# R. P. KAPUR AND OTHERS v. SARDAR PRATAP SINGH KAIRON AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 143
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Bench:** S. K. DAs, M. Hidayatullah, K. C. DAs Gul'TA J. C. SHAH, N. Raja.Gop.A.La Ayyang.A.B
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r-p-kapur-and-others-v-sardar-pratap-singh-kairon-and-others-2204
- **Pages:** 20

## Headnote

Criminal Procedure-Investigation of offences-Investigation
by Deputy Superintendent of Police under orders of Inspector-General of Police - Validity- Allegations against Chief MinisterN ecessity of affidavit by Chief Minister-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (V of I898), ss. Ij4, Ij6, I57 and 55I-Constitution of
Ifldia, Art. I4.
One S sent a complaint against the first petitioner to the
Chief Minister who sent it to the Additional Inspector-General
of Police who in his turn sent it to the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, C.I.D., with the endorsement " Register a case and
investigate personally". The Deputy Superintendent of Police
drew up a first information report. There were also three other
cases instituted against the petitioners or some of them, which
were being investigated into by the C.I.D. Police officers. The
petitioners contended that the respondents had violated the
provisions of ss. 154, 156 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had adopted a procedure unknown to law and had
thus singled out the petitioners for unequal treatment in violation of Art. I 4· of the Constitution.
Held, that the procedure adopted was authorised by s. 551
of the Code and in the first case the Inspector-General had
power to deal with the complaint and to direct investigation of
the same by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Even if the
reason given for the Inspec.tor-General making over the investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of Police that the case
was of a technical nature was not correct, it was open to him to
make over the investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of
Police in view of the status of the petitioners. The procedure
adopted in the other three cases was also not illegal, and there
was no unequal treatment of the petitioners in the matter of
the institution or investigation of the cases so as to entitle them
to invoke in aid Art. 14 of the Constitution.
H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, [1955]
l S.C.R. u50, King Emperor v. Nilkantha, 1.L.R. 35 Mad. 247,
Pulin Bihari Ghosh v. The King, I.L.R. (1950] I Cal. 124 and
Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. The State of U. P., A.I.R. 1959
All. 337, referred to.
Since allegations were made _against the Chief Minister by
the petitioners, he owed a duty to the Court to tile an affidavit
stating what the correct position was so far as he remembered it.
October aB.
R. P. f{apur
c .... Others
v.
Sai'dnr Pratap
Singh f(airon
(.'..,.. Others
S. /(.Das].
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 59 of 1960.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. S. R. Chari, S. N. Andley, J .. B. Dadacltanji,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the Petit.ioners.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, H. S. Doabia, Additional Advocate-General for
the State of Punjab, M. S. Punnu, Deputy AdvocateGeneral for the State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for the
Respondents.
1960. October 28.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
S. K. DAS J.-This is a writ petition. The three
petitioners before us are (1) R. P. Kapur, a member of
the Indian Civil Service, who before his suspension
was serving as a Commissioner in the State of Punjab,
(2) Sheila Kapur, his wife, and (3) Kaushalya Devi,
his mother-in-law. They have moved this Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement
of their rights under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, which rights they say have been violated by the
respondents who are the State of Punjab, Sardar
Pratap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister thereof, and
certain officials, police, administrative and magisterial
who have been conducting, or are connected with, the
investigation or inquiry into a number of criminal
cases instituted against the petitioners. We shall
refer to some of these officials later in this judgment
in relation to the part which they have played or are
playing in those criminal cases.
Briefly stated the case of the petitioners is that
p

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2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
R. P. KAPUR AND OTHERS
v.
SARDAR PRATAP SINGH KAIRON
AND OTHERS.
(S. K. DAs, M. HIDAYATULLAH, K. C. DAs Gul'TA
J. C. SHAH and N. RAJA.GOP.A.LA AYYANG.A.B, JJ.)
Criminal Procedure-Investigation of offences-Investigation
by Deputy Superintendent of Police under orders of Inspector-General of Police - Validity- Allegations against Chief MinisterN ecessity of affidavit by Chief Minister-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (V of I898), ss. Ij4, Ij6, I57 and 55I-Constitution of
Ifldia, Art. I4.
One S sent a complaint against the first petitioner to the
Chief Minister who sent it to the Additional Inspector-General
of Police who in his turn sent it to the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, C.I.D., with the endorsement " Register a case and
investigate personally". The Deputy Superintendent of Police
drew up a first information report. There were also three other
cases instituted against the petitioners or some of them, which
were being investigated into by the C.I.D. Police officers. The
petitioners contended that the respondents had violated the
provisions of ss. 154, 156 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and had adopted a procedure unknown to law and had
thus singled out the petitioners for unequal treatment in violation of Art. I 4· of the Constitution.
