari. 31(2) and Art. 19(1) of the Constitution-lnterprttation-Disthiction made be.tween Government companies, Public companies and Prtvatt companie1 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REfORTS If hit by Art. 14-Conitltution of India, ATll. 14, 19(1), 31(2)- Land Acqui1itloit (Amtndmtnl) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), 1t. 1, 40 and 41. IHI It. I.. A,.,,. '· The petitioner i.o the owner of certain land in Kanpur, U.P. On 81•1• 01 Ull• a previous occasion land acquisition proceedings were taken regardin1 ,,,__,, this land for acquiring it for an industrialist. The petitioner ques.~oned the validity of these proceedings and this Comt by its judgment reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. J49, quashed the notification made under s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter certain amendments were made to ss. 40 and 41 of that Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961. The petitioner thereupon filed before this Co\Jrt a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the amended ss. 40, 41 and s. 7 ol Ille amending Act The petitioner contended that the said sections violated Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as cl. (aa) ol the amended s. 40 provided that ail acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building arc permissible even though the building may not be for a public purpose. The validity ol s. 7 of tile amending Act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened Art. 31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before !uly 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so ill fact. Section 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before July 2n. 1962 and after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on thl basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose. Held (ptr P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, CJ., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. Du GuPTA and J. C. SHAH JI.): (i) If the language of a provision of law is capable of only one construction and if according to that construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it must be struck down. A literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to loot at the setting in which the words arc used and the circumstances in wlti~ the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal mcsnina of the words used. The Mysore State El~ctricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cottor1 and Silk Mills, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127; followed. (ii) It is well settled that if certain provisions ol law construed in one way will be consistent with the Constitution and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional the court would bear in favour of the former construction. Kedar Nath Singh v. Stalt of 811"", [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.JL 78, followed. 134-159 S.C.-50 1961 B 1- Arora ... State nf Utta1 l'rad61h SUPREME COURT REPORTS (iii) Applying the above principles of constn1ction it cannot be •aid that •· 40(aa) contravenes Art. 31(2), for the public purpose required therein is present v.·here land is acquired for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the indllstry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be engaged. Nor can it be said that the provision is hit by Art. 19(1)(f) for it would be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property. The amendments to s. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of cl. (aa) in s. 40(1) and would therefore be equally valid. (iv) The first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the Amend, ment Act merely lays- down that where ## Text _Characters 0–39,946 of 70,410. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39946 for what follows._ 1961 & M. Karim •• Bibi Sakinri Hidayatullah J. 1961 February 14. SUPREME COURT REPORTS suggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever aserted any hostile title against him or thitt a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here when possession became adverse, if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered, because each case must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in tl1at case. It is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad and another [A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 202], the Judicial Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase without a proper plea. Reading the plaint as a whole, we agree with the High Court that a case based on possession after the purchase was not stated in the plaint and the decision of the High Court in the circumstances of this case was therefore proper. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. R. L. ARORA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA, J. C. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Land Acquisition Act-Acquisition for company engaged in industry for public purpose-Provision if hit by Ari. 31(2) and Art. 19(1) of the Constitution-lnterprttation-Disthiction made be.tween Government companies, Public companies and Prtvatt companie1 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REfORTS If hit by Art. 14-Conitltution of India, ATll. 14, 19(1), 31(2)- Land Acqui1itloit (Amtndmtnl) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), 1t. 1, 40 and 41. IHI It. I.. A,.,,. '· The petitioner i.o the owner of certain land in Kanpur, U.P. On 81•1• 01 Ull• a previous occasion land acquisition proceedings were taken regardin1 ,,,__,, this land for acquiring it for an industrialist. The petitioner ques.