# r959 April 2I, <959 Ranjit Singh v. The State of Pun} ab

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 727
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-03-07
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1957
- **Bench:** Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r959-april-2i-959-ranjit-singh-v-the-state-of-pun-ab-1741
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Perjury-False statement in affidavit-Affidavit affi"Ymed to the best of knowledge and belief-N v obligation to
file affidavit-Offence, if made out-Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV
of I86o), SS. I9I and I93·
A habeas corpus application was made to the High Court
al)eging that one S had been illegally arrested and kept in unlawful custody without any charge being made against him and
without obtaining remand from a Magistrate. By way of a
return the appellant, a sub-Inspector of Police, filed a false
affidavit controverting the allegations made in the application.
He was prosecuted and convicted under s. 193· Indian Penal
Code. The appellant challenged his conviction on the grounds
that: (i) as he was not bound under the law to file an affidavit,
the case did not fall under s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code and
he could not be convicted under s. 193 ; and (ii) the affidavit
having been affirmed as true to the best of the knowledge and
belief of the appellant it could not be said which part was true to
his knowledge and which to his belief.
Held that, the appellant was rightly convicted. It was not
necessary for the application of s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code
that the accused should be bound under the law to make an
affidavit. If he chose to make one and bound himself on oath
to state the truth he was liable under s. 193 of the Code if he
made a false statement and it was no defence to say that he was
not bound to enter the witness-box or make an affidavit.
In the
present case it was necessary for the appellant to file an affidavit
as he was bound to place the facts and circumstances justifying
I959
The l\fanag,•ment
of Ranij>ur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
.J;. Others
Wanchoo J.
r959
April 2I,
<959
Ranjit Singh
v.
The State of
Pun} ab
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
the detention which could only he done by an affidavit. Ordinarily, where the detention- is under orders of the detaining
authority in exercise of his plenary powers or of a Court an
affidavit may not be necessary in making the return but where
it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to justify its
action by disclosing facts it has to file an affidavit.
Held, further, that explanation 2 to s. 191 of the Code brings
a false statement affirmed to the belief of the accused also within
the mischief of s. l9I and thus makes it punish3:ble under s. 193
of the Code.
Emperor v. Lachmi Narain, I. L. R. 1947 All. 155, disapproved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 19 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated March 7, 1956, of the former PEPSU High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 45 of 1956, arising out
of the judgment and order dated February 22, 1956, of
the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, in Criminal
Appeal No. 175/36of1955-56.
Pritam Singh Safeer, for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1959.
April 21. The Judgment of the Court was_
delivered by
Kapur J.
KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
against the judgment and order of the High Court of
PEPSU passed in revision. The appellant was a subInspector of Police who at the relevant time was the
Station House Officer in-charge Shehna police station
in the erstwhile PEPSU State. He was convicted
under s. 193, Indian Penal Code, by a First Class
Magistrate and his appeal to the Sessions Judge,
Patiala, was dismissed except as to sentence. He took
a revision to the PEPSU High Court but that was also
dismissed.
This appeal has arisen in the following circumstances : One Surjit Singh, s/o Risaldar W aryam Singh, was
arrested on September 25, 1953, at Barnala in l'EPSU
State by the Police Inspector Jaswant Singh. He was
kept in the lock-up at Barnala and on the following
day his custody was handed over to the appellant and
he was taken to Shehna and was kept in custody-it
(2) s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
is not clear under what section-in the police station
lock-up at Shehna. Surjit Singh was there kept in
custody from Septe

## Text

(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
as that part of the award has been upheld by the
Appellate Tribunal, there is no question of the employees being paid during the period of suspension without pay.
We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside
the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and restore the order of the Industrial Tribunal dismissing the
two applications under s. 33-A. In the circumstances,
we pass no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed. ·.
RANJIT SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(JAFER IMAM and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Perjury-False statement in affidavit-Affidavit affi"Ymed to the best of knowledge and belief-N v obligation to
file affidavit-Offence, if made out-Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV
of I86o), SS. I9I and I93·
A habeas corpus application was made to the High Court
al)eging that one S had been illegally arrested and kept in unlawful custody without any charge being made against him and
without obtaining remand from a Magistrate. By way of a
return the appellant, a sub-Inspector of Police, filed a false
affidavit controverting the allegations made in the application.
