# R. P.KAPUR v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

- **Citation:** [1960] 3 S.C.R. 388
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-09-10
- **Case number:** CRIMINAL APPELJ,ATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 217of1959
- **Bench:** P .B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r-p-kapur-v-the-state-of-punjab-1627
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Quashing of proceedings-Inherent power of
High Court-When to be exercised-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898
(V .9f I898), s. 56I-A.
• One S lodged a first information report against K. When K
found that no action was taken on the report for several months
he filed a criminal complaint against S contending that the report
lodged by S was false. At the instance of S the magistrate ordered
K's complaint to stand adjourned till the police made its final
report on the first information report.
Thereupon K moved the
High Court under s. 56r-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for
quashing the proceedings initiated by the first information report.
Pending the hearing the police submitted its report under s. r73
of the Code. Subsequently the High Court dismissed the petition.
K obtained special leave and appealed:
Held, that no case for quashing the proceedings was made
out.
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be
exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent
the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. The following are some categories of cases where
the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash
proceedings:
(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or
continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint did not make out the offence alleged ; and
.
(iii) where either there was no legal evidence adduced in
support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.
In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 56r-A of the Code the
High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the
evidence in the case is reliable or not.
In the present case there
was no legal bar to the institution of the proceedings or to their
continuance; the allegations made in the first information report
did constitute the offences alleged and it C?uld not be contended
that on the face of the record the charge was unsustainable.
In re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, A.LR. r928 Born. r84,
Jagat Chandra Mozu.mdar v. Queen Empress, (r899) LL.R. 26
Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1954) 56
Punj. L.R. 54, Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Govind Bhandhu Majumdar, A.LR. r924 Cal. ro18 and Ramanathan Chettiar v. K. Sivarama
Subrahmanya Ayyar, (1924) LL.R. 47 Mad. 722, referred to.
S.P. faiswal v. The State, (r953) 55 Punj. L.R. 77, distinguished.
• ..
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
CRIMINAL APPELJ,ATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 217of1959.
R. P. Kapur
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
v.
order dated September 10, 1959 of the Punjab High state of Punjab
-Court in Criminal Misc. No. 559 of 1959.
Appellant in person.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of
Punjab, Mohinder Singh Punnan,
T. M. Sen and
D .. Gupta, for the respondent.
1960. March 25. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-On December 10, 1958, Mr. Gajendragadkar ],
M. L. Sethi lodged a First Information Report against
•
the appellant Mr. R. P. Kapur and alleged that he and
-
• his mother-in-law Mrs. Kaushalya Devi had committed
offences under ss. 420-109, 114 and 120B of the Indian
Penal Code. When the appellant found that for several
months no further action was taken on the said First
Information Report which was hanging like a sword
over his head he filed a crimihal complaint on April 11,
1959, against Mr. Sethi under ss. 204, 211 and /385 of
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the Indian Penal Code and thus took upon himself the
onus to prove that the First Information Report
lodged by Mr. Sethi was false.
On the said complaint
Mr. Sethi moved that the proceedings in question
should be stayed as the police had not made any report
on the First Information Report lodged by him and
that the case started by him was still pending with the
police. After hearing arguments the learned Magistrate
ordered t_hat the appellant's complaint should stand
adjourned.
Thereupon th

## Text

Ig6o
March 25.
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
R. P.KAPUR
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
( P .B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Quashing of proceedings-Inherent power of
High Court-When to be exercised-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898
(V .9f I898), s. 56I-A.
• One S lodged a first information report against K. When K
found that no action was taken on the report for several months
he filed a criminal complaint against S contending that the report
lodged by S was false. At the instance of S the magistrate ordered
K's complaint to stand adjourned till the police made its final
report on the first information report.
Thereupon K moved the
High Court under s. 56r-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for
quashing the proceedings initiated by the first information report.
Pending the hearing the police submitted its report under s. r73
of the Code. Subsequently the High Court dismissed the petition.
K obtained special leave and appealed:
Held, that no case for quashing the proceedings was made
out.
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be
exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent
the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. The following are some categories of cases where
the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash
proceedings:
(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or
continuance of the proceedings;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint did not make out the offence alleged ; and
.