Held, that the procedure adopted was authorised by s. 551
of the Code and in the first case the Inspector-General had
power to deal with the complaint and to direct investigation of
the same by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Even if the
reason given for the Inspec.tor-General making over the investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of Police that the case
was of a technical nature was not correct, it was open to him to
make over the investigation to the Deputy Superintendent of
Police in view of the status of the petitioners. The procedure
adopted in the other three cases was also not illegal, and there
was no unequal treatment of the petitioners in the matter of
the institution or investigation of the cases so as to entitle them
to invoke in aid Art. 14 of the Constitution.
H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, [1955]
l S.C.R. u50, King Emperor v. Nilkantha, 1.L.R. 35 Mad. 247,
Pulin Bihari Ghosh v. The King, I.L.R. (1950] I Cal. 124 and
Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. The State of U. P., A.I.R. 1959
All. 337, referred to.
Since allegations were made _against the Chief Minister by
the petitioners, he owed a duty to the Court to tile an affidavit
stating what the correct position was so far as he remembered it.
October aB.
R. P. f{apur
c .... Others
v.
Sai'dnr Pratap
Singh f(airon
(.'..,.. Others
S. /(.Das].
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 59 of 1960.
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. S. R. Chari, S. N. Andley, J .. B. Dadacltanji,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the Petit.ioners.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, H. S. Doabia, Additional Advocate-General for
the State of Punjab, M. S. Punnu, Deputy AdvocateGeneral for the State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for the
Respondents.
1960. October 28.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
S. K. DAS J.-This is a writ petition. The three
petitioners before us are (1) R. P. Kapur, a member of
the Indian Civil Service, who before his suspension
was serving as a Commissioner in the State of Punjab,
(2) Sheila Kapur, his wife, and (3) Kaushalya Devi,
his mother-in-law. They have moved this Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement
of their rights under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution, which rights they say have been violated by the
respondents who are the State of Punjab, Sardar
Pratap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister thereof, and
certain officials, police, administrative and magisterial
who have been conducting, or are connected with, the
investigation or inquiry into a number of criminal
cases instituted against the petitioners. We shall
refer to some of these officials later in this judgment
in relation to the part which they have played or are
playing in those criminal cases.
Briefly stated the case of the petitioners is that
petitioner no. 1 had the misfortune to incur the wrath
of the Chief Minister of the State. It is alleged that
the Chief Minister was annoyed with petitioner no. 1,
because the latter did not show his readiness to give
evidence for the prosecution in a case known as the
Kamal Murder Case (later referred to as the Grewal
case) in which one D.S. Grewal, then Superintendent
of Police, Kamal, and some other police officials were,
along with others, accused of some serious offences.
That case was transferrer! by this Court to a Special
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
.Judge, at Delhi, who commenced the trial sometime in
May/June 1959. Petitioner no. 1 was at the time Commissioner of Ambala, and he alleges that he was told
by the Chief Minister that it was proposed to cite the
Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police as prosecution witnesses in the said case
and it would be in the fitness of things that petitioner
no. I should also figure as a prosecution witness ; to this
suggestion petitioner no. 1 gave a somewhat dubious
reply to the effect that his appearance as a prosecution
witness might or might not help the prosecution.
Another reason for the displeasure of the Chief Minister, as alleged in the petition, related to certain orders
which pet.itio.ner no. 1 had passed as Commissioner,
Patiala Division, in a revenue case known as the
Sangrur case.
We shall presently give more details
of that case, but it is enough to state here that the
allegation is that in that case petitioner no. 1 passed
certain orders, involving the disposal of properties
worth about Rs. 9 lacs, which were adverse to one
Surinder Kairon, son of the Chief Minister. It is stated
that as a result of the displeasure which petitioner
no. 1 had . incurred for the two reasons mentioned
above, a special procedure was adopted in the investigation of the criminal cases instituted against the
petitioners; and some new cases were started through
the instrumentality of the C. I. D. Police with a view
to subject the petitioners to harassment and persecution. The substantial allegation, to quote the language ·.of the petition, is that "a special procedure or
rather a technique has been devised for circumventing
the mandatory provisions of the law (meaning the
Code of Criminal Procedure) as regards the petitio-.
ners, two of whom are ladies and who are being
dragged about unnecessarily because they happen to
be releted to petitioner no. l".