He was prosecuted and convicted under s. 193· Indian Penal
Code. The appellant challenged his conviction on the grounds
that: (i) as he was not bound under the law to file an affidavit,
the case did not fall under s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code and
he could not be convicted under s. 193 ; and (ii) the affidavit
having been affirmed as true to the best of the knowledge and
belief of the appellant it could not be said which part was true to
his knowledge and which to his belief.
Held that, the appellant was rightly convicted. It was not
necessary for the application of s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code
that the accused should be bound under the law to make an
affidavit. If he chose to make one and bound himself on oath
to state the truth he was liable under s. 193 of the Code if he
made a false statement and it was no defence to say that he was
not bound to enter the witness-box or make an affidavit.
In the
present case it was necessary for the appellant to file an affidavit
as he was bound to place the facts and circumstances justifying
I959
The l\fanag,•ment
of Ranij>ur
Colliery
v.
Bhuban Singh
.J;. Others
Wanchoo J.
r959
April 2I,
<959
Ranjit Singh
v.
The State of
Pun} ab
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
the detention which could only he done by an affidavit. Ordinarily, where the detention- is under orders of the detaining
authority in exercise of his plenary powers or of a Court an
affidavit may not be necessary in making the return but where
it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to justify its
action by disclosing facts it has to file an affidavit.
Held, further, that explanation 2 to s. 191 of the Code brings
a false statement affirmed to the belief of the accused also within
the mischief of s. l9I and thus makes it punish3:ble under s. 193
of the Code.
Emperor v. Lachmi Narain, I. L. R. 1947 All. 155, disapproved.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 19 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated March 7, 1956, of the former PEPSU High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 45 of 1956, arising out
of the judgment and order dated February 22, 1956, of
the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, in Criminal
Appeal No. 175/36of1955-56.
Pritam Singh Safeer, for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1959.
April 21. The Judgment of the Court was_
delivered by
Kapur J.
KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
against the judgment and order of the High Court of
PEPSU passed in revision. The appellant was a subInspector of Police who at the relevant time was the
Station House Officer in-charge Shehna police station
in the erstwhile PEPSU State. He was convicted
under s. 193, Indian Penal Code, by a First Class
Magistrate and his appeal to the Sessions Judge,
Patiala, was dismissed except as to sentence. He took
a revision to the PEPSU High Court but that was also
dismissed.
This appeal has arisen in the following circumstances : One Surjit Singh, s/o Risaldar W aryam Singh, was
arrested on September 25, 1953, at Barnala in l'EPSU
State by the Police Inspector Jaswant Singh. He was
kept in the lock-up at Barnala and on the following
day his custody was handed over to the appellant and
he was taken to Shehna and was kept in custody-it
(2) s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
is not clear under what section-in the police station
lock-up at Shehna. Surjit Singh was there kept in
custody from September 26, 1953, till October 10, 1953,
when at about 10 p.m., he was surreptitiously removed
to Police Station Dialpur and then to Police Post
Hamirgarh and from there was taken to Police Station
Baga Purana in Ferozepur District, of the then Punjab.
An application under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure
Code and under Art. 226 of the Constitution was made
for a writ of Habeas Corpus and Mandamus in the
High Court of PEPSU. In that petition it was alleged
that Surjit Singh was being kept in unlawful custody 1
without any charge being made and without obtaining
a remand by a Magistrate. In reply to this, an affidavit dated October 13, 1953, was filed by the appellant in which he stated that Surjit Singh had association with notorious dacoits; that he, the appellant, had
never taken him into custody at any time ; that the
said Surjit Singh was absconding and had not been
arrested in spite of the best efforts of the police; that
at the time of the making of the affidavit he was not
in the appellant's custody and that it was incorrect
that Inspector Jaswant Singh had ever entrusted
l:lurjit Singh to his (appellant's) custody. He also
stated that no petition had been brought to him nor
had he received any telegram in connection with the
custody of Surjit Singh. This affidavit was affirmed
as follows:-
" I solemnly affirm that the facts stated from
paras Nos. 1 to 7 are true to the best of my know ledge
and belief and nothing which is relevant to this case
has been kept back from this Hon'ble Court".
As both the parties admitted before the High Court
that Surjit Singh was not in the custody of the appellant the petition was dismissed. On November 9,
1953, the brother of Surjit-Singh made an application
under s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code, for the prosecution of Inspector Jaswant Singh and the appellant for
perjury under s. 193, Indian Penal Code, in that they
had filed false affidavits. This matter was heard by
another learned Judge of that Court who ordered the
92
I959
Ranjit Singh
v,
The Stat; of
Punjab
J(apur .f,
I959
Ranjit Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Kapur].
