# r960 November ;r6. Pandit J handu Lal & Ors v. The Slate flj Punjab G Ors

- **Citation:** [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-01-28
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r960-november-r6-pandit-j-handu-lal-ors-v-the-slate-flj-punjab-g-ors-2239
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Land Acquisition -
Constitutional · validity of enactmentConstruction of labour colony for a company, if a public purposeTest-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 4, 6, Part VIIConstitution of India, Arts. 31(2), 31(5)(a).
The Punjab Government issued notification under ss. 4 and
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and started proceedings for
acquisition of lands for the construction of a labour colony
under the Government sponsored Housing Scheme for the
workers of the Thapar Industrial Workers' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. The appellants challenged the acquisition
proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground,
inter alia, that the procedure prescribed by Part VII of the
said Act had not been admittedly complied with. The Division
Bench in affirming the order of dismissal passed by the trial
Judge held that although Art. 31 of the Constitution by prohibiting compulsory acquisition of property except for a public
purpose had made Part VII of the Act redundant, the present
proceedings were saved since the acquisition was for a public
purpose.
Held, that the High Court was in error in holding that· the
Constitution had rendered Part VII of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, redundant or null and void, although it was right in
dismissing the appeal.
That Act, as an existing Act, was
saved by Art. 31(5)(a) from being affected by Art. 31(2) of the
Constitution.
Acquisition of building sites for re.sidential houses for
industrial Jabour is for a public purpose even apart from s. 17(2)
The Stale of
Punjab
v.
Sodhi
Sukhdeu Singh
Subba Rao J.
;r960
November ;r6.
Pandit J handu
Lal & Ors.
v.
The Slate flj
Punjab G Ors.
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
(b) of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Punjab
Amendment) Act of 1953.
Babu Barkava Thakur v. The State of Bombay [1961] I S.C.R.
r2R, referred to.
Although in the case of an acquisition for a company
simpliciter, no declaration under s. 6 of the Act can be made
without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Act,
it is not correct to say that no acquisition for a company for a
public purpose can be made except under Part VII of the Act.
If the cost of the acquisition is borne either wholly or partially
by the Government, the purpose would be a public purpose
within the meaning of the Act. But if the cost is entirely borne
by the company it would be an acquisition for the company
simpliciter and Part VII would apply.
Since in the instant case a part of the compensation was to
be borne by the Government, it was not necessary to comply
with the provisions of Part VII of the Act.
C1v1L APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 4 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated January 28, 1959 of the Punjab High
Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 52 of 1958
arising out of the Judgment aud Order dated
February 17, 1958 of the said High Court in Civil
Writ Application No. 124 of 1957.
C. B. Aggaru-ala, Daya Su·arup Mehra and R. S.
Gheba, for the appellants.
S. M. Sikri, Advowte General for the State of Punjab,
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for respondent No. I.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and S. N.
Andley, for Respondent No. 2.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of 1-ndia and T.M.
Sen, for the Attorney-General for India (Intervener).
1960. November 16. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Sinha c. J.
SINHA, C. J.-This appeal, by special leave granted on May 29, 1959, is directed against the decision of
the Letters Patent Bench (G. D. Khosla, C. J., and
Dulat, J.) dated January 28, 1959, affirming that of
the learned single Judge (Bishan Narain, J.) dated
February 17, 1958, whereby he dismissed the
)
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
appellants' Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Con.
stitution.
It appears that the appellants are the owners of,
what is said to be, agricultural land, measuring about
86 bighas odd, in village Munda Majra, Tehsil J agadhari, in the district of Ambala. On October 27, 1954,
the Additi

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
BY COURT: In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, this appeal is allowed, the order passed
by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial
court restored with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
PANDIT JHANDU LAL & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Land Acquisition -
Constitutional · validity of enactmentConstruction of labour colony for a company, if a public purposeTest-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 4, 6, Part VIIConstitution of India, Arts. 31(2), 31(5)(a).
The Punjab Government issued notification under ss. 4 and
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and started proceedings for
acquisition of lands for the construction of a labour colony
under the Government sponsored Housing Scheme for the
workers of the Thapar Industrial Workers' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. The appellants challenged the acquisition
proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground,
inter alia, that the procedure prescribed by Part VII of the
said Act had not been admittedly complied with. The Division
Bench in affirming the order of dismissal passed by the trial
Judge held that although Art. 31 of the Constitution by prohibiting compulsory acquisition of property except for a public
purpose had made Part VII of the Act redundant, the present
proceedings were saved since the acquisition was for a public
purpose.