~oned the validity of these proceedings and this Comt by its judgment reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. J49, quashed the notification made under s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thereafter certain amendments were made to ss. 40 and 41 of that Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1961. The petitioner thereupon filed before this Co\Jrt a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the amended ss. 40, 41 and s. 7 ol Ille amending Act The petitioner contended that the said sections violated Art. 31(2) and Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as cl. (aa) ol the amended s. 40 provided that ail acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building arc permissible even though the building may not be for a public purpose. The validity ol s. 7 of tile amending Act was challenged on the ground' that it contravened Art. 31(2) inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before !uly 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so ill fact. Section 7 was also challenged on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes an unreasonable discrimination in the matter of acquisition for a company before July 2n. 1962 and after that date insofar as the former acquisitions are validated on thl basis of their being deemed to be for a public purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose. Held (ptr P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAR, CJ., K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. Du GuPTA and J. C. SHAH JI.): (i) If the language of a provision of law is capable of only one construction and if according to that construction the provision contravenes a constitutional provision it must be struck down. A literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to loot at the setting in which the words arc used and the circumstances in wlti~ the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal mcsnina of the words used. The Mysore State El~ctricity Board v. Bangalore Woollen, Cottor1 and Silk Mills, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127; followed. (ii) It is well settled that if certain provisions ol law construed in one way will be consistent with the Constitution and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional the court would bear in favour of the former construction. Kedar Nath Singh v. Stalt of 811"", [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.JL 78, followed. 134-159 S.C.-50 1961 B 1- Arora ... State nf Utta1 l'rad61h SUPREME COURT REPORTS (iii) Applying the above principles of constn1ction it cannot be •aid that •· 40(aa) contravenes Art. 31(2), for the public purpose required therein is present v.·here land is acquired for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the indllstry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be engaged. Nor can it be said that the provision is hit by Art. 19(1)(f) for it would be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property. The amendments to s. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of cl. (aa) in s. 40(1) and would therefore be equally valid. (iv) The first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the Amend, ment Act merely lays- down that where a notification under s. 6 of the Act cannot be justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1) it will be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa) and if it satisfies those provisions the acquisition will be deemed for the purpose of that clause as if that clause existed at the relevant time, though in actual fact it did not. The first fiction does not provide that. even though the purpose of the acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa) it· will still be deemed to· be a public purpose. Therefore s. 7 dOCB not violate Art. 31(2). (v) '.fhe acquisition made before July 20, 1962 as well as the acquisitions. nlade thereafter have to satisfy the conditions of cl. (aa) ot, s. 40 and s. 7 of the Amendment Act validates only acquisitions before July 20, 1962 which actually satisfy the provisions in cl. (aa). Therefore it cannoi be said that s. 7 v.iolates Art. 14. (vi) 'Section T specifically validates acqui•ition made before July 20, 1962 .. nc'twithstanding any judgment. decree or orders of any court'' and therefore the petitioner's contention that the acquisition of the petitioner's land declared to be invalid by reason of the judgment of this Court reported as R. L. Arora v. State of U.P., [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149 is bad is rejected. (vii) The various pi"ovisions in the agreement between the GovemR ment and the · industrialist for whom the ]and in question bas been acquire'd: conclusively e~tablish that the acquisition is for a public purpose within the meanin~ of cl. (aa) of •· 40. Province of Bombay v. KusaldaJ 1. Advanl, [1950] S.C.R 621, distinguished. (viii) A distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and .private companies on the other is justified considering the object behind cl .. (aa) of s. 40 of the Act and therefore it does not violate Art. 14. Per Ayyangar J. (dissent1'ng) '(i) The wording of cl. (aa) of 1. 40 is not capable of two interpretatiom and there is no ;imbiguity In the wording. It is a well established principle of construction that It is only when there b an ambiguity and the words are capable ot 6 S.C.K. SUPREME COURT REPORTS more than one construction that any extrinsic nid in the shape of tbe purpose of the legislature or the object of the legislation come in for consideration. Where -the language of an Act is clear and expl~cit the court must give effect to it wbateVer may be the consequences. for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature is -not a · matter to be speculated upon. lnterpret?.tion or construction cannot mean thaL a Court first reaches a conclusion as to what in its opinion the legislature intended, even though this involves attributing a meaning divorced from lhe words used and then adjust the meaning to the conclusio3 fl baa reached. Warburton v. Loveland, 2 D. & Cl. