# r96I Inder Singh v. Gurdial Singh

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 852
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. G Ajendragadkar, A. Ic Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r96i-inder-singh-v-gurdial-singh-2099
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Shop Establishments-Enactment to provide for regulation of
hoitrs of work-Constitutional validity-Forty eight hour weekOpening and closing hours-Reasonable restrictions-Punjab Shops
and Commercial Establishments Act, r958 ( Punj. I 5 of I958), .
ss. 4, 7, 9, Io-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r)(g), i9(6).
Section 7 of the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments
Act, 1958, provided that no person shall be employed about the
business of an establishment for more than forty eight hours in
any week and nine hours in any one day. Under s. 9 of the Act
no establishment shall, save as otherwise provided by the Act,
open earlier than .ten o'clock in the morning or close later than
eight o'clock in the evening. The petitioners challenged the
constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions of the Act on
the ground that having regard to the nature of their business,
it would be impossible for them to carry it on in the manner in
which they were doing unless the Act permitted them to work
without regard to the restrictions imposed by the limitation as
to hours of work of employees under s. 7(1) or the hours for the
opening and closing of the establishments under s. 9, and that,
;
" .
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
consequently, these provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental right to carry on their trade or business under Art. r9(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The
petitioners' case was that their business was such that the customers who supplied them with goods brought them in vehicles
which arrived at their godowns at all hours of the day and
night and that they received messages by telephone and
telegram similarly both.during day and night. These according
to them rendered it necessary that their place of business
should be kept open practically for all the 24 hours of
the day.
Held, that ss. 7 and g of the. Punjab Shops and Commercial
Establishments Act, 1958, are intra vires the Constitution of
India.
· The test of constitutional validity is whether the impugned
provisions of the Act which were enacted to afford the worker
better conditions of work and more regulated hours so as to
avoid physical overstrain and ensure to him a reasonable
a1nount of leisure in the interest of the general public, are unreasonable restrictions from the point of view of the employer
and go beyond what is reasonably needed to protect the worker.
Judged· by this test, neithor the 48-hour week, nor the specification of the opening and closing hours could be said to have
gone beyond what by modern standards are necessary· for ensuring the health and efficiency of the employee.
Manohar Lal v. The State of Punjab, [1961] z S.C.R. 343,
followed.
ORIGINAL .JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 164 of
1958.
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Hights.
N. 0. Chatterjee and N aunit Lal, for the petitioners.
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1961.
April 10.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
I96I
Ramdhandas
v.
State oj Punjab
AYYANGAR, J.-The constitutional validity of the
Ayyangar J.
operative provisions of the P•mjab Shops a.nd Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (Punjab Act 15 of
1958), which we shall hereafter refer to as the Act
is challenged in this writ petition filed under Art. 32
of the Constitution, seeking reliefs appropriate to such
a challenge .
There are two petitioners and the nature of the
business carried on by them, which is set ont in the
Ramdhandas
v.
State of Punjab
Ayyangar ].
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
petition, indicates that they have combined with a
view to bring up before the Court the implications of
the enactment with reference to different types of
business which traders in the Punjab might be carrying on and which would be impeded or restricted by
the provisions of the Act. The first petitioner states
that he has a shop at Mandi Dabwali in Hissar District where he carries on business in the purchase and
sale of grains,