Held, that the High Court was in error in holding that· the
Constitution had rendered Part VII of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, redundant or null and void, although it was right in
dismissing the appeal.
That Act, as an existing Act, was
saved by Art. 31(5)(a) from being affected by Art. 31(2) of the
Constitution.
Acquisition of building sites for re.sidential houses for
industrial Jabour is for a public purpose even apart from s. 17(2)
The Stale of
Punjab
v.
Sodhi
Sukhdeu Singh
Subba Rao J.
;r960
November ;r6.
Pandit J handu
Lal & Ors.
v.
The Slate flj
Punjab G Ors.
460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
(b) of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Punjab
Amendment) Act of 1953.
Babu Barkava Thakur v. The State of Bombay [1961] I S.C.R.
r2R, referred to.
Although in the case of an acquisition for a company
simpliciter, no declaration under s. 6 of the Act can be made
without complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Act,
it is not correct to say that no acquisition for a company for a
public purpose can be made except under Part VII of the Act.
If the cost of the acquisition is borne either wholly or partially
by the Government, the purpose would be a public purpose
within the meaning of the Act. But if the cost is entirely borne
by the company it would be an acquisition for the company
simpliciter and Part VII would apply.
Since in the instant case a part of the compensation was to
be borne by the Government, it was not necessary to comply
with the provisions of Part VII of the Act.
C1v1L APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal
No. 4 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and
Order dated January 28, 1959 of the Punjab High
Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 52 of 1958
arising out of the Judgment aud Order dated
February 17, 1958 of the said High Court in Civil
Writ Application No. 124 of 1957.
C. B. Aggaru-ala, Daya Su·arup Mehra and R. S.
Gheba, for the appellants.
S. M. Sikri, Advowte General for the State of Punjab,
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for respondent No. I.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and S. N.
Andley, for Respondent No. 2.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of 1-ndia and T.M.
Sen, for the Attorney-General for India (Intervener).
1960. November 16. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
Sinha c. J.
SINHA, C. J.-This appeal, by special leave granted on May 29, 1959, is directed against the decision of
the Letters Patent Bench (G. D. Khosla, C. J., and
Dulat, J.) dated January 28, 1959, affirming that of
the learned single Judge (Bishan Narain, J.) dated
February 17, 1958, whereby he dismissed the
)
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
appellants' Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Con.
stitution.
It appears that the appellants are the owners of,
what is said to be, agricultural land, measuring about
86 bighas odd, in village Munda Majra, Tehsil J agadhari, in the district of Ambala. On October 27, 1954,
the Additional District Magistrate of Ambala ordered
the land aforesaid to be requisitioned under the
Punjab Requisitioning & Acquisition of Irnmo,'"eable
Property Act (XI of 1953) for the construction of
houses by members of the Thapar Industries Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Yamuna Nagar. Possession of the land was taken on November 5, 1954. The
appellants, at once, instituted a suit on November 14,
1954, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Jagadhari, challenging the requisition proceedingi>. The
suit was ultimately decreed by the Court on June 21,
1955, and the possession of the property in question
was restored to the petitioners. On May 27, 1955, the
first respondent, i. e., the State of Punjab, through
the Secretary, Labour Department, if-;sued a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894)
(which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act). The
notification, under s. 4 is in these terms-
"N o. 4850-S-LP-55/14144. \Vhereas it appears to
the Governor of Punjab that land in the locality hereunder specified is likely to be needed by the Government for a public purpose, namely, for the constrnction of a Labour Colony under the Government sponsored Housing Scheme for the Industrial \Vorkers of
the Thapar Industrial Workers' Co-operative Housing
Society Limited, Jamna Nagar (District Ambala), it is
hereby notified that the land described in the specifications below is likely to .be required for the above
purpose.
This notification is made under the provisions of
Section 4 rea,d with section 17 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, as amended by t;he Land Acquisition
(Punjab Amendment) Act, 1953, to all to whom it may
concern and the Collector shall cause public notice of
the substance of this notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality;
Pandit ] handu
Lal & Ors.
v.
The State of
Punjab & Ors.
Sinha C. ].
Pandit ] handu
Lal &- Ors.
v.
The State of
Puniab &- Ors.
Sinha C. J.
462
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid sections, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to
authorise the President of the above said Society with
the members and servants to enter upon and survey
any land in the locality and do all other acts required
or permitted by that section.
Further in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act the Governor of Punjab is pleased to direct that, on the grounds
of urgency, the provisions of Section 5(a) of the said
Act, shall not apply in regard to this Acquisition".