(iii) where either there was no legal evidence adduced in
support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.
In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 56r-A of the Code the
High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the
evidence in the case is reliable or not.
In the present case there
was no legal bar to the institution of the proceedings or to their
continuance; the allegations made in the first information report
did constitute the offences alleged and it C?uld not be contended
that on the face of the record the charge was unsustainable.
In re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, A.LR. r928 Born. r84,
Jagat Chandra Mozu.mdar v. Queen Empress, (r899) LL.R. 26
Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1954) 56
Punj. L.R. 54, Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Govind Bhandhu Majumdar, A.LR. r924 Cal. ro18 and Ramanathan Chettiar v. K. Sivarama
Subrahmanya Ayyar, (1924) LL.R. 47 Mad. 722, referred to.
S.P. faiswal v. The State, (r953) 55 Punj. L.R. 77, distinguished.
• ..
,
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
CRIMINAL APPELJ,ATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 217of1959.
R. P. Kapur
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
v.
order dated September 10, 1959 of the Punjab High state of Punjab
-Court in Criminal Misc. No. 559 of 1959.
Appellant in person.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of
Punjab, Mohinder Singh Punnan,
T. M. Sen and
D .. Gupta, for the respondent.
1960. March 25. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-On December 10, 1958, Mr. Gajendragadkar ],
M. L. Sethi lodged a First Information Report against
•
the appellant Mr. R. P. Kapur and alleged that he and
-
• his mother-in-law Mrs. Kaushalya Devi had committed
offences under ss. 420-109, 114 and 120B of the Indian
Penal Code. When the appellant found that for several
months no further action was taken on the said First
Information Report which was hanging like a sword
over his head he filed a crimihal complaint on April 11,
1959, against Mr. Sethi under ss. 204, 211 and /385 of
..,,..
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. -~
the Indian Penal Code and thus took upon himself the
onus to prove that the First Information Report
lodged by Mr. Sethi was false.
On the said complaint
Mr. Sethi moved that the proceedings in question
should be stayed as the police had not made any report
on the First Information Report lodged by him and
that the case started by him was still pending with the
police. After hearing arguments the learned Magistrate
ordered t_hat the appellant's complaint should stand
adjourned.
Thereupon the appellant moved the Punjab High
Court under s. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
for quashing the proceedings - initiated by the First
Information Report in question. Pending the hearing
of the said petition. in the said High Court the police
report was submitted under s. 173 of the Code on
July 25, 1959. Subsequently, on September 10, 1959,
Mr. Justice Capoor heard the appellant's petition and
held that no case had been made out for quashing the
proceedings under s. 561-A. In the result the petition
was dismissed. It is against this order that the appelIa.nt has come to this Court by special leave.
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[Hl60)
•
x96o
The material facts leading to the proceedings against
the appellant lie within a very narrow com1mss.
It,
R. P. Kapur
v.
appears that in January 1957 the mother.in.Jaw of the
State of Punjab appellant and his wife entered into an agreement with
the owners of certain lands in village Mohammadpnr
Gajendmgadkar ]. Munirka to purchase lands at Rs. 5 per sq. yd.
Earnest money was accordingly paid to the vendors and
it was agreed that the sale had t? be completed by
April 13, 1957; by consent this period was extended
to ,June 13, 1957. Meanwhile, on March 8, 1957, not ifications were issued by the Chief Commissioner under
ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for
acquiring considemble area of land which included
the lands belonging to the vendors; this acquisition
was intended for the housing scheme of the Ministry
of Vil or ks, Housing and Supply in the Government of
India. The proposed acquisition was treated as one
of urgency and so under s. 17 of the Acquisition Act
possession of the land was taken by the Collector on
June 8, 1957. Some of the persons concerned in thp,
said lands filed objections against the validity of the
action taken under s. 17. It was under these circumstances that the sale deeds were executed by the
vendors in favour of Mrs. Kaushalya Devi and certain
other vendees on June 12, 1957. It appears that the
vendees presented their claim before the Land Acquisition Collector and an award has been made in September 1958 by which Mrs. Karnihalya Devi has been
allowed compensation at Rs. 3-8·0 per sq. yd.