It is stated that there
has been a deliberate departure from the normal and
legal procedure in the matter of institution and investigation of criminal cases against the petitioners-a
departure said to be the result of " an evil eye and
unequal hand" which the petitioners allege constitutes
19
R. P. J{ajntt
(- Others
v.
Sardar Ptatap
Singh J{airon
& Others
S. I\. Das ].
z960
R. P, J<apur
& Others
v.
Sardar Dratap
Singh Kairon
&- Others
S, K. Das J.
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
a denial of the right of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed to them under Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The special procedure or technique of which the
petitioners complain is said to consist of several items,
such as (I) enter~ainment of a criminal complaint
personally by the Chief Minister; (2) institution of
complaints by the C. I. D. police; (3) registration of
first informations after such.complaints; (4) investigations in advance of the complaints; (5) investigation
by specially chosen (hand· picked as learned Counsel for
the petitioners has suggested) C.I.D. officials, not neces.
sarily of high rank, who have no power to investigate;
(6) the arrangement of a special C.I.D. squad to "unearth something" against the petitioners, etc. In the
petition four criminal cases were referred to as illustrative of the special procedure, said to be unwarranted by law, adopted against the petitioners, and in a
supplementary petition filed on June 9, 1960, some
more cases were referred to.
After we had conveyed
to learned Counsel for the petitioners that we could
not consider the supplementary petition which the
respondent had no opportunity of meeting, the
supplementary petition was withdrawn. Therefore,
we do not propose to say anything about the cases
which are referred to in the supplementary petition.
The four cases mentioned in the original petition
a.re:-
,
(I) F.I.R. no. 304 of 1958, given by one M. L.
Sethi, referred to hereinafter for brevity as Sethi's
case;
(2) F.I.R. no. 39 of 1959, instituted on the complaint of one M. L. Dhingra, called hereinafter as
Dhingra's case;
(3) F.I.R. no. 135 of 1959, instituted on the complaint of the Civil Supply Officer, Karna!, the accused
in this case being the State Orphanage Advisory
Board of which petitioner no. l was Vice.President
at the relevant time and Kartar Singh, farm manager
of Kaushalya Devi, called the Orphanage case; and
(4) F.I.R. no. 26 of 1960, instituted on the complaint_ of Daryao Sing, D.S.P., C.I.D., Karna!, (one of
the respondent police officials) in which there are three
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
147
accused .persons including petitioner no. I, called for
brevity the Ayurvedic Fund case.
We ma.y sa.y a.t once that we are not concerned with
the merits of a.ny of the aforesaid cases : that is a
question which will fall for consideration if and when
the cases are tried in Court. Therefore, nothing said
in this judgment shall be construed as affecting the
merits of the cases. Two questions have been posed
before us in relation to these cases : one is if in the
matter of institution and investigation of these cases
a special procedure unknown to law has been adopted; and the other is if the petitioners have been
singled out for unequal treatment in administering the
law relating to the institution and inve~tigation of
criminal cases in the State. The two questions a.re in
one sense connected, for if a special procedure unknown to law has been adopted against the petitio·
ners, that by itself will be a denial of the right of the
equal protection of the laws. Learned Counsel for
the petitioners has, however, argued the second question somewhat independently of the first question,
and he has submitted that even if the procedure
adopted against the petitioners is warranted by law,
it is a departure from the normal procedure and has
been adopted with "a.n evil eye a.nd unequal hand "
so as to put the petitioners to harassment a.nd perFtecution. We shall consider both these questiOlls in
relation to the procedure adopted in the four cases
referred to a.hove.
It is necessary to state that the petition has been
contested by the respondents. The Chief Minister has
himself ma.de no affidavit in respect of the allegations
made age.inst him; but affidavits in reply have been
made by the Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary
. to the Punjab Government and some of the respondent officials. To these affidavits we shall advert later
in somewhat greater detail. We shall als,o have some.
thing to say about the failure of the Chief Minister to
make an affidavit. It is enough to state here tha.t the
respondents ha.ve seriously contested both the alleg&.
tions made on behalf of the petitioners, namely,
(1) that a special procedure unknown to law was
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kaiton
0Oth~rs
S. K. Das].
I
I960
R. P. l(apur
& Others
v.
Satdar Pratap
Singh J(airon
& Others
; S. H. Das ].
I
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
adopted against them or (2) that the procedure adopted was motivated by "an evil eye and unequal hand "
so as to persecute and harass the petitioners.