Later, the same day, another notification, under s.
6 of the Act, was issued. This notification, under s. 6,
states that it appeared to the Governor of Punjab that
the land is required to be taken by Government for a
public purpose, namely, for the construction of a
Labour Colony under the Government sponsored
Housing Scheme for the Industrial Workers of the
Thapar Industrial Workers' Co-operative Housing
Society Limited (which is the second respondent in this
case). It also says that under the provisions of s. 7
of the Act, the Collector, Ambala, is directed to take
order for the acquisition of the land. The Patwari
effected delivery of possession of the lands in question
to the second respondent on August 21, 1955. Even
before the delivery of possession had been effected,
the appellants promptly instituted their suit on August
20, 1955, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Class
I, J agadhari, for a perpetual, injunction restraining
the second respondent from entering upon or taking
possession of the land in question, or making any construction thereon. The trial Court dismissed the suit
on June 25, 1956, on the preliminary ground that the
suit was not competent in the absence of a previous
notice under s. 59 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1955 (XIV of 1955).
The appellants appealed to the Senior Sub.,Judge, Ambala, who dismissed
their appeal, upholding the decision of the trial Court
that the notice was a condition precedent to the
institution of the suit. Tlw.:r second appeal was dismissed by the Punjab High Court on February 6, 1957.
During the pendency of the ci vii litigation aforesaid,
in spite of the fact that the second respondent had
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
obtained delivery of possession through Government
agency, by an Order of Injunction issued by the Court,
construction had been stayed. As soon as the High
Court decided the suit in favour of the respondents,
the second respondent "started making huge constructions on the land in dispute in a very speedy manner",
as alleged by the appellants in their petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution, which they filed on
February 13, 1957. ]'rom the High Court also, they
obtained similar Stay Orders whereby building operations were stopped. In their Writ Petition, the appellants, as petitioners in the High Court, challenged the
acquistion proceedings on a number of grounds, of
which it is only necessary to notice the one which has
formed the subject matter of decision in the High
Court, namely, that the proceedings were void for
want of compliance with the procedure laid down in
Chapter VII (mistake for Part VII) of the Act. It is
not necessary to refer to the other contentions raised
in the Writ Petition, because it is common ground
before us that the whole controversy must be determined by the answer to the question, 'whether or not
the proceedings were vitiated by reason of the admit-
. ted fact that no proceedings under Part VII of the Act
had been. taken in making the acquisition'.
The matter was heard, in the first instance, by
Bishan Narain, J. The learned Judge dismissed the
petition, holding that the acquisition was by the
Government for a public purpose, namely, of construction of tenements for industrial workers, under a
scheme subsidised by the Government out of public
funds; that Part VII of the Act had no application to
the present proceedings, and that, therefore, the notification under s. 6 was not invalid. The appellants
preferred an appeal, under the Letters Patent. The
Letters Patent Bench dismissed the appeal, but for
different reasons. After an examination of the precedents of the different High Courts, bearing on the
controve;:sy in this case, the Bench came to the conclusion, which may better be expressed in its own
words:-
''There is thus considerable authority for the
Pandit j handu
Lal cSo Ors.
v.
The State of
Punjab cSo Ors.
Sinha C. ].
Pandit J handu
Lal & Ors.
v.
The State of
Punjab & Ors.
Sinha C. ].
464
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
view advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that compliance with the provisions of Part VII
is obligatory in the case of all acquisitions for a company. In the present case the acquisition was undoubtedly for the benefit of a company. I have given
this matter my most anxious consideration, and, with
great respect to the learned Judges, whoso decisions
have been noted above, I find myself unable to subscribe to the views expressed by them. It seems to
me that their views were coloured by the background
of the provisions of the Constitution. Article 31 of
the Constitution prohibits compulsory acquisition of
property for anything except a public purpose. Therefore, acquisition for anything which is not a public
purpose cannot now be done compulsorily, but it has
never been disputed that before the Constitution came
into force land could have been acquired compulsorily
by Government for a purpose which was not public.
There is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act to warrant the assumption that the embargo placed by Artticle 31 of the Constitution found place in the Act. It
seems to me that the Land Acquisition Act contemplates two categories of acquisitions".
After an examination of the provisions of the Act, the
High Court observed that the Land Acquisition Act
came into force when there was no bar to compulsory
acquisition for private purposes. Such a bar was only
imposed, for the first time, by Art. 31 of the Constitution. After the Constitution came into force, Part VII
of the Act became redundant or null and void. But,
in its view, the present acquisition proceedings were
saved from all attack based on non-compliance with
the provisions of Part VII of the Act. The reason
for this conclusion, according to the High Court, was
that as the land was acquired for a public purpose,
there was no need to comply with the provisions of
Part VII, even though the Company is to bear all the
expenses for the acquisition.
