# r - LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC v. PROF. MANUBHAI D. SHAH ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1992] 3 S.C.R. 595
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1992-07-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1254 of 1990
- **Bench:** A.M. Ahmadi, M.M. Punchhi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r-life-insurance-corpn-of-india-and-ors-etc-v-prof-manubhai-d-shah-etc-etc-11490
- **Pages:** 31

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950: Part Ill-Fundamental Rights-Article
19(1)(a) & 19(2).
A
B
Freedom of Speech and Expression-Scope of-lncludes freedom to C
I
circulate and propagate views through electronics media subject to reasonable
restrictions-R.ight extends to use the media to answer the criticism levelled
against the propagated view.
Publication of a research paper by Executive Trustee of Consumt{r
Education and Research Centre-l'aper criticising premium policy adopted by D
Life Insurance Corporation-Counter prepared by a membe" of LIC as well
as rejoinder prepared by Executive Trustee Published in a newspaper-L1C
also publishing its counter in its own magazine-Refusal to publish Executive
Trustee's rejoinder in its magazine on the ground that it was In - House
magazine-Held refusal by LIC to publish rejoinder in its magazine was E
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(a).
Freedom of expression through movies-Film-Right to telecast on
television-Guidelines for film certificatiott-Documentary film on Bhop~l
Gas Disaster-Film awarded national award and granted 'U' Certificate-Refusal by Doordarshan to telecast the film-Held film maker has a
F
right to telecast the film-Refusal to telecast should be justified by law under
Article 19(2)--0nus lies on the party who refuses to telecast to show that the
film does not confonn to requirements of law--Grounds of refusal held not
justified-Doordarshan being State controlled agency cannot refuse telecast of
film except on valid grounds.
G
Article 12-State--Life Insurance Corporation is State.
Constitution-Interpretation of-Provisions should be construed broadly unless the context otherwise requires-Scope of provisions, particularly
Fumlamental Rights should not be cut down by restricted approach.
H
595
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992)3 S.C.R.
A
Doctrine of Fairness.
Doctrine of Prior Restraint.
Cinematograph Act, 1952: Sections SA-SB.
B
The respondent, the executive trustee of the Consumer Education &
Research Centre Ahmedabad, after undertaking research into the working
of the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC)published and circulated a study
paper titled "A fraud on policy holders-a shocking story" portraying the
discriminatory practice adopted by the LIC which adversely affected the
C interest of a large number of policy holders. The underlying idea was to
point out that unduly high premiums were charged by the LIC from those
taking out life insurance policies thereby denying access to insurance
coverage to a vast majority of people who cannot afford to pay the high
premiums. A member of the LIC prepared a counter to the respondent's
study paper and published tbe same as an article titled 'LIC and its policy
D holders' in the "Hindu", a daily newspaper, challenging the conclusions
reached by the respondent in his study paper. The respondent prepared a
rejoinder 'Raw deal for Policy Holders' which too was published in the
same newspaper.
E
Thereafter, the LIC published its member's article which was in the
nature of a counter to the respondent's study paper in its magazine
'Yogakshema'. On the respondent learning about the same, he requested
that in fairness his rejoinder which was already published in the Hindu
should also be published in the said magazine to present a complete
picture to the reader. The LIC refused his request on the ground that their
F
magazine was an in-house magazine circulated amongst subscribers who
were policy holders, officers, employees and agents of the Corporation and
it is not put up in the market for sale to the general public.
The respondent filed a writ petition in the Gujarat High Court which
came to the conclusion that the LIC's stand that the magazine was an
G in-house magazine was untenable because it was available to anyone on
payment of subscription; and it invited articles for publication therein
from members of the public. Assuming that the magazine was an in-house
magazine the corporation, which was a State within the meaning of Artic

## Text

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--r
-
LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC.
v.
PROF. MANUBHAI D. SHAH ETC. ETC.
JULY 22, 1992
[A.M. AHMADI AND M.M. PUNCHHI, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950: Part Ill-Fundamental Rights-Article
19(1)(a) & 19(2).
A
B
Freedom of Speech and Expression-Scope of-lncludes freedom to C
I
circulate and propagate views through electronics media subject to reasonable
restrictions-R.ight extends to use the media to answer the criticism levelled
against the propagated view.