That,
is how the title of the lands in question passed to Mrs.
Kaushalya Devi.
The First Information Report filed by Mr. Sethi
alleges that he and the appellant were friends and that
on January 4, 1958, the appellant dishonestly and
fraudulently advised him to purchase 2,000 sq. yds. of
land in Khasra Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 25 in the aforesaid
village Mohammadpur Munirka on the representation
that as owner of the land in the area Mr. Sethi would
get a plot of desired dimensions in the same area
developed by the Ministry under its housing scheme.
The appellant also represented to Mr. Sethi, according
to t.he First Information Report, that since under the
scheme no person would be allotted more than one
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
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plot he would have to surrender a part of his land;
1960
that is why as a friend ,he was prepared to give to Mr.
h
h d b
R. P. Kapur
Sethi one plot at the price at w ich it
a
een purv.
chased.
According to Mr. Sethi the appellant dictated State of Punjab
an application which he was advised to send to the
Secretary of the Ministry of Works and he accordingly Gajendragadkar J.
sent it as advised. _ The First Information Report
further .alleges that the appellant had assured Mr .
Sethi that the land had· been purchased by his motherin-law at Rs. 10 per sq. yd. Acting on this representation Mr. Sethi paid Rs. 10,000 by cheque drawn in
favour of Mrs. Kaushalya Devi on January 6, 1958.
This cheque has been cashed. Subsequently a draft
of the sale deed was sent by.the appellant to Mr. Sethi
in the beginning of March 1958 and on March 6, 1958,
a further sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid by cheque. The
draft was duly returned to the appellant with a
covering letter in ~hich Mr. Sethi stated that he would
have liked to add one clause to the deed to the effect
that in the event of the authorities not accepting the
sale for the purpose of allotment, the amount of
Rs. 20,000 would be refunded to him; and he expressed the hope that even if the said clause was not included in the document the appellant would accept it.
The sale deed in favour of Mr. Sethi was registered on
March 21, 1958. It is this transaction which has given
rise to the First Information Report in question.
Broadly stated the First Information Report is based
on four material allegations about fraudulent misrepresentation. It is alleged that the appellant fraudulently
misrepresented to Mr. Sethi that the land had been
purchased at Rs. 10 per sq. yd.; that the appellant
fraudulently concealed from Mr. Sethi the pendency of
the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector,
Delhi, and of the acquisition of the said property
under s. 17 of the said Act; he also made similar
fraudulent misrepresentations as regards the scheme
of housing to which he referred.
As a result of these
misrepresentations Mr. Sethi entered into the transaction and parted with Rs. 20,000. That in brief is
the nature of the complaint made by Mr. Sethi in his
First Information Report. The appellant urged before
the Punjab High Court that the case started a~ai.nst
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
i96o
him by the First Information Report should be quashed under s. 561-A of the Code. The Punjab High
R.P. J(apur
v.
Court has rejected the appellant's contention. The
state of Punjab question which arises for our decision in the present
-
appeal is: Was the Punjab High Court in error in
Gajmdragadka. J. refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under
s. 561-A of the Code in favour of the appellant?
Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is
necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561-A of the
Code. The said section saves the inherent power of
the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that
this inherent power cannot be exerQised in regard to
matters specifically covered by the other provisions of
the Code. In the present case the magistrate before
whom the police report has been filed under s. 173 of
the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits
of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of
the appellant that his request for the quashing of the
proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any
specific provision of the Code. It is well-established
that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can
be exercised to quash prnceedings in a proper case
either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Ordinarily
criminal· proceedings instituted against an accused
person must be tried under the provisions of the Code,
and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere
with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage.
It is not possible, desirable or expedient to la.y down
any inflexible rule which would govern tho exercise
of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some _categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the
proceedings.
There may be cases where it may be
possible for the High Court to take the view that the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings
against an accused person may amount to the abuse
of the process of the court or that the quashing of
the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
j;stice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in
;960
respect of an offence alleged to have been committed
by an accused person and it manifestly appears that
R. P. Kapur
there is a legal bar against the institution or continuState 0/I'unjab
ance of the said proceeding the High Court would be
justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Gajendragadkar ].
Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance,
furnish cases under this category. Cases may also
arise where the allegations in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety, do nqt
constitute the offence alleged ; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter_~/
merely of looking at the complaint or the First Infor-
('
mation Report to decide whether the offence alleged
is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be
manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal
court to be issued against the accused person. A third
category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court can be successfully invoked may also
arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute
an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence
adduced in support -of the case or evidence adduced
clearly or manifestly fails to prove. the charge. In
dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is·
no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is
manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation
made and cases where there is legal evidence which
on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in questiop. In exercising its jurisdiction under
s. 561-A the High Court would nqt embark upon an
enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party
to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and
contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the
evidence the accusation made against the accused
would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the
nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court under s. 561-A in the matter of quashing •
;!94
SUPREME COUJ{'f Rl~l'ORTS
LlU6U J
z960
criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the
-
judicial decisions on the point (Vide: In Re: ShriR. P.:<apur
pad G. Ohandavarkar ('}, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v.
State of Punjab Queen Empress (2), Dr. Shanker Singh v. The State of
---
Punjab (3), Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Gobind Bandhu
Gajendragadkar J. Majumdar( 4} and Ramano.than Ohettiyar v. K. Sivarama
Subrahmanya Ayyar (5).)
•
Mr. Kapur, who argued his own case with ability
before us, strongly relied on the decision of the Punjab
High Court in S. P. Jaiswal v. The State & Anr. (")
and contended that in the interest of justice and in
order to avoid unnecessary harassment to him we
should ourselves examine the evidence on record and
decide whether the said evidence can possibly lead to
his conviction. In that case Jaiswal was charge'd with
having committed offences under s. 147 ands. 452 of
the Code and it does appear from the judgment of the
High Court that the learned judge elaborately considered all the evidence on which the prosecution relied
and came to the conclusion that the proceedings taken
against Jaiswal and his co.accused should be quashed.
It is, however, clear from the judgment that the learned judge was very much impressed by the fact that
the police had reported that there was no case or at
the most only a technical offence against Jaiswal but
the district magistrate had interfered with the statutory duty of the police and had directed the police
officer concerned to prosecute him. On these facts the
learned judge was inclined to take the view that there
was a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to
J aiswal under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Besides, in
the opinion of the learned judge the evidence on which
the prosecution relied showed that the essential ingredients of the offence charged were missing "and the
very essentials were non.existent". It is on these
findings that the criminal proceedings against Jaiswal
were qua§hed. It is unnecessary for us to consider
whether the fundamental right guaranteed under
Art. 21 had really been contravened or not. We have
merely referred to the relevant findings recorded by
(1) A.LR. 1928 Born. I8j.
(2) (1899) LL.R. 26 Cal. 786.
(3) (1954) 56 Punjab L.R. 54.
(4) A.LR. 1924 Cal. 1018.
(5) (I9z4) l.L.R. 47 Mad. 7n.
(6) (19531 55 Punjab L.R. 77 •
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
the learned judge in order to emphasise the fact that
x960
this decision cannot be read as an authority for the
proposition that an accused person can approach the
R. P. :~apur
High Court under s. 561-A of_ the Code and ask it to State of Punjab
appreciate the evidence adduced against him and
quash the proceedings in case it thought that the said Gajendragadkar .J.
evidence did not justify the charge. In fact, in dealing with the case the learned judge has himself
approved of the several decisions which have construed the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction
under s. 561-A and so the decision must be confined
to the basic findings recorded by the learned judge in
that case.
This being the true legal position the question which
falls for our decision is: Does the appellant show
that his case falls . under any of the three categories
already mentioned by us. There is no legal bar to the
institution of the present proceedings.or their continuance, and it is ol;ivious that the allegations made in
the First Information Report do constitute offences
alleged against the appellant. His argument, however, is that the evidence on record clearly and unambiguously shows that the allegations made in the
First Information Report are untrue; he also contends that "certain powerful influences have been
operating against him with a view to harm him and
debar him o.:ffi.cially and otherwise and have instigated
and later seized upon the false First Information
Report filed by Mr. Sethi against him". In this
connection he has naturally placed emphasis on the
fact that the investigating agency has acted with
extraordinary dilatoriness in the matter and that for
several months the police did not make the report
under s. 173 of the Code.