The
respondents have said that the procedure adopted was
warranted by law and the employment of the C. I. D.
officials in the investigation of the cases against the
petitioners was due to the special nature of the cases.
The respondents have also contested the correctness
of the allegation that petitioner no. 1 had incurred the
displeasure of the Chief Minister on account of the
two reasons stated in the petition. In brief, the
claim of the respondents is that there has been no
violation of the rights of the petitioners guaranteed
under Arts. 14 and 21, and there are no grounds for
interference by this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It has been stated on behalf of the respondents that in the two cases called Setbi's case and
Dhingra's case, the petitioners had moved the High
Court without success for quashing the proceedings
and in Sethi's case, an appeal to this Court against the
order of the High Court also proved unsuccessLI. It
is also pointed out that a petition made by petitioner
no. 1 in the High Court for proceeding by way of contempt of court against the Chief Minister on some of
the allegations now raised or allegations similar in
nature, was dismissed in limine and the learned Advocate-General of the Punjab has taken us through tho
order of the High Court in respect of some of the
allegations made.
Having stated the respective cases of the parties
before us, we shall proceed now to a more detailed
examination of !.he proceduro adoptct! in the four
cases instituted against the petitioncrH.
JJ11t before
we du so, it is necessary to say a few words about
Grewal's case and Sangrur _case which are stated to
furnis]l the reasons why petitioner no. 1 incurred the
displeasure of the Chief Minister. It is alleged that in
Grewal's case petitioner no. 1 was tt.sked to give evidence for the prosecution, but he gave a dubious reply
which displeased the Chief Minister. It is worthy of
note, however, that the trial in Grewal's ca.so began in
May-June, 1959; Sethi's complaint was made in
'
'·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
December, 1958 and Dhingra's in February, 1959.
Obviously, those two cases could not be the result of
any refusal by petitioner no. 1 to give evidence in
Grewal's case. On May 28, 1959, petitioner no. 1 wrote
to the Chief Secretary about Sethi's case and Dhingra's case, but no allegation was made therein against
the Chief Minister. What the petitioner wanted then
was that an opportunity should be given to him to
explain his position. On June 9, 1959, petitioner no. 1
again wrote to the Chief Secretary about the complaints of Sethi and Dhingra-again there was no
aillegation against the Chief Minister. On June 29,
1959, petitioner no. 1 filed two petitions in the Punjab
High Court for quashing the proceedings in Sethi's
case and Dhingra's case; in this petition an allegation was made that powerful influences were operating
against the petitioner " to harm him and debar him
officially" and Sethi's case and Dhingra's case were
the result of such influences, but there was no specific
mention of Grewal's case and of any request to the
petitioner to give evidence in that case. It was for
the first time on July 20, 1959, when the petition for
contempt proceedings was filed that a specific allegation against the Chief Minister was made in paragraphs 35 to 37 thereof (this is annexure I to the
present petition). This petition was dismissed in
limine, the High Court saying that it was not prima
facie satisfied that. the allegation was made out.
We
do not think that petitioner no. 1 has been able to
advance his case any further in spite of the fact that
the Chief Minister has made no affidavit, a matter to
which we shall advert later.
As to the Sangrur case, that was also referred to in
the petiti~n of July 20, 1959, and the High Court did
not accept the allegation of petitioner no. 1.
What
happen~d in that case was this. The late Sardar Mukan
Sing of Sangrur left two widows, Sardarni Pritam
Kuar and Sardarni Pavitar Kaur. Sardarni Pavitar
Kaur bad three daughters one of whom was married to
Surinder Singh Kairon, son of the Chief Minister. The
Sangrur estate was in charge of the Court of Wards,
that is, the Financial Commissioner, Punjab. On June
Ig6o
R. P. Rapur
& Others
v.