Publication of a research paper by Executive Trustee of Consumt{r
Education and Research Centre-l'aper criticising premium policy adopted by D
Life Insurance Corporation-Counter prepared by a membe" of LIC as well
as rejoinder prepared by Executive Trustee Published in a newspaper-L1C
also publishing its counter in its own magazine-Refusal to publish Executive
Trustee's rejoinder in its magazine on the ground that it was In - House
magazine-Held refusal by LIC to publish rejoinder in its magazine was E
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(a).
Freedom of expression through movies-Film-Right to telecast on
television-Guidelines for film certificatiott-Documentary film on Bhop~l
Gas Disaster-Film awarded national award and granted 'U' Certificate-Refusal by Doordarshan to telecast the film-Held film maker has a
F
right to telecast the film-Refusal to telecast should be justified by law under
Article 19(2)--0nus lies on the party who refuses to telecast to show that the
film does not confonn to requirements of law--Grounds of refusal held not
justified-Doordarshan being State controlled agency cannot refuse telecast of
film except on valid grounds.
G
Article 12-State--Life Insurance Corporation is State.
Constitution-Interpretation of-Provisions should be construed broadly unless the context otherwise requires-Scope of provisions, particularly
Fumlamental Rights should not be cut down by restricted approach.
H
595
596
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992)3 S.C.R.
A
Doctrine of Fairness.
Doctrine of Prior Restraint.
Cinematograph Act, 1952: Sections SA-SB.
B
The respondent, the executive trustee of the Consumer Education &
Research Centre Ahmedabad, after undertaking research into the working
of the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC)published and circulated a study
paper titled "A fraud on policy holders-a shocking story" portraying the
discriminatory practice adopted by the LIC which adversely affected the
C interest of a large number of policy holders. The underlying idea was to
point out that unduly high premiums were charged by the LIC from those
taking out life insurance policies thereby denying access to insurance
coverage to a vast majority of people who cannot afford to pay the high
premiums. A member of the LIC prepared a counter to the respondent's
study paper and published tbe same as an article titled 'LIC and its policy
D holders' in the "Hindu", a daily newspaper, challenging the conclusions
reached by the respondent in his study paper. The respondent prepared a
rejoinder 'Raw deal for Policy Holders' which too was published in the
same newspaper.
E
Thereafter, the LIC published its member's article which was in the
nature of a counter to the respondent's study paper in its magazine
'Yogakshema'. On the respondent learning about the same, he requested
that in fairness his rejoinder which was already published in the Hindu
should also be published in the said magazine to present a complete
picture to the reader. The LIC refused his request on the ground that their
F
magazine was an in-house magazine circulated amongst subscribers who
were policy holders, officers, employees and agents of the Corporation and
it is not put up in the market for sale to the general public.
The respondent filed a writ petition in the Gujarat High Court which
came to the conclusion that the LIC's stand that the magazine was an
G in-house magazine was untenable because it was available to anyone on
payment of subscription; and it invited articles for publication therein
from members of the public. Assuming that the magazine was an in-house
magazine the corporation, which was a State within the meaning of Article
12, cannot under the guise of publication of an in-house magazine violate
H the fundamental right of the respondent. Accordingly, the High Court held
' r
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L.I.C. v. PROF. SHAH
597
that refusal by LIC to publish respondent's rejoinder was arbitrary and A
violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(a). Against the decision orthe High Court
this appeal is filed.
In the connected appeal the respondent produced a documentary
film on the Bhopal Gas Disaster titled "Beyond Genocide" which was B
awarded the Golden Lotus, being the best non-feature film of 1987. At the
time of the presentation of awards .the Central Minister for Information
& Broadcasting made a declaration that the award winning short films
would be telecast on Doordarshan. The respondent submitted his film to
Doordarshan for telecast but Doordarshan refused to telecast the same on
the grounds that (i) the film was out dated (ii) it had lost its relevance (iii)
C
it lacked moderation and restraint (iv) it was not fair and balanced (v)
political parties have raised various issues concerning the tragedy and (vi)
claims for compensation by victims were sub-judice.