It is manifest that the main point for detormination in this appeal is: Whether or not the acquisition
proceedings had been vitiated by reason of the admitted fact that there was no attempt made by the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
Government to comply with the requirements of
Part VII of the Act. It is equally clear that the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court was misled in its
conclusions, because all the provisions of Art. 31 of
the Constitution had not been brought to their notice.
It is not correct to say that Part VII of the Act had
become redundant or null and void, as suggested by
the High Court, because that Part provided for acquisition for a private purpose. As held by this Court
in a recent decision, in the case of Babu Barkaya
Thakur v. The State of Bombay (1), the Act deals with
two kinds of acquisitions: (1) for a public purpose, at
the cost of the Government, and (2) for a purpose
akin to such a purpose, a.t the cost of a Company, and
to the latter class of acquisition, the provisions of
Part VII are attracted. It was further held in that
case tl1:at acquisition of a site for building residential
houses for industrial labour was a public purpose, and
that the Land Acquisition Act was immune from attack based on the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the
Constitution, in view of the provisions of cl. 5(a) of
that Article, which saved an existing law of the
nature of the Act in question.
As will presently appear, the conclusion of the High Court is entirely
correct, but the process of reasoning by which it has
reached that conclusion is erroneous. That process
suffers from the initial error arising from the fact
that the provisions of .Art. 31(5) of the Constitution
had not been brought to the notice of that Bench. If
the Bench were cognisant of the true' legal position
that the Land Acquisition Act, in its entirety, including Part VII dealing with the acquisition of Land for
Companies, was not subject to any attack under Art.
31(2) of the Constitution, it would not have based that
conclusion on that ratio. Otherwise, there would be
no answer to the contention in which the appellants
had persisted throughout the long course of litigation
in which they have indulged in their vain effort to
save the land from being used for the public purpose
aforesaid. The Letters Patent Bench has also fallen
(l) (1961] l S.C.R. 128.
59
Pandit .fhandu
Lal & 0'5.
v.
The Stale of
Punjab & Ors.
Sinha C. ].
z960
Pandit ] handu
Lal 0- Ors.
v.
The StaltJ of
Punjab cf>. Ors.
Sinha C. ].
466
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
into another error in assuming that "the compensation
was paid in its entirety by the Company''. It is better to clear the ground by showing that this assumption is not well-founded in fact.
In their Writ Petition, as originally filed in the
High Court, it was not categorically stated by the
appellants that the compensation in respect of the
land in question was paid, or was to be paid, by the
Company. It may be stated here, by the way, that it
is common ground that the second respondent is a
Company within the meaning of the Act, being a registered society under the Co-operative Societies Act. It
is also common ground that the purpose for which
the land was being acquired was for erecting residential quarters for industrial labour, which had organised itself into the Co-operative Housing Society, the
second respondent. It was only at a later stage of the
proceedings in the High Court, that is to say, in the
replication filed on behalf of the appellants to the
Written Statement filed by the Government, in answer
to the appellant's Writ Petition, that, for the first
time, it was alleged by the appellants that "the entire
amount of compensation has been borne by the respondent society". This allegation has not been either
supported or countered by evidence on either side.
But it has been pointed out by the learned single Judge
that it was clear from the Government Housing
Scheme that a substantial amount to be expended
on this Scheme comes out of the Revenues, in the form
of subsidies and loans. It was stated at the Bar, with
reference to the terms and conditions of the Government Housing Scheme, that 25% to 50% of the
cost of land and structures to be b•1ilt upon the land
was to be advanced by Government out of public
funds, in the shape of subsidy and loan. It would,
thus, appear that the High Court was not right in the
assumption made as aforesaid
It is clear from the statement of facts on record
that the respondent No. 2 is a 'Company', within the
meaning of the Act; that the land is acquired for the
benefit of the Company, and at its instance, and that
a large proportion of the compensation money was to
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
come out of public funds, the other portion being supplied by the Company or its members. There is also
no doubt that the structures to be made on the land
would benefit the members of the Co-operative Society.