,
I
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
prosecution of the appellant and directed the Registrar
of the High Court to file a complaint which was filed.
The complaint was taken cognizance of by the First
Class Magistrate at Patiala who convicted the appellant and sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment
and a fine of Rs. 300/- and in default to undergo
simple imprisonment for two months. The appellant
took an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Patiala, who
confirmed the order of conviction but reduced the sentence to one of three months' simple imprisonment
and a fine of Rs. 50 and in default one month's simple
imprisonment, a revision against this order was dismissed in limine by the Chief Justice although he
gave reasons for dismissing it. The appellant .then
obtained special leave from this Court.
On behalf of the appellant the first contention raised
was that the appellant was not bound to file an affidavit and therefore he could not be convicted under
s. 193, Indian Penal Code, because his case did not fall
under s. 191, Indian Penal Code. In support of his
contention he relied upon the Rules of the PEPSU
High Court framed for the purpose of proceedings
under Art. 226 and s. 491(2), Criminal Procedure Code,
for the issuing of writs of Habeas Corpus. He also
referred to the Rules made by that Court for the issuing of writs of Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto
and Certiorari under Art. 226 and submitted that there
was no Rule in the former, i.e., for writ of Habeas Corpus requiring a return to be made on behalf of the respondent to be supported by an affidavit whereas in
the latter, i.e., issuing of writs of Mandamus etc. an
affidavit was necessary and therefore it was submitted
that s. 191 was inapplicable. Rule 2 of the Rules of
the Court required that when a Judge was of the opinion that prima facie case had been made out for
granting the application a rule nisi was to issue calling·
upon the person G>r persons against w horn the order
was sought, to appear before the Court and to show
.cause why such an order should not be made. As has
been pointed out in Greene v. Home Secretary (1) which
was a case under Reg. 18-B of the Defence of the
(z) [1942] A.C. 284, 302.
•
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
Realm Act the whole object of proceedings for a writ
of Habeas Corpus is to make them expeditious, to
keep them as free from technicality as possible and to
keep them as simple as possible. "The incalculable
value of Habeas Corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the right to the appellant's
freedom" (Lord Wright). When there is no question
of fact to be examined or determined no affidavit is
needed.
As soon as there emerges a fact into which
the Court feels it should enquire the necessity for an
affidavit arises. Ordinarily an affidavit may not be
necessary in making the return if the detention is
under orders of the detaining authority in exercise of its plenary discretion as in Liversidge v.
Anderson (1) and in Greene's case (2) or a person is detained under the orders of a Court. But where the
detention is, as it was in the present case, it becomes
necessary for the detaining authority to justify its
action by disclosing facts which would show to the
si;ttisfaction of the Court that the custody is not improper. Where the prisoner says" I do not know why
I have been detained, I have done no wrong", it is
for the detaining authority to justify the custody.
When issues of fact are raised and the actions of the
police officers, as in the present case, are expressly
challenged and facts are set out which if unrebutted
and unexplained would be sufficient for the writ to
issue, an affidavit becomes necessary. It cannot be
said therefore that in the present case the appellant
was not legally bound to place facts and circumstances
before the Court to justify the detention of Surjit
Singh and this could be done by an affidavit.
Section 4 of the Oaths Act lays down the authority
to administer oaths and affirmations and it prescribes
the courts and persons authorised to administer by
themselves or by their officers empowered in that
behalf oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties
or in exercise of the powers imposed upon them and
they are, all courts and persons having by law the
authority to receive evidence. Section 5 prescribes
the persons by whom oaths or affirmations must be
(1) (1942] A.C. 206.
(2) [1942] A.C. 284, 302.
I959
Ranjit Singh
v.
The State of
Punjab
Kapur].
I959
IVuijit Singh
v.
The State of
i:iunjab
Hapur j.
'732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
made and they include all witnesses, i.e., all persons
who may lawfully be required to give evidence by or
before any court. These two sections show that the
High Court or its officers were authorised to administer the oath and as the appellant was stating facts
as evidence before the High Court he had to make the
oath or affirmation and was bound to state the truth.
Sectiop 14 of that Act is in the following words:
S. 14. "Every person giving evidence on any
subject before any Court or person hereby authorised
to administer oaths and affirmations shall be bound to
state the truth on such subject".