The respondent filed a writ petition challenging the refusal to D
telecasi his film on the ground of violation of his fundamental right under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and for a mandamus to Doordarshan
to telecast the same. The Union of India contested the petition "by stating
that although a decision was taken to arrange a fixed fortnightly telecast
of award winning documentaries, no decision was taken to telecast all
national award winning documentaries; that the parameters applied for E
selection of a film for national award were not the same as applied by the
Film Selection Committee of Doordarshan for selection of a film for
telecast; and the respondent's film which was previewed by a duly constituted Screening Committee was not found to meet the requirements for
telecast on Doordarshan. The High Court held that no restriction could
F
be placed on the fundamental right quaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution save and except by law permitted by Article 19(2); that the
respondent's right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution obligated
Doordarshan to telecast the film since the guidelines or norms on which
the refusal was based were purely executive in character and not law within
the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Accordingly, it directed G
Doordarshan to telecast the film, "Beyond Genocide" at a time and date
convenient to it keeping in view the public interest and on such terms and
conditions as it would like to impose in accordance with law.
In appeal to this Court it was contended for Doordarshan, (i) that H
598
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
A sub-section (2) of Section SB of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 empowers
the Central Government to issue directions setting out the principles
which shall guide the authority competent to grant certificates under the
Act in sanctioning films for public exhibition and since the exemption
granted to Doordarshan under Section 9 of the Act from the provisions
B
c
D
E
F
relating to <::ertification of films in Part II of the Act and Rules made
thereunder by notification dated 16th October, 1984 is subject to the
condition that while clearing programmes for telecast Doordarshan shall
keep in view the film certification guidelines issued by the Central Government under Section SB of the Act, the guidelines clearly have statutory
flavour and would, therefore, fall within the protective umbrella of Article
19(2); (ii) the High Court completely misdirected itself in not appreciating
that these norms wer-e f1Xed keeping in mind the requirement of Section
SB of the Act which section was consistent with Article 19(2), therefore the
High Court was wrong in brushing them aside as mere departmental
executive directions.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court
HELD: 1. A constitutional Provision is never static, it is ever evolving
and ever changing and, therefore, does not admit of a narrow, pedantic or
syllogistic approach. The Constitution makers employed a broad phraseology while drafting the fundamental rights so that they may be able to cater
to the needs of a changing society. Therefore, constitutional provisions in
general and fundamental rights in particular must be broadly construed
unless the context otherwise requires. The scope and ambit of such
provisions, in particular the fundamental rights, should not be cut down
by too astute or too restricted an approach. [606E, 607E-F]
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 842 A.l.R.
1962 S.C. 305, referred to.
Dennis v; United States, 341 U.S. 494; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, \.
G 343 U.S. 495 and Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, ,
236 U.S. 230, referred to.
2. The words 'freedom of speech and expression' must be broadly
construed to include the freedom to circulate one's views by words of mouth
Tor in writing or through audio-visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, inH eludes the right to propagate one's views through the print media or
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L.I.C. v. PROF. SHAH
599
through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the television. A
The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role of public
educators, so vital to the growth of a healthy democracy. Every citizen of this
free country, therefore, has the right to air his or her views through the
printing and/or the electronic media subject of course to permissible
restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The right
extends to the citizen being permitted to use the media to answer the
criticism levelled against the view propagated by him. [607 G-H, 608 A,EJ ·
B
Romesh Tappar v. The State of Madras, [1950) S.C.R. 495; Sakal
Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1962) 3 S.C.R. 842-A.I.R.1962 S.C. 305;
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. etc. etc. v~ Union of C
India & · Ors. etc. etc., [1985) 2 S.C.R. 287; Odyssey Communications Pvt.
Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana & Ors., [1988) 3 S.C.C. 410 and S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, [1989) 2 S.C.C. 574, referred to.
3. No serious exception can be taken to the approach which commended to the High Court. The LIC is a State within the meaning of Article D
12 of the Constitution. It is created under an Act, namely, the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, which requires that it should function in
the best interest of the community. The community is, therefore, entitled
to know whether or not this requirement of the statute is being satisfied
in the functioning of the LIC. The respondent's effort in preparing the E
study paper was to bring to the notice of the community that the LIC had
strayed from its path by pointing out that its premium rates were unduly
high when they could be low if the LIC avoided wasteful h.dulgences. The
endeavour was to enlighten the community of the drawbacks and·
shortcomings of the corporation and to pin-point the areas where improvement was needed and was possible. By denying information to the conF
somers as well as other subscribers that LIC cannot be said to be acting
in the best interest of the community. [6UA, E-H, 613 A,D]
Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975) 1 S.C.C. 421,
relied on.