Sardar I'rntap
Singh Kairon
& Others
S. K. Das].
R. P. I<apttr
& OJhers
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kairon
6- Othars
S. K. Das].
150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
19, 1958, the Court of W a.rds decided to release the
estate after partitioning the immovable property between the two widows. At one time a. question a.rose as
to whether the immovable properties should be partitioned into five equal aha.res for the two widows and
three daughters or into two aha.res only for the two
widows. Sometime before May 6, 1959, it was decided
that the partition would be of two shares only and
thereafter a. detailed mode of partition was a.greed to
between the parties. This is clear from the note of petitioner no. 1 dated May 6, 1959. Thereafter there was no
more dispute left, and the case of petitioner no. 1 that
he was arrested on July 18, 1959, because he dictated
a.n adverse order some days previously which had
been typed but not yet signed does not prima facie
appear to be correct, a.part altogether from the question whether petitioner no. 1 was acting merely as
the channel between the Deputy Commissioner, and
the Financial Commissioner, the latter being the only
authority competent to pass final orders in the
matter.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that
the petitioners have not established what they have
alleged, namely, that R. P. Kapur, one of the petitioners, had incurred the displeasure of the Chief Minister by reason of what happened in the Grewal case
and the Sa.ngrur case. Whether there were other
reasons, administrative or otherwise, for the displeasure of the Chief Minister is a. matter which is not
germane to the present case. In the affidavits filed
before us some reference has been made to the past
record of R. P. Kapur. We consider it unnecessary
to refer to that record; firstly, because it is not relevant to the case before us, and secondly because we
think that it is not fair to refer to the confidential
record of an officer unless the circumstances in which
certain adverse remarks were made are known.
We proceed now to consider the four criminal oases
pending against the petitioners or some of them, in
relation to the two points urged: (l) whether in the
institution and investigation of these oases a special
procedure unknown to law has. been adopted and (2)
•
.
,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
if the petitioners have been singled out for unequal
treatment in administering the law relating to the
institution and investigation of criminal cases in the
State.
The first two cases, namely, Sethi's case and Dhingra's case need be dealt with at some length. Sethi's
case started on a complaint which it was said was
sent direct to the Chief Minister. Four material
allegations about fraudulent misrepresentation were
made in that complaint. It was alleged that R. P.
Kapur had fraudulently misrepresented to Sethi that
a particular piece of land which he had sold to Sethi
had been purchased by him at Rs. 10 per square
yard; that he had fraudulently concealed from Sethi
the pendency of certain proceedings before the Land
Acquisition Collector, Delhi, and of the acquisition of
the said land under s. 17 of the relevant Act; that he
had made a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards
the scheme of housing with regard to the area in
which the land lay. Though the complaint was dated
December lO, 1958, it appears to have been made
over to the Additional Inspector General of Police on
December 23, 1958. The Additional Inspector General of Police then appears to have passed an order to
the following effect: "Register a case and investigate
personally". This was addressed to Sardar Hardayal Singh, D. S. P. Thereupon Sardar Hardayal Singh,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Amritsar,
appears to have drawn. up a first information report.
The original complaint which Sethi filed has not been
produced before us.
What was produced before us
was a carbon copy and on that carbon copy was the
order of the Additional Inspector General of Police to
which we have already made a reference. The allegation of the petitioners was that the original complaint
had been sent to the Chief Minister and the Chief
Minister had passed certain orders thereon. On behalf
of th~ petitioners it was suggested that the original was
not produced in order to conceal from . the Court the
orders which the Chief Minister had passed thereon.
We have stated earlier that the Chief Minister had filed
no affidavit in respect of these allegations. An affidavit ha.a been filed by A. N. Ka.shyap, Home Secreta.ry
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh j(afron
&· Others
S. K. Das].
' .
' . .
,~'
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Sing~ J(airon
& Others
S. K. Das].
152
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
to the Government but obviously he was not in a. position to say anything about the allegations made
against the Chief Minister. We, therefore, proceed
on the basis that so far as Sethi's case is concerned, a.
complaint was made or sent to the Chief Minister who
thereupon sent it to the Additional Inspector General
of Police who in his turn sent it to Sardar Hardayal
Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C. I. D., at
Amritsar. The short question before us is-does this
amount to adopting a procedure unknown to law or
even to unequal treatment so as to attract Art. 14 of
the Constitution ? Learned Counsel for the petitioners
has taken us through the relevant provisions in Part
V, Chapter XIV, of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and has submitted that under s. 154 of the Code every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence should be given to an officer in charge of a. police
station and under s. 156 any officer in charge of a.
police station may, without the order of a Magistrate,
investigate any cognizable case which a Court having
jurisdiction over the local area would have power to
inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter
XV relating to the place of inquiry or trial.
He ha.s
also referred to s. 157 under which the officer in
charge of a police station, sha.11 forthwith send a
report of the first information to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence and shall
proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the
State Government may, by general or special order,
prescribe in this behalf, to proceed to the spot to
investigate the facts a.nd circumstances of the case,
and if necessary to take measures for the discovery
and arrest of the offender. It is contended that the
provisions of ss. 154, 156 a.nd 157 of the Code
have been violated in the case against the petitioners; and thus the petitioners have been subjected to
a special procedure unknown to la.w or, a.t a.ny rate,
to unequal treatment, treatment different from that of
other persons against whom informations of a cognizable offence are ma.de.