But, the private benefit of a large number of industrial workers becomes public benefit within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. In this connection,
it may be mentioned that s. 17 of the Act was amended by the Land Acquisition (Punjab Amendment) Act
(II of 1954) in these terms-
"l 7(2)(b). Whenever in the opinion of the Collector it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate
possession of any land for the purpose of any library
or educational institution or for the construction, extension or improvement of any building or other
structure in any village for the common use of the inhabitants of such village, or any godown for any
society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act,
1912 (II of 19.12), or any dwelling-house for the poor,
or the construction of labour colonies under a Government-sponsored Housing Scheme, or any irrigation
tank, irrigation or drainage channel, or any well, or
any public road,
the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub.section (1), and
with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government enter upon and take possession of such land,
which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances".
It will appear from the (amended) s. l 7(2)(b), quoted
above, that the construction of labour colonies, under
a Government-sponsored Housing Scheme, has been
included in the category of 'works of public utility'.
As already indicated, even apart from the indication
given by the (a.mended) section 17, quoted above, this
Court has held, in the recent decision (1) that building
of residential quarters for industrial labour is public
purpose. Hence, even a.part from the a.mended provisions of s. 17, it is clear on the authorities that the
purpose for which the land wa.s being acquired was a.
public purpose.
(1) [1961] I S.C.R. 128 •
Pandil ] ltandu
Lal .S. Ors.
v.
The Slalc of
Punjab .S. Ors.
Sinha C. ].
1960
Pandit j handu
La.I &- Ors.
v.
The State of
Punjab IS- Ors.
Sinha C. J.
468
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
Having cleared the ground, it now remains to consider the terms of s. 6, on which great reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants. There is no doubt that,
as pointed out in·the recent decision of this Court (1),
the Act contemplates acquisition for a public purpose
and for a Company, thus conveying the idea that
acquisition for a Company is not for a public purpose.
It has been held by this Court, in that decision, that
the purposes of public utility, referred to in ss. 40-41
of the Act, are akin to public purpose. Hence, acquisition for a public purpose as also acquisitions for a
Company are governed by considerations of public
utility. But the procedure for the two kinds of acquisitions is different, in so far as Part VII has made substantive provisions for acquisitions of land for Companies.
Where acquisition is made for a public purpose,
the cost of acquisition for payment of compensation
has to be pa.id wholly or partly out of Public Revenues,
or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. On the other hand, in the case of an acquisition
for a Company, the compensation has to be pa.id by
the Company. But, in such a case, there has to be an
agreement, under s. 41, for the transfer of the land
acquired by the Government to the Company on payment of the cost of acquisition, as also other matters
not material to our present purpose. The agreement
contemplated by s. 41 is to be entered into between
the Company and the Appropriate Government only
after the latter is satisfied about the purpose of the
proposed acquisition, and subject to the condition precedent that the previous consent of the Appropriate
Government has been given to the acquisition. The
'previous consent' itself of the Appropriate Government is made to depend upon the satisfaction of that
Government that the purpose of the acquisition was
as la.id down in s. 40. It is, thus, clear that the provisions of ss. 39-41 lay down conditions precedent to
the application of the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, if the acquisition is meant for a Company.
Now, s. 6 itself contains the prohibition to the ma.king of the necessary declaration under that section in
these terms-
(1) [1g61j I S.C.R. 128.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
"Provided that no such declaration shall be made
unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly
out of public revenues or some fund controlled or
managed by a local authority".
Section 6 is, in terms, made subject to the provisions
of Part VII of the Act. The provisions of Part VII,
read with s. 6 of the Act, lead to this result that the
declaration for the acquisitio:6. for a Company shall
not be made unless the compensation to be awarded
for the property is to be paid by a company. The
declaration for the acquisition for a public purpose,
similarly.,. cannot be made unless the compensation,
wholly or partly, is to be paid out of public funds.
Therefore, in the case of an acquisition for a Company
simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made without
satisfying the requirements of Part VII. But, that
does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a
Company for a public purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part VII, if the cost
or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come
out of public funds. In other words, the essential
condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that
the cost of the acquisition should be borne, wholly or
in part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for
a Company may also be made for a public purpose,
within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole
of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If,
on the other hand, the acquisition for a Company is to
be ma.de at the cost entirely of the Company itself,
such an acquisition comes tinder the provisions of
Part VII. As in the present instance, it appears that
part at any rate of the compensation to be awarded
for the acquisition is to come eventually from out of
public revenues, it must be held that the acquisition is
not for a Company simpliciter. It was not, therefore,
necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by
Part VII. We, therefore, agree with the concl~sion of
the High Court, though not for the same reasons.
The appeal, accordingly, is dismissed with costs.
Appeal diBmissed.
Pandit Jhandu
Lal &- Ors.
v.
The State of
Punjab &- Ors.
Sinha C. J.