1
4. By refusing to print and publish the rejoinder the LIC had violated
the respondent's fundamental right. The rejoinder to their acticle is not in
any manner prejudicial to the members of the community nor it is based
on imaginery or concocted material. It does not contain any material which
G
can be branded as offensive, in the sense that it would fall within anyone H
600
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
A
of the restrictive clauses of Article 19(2). That being so on the fairness
doctrine the LIC was u.nder an obligation to publish the rejoinder since it
had published its counter to the study paper. (614-C, 613-D, 612A, 613-E]
B
5. The LI C's refusal to publish the rejoinder in its magazine financed
from public funds is an attitude which can be described as both unfair and
unreasonable; unfair because fairness demanded that both view points
were placed before the readers, however, limited be their number, to enable
them to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable because there was
no logic or proper justification for refusing publication. A monopolistic
state instrumentality which survives on public funds cannot act in an
C
arbitrary manner on the specious plea that the magazine is an in- house
one and· it is a matter of its exclusive privilege to print or refuse to print
the rejoinder. [613 B-D]
6. A wrong doer cannot be heard to say that its persistent refusal to
print and publish the article must yield the desired result, namely to
D frustrate the respondent. The Court must be careful to see that it does not,
even unwittingly, aid the effort to defeat a party's right. However, in order
that the reader knows and appreciates why the rejoinder has appeared
after such long years it is directed that the LIC will, while publishing the
rejoinder print an explanation and an apology for the delay. [614 C-D]
E
F
G
7. Speech is God's gift to mankind. Through speech a human being
conveys his thoughts, sentiments and feelings to others. Freedom of speech
and expression is thus a natural right which a human being acquires on
birth. It is, therefore, a basic human right. Thus freedom to air one's views
is the life line of any democratic institution and any attempt to stifle,
suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to democracy and
would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship. Efforts by intolerant
authorities to curb or suffocate this freedom have always been firmly
repelled. More so when public authorities have betrayed autocratic tenden·
cies. [605G, 608-B, 611E]
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), referred to.
8. The feedom conferred on a citizen by Article 19(l)(a) includes the
):
/
--
freedom to communicate one's ideas or thoughts through a newspaper, a
>--
magazine or a movie. Although movie enjoys that freedom it must be
H remembered that movie is a powerful mode of communication and has the
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L.l.C. v. PROF. SHAH
601
capacity to make a profound impact on the minds of the viewers and it is, A
therefore, essential to ensure that the meassage it conveys is not harmful
to the society or even a section of the society. Censorship by prior restraint,
therefore, seems justified for the protection of the society from the ill-effects that a motion picture may produce if unrestricted exhibition is
allowed. Censorship is thus permitted to protect social interests
enumerated in Article 19(2) and section SB of the Cinematograph Act. B!ut
such censorship must be reasonable and must answer the test of Article
14 of the Constitution. (623 E-G]
B
9. Once it is recognised that a film-maker has a fundamental right
under Article 19(1) (a) to exhibit his film, the party which claims that it C
was entitled to refuse enforcement of this right by virtue of law made under
Article 19(2), the onus lies on that party to show that the film did not
conform to the requirements of that law, in the present case the guidelin~s
relied upon. (620 D-E]
10. The respondent had a right to convey his perception of the gas
disaster in Bhopal through the documentary film prepared by him. 'fhe
D
film not only won the Golden Lotus award but was also granted the 'U'
Certificate by the censors. It is an appraisal of what exactly transpired in
Bhopal on the date the gas leak occurred. Therefore, the respondent
cannot be accused of having distorted the events subsequent to the disE
aster. (624 E-F]
Merely because it is critical of the State Government is no reason to
deny selection and exhibition of the film. So also pendency of claims for
compensation does not render the matter sub-judice so as to shut out the
F
entire film from the community. In fact the community was keen to know
what actual_!f had happened, what is happening, what remedial measures
the State authorities are taking and what are the likely consequences Of
the gas leak. To bring out the inadequacy of the. State effort or the
indifference of ·the officers, etc,. cannot amount to an attack on any
political party if the criticism is genuine and objective and made in good G
faith. If the norm for appraisal was the same as applied by the censors
while granting the 'U' Certificate, it is difficult to understand how Doordarshan could refuse to exhibit it. It is not that it was not sent for being
telecast soon after the disaster that one could say that it is outdated or
has lost relevance. [624 G-H, 625 A-BJ
' H
A
B
c
D
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1992) 3 S.C.R.