We are unable to accept these contentions a.s
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
153
correct. First of all, s. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, does not say that an information of a cognizable
offence can only be made to an officer in charge of
a. police station. That section merely lays down, inter
alia, that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to
writing by. him or under his direction, and be read
over to the informant; and every such information
shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by
such officer in such form as the State Government
may prescribe in that behalf.
Section 156 gives
power to an officer in charge of a police station to investigate without the order of a Magistrate any cognizable case which a Court, having jurisdiction in the
local area. etc. would have power to inquire into or
try; sub-s. (2) of s. 156 lays down that no proceeding
of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage
be called in question on the ground that the case was
1 one which such officer was not empowered under this
section to investigate. There has been some argument
before us as to the meaning of the expression "any
such case " occurring in sub-s. (2) of s. 156. As we are
not resting our decision on sub-s. (2) of s. 156,~Code of
Criminal Procedure, we consider it unnecessary to
embark upon a discussion as to the true scope and
effect of sub-s. (2) of a. 156. Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down the procedure which a.n
officer in charge of a police station must follow where
information of a cognizable offence is made. Now,
there is another important provision in the Code which
is of great relevance in this case and must be read.
That provision is contained in s. 551 which is in these
terms:
"S. 551. Police officers superior in rank to a.n
officer in charge of a police station may exercise the
same powers, throughout the local area to which they
a.re appointed, as may be exercised by such officer
within the limits of his station."
The Additional Inspector General of Police to whom
ao
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kairon
& Others
S. K. Das j.
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Ka.iron
& Others
S. K. Das].
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Sethi's complaint was sent was, without doubt, a.
police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge
of a police station. Sa.rdar Harde.ya! Singh, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Amritsar, was also
an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a.
police station. Both these officers could, therefore,
exercise the powers, throughout the local area to
which they were appointed, as might be exercised by
a.n officer in charge of a police station within the
limits of his police station. It is not disputed that the
jurisdictional area of the Additional Inspector General of Police was the whole of the State.
As to the
jurisdictional area of the Deputy Superintendent of_
Police, C.I.D., the contention on behalf of the respondent State is that though he was posted at Amritsar,
his jurisdictional area extended over the whole State.
The learned Advocate-General for the respondent
State has drawn our attention to Police Rule 21.28
in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Vol. III, issued by
and with the authority of the State Government
under ss. 7 and 12 of the Police Act (V of 1861 ). That,
rule lays down that the Criminal Investigation
Department has no separate jurisdiction a.nd the
Deputy.Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation i)epartment, may decide to take over the
control of any particular investigation himself or
depute one or more of his officers to work directly
under the control of the Superintendent of Police of
the district. Police Rule 21.32 enumerates some of
the cases in which the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Department may be sought. Police Rule
25.14 says that the Criminal Investigation Department
is able to obtain expert technical assistance, and in
cases where such a.B"Bistance is required the a.ssista.nce of the Criminal Investigation Department ma.y be
obtained. In the affidavit made by Sa.rdar Ha.rdayal
Singh, he has stated that he was entrusted with the
investigation of Sethi's case because of its technical
nature and also because his sphere of duty a.s a Gazetted Officer attached to the Criminal Investigation
Department was the whole of the State in view of
the memorandum no. 9581-H-51/7912 dated October
' "
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
26, 1951. That memorandum shows that the Deputy
Inspector General, C.I.D. and all gazetted officers of
the Criminal Inv~stigation Department have jurisdic-~
tion extending over the whole of the Punjab State.
This is also supported by the affidavit made by Shamshere Singh, Additional Inspector General of Police.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners has pointed out
that Sethi's case involved no technical questions and
the ground stated in the affidavits of Shamshere Singh
and Sardar Hardayal Singh is not, therefore, correct.
The question before us is not whether the reason for
which the investigation was made over to Sardar
Hardaya.l Singh is correct or not. The question before
us is, whether in making over the investigation to
Sardar Hardayal Singh a special procedure unknown
to law was adopted or the la.w as to the investigation
of cases was administered with an evil eye or unequal
hand. If the police officer concerned thought that the
case should be investigated by the 0. I. D. -
even
though for a reason which does not appeal to us-it
cannot be said that the procedure adopted was illegal.