As the appellant was giving evidence on his own
behalf in that he was denying the allegation made in
the affidavit of the brother of Surjit Singh he was
bound to state the truth on the subject on which he
was making the statement. The contention therefore
that under s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code the
relevant portion of which is:
S. 191. "Whoever being legally bound by an oath
or by an express provision of law to state the truth
......... makes any statement which is false and which
he either knows or believes to be false or does not
believe to be true, is said to give false evidence "
the appellant was not legally bound by oath to state
the truth cannot be supported. On the other hand at
the stage of the proceedings in the High Court where
it was being alleged that . Surjit Singh was being
detained by the appellant illegally it was necessary
for the appellant to make an affidavit ir\. making a
return and therefore if the statement is false, as it has
been found to be, then he has committed an offence
under s. 193.
The opening words of s. 191 "whoever being legally
bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to
state the truth ......... " do not support the submission
that a man, who is not bound under the law to make
an affidavit, can, if he does make one, deliberately
refrain from stating truthfully the facts which are
within his knowledge. The meaning of these words is
that whenever in a court oflaw a person binds himself
on oath to state the truth he is bound to state the
•
(2) S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
733
truth and he cannot be heard to say that he should
not have gone into the witness-box or should not have
made an affidavit and therefore the submission that
any false statement which he had made after taking
the oath is not covered by the words of s. 191, Indian
Penal Code, is not supportable. Whenever a man
makes a statement in court on oath he is bound to
state the truth and if he does not, he makes himself
liable under the provisions of s. 193. It is no defence
to say that he was not bound to enter the witness-box.
A defendant or even a plaintiff is not bound to go into
the witness-box but if either of them chooses to do so
he cannot, after he has taken the oath to make a
truthful statement, state anything which is false.
Indeed the very sanctity of the oath requires that a
person put on oath must state the truth. In our
opinion this contention is wholly devoid of force and
must be repelled.
·
It was then contended that the officer before whom
the appellant swore the affidavit, i. e., the Deputy
Registrar of the High Court of PEPSU was not
authorised to administer oaths. That officer as a
witness for the prosecution has stated that he could
administer an oath and therefore this contention of
the appellant is also without any force and must be
repelled.
It was also argued that the affidavit filed by the
appellant was affirmed as being true to the best of
know ledge and belief and therefore it could not be said
as to which part was true to the appellant's knowledge
and which to his belief. We have read the affidavit
which consists of 7 paragraphs and each paragraph
relates to affirmation of a fact which, if true, could
only be so to the appellant's knowledge. But even
belief would fall under Explanation 2 to s. 191 which is
as under:
Explanation 2 to s. 191. "A false statement as to the
belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of
this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false
evidence by stating that he believes a thing which ho
does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows
a thing which he does not know".
1959
Ranjit Singh
y.
The State of
Punjab
Kapur].
I959
Ranjit Singh
v.
Tlic State of
Punjab
J;·apur j.
•
I959
April 21.
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
The appellant relied upon a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Lachmi Narain (1). But
unless there was something peculiar in the facts of
that case it cannot be considered to be good law. It
does not even take into consideration Explanation 2 of
s. 191.
Lastly it was urged that the· procedure adopted by
the Magistrate was erroneous in that he did not hold
an enquiry as required·under ss. 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, the former of which is expressly
mentioned in sub-section 2 of s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. That contention is equally untenable
because under s. 200, proviso (aa) it is not necessary
for a Magistrate when a complaint is made by a court
io examine the complainant and neither s. 200 nor
s. 202 requires a preliminary enquiry before the Magistrate can assume jurisdiction to issue process against
the person complained against.
In our opinion the appellant has been rightly convicted and we would therefore dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed .
.
ANDHERI MAROL KURLA BUS SERVICE
& ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
(JAFER IMAM and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Conciliation proceedings-Pendency ofWhether terminate on expiry of I4 days-Industrial Disputes Act,
I947 (XIV of r947) SS. I2(6), 20(2), JI(I) and 33(I).
Conciliation proceedings were started in January r952 with
respect to some disputes between appellant l and its workmen. On
May g, 1952, the Union and on June 2, 1952, the appellant l indicated to the Conciliation Officer that the negotiations had failed.
In the meantime on March 18, 1952, the appellant 1 dismissed
(1) I.L.R. 1947 All. 155·