In the circumstances it cannot be said that the film was not consistent with the accepted norms. Doordarshan being a State controlled agency
funded by public funds could not have denied access to the screen to the
respondent except on valid grounds. [625-C]
KA.Abbasv. The Union of India, [1971) 2 S.C.R. 446;Ramesh v. The
Union of India, [1988) 1 S.C.C. 668 and S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,
[1989) 2 S.C.C. 574, relied on.
New York Times Company v. The United States, 403 U.S. 713, referred
to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1254 of
1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.6.80 of the Gujarat High
Court in Special Civil Application No.2711 of 1979.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 2643 of 1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.9.90 of the Delhi High Court
E · in Civil Writ Petition No.212 of 1989.
F
G
K.T.S. Tutsi, Additional Solicitor General, P.P. Rao, Kailash Vasdev,
Ms. Alpana Kirpal, A. Subba Rao, Hemant Sharma and C.V.S. Rao for
the Appellants.
P.H. Parekh, B.K. Brar, Ashok Aggarwal and P.O. Sharma for t\le
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AHMADI, J. Special leave granted in SLP(C) No.339of199L
These two appeals though arising out of different circumstances and
concerning different parties, relate to the scope of our constitutional policy
of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. The importance of the constitution~ question prompted this
Court to grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
H
We may properly begin the discussion of this judgment by stating the
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L.I.C. v. PROF. SHAH [AHMADI, J.]
603
factual background of the two cases in the light of which we are required A
~
to examine the scope of the constitutional liberty of speech and expression.
Civil Appeal No.1254/80 arises out of the decision of the Gujarat
High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2711 of 1979 decided by a
Division Bench on 17th June, 1980. The respondent, the executive trustee
of the Consumer Education & Research Centre (CERC), Ahmedabad, B
after undertaking research into the working of the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) published on 10th July, 1978 a study paper titled "A fraud on
policy holders - a shocking story". This study paper portrayed the discriminatory practice adopted by the LIC which adversely affected the c
interest of a large number of policy holders. This study paper was widely
circulated by the respondent. Mr. N.C. Krishnan, a member of the LIC
-
prepared a counter to the respondent's study paper and published the
same as an article in the "Hindu", a daily newspaper, challenging the
conclusions reached by the respondent in his study paper. The responde~t
---.../..
prepared a rejoinder which was published in the same newspaper. The LIC D
publishes a magazine called the 'Yogakshema' for informing its members,
--
staff and agents about its activities. It is the contention of the LIC that tliis
magazine is an in-house magazine and is not put in the market for sale ~o
the general public. Mr. Krishnan's article which was in the nature of a
counter to the respondent's study paper was published in this magazine.
E
~
The respondent thereupon requested the LIC to publish his rejoinder to
-{-
the said article in the said magazine but his request was spumed. The
respondent thereafter met the Chairman of the LIC and requested him to
revise the decision and to publish the article in the magazine but to no
avail. Thereupon he filed the petition contending that the refusal to publish
his rejoinder in the magazine violated his fundamental right under Article F
14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The High Court came to the con-
~
clusion that the LIC's stand that the magazine was an in-house magazine
was untenable for two reasons, namely (1) it was available to anyone on
payment of subscription; and (2) it invited articles for publication therein
from members of the public. The High Court took the view that merely G
because the magazine finds it circulation among officers, employees and
agents of the Corporation, it does not acquire the character of an in-house
magazine since the same can be purchased by any member of the public
-.oiC
on payment of subscription and members of the public are invited to
contribute articles for publication in the said magazine. It further held that
assuming that the magazine was an in-house magazine as contended by the H
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992) 3 S.C.R.
A
LIC, the Corporation cannot under the guise of publication of an in-house
magaziμe violate the fundamental right of the respondent. Taking note of
the fact that the LIC was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution and the in-house magazine was published with the aid of
public funds and public money, the High Court held that in the interest of
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
democracy and free society the magazine should be available to both, an
admirer and a critic, for dissemination of information. In this view of the
matter the High Court concluded that the LIC had violated the
respondent's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
by refusing to publish his rejoinder to Mr. Krishnan's counter to his study
paper. It also concluded that the refusal of the LIC was arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as well. The High Court, therefore, directed the LIC to publish in the immediate next issue of Yogakshema the respondents' rejoinder to Mr. Krishnan's reply to his study
paper of lOthe July, 1978. This view of the Gujarat High Court is assailed
by. the LIC in the first appeal.