We are unable to agree with learned Counsel for the
petitioners that any of these two contentions ha11 been
made out in the present case. We are satisfied that
the Inspector General of Police, C,I.D. had power to
deal with Sethi's complaint and had further power to
direct investigation of the same by Sardar Hardayal
Singh who as a police officer superior in rank to an
officer incharge of a police station could exercise
powers of an officer in charge of a police station in
respect of the same. It cannot, therefore, be said
that the procedure adopted was unknown to law. Nor
are we satisfied that the procedure adopted was motivated by any evil purpose, though we are not quite
impressed by the reason given by Shamshere Singh or
Sardar Hardayal Singh that Sethi's case was of a
technical nature and, therefore, required the assistance of the C.I.D. Even if it was not of a technical
nature, it was open to the Additional Inspector General of Police to make over the investigation to a.
Deputy Superintendent of Police in view of the status
of the petitioners. In paragraph 31 of his affidavit
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kairon
& Others
S. K. Das].
•
I
R. P. Kapur
cf>. Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kairon
& Others
S. K. Das J.
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
A. N. Kashyap, Home Secretary, has said that the
Inspector General of Police on receiving the complaint from Sethi ordered on his oww the registration
of the case without any order or direction from the
Chief Minister. The correctness of this statement
has been very seriously commented on. In the
absence of any affidavit from the Chief Minister and
_of the original complaint, we have preferred to proceed in this case on the footing that the Additional
Inspector General of Police got the complaint from
the Chief Minister and then passed ne,eessary orders
thereon. Even on that footing we are unable to hold
that there has been any violation of legal procedure or that an unfair discrimination has been made
against the petitioners.
·
_
Learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on
certain observations made by this Court in H. N. Rishbud and· Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi (').
The
observations occur at page 1160 of the report and are
to the effect that it is of considerable importance to an
accused person that the evidence collected against
him during investigation is collected under the responsibility of an authorised and competent investigating
officer. These observations were made in a case where
the question that fell for decision was whether the
provisions in s. 5(4) and the proviso to s. 3 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947)
and the corresponding s. 5A of the Prevention of
Corruption (Second Amendent) Act, 1952 (Act LIX of
1952), were mandatory or not. It was held that they
were mandatory and an investigation conducted in
violation thereof was illegal. It was also held that an
illegality committed in the course of an investigation
did not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the
Court for trial; but if any breach of the mandatory provisions relating tq investigation were brought to the
notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial, the
Court would have to consider the nature and extent of
the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as might be called for. We do not think
that the observations made and the decision are of any
(1) [1955] (1) S.C.R. u50.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
assistance to the petitioners. We have held that there
has been no violation of any' mandatory provisions as
to investigation in Sethi's case against the petitioners
and the investigation procedure followed is legal. Our
attention has been drawn to King Emperor v.
Nilkantha (1). On a certificate by the Advocate-General, the case was considered by a Full Bench of the
Madras High Court and one of the questions for
decision was-" Is an Inspector of the Criminal In vestigation Department an authority legally competent
to investigate the facts within the meaning of s. 157,
Evidence Act ? " The question was answered in the
affirmative by the majority of judges, Abdur Rahim, J.
and Sundara Ayyar, J., dissenting. In the course of
the arguments before their Lordships, one of the questions mooted was whether Inspectors of the Criminal
Investigation Department were appointed to any local
area within the purview of s. 551, Code of Criminal
Procedure. Some of the Judges held that the whole
Presidency was their local area; some held that that
was not so. On the materials before us, we have no
hesitation in holding that the Deputy Superintendent
of Police entrusted with the investigation of Sethi's
case had the necessary authority to hold the investigation. The decision in Pulin Bihari Ghosh v. The
King (2) on which also some reliance has been placed
does not appear. to us to be in point: that was a case
in which the Magistrate purported t9 .act both under
s. 202 and s. 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, and
it was held that proceedings under s. 202 and investigation under s. 156(3) could not proceed simultaneously; it was further held that a direction under
s. 156(3) could only be made to an officer in charge of
a police station. No question arose there of the
exercise of powers under s. 551, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the decision does not establish what the
petitioners are seeking to establish in the present case.
More in point is the decision in Textile Traders
Synd~cate Ltd. v. State of U. P. (3) where it was held
that an Inspector of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department was superior in rank to that of an
(1) I.L.R. 35 Mad. 247.
(2) I.L.R. [1950] I Cal. 124.
(3) A.I.R. 1959 All. 337.
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh K airon
& Others
S. K. Das].
I960
R. P. Kapur
6' Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kairon
& Others
5. K. Das].
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
officer in ohe.rge of a. police station and under s. 551,
Code of Criminal Procedure, he could exercise the
powers of e.n officer in charge of a. police station
throughout the State.