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 and Cox followed. (H.L.) 480. Salomon v. A. v. II akes, 15 App. caa. '06, (iv) The only way cl. (aa) could be read is to relate t~e "·ordl .. public purpose" to the nature of the industry carried on , by\ tha company· and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic 'aid1 or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammer, can the reference t~ public purpose he related to the building or _wort for which the acquisition is permitted to be n1ade. ( v) Where the provisions, as in the present case, gives a carte blanche to Government to acquire land for any purpose it Is not possible to sustain the validity of such law and strike down merely the parti~ cular acquisition where land is acquired for a purpose which is .C a public purpose, for here the vice is in the law itself and not mlftly in its application. Clause (aa) of s. 40 is ~iolative of Art. 21(2) of the Constitution. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 137 of 1962. Petition under Art. 32 of th: Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fum.J~ental Rights. C. B. Agarwala and Naunit Lal, for the petitioner. M. C. Setalvad and C. P. Lal, for respondent No. 1. C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, N. S. !Jindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 2. M. C. Setalvad, M. S. Devendra Swamv and l. P. Guyal, for resrondent No. 3. I. M. Nanavati, 0. C. Mathur, l. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain. for Intervener No. 1. - JI. L ,t,.,,. ... State of Uttar Prad61~ 1,,, - a.LA.rON •• llMI of Utt°' l'roddh - Wanchoo 1. SUPREME COURT REPORTS Rajani Pa~/ and /. N. Shroff, for Intervener No. 2. February 14, 1964. The Judgment of P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah JJ. was delivered by Wanchoo J. Rajagopala Ayyangar J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. WANCHOO . 1.-This petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution is a sequel to the judgment of this Court in R. L. Arora v. State of U.P.('). The petitioner is the owner of certain lands in village Nauraiya Khera, in the district of Kanpur. He got information in May 1956 that steps were being taken to acquire nine acres of his land for an industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the Collector of Kanpur .in that connection. On June 25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, No. I of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that the land in dispute was required for a company for the construction of textile machinery parts factory by Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur. This order was followed on July 5, 1956, by a notification under s. 6 of the Act, which was in similar terms. This notification also provided for the Collector to take possession of any waste or arable land forming part of the land in the Schedule to the notification immediately under the powers conferred by s. 17(1) of the Act. On July 31, 1956, the Collector took possession of the land and handed it over to the company along with some constructions standing on it. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court on July 31, 1956, praying that the notification under s. 6 of July 1956 be quashed and also applied for interim stay. As however possession had already been taken on July 31, 1956, the application for interim stay became infructuous. One of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of July 31, 1956 was that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not been complied with. Thereafter steps were taken by the State Government to comply with the provisions of ss. 3 8 to 42 of the Act and an agreement was entered into between the Government and the company in August 1956 and wa, (I) [1962) ~upp. 2 S.C.IL 1-49. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS published in the Government gazette on August 11, 1956. This was done without making any enquiry either under s. 5-A or s. 40 of the Act. Therefore on Septen•ber 14, 1956 an inquiry was ordered by the Government under s. 40. The inquiry was accordingly made and the inquiry officer submitted a report on October 3, 1956. This was followed by a fresh agreement between the Government and the company on December 6, 1956. On December 7, 1956, a fresh notification was issued under s. 6 of the Act after the formalities provided under ss. 38 to 42 had been complied with. Thereafter a fresh notice was issued under s. 9 of the Act and it appears that possession was formally taken again after January 2, 1957. A fresh writ petition was filed by the petitioner before the High Court on January 29, 1957 in view of the fresh action taken by the State Government and the main ground taken in this petition was that the notification was invalid as it was not in compliance with s. 40(1 ){b) of the Act read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in the agreement under s. 41. The petitioner failed in the High Court. Thereafter he came by special leave to this Court. This Court decided on a construction of s. 40 ( 1 )(b) read with the fifth clause of the matters to be provided in the agreement under s. 41 that these provisions had to be read together and required that the work should be directly useful to the public and that the agreement should contain a term as to how the public will have the right to use the work directly. The provision as to access to land or works for those having business with the company or the fact that the product would be useful to public was not considered sufficient to bring the acquisition for a company within the meaning of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. The appeal therefore was allowed on December 1, 1961 and the last notification under s. 6 was quashed: see R. L. A rortl 11 case('). On July 20, 1962, the Lal'.d Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 (No. 3 of 1962) was promulgated by the President of India. By that Ordinance, ss. 40 and 41 ~ the Act were amended and certain acquisitiom of lml (I) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.Jl. 149. 