In the other appeal the facts reveal that Shri Tapan Bose, Managing
Trustee ~f the respondent trust, had produced a documentary film on the
Bhopal Gas Disaster titled "Beyond Genocide". This film was awarded the
Golden Lotus, being the best non-feature film of 1987. The respondent
contended that at the time of the presentation of awards the Central
Miniscer for Information & Broadcasting had made a declaration that the
award winning short films will be telecast on Doordarshan. The respondent
submitted for telecast his film to Doordarshan but Doordarshn refused to
telecast the same on the ground : "the contents being outdated do not have
relevance now for the telecast". The respondent represented to the Minister for Information & Broadcasting, but to no avail. He, therefore, filed
the writ petition, being Civil Writ No. 212 of 1989, challenging the refusal
on the ground of violation of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution and for a mandamus to Doordarshan to telecast the
same. In the counter filed to the writ petition it· was contended that
although a decision was taken to arrange a fixed fortnightly telecast of
award winning documentiuies, no decision was taken to telecast all national
award winning documentaries. It was emphasised that the parameters
applied for selection of a ·film for national award were not the same as
applied by the Film Selection Committee of Doordarshan for selection of
a film for telecast. Emphasis was laid by Doordarshan on socially relevant
films which were fair imd balanced and the respondent's film which was
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A
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L.I.C. v. PROF. SHAH [AHMADI, J.]
605
previewed by a duly constituted Screening Committee was not found to A
meet that requirement for telecast on Doordarshan. The Ministry of Information & Broadcasting had reconsidered the matter in the light of the
respondent's representation but did not see any reason to depart from the
view taken by the Screening Committee. The Screening Committee had
founded its decision on the accepted norins for display of the documentary B
films on Doordarshan and since the respondent's film did not satisfy the
norms for the reason that it lacked moderation and restraint in judging
things and expressing opinions, it was found not suitable for telecast. It also
took into consideration the fact that while most of the claims for compensation for the victims of Bhopal o:saster were sub-judice and political
parties were raising certain issue, it was inexpedient and unwise to telecast C
the film. It was also feared that it would only end in further vitiating the
atmosphere and will serve no social purpose. The High Court came to the
conclusion that the respondent's right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution obligated Doordarshan to telecast the film since the guidelines or
norms on which the refusal was based were purely executive in character D
and not law within the meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. It,
therefore, came to the conclusion that no restriction could be placed on
the fundamental right guranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
save and except by law permitted by Article 19(2) and not by executive or
non-statutory guidelines on the basis of which Doordarshan had refused to
telecast the film. It took the view that these norms were for internal E
guidance and cannot interfere with the fundamental right guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It, therefore, directed Doordarshan to .
' telecast the film "Beyond Genocide" at a time and date convenient to it ·
' keeping in view the public interest and on such terms and conditions as it ·
would like to impose in accordance with law. It is against this direction of F
the High Court that the second the second appeal is preferred.
Speech is God's gift to mankind. Through speech a human being ·
conveys his thoughts, sentiments and feelings to others. Freedom of speech ·
and expression is thus a natural right which a human being acquires on
birth. It is, therefore, a basic human right. "Everyone has the right to G
freedom of opinion and expression; the right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek and receive and impart informa-.
tion and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" proclaims
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The People of India
declared in the Preamble of the Constitution which they gave into them- H
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(1992) 3 S.C.R.
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selves their resolve to secure to all citizens liberty of thought and expresy
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sion. This resolve is reflected in Article 19(1)(a) which is one of the articles
found in Part III of the Constitution which enumerates the Fundamental
Rights. That article reads as under :
"19(1). All citizens shall have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;"
Article 19(2) which has relevance may also be reproduced :
"19(2). Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the
operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making
any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the
interests of [the sovereignty and integrity of India,] the security
of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence."
A constitutional provision is never static, it is ever evolving and ever
chaning and, therefore, does not admit of a narrow, pedantic or syllogistic
approach. If such an approach had been adopted by the American Courts,
E the First Amendment-(1791)- "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press" - would have been restricted in its
application to the situation then obtaining and would not have catere~ to
the changed stituation arising on account of the transformation of the print
media. It was the broad approach adopted by the court which enabled
F
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them to chart out the contours of ever expanding notions of press freedom.