·
It is true that though the complaint against the
appellant is essentially very simple in its nature the
police authorities did not make their report for nearly
seven months after the First Information Report was
lodged.
We have already indicated -how the appellant was driven to file a complaint on his own charging Mr. Sethi with having filed a false First Information Report against him, and how the Report, in question was filed aJter the appellant moved the High
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1960]
.....
r960
Court by his present petition under s. 561-A. It is
very much to be deplored that the police officers
R. P. I<apu'
concerned did not act diligenUy in this matter, and
State 0;·Punjab it is not surprising that this unusual delay has given
rise to the apprehension in the mind of the appellant
Gajendragadk"' J. that the object of the delay was to keep the sword
hanging over his head as long as possible. It is perhaps likely that the appellant being the senior-most
Commissioner in the Punjab the investigating authorities may have been cautious and circumspect in taking
further steps on the First Information Report ; but
we are satisfied that this explanation cannot account
for the inordinate delay made in submitting the
report under s. 173. It is of utmost importance that
investigation into criminal offences must always be
free from any objectionable features or infirmities
which may legitimately lead to the grievance of the
accused that the work of investigation is carried on
unfairly or with any ulterior motive. Even so it is
difficult to see how this conduct on the part of the
police officers can materially assist the appellant in his
prayer that the proceedings which have now reached
the criminal court should be quashed. ·
\Ve must, therefore, now proceed to consider the
appellant's case. that the evidence on record is
demonstrably against the allegation of Mr. Sethi
that he was induced by the appellant to part with
Rs. 20,000 as a result of the several misrepresentations
alleged in the First Information Report. He contends
that the principal allegation against him is two-fold,
that he fraudulently and dishonestly concealed from
Mr. Sethi any information about the pendency of the
proceedings before the Collector, and fraudulently represented to him that the land had been purchased at
Rs. 10 per sq. yd.
According to the appellant, if t.he
correspondence on the record is considered, and the
statements made'by Mr. Sethi and his wife and their
conduct at the material time are taken into account,
it would irresistibly show that the whole story about
the fraudulent misrepresentations is untrue. The appellant has taken us through the relevant correspondence and has referred us to the statements and the
oeni:lnct of the parties. We are anxious not to expres~
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
any opinion on this part of the appellant's argument.
i96o
All we wish t,_o say is that we would inevitably have.
I
d
R. P. Kapur
to consider the evidence ourse ves an to appreciate
v.
it before we pronounce any opinion on the validity or State of Punjab
otherwise of the argument. It is not a· case where the
-
appellant can justly contend that on the face of the re- Gajendragadkar J.
cord the charge levelled against him is unsustainable •.
The appellant no doubt very strongly feels that on the
relevant evidence it would not be reasonably possible
to sustain the charge but that is a matter on which
the appellant will have to satisfy the ma.gistrate who
takes cognisance of the case. We would, however,
like to emphasise that in rejecting the appellant's
prayer for quashing the proceedings at this stage we
are expressing no opinion one way or the other on
the merits of the case.
There is another consideration which has weighed
in our minds in dealing with this appeal. The appellant has 'come to this Court under Art. 136 of the
Constitution against
the decision of the Pμnjab
High Court; and the High Court has refused to
exercise its inherent jurisdiction in favour of the
appellant. Whether or not ,we would have come to
the same conclusion if we were dealing _with the
matter ourselves under s. 561-A is not really very
material because in the present case what we have to decide is whether the judgment under appeal is erroneous
in law so as to call for our interference under Art. 136.
Under the circumstances of this ca§e we are unable
to answer this question in favour of the appellant.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismjssed.
Appeal dismissed.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
M/S. S. S. MIRANDA LIMITED
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Excise Duty-Imposition at successive stages of transportation of
excisable article-Validity of-Bombay Abkari Act, z878 (Bom. V of
I878), SS. IO, I9 & I9A.
. The respondent held a trade and import licence for foreign
liquor-as well as a velldor's licence under the Bombay Abkari
51
1960
March 25.