1961 R. L. dtDN "· :Stott 01 Uti. l'rad•m Wane/loo I. R. L. Arora T. State of Uttar Prade1h 'Wanchoo I. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] made before the date of the Ordinance were validated notwithstanding any judgment, decree or ord'r of any court. The Ordinance was replaced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 1962, (hereinafter referred to as the Amendme.nt Act), which was made retrospective from July 20, 1962, the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated. This Act made certain amendments in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act and validated certain acquisitions. The pn:sent petition challenges the validity of the amendments to ss. 40 and 41 ::tn•1 also the validity of s. 7 of the Amendment Act by which certain acquisitions made before July 20, 1962 were validated. It is therefore necessary to read the amendments made in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as well as ll. 7 of the Amendment Act. In s. 40 ( 1) of the Act a new clause was inserted in these terms:- "(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construe·· tion oi some building or work for a company which is engaged or is takinr, steps for engr.ging itseli in any industry or work which is for a public purpose;" Section 41 was lmended to read as below:- "41. If the appropdatc Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector, under section SA, sub-section (2), or on the report of the officer making an inquiry under section 40 that the proposed acquisition is for any of the purposes referred to in clause (a) or clause ( aa) or claU3e (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 40, it shall require tlie company to enter into an. agreement with the appropriate Government providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government for the following matters, namely:- (1) • • • • • (2) • • • • • (3) • • * • • (4) • * * * • ( 4A) Where the acquisition is for the construetion of any builcfing or work for a com- 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 791 pany which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, the time within which, and the conditions on which, the building or work shall be constructed or executed; and (5) • • • • .,, Section 7 of the Amendment Act, which validated certain acquisitions reads as fo!lows:- "Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, every acquisition of land for a company made or purporting to have been made under Part VlI of the principal Act before 20th day of July 1962, shall, insofar as such acquisition is not ior any of the purposes mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section ( 1) of section 40 of the principal Act, be deemed to have been made for the purpose mentioned in clause (aa) of the said sub-secti.on. and accordingly e\'ery such acquisition and any proceeding, order, agreement or action in connection with such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, as valid as if the provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, were in force at all \naterial times when such acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken. Explanation • • • • . .. Besides these amer.dments which require consideration in the present petition, ss. 44A and 44B were also inserted in the Act providing for restriction on transfer, etc. (s. 44A) and making certain provisions forbidding acqui~i'ion of land for a private company other than a government company (s. 44B). It is however not necessary to set out the terms of these new sections. 1961 R. L Arora ... State of U ttar Prade1h Wane/zoo /, IHI Jl. L. A.101• ... ~ of Ulk:t hade1h Wanchoo /. 792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS' [1g64) The present petition challenges the validity of the amendments to ss. 40 and 41 of the Act and also of s. 7 of the Amendment Act, and the challenge is made in this way. It is submitted that the amendments made to ss. 40 and 41 of the Act are ultra vires, as they contravene Art. 31(2) and Art. !9(l){f) of the Constitution. The argument is that on a construction of the amendment to s. 40 by which cl. (aa) has been introduced therein, it is provided that aJI acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building or work are permissible even though the building or work for the construction of which the acquisition is made may not be for a public punpose, as the new cl. ( aa) ll\erely requires that the company which is applying for acquisition is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose. It is urged that all that this clause requires is that tha company for which the acquisition is being made should be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and in that case it can acquire land under this clause even though the particular building or work for thct construction of which land is acquired may not be for a public purpose. Therefore the new clause ( aa) which permits such acquisition contravenes Art. 31( 2) which lays down that no property shaJI be compulsorily acquired save for a public purpose, and also Art. 19 ( 1) ( f), as such acquisition would amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to hold property. · The validity cif s. 7 of the Amendment Act is attacked on the ground that it contravenes Art. 31 ( 2) and Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it makes acquisition for a company before July 20, 1962 as being for a public purpose even though it may not be so in fact and thus raises 'J:I irrebuttable presumption of public purpose by fiction of . ltlw and so contr~venes Art. 31 (2) which requires that there muiiJ: be an actual public purpose before land can be compulsorily acquired. And it also contravenes Art. 14 inasmuch as it makes a discrimination in the matter of acquisitions for a company before July 20, 1962 and after July 20, 1962 insofar as the former acquisitions .are validated on the basis of their being deemed to be for a public 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 793 purpose while the latter acquisitions are not so deemed and have to satisfy the test of public purpose. 