In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, Justice Frankfurtur observed :
" .... The language of the First Amendment is to be read not as
barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic
experience illuminated by the presuppositions of those who
employed them."
Adopting this approach in Joseph Burstyn. Inc. v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495
the Court rejected its earlier detennination to the contrary in Mutual Film
Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 and concluded
that expression through motion pictures is included within the protection
H of the First Amendment. The Court thus expanded the reach of the First
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X.l.C. v. PROF. SHAH [AHMADI, J.]
607
Amendment by placing a liberal construction on the language of that A
provision. It will. thus be seen that the American Supreme Court has always
placed a broad interpretation on the contitutional provisions for the obvious reason that the constitution has to serve the needs of an ever chll1:1ging
society.
The same trend is discernible from the decisions of the Indian Courts
also. It must be appreciated that the Indian Constitution has separately
enshrined the fundamental ;ights in Part III of the Constitution since they
represent the basic values which the People of India cherished when they
gave unto themselves the constitu.tion for free India. That was with a view
to ensuring that their honour, dignity and self respect will be protected in
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free India. They had learnt a bitter lesson from the behaviour of those in
authority during the colonial rule. They were, therefore, not prepared to
leave anything to chance. They, therefore, considered it of importance to
protect specific basic human rights by incorporating a Bill of Rights in the
Constitution in the form of Fundamental Rights. These fundamental rights D
were intended to serve generation after generation. They had to be stated
in broad terms leaving scope for expansion by courts. Such an intention
must be ascribed to the Constitution makers since they had themselves
made provisions in the Constitution to bring about a socio-economic
transformation. That being so, it is reasonable to. infer that the Constitution
makers employed a broad phraseology whil¢fArafting the fundamental
rights so that they may be able to ca_t~r. to·the ne~ds of a changing society.
It, therefore, does not need any elaborate argument to uphold the contention that constitutional provisions in general and fundamental rights in
particular must be broadly construed unless the context otherwise requires.
It seems well settled from the decisions referred to at the Bar that constitutional provisions must' receive a broad interpretation and the scope and
ambit of such provisions, in particular the fundamental rights, should not
be cut down by too astute or too restricted an approach. See Sakal Papers
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842 = AIR 1962 SC 305.
E
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The words 'freedom of speech and expression' must, therefore, be G
broadly construed to include the freedom to circulate one's views by words
of mouth or in writing or through audio-visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, includes the right to propagate one's views through the print media
or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the
television. Every citizen of this free country, therefore, has the right to air H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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his or her views through the printing and/or the electronic media subject
-,....--
of course to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the
Constitution. The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role
of public educators, so vital to the growth of a healthy democracy. Freedom
to air one's views is the life line of any democratic institution and any
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attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to
democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship. It cannot be
gainsaid that modern communication mediums advance public interest by
)-.
informing the public of the events and developments that have taken place
and thereby educating the voters, a role considered significant for the
vibrant functioning of_a democracy. Therefore, in any set up, more so in a
c democratic set up like ours, dissemination of news and views for popular
_,.
consumption is a must and any attempt to deny the same must be frowned
_,,
upon unless it falls within the mischief of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
t
It follows that a citizen for propagation of his or her ideas has a right to
~
publish for circulation his views in periodicals, magazines and journals or
D through the electronic media since it is well known that these communication channels are great purveyors of news and views and make considerable
.--
impact on the minds of the readers and viewers and are known to mould
public opinion on vital issues of national importance. Once it is conceded,
and it cannot indeed be disputed, that freedom of speech and expression
includes freedom of circulation and propagation of ideas, there can be no
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doubt that the right extends to the citizen being permitted to use the media
'
to answer the criticism levelled against the view propagated by him. Every
free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public; to forbit this, except to the extent permitted by Article 19(2),
---
would be an inroad on his freedom. This freedom must, howe~er, be
F
exercised with circumspection and care must be taken not to trench on the
rights of other citizens or to jeopardise public interest. It is manifest from
~
Article 19(2) that the right conferred by Article 19(1)(a) is subject to
imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interest of, amongst others,
publlc order, decency or morality or in relation to defamation or incitement
G
to an offence.It is, therefore, obvious that subject to reasonable restrictions
placed under Article 19(2) a citizen has a right a publish, circulate and
--
disseminate his views and any attempt to thwart or deny the same would
,>:---
offend Article 19(1)(a).