Turning now to Dhingra's case, the position is this.
Admittedly, a. complaint dated February 27, 1959,
was sent to the Chief Minister with a. covering letter
in which it was stated that "R. P. Kapur had already
started tampering with the evidence and I, therefore,
request that · orders be passed that the Police should
take in hand investigation immediately and collect all
material evidence ". The Chief Minister wrote on
this : " Inspector Genera.I, Police, is sick. Will Addi.
Inspector Genera.I please take immediate action in
taking over papers from Government departments
concerned and the papers with Sri Dhingra. Please
give a prime. facie report." The Additional Inspector
Genera.I
then made the following endorsement :
" Please take immediate necessary action. Depute one
of your officers to contact Sri Dhingra and get the
necessary records from him. Immediate action may
be taken to take over the record from the various
departments. A case may be registered. I have
informed Chief Secretary and he agrees with this."
This was addressed to the Deputy Inspector General,
C,I.D., and the latter wrote-" Case should be registered .and investigated by Bir Singh, D.S.P., under
your supervision. Immediate steps should be taken to
get the salient records of Sri Dhingra." This was
addressed to Ujager Singh, Superintendent of Police,
C.I.D. The case was then registered by Sardar
Sampuran Singh, Inspector of Police, Police Station
Chandigarh, and the invest.igation wa~ in charge of
Sardar Bir Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
C.I.D.
The legal position as to the institution of Dhingra's
oase and its investigation is the same as in Sethi's
case. The legal ea.notion for both is s. 551, Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the ree.sons whioh we .have
given for holding that the procedure followed in
instituting and investigating Sethi's ce.se is lege.lly
ve.lid e.pply to Dhingre.'s case e.lso.
On behe.lf of the
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
petitioners it has been submitted that the hand of the
Chief Minister is no longer concealed in respect of
Dhingra.'s case. It is pointed out that in 1959, a complaint is made in respect of offences alleged to have
been committed about five years ago in 1954 and the
Chief Minister, without any enquiry whatsoever, says
" Please give a prima facie report, " and the same
C.I.D. machinery is again set in rapid motion as in
Sethi's case, and this at a time when Sethi's case was
kept " banging as a. sword " over the petitioners. It
has been further submitted that the direction as to
the seizure of papers was not justified in law, as the
Chief Minister had no legal power to give such a direction. We do not think that these submissions establish
what the petitioners have to establish in order to
succ·eed on their writ petition, namely, that in the
institution of Dhingra's case and its investigation, a.
procedure unknown to law has been followed or that
the petitioners have been singled out for an unfair and
discriminating treatment. We do not know what reasons led the Chief Minister to make the endorsement on
the complaint of Dhingra. a.she did and why instead of
referring the complaint to the officer in charge of the
police station concerned, a reference was ma.de to the
Additional Inspector General or the Criminal Investigation Department. These are matters within his
special knowledge, and he has chosen to throw no light ·
on them. Shamshere Singh has said in his affidavit
that he dealt with Dhingra's case in exercise of his
powers under s. 551, Code of Criminal Procedure.
Sardar Bir Singh has said in his affidavit that this
case was also of a technical nature and so the investigation was entrusted to him. As we have said in
Sethi's case this reason does not appear to us to be a.
convincing reason, but the Police officers concerned
may honestly have thought that the case should be
investigated by the Criminal Investigation Department. We a.re not called upon to express any opinion
on the merits of Dhingra's case, and all that we say
now is that the petitioners have failed to establish
either of their two contentions-(!) that the procedure
adopted was illegal, or (2) that the petitioners were
unfairly discriminated against.
x960
R. P. Kapur
& Others
v.
Sardar Pratap
Singh Kairon
& Others
S. K. Das].
Ig60
R. P. Kapur
&- Others
v.
Sardar Pra.tap
Singh Ka iron
&.> Otherr
S. K. Das].
160
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
We go now to the remaining two cases, the Orphanage Case and the Ayurvedio Fund case. One was
instituted on the complaint of the Civil Supply Officer,
Karna!, and the other on the statement of Daryao
Sing, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, C. I. D.,
Karna!. The Orphanage case is against the Orphanage Advisory Board of which R. P. Kapur was the
Vice President at the relevant time, and Kartar Sing,
farm manager of Kaushalya Devi. It related to the
alleged violation of certain Control Orders in the
matter of a brick kiln. The Ayurvedic Fund case is
against R. P. Kapur and certain other persons, who
are not petitioners before us. It alleged criminal
breach of trust etc. in respect of certain funds in the
hands of the persons accused therein.