1961 R. L. Aroto Y, Besides the attack as to the vires of these provisions in the Amendment Act, it is urged that the rights of the petitioner cannot be affected by the validating provision in the Amendment Act as s. 7 of the Amendment Act does not re-open decided cases and does not revive notifications or acquisitions struck down by courts. Lastly, it is urged that the acquisition in the present case cannot be said to be for a public purpose inasmuch as (firstly) the agreement between the company and the Government does not regulate or control the products of the company in the interest of the public, and (secondly) the petitioner's land which was intended to be used for one public purpose is being taken away for another such purpose. We shall deal with these contentions seriatim. State of Ullal Pradt1h The first question that falls for consideration is the construction of cl. ( aa) of sub-s. (1) of s. 40 of the Act. The amendments to s. 41 are consequential and will stand or fall with cl. (aa) inserted ins. 40(1). It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that on a literal construction of this clause (which, it is urged, is the only possible construction) it requires that the company which is acquiring the land should be engaged or should be taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose. If a company satisfieS that requirement it can acquire land for the construction of some building or work, even though that building or work may not itself subserve such public purpose. Therefore, the argument runs that cl. ( aa) permits compulsory acquisition of land for a purpose other than a public purpose and is hit by Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution, whereunder land can be compulsorily acquired only for a public purpose. It may be conceded that on a literal construction the adjectival clause, namely, "which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose", qualifies the word "company" and not the words "building or work" for the construction of which the iand is needed. So prima facie it can be argued with some force that all that cl. ( aa) requires is that the company for which land Wanchoo J. 1961 R. L. Arora ... State of U ttor Praderh Wonchoo /. • 794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1go4J is being acquired should be engaged or about to be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and it is not required that the building or work, for the construction of which l&lld is acquired should be for such public purpose. In approaching the question of construction of this clause, it cannot be forgotten that the amendment was made in consequence of the decision of this Court in R. l,. Arora's case(') and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the matter of acquisitions for a company; nor can it be forgotten that Parliament when it enacted the Amend· ment Act was aware of Art. 31 ( 2) of the Constitution which provides that land can only be acquired compulsorily for a pt!blic purpose and not otherwise. It could not therefore be the intention of Parliament to make a provision which would be in contravention of Art. 31 (2), though it may be admitted that if the language used is capable of only one construction and fails to carry out the intention of Parliament when making the amendment, the .amendment may have to be struck down if it contravenes a constitutional prov1s10n. Further, a literal interpretation is not always the only interpretation of a provision in a statute and the court has to lpok at the setting in which the words are used and the circumstances in which the law came to be passed to decide whether there is something implicit behind the words actually used which would control the literal meaning of the words used in a provision of the statute. It is permissible to control the wide language used in a statute if that is. possible by the setting in which the words are used and the· intention of the ·law-making body which may be apparent from the circumstances in which the particular provision came to be made. Therefore, a literal and mechanical inteqiretation is not the only interpretation which courts are bound to give to the words of a statute; ?nd it may be possible to control the wide language in which a provision is made by ta!>ing mto account what is implicit in it in view. of the setting in which the provision appears and the circumstances in which it might have been enacted. (I) [!962] Supp. 2 S.C.R 149. 6 S.C.R SUPREME COURT REPORTS 795 We may in this connection refer to a decision of this Court in The Mysore State Eln;tricity Board v. The Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd.('), where the wide words used ins. 76(1) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 fell for interpretation, and this Court held that even though the words used were of wide amplitude, it was implicit in the sub-section that the question arising thereunder w:is one which arose under the Electricity (Supply) t\ct. Therefore, we have to see whether the provision in cl. ( aa) bears another construction also in the setting in which it a;:ipears and in the circumstances in which it was put on the statute book and also in viow of the lang!lage used in the clause. The circumstances in which the amendment came to be made have already been mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament clellrty was to fill up the lacuna in the Act which became evident on the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora's case(2 ). Parliament must also be well aware of the provision of Art. 31( 2) which lays down that compulsory acquisition of property can only be made for a public purpose. Clause ( aa) was insert~d between cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1). Section 40(1) as it stood before the amendment prohibited consent being given to acquisition of land by a company unless the acquisition was for one of the two reasons mentioned in els. (a) and (b). Those two clauses clearly showed that acquisition for a company was for a public purpose and sach acquisition could not be made for any purpose other than public purpose. Between the existing cl. (a) and cl. (b) . of s. 40(1 ), we find cl. (aa) bc!ng inserted. We also find thr.t cl. ( aa) specifically uses the words "public purpose" and indicates that the company for which land is required should be engaged or about to be engaged in some industry or work of a public purpose. It was only for such a company that land was to be acquired compulsodly and the acquisition w.1s for the construction of some building or work for such a company, i.e. a company engaged or about fo be engaged in some industry or work wl1ich is for. a public purpose. .Jn this setting it seems to us r°'uoon~ble to hold that the intention of Parliament could only have (1) [1963} Supp. 2 S.C.R. 127. (2) (1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149. R. L. Arora ... State of Uttat Pradesh Wanchoo ]. 1961 "· L. A.1010 ... Stat• of Uf/01 l'tath1ll Wanchoo /. 796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1g64] been that land should be acquired for such building or work for a company as would subserve the public purpose of the company; it could not have been intended, considering the setting in which cl. ( aa) was introduced, that land could be acquired for a building or work which would not subserve the public purpose of the company. In the circumstances it seems to us clear that the literal construction of the clause based on rules of grammar is not the only construction of it and it is in our opinion legitimate to hold that the public purpose of the industry of the company, which is imperative under the clause, also attaches to the building or work for the construction of which land is to be acquired. Further, acquisition is for the construction of some building or work for a company and the nature of that company is that it is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a rpublic purpose. When therefore the building or work is for such a company it seems to us that it is reasonable to hold that the nature of the building or work to be constructed takes colour from the nature of the company for which it is to be constructed. We are therefore of opinion that the literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is neither the only nor the true construction of cl. ( aa) and that when cl. (aa) provides for acquisition of land needed for construction of some building or work it implicitly intends that the building or work which is to be constructed must be such as to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged or is about to be engaged. In short, the words "building or work"· used in cl. ( aa) take their colour from the adjectival clause which governs the company for which the building or work is being constructed and acquisition undet this clause can only be made where the comrpany is engaged or is taking steps to engage itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, and the building or work which the company is intending to construct is of the same nature, namely, that it is a building or work which is meant to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work for which it is being constructed. It is only in these cases where the company is engaged in an industry or work of that kind and where the buildin& or work is also constructed for a purpose of 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS that kind, which is a public purpose, that acquisition can be made under cl. ( aa) . As we read the clause we are of opinion that lthe public purpose of the company for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of the company. We are therefore of opinion that in the setting in which cl. ( aa) appears and in the circumstances in which it came to be enacted, a literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is nonhe only construction of this clause and that there is another construction which in our opinion is a better construction, and which is that the public pul'ljlose of the company is also implicit in the purpose of the building or work which is to be constructed for the company and it is only for such work or building which subserves the public purpose of the company that acquisition under cl. ( aa) can be made. Thus there are two possible constructions of this clause, one a mere mechanical and literal construction based on rules of grammar and the other which emerges from the setting in which the clause appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and also from the words used therein, namely, acquisition being for a company which has a public purpose behind it, and therefore the building or work which is to be constructed and for which land is required must also have the same public purpose behind it, that animates the company making the construction. We are therefore clearly of opinion that two constructions are possible of this clause of which the second construction which is other than literal is .the better one. It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way will be consistent with the Constitution, and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction: [see Kcdar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar(') ]. We are therefore of opinion that cl. (aa) does not permit acquisition of land for construction of some building or work for a company engaged or to be engaged in an industry or work, which