We may now refer to the case law on the subject. In Romesh Tappar
~
H v. The State of Madras, (1950] SCR 495 this Court held that the freedom
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L.I.C. v. PROF. SHAH [AHMADI, J.)
609
of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas and this A
freedom is ensured by. the freedom of circulation. It pointed out that
freedom of speech and expression are the foundation of all democratic
organisations and are essestial for the proper functioning of the processes
of democracy. This view was reiterated in Sakal Papers Pvt. Ltd. (supra)
wherein this Court observed that the freedom, of speech and expression B
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) includes the freedom of the Press. For
propagating his ideas a citizen had the right to publish them, to disseminate
them and to circulate them, either by word of mouth or by writing. In
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of
India & Ors. etc. etc., [1985] 2 SCR 287 this Court after pointing out that ·
communication needs in a democratic society should be met by the extenC
tion of specific rights e.g., the right to be informed, the right to inform, the
right to privacy, the right to participate in public communications, the right
to communicate, etc., proceeded to observe at page 316 as follows :
"In today's free world freedom of Press is the heart of social
and political intercourse. The press has now assumed the role .
of the public educator making formal and non formal education
possible in large scale particularly in the developing world
where television and other kinds of modern communication are
n:
not still available for all sections of society. The purpose of the
press is to advance the public interest by publishing facts and E
opinions without which a democratic electorate cannot make
responsible judgments. Newspaper being surveyors of news and
views having a bearing on public administration very often carry
material which would not be palatable to Governments and·
other authorities. The authors of the article which are published F
in the newspapers have to be critical of the action of the
Government in order to expose its weaknesses. Such articles
tend to become an irritant or even a threat to power."
This Court pointed out that the constitutional guarantee of the
freedom of speech and expression is not so much for the benefit of the G
press as it is for the benefit of the public. The people have a right to be
informed of the developments that take place in a democratic process and
the press plays a vital role in disseminating this information. Neither the
Government nor any instrumentality of the Government or any public
sector undertaking run with the help of public funds can shy away from H
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1992] 3 S.C.R.
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articles which expose weaknesses in its functioning and which is given cases
pose a threat to their power by attempting to create obstacles in the
information percolating to the members of the community. In Odyssey
Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidayan Sanghtana & Ors., [1988] 3 SCC
410 a public interest litigation was commenced under Article 226 of the
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Constitution to restrain the authorities from telecasting the serial 'Honi
Anhony' on the plea that it was likely to spread false and blind beliefs and
superstition amongst the members of the public. The High Court by an
· interim injunction restrained the authorities from telecasting the serial
which led the producer thereof to approach this Court under Article .136
of the Constitution. This Court while allowing the appeal held that the right
of a citizen to exhibit films on the Doordarshan subject to the conditions
imposed by the Doordarshan being a part of the fundamental right of
freedom of expression could be curtailed only under circumstances set out
in Article 19(2) and in no other manner. The right to exhibit the film was
similar to the right of a citizen to publish his views through any other media
D such as newspapers, magazines, advertisement hoardings, etc. More recently in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, [1989] 2 SCC 574 this Court was
required to consider if the Madras High Court was justified in revoking
the 'U' certificate issued to a Tamil Film "Ore Oru Gramathile" for public
exhibition. The fundamental point urged before this Court was based on
the freedom enshrined in Article 19(1)(a). This Court after pointing out
E
the difference in language between the U.S. First Amendment clause and
. Article 19(1)(a), proceeded to observe in paragraph 10 as under :
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"Movie doubtless enjoys the guarantee under Article 19(1)(a)
but there is one significant difference between the movie and
other modes of communication. The movie canno~ function in
a free market place like the newspaper, magazine or advertisement. Movie motivates thought and action an~ assures a high
degree of attention and retention. lt makes its impact simultaneously arousing the visual and aural senses. The focussing
of an intense light on a screen with the dramatizing of facts and
opinion makes the ideas more effective. The combination of
act and speech, sight and sound in semi-darkness of the theatre
with elimination of all distracting ideas will have an impact in
the minds of spectators. In some cases, it will have a complete
and immediate influence on, and appeal for everyone who sees
it.