## Text

r96I
Inder Singh
v.
Gurdial Singh
l
!~ S. J{. Das ].
April IO,
;~·
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
< '
~
on March 24, 1946, and the execution of a deed of
adoption which he cancelled within a short time were
not a sufficient manifestation of the intention of N athu
to adopt Inder Singh as his son. There was no evidence that Nathu Singh treated Inder Singh as his
son; on the contrary, there was evidence to show that
he repudiated the declaration that he had earlier
made.
For the reasons give above, we see no merit in the
appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
ItAMDHANDAS AND ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(P. B. G AJENDRAGADKAR, A. IC SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Shop Establishments-Enactment to provide for regulation of
hoitrs of work-Constitutional validity-Forty eight hour weekOpening and closing hours-Reasonable restrictions-Punjab Shops
and Commercial Establishments Act, r958 ( Punj. I 5 of I958), .
ss. 4, 7, 9, Io-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r)(g), i9(6).
Section 7 of the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments
Act, 1958, provided that no person shall be employed about the
business of an establishment for more than forty eight hours in
any week and nine hours in any one day. Under s. 9 of the Act
no establishment shall, save as otherwise provided by the Act,
open earlier than .ten o'clock in the morning or close later than
eight o'clock in the evening. The petitioners challenged the
constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions of the Act on
the ground that having regard to the nature of their business,
it would be impossible for them to carry it on in the manner in
which they were doing unless the Act permitted them to work
without regard to the restrictions imposed by the limitation as
to hours of work of employees under s. 7(1) or the hours for the
opening and closing of the establishments under s. 9, and that,
;
" .
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
consequently, these provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental right to carry on their trade or business under Art. r9(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The
petitioners' case was that their business was such that the customers who supplied them with goods brought them in vehicles
which arrived at their godowns at all hours of the day and
night and that they received messages by telephone and
telegram similarly both.during day and night. These according
to them rendered it necessary that their place of business
should be kept open practically for all the 24 hours of
the day.
Held, that ss. 7 and g of the. Punjab Shops and Commercial
Establishments Act, 1958, are intra vires the Constitution of
India.
· The test of constitutional validity is whether the impugned
provisions of the Act which were enacted to afford the worker
better conditions of work and more regulated hours so as to
avoid physical overstrain and ensure to him a reasonable
a1nount of leisure in the interest of the general public, are unreasonable restrictions from the point of view of the employer
and go beyond what is reasonably needed to protect the worker.
Judged· by this test, neithor the 48-hour week, nor the specification of the opening and closing hours could be said to have
gone beyond what by modern standards are necessary· for ensuring the health and efficiency of the employee.
Manohar Lal v. The State of Punjab, [1961] z S.C.R. 343,
followed.
ORIGINAL .JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 164 of
1958.
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Hights.
N. 0. Chatterjee and N aunit Lal, for the petitioners.
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1961.
April 10.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
I96I
Ramdhandas
v.
State oj Punjab
AYYANGAR, J.-The constitutional validity of the
Ayyangar J.
operative provisions of the P•mjab Shops a.nd Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (Punjab Act 15 of
1958), which we shall hereafter refer to as the Act
is challenged in this writ petition filed under Art. 32
of the Constitution, seeking reliefs appropriate to such
a challenge .
There are two petitioners and the nature of the
business carried on by them, which is set ont in the
Ramdhandas
v.
State of Punjab
Ayyangar ].
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
petition, indicates that they have combined with a
view to bring up before the Court the implications of
the enactment with reference to different types of
business which traders in the Punjab might be carrying on and which would be impeded or restricted by
the provisions of the Act. The first petitioner states
that he has a shop at Mandi Dabwali in Hissar District where he carries on business in the purchase and
sale of grains, etc. in wholesale. The relevant averment in regard to the nature of his business is that
the customers who supply him with goods bring them
loaded in carts drawn by camels or bullocks and that
these vehicles arrive at his god owns at all hours of
the day and night. He also states that for the purpose of the purchases or sales effected by him, he
receives messages by telephone and telegram both
during the day and the night.
These, according to
him, render necessary, if he has to carry on business
as he has been doing all along, that his place of business should be kept open practically the whole of the
day and night, i.e., for all the 24 hours. The second
petitioner states that he is carrying on a retail business on a small scale, and that he employs no outsider
but attends to all the work in the shop himself, with
the assistance, if necessary, of the members of his
family. In this case also it is stated that the goods
purchased are brought to him at all hours of the day
and night and similarly he has to receive messages
during the entire period. It is in this background
that the petitioners desire that the Court should view
the restrictions imposed upon them by those provisions of the Act which are challenged in the petition.
We shall now proceed to set out the impugned provisions of the Act with a view to determine whether
for all or any of the reasons set out in the petition,
any of them could be said to constitute 3.n unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade or business so as not to be protected by Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution which.is the gravamen of the complaint
formulated in the petition.
The Act received the assent of the President on
April 25, 1958, 3.nd was published in the Punjab
' . -
-t
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,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R:E:PORTS
855
Gazette on May 1, 1958. According to the preamble,
it is an Act to provide for the regulation of conditions
of work and employment in shops and commercial
establishments.
The Act repealed and re-enacted,
with modifications, the Punjab Trade Employees Act,
1940, to which enactment also it would be necessary
to advert in its proper place. Section 1(3) of the1 Act
provides that the Act shall come into force on such
date as Government may, by notification appoint in
this behalf and by a notification under this provision
the Act was directed to come in~o force from June 1,
1958.
The Act, however, did not of its own force
apply to the entirety of the Punjab State, for s. 1(4)
enacted:
"1(4). It shall apply in the first instance to the
areas specified in the Schedule, but Government
may by notification direct that it shall also apply
to such other area and on such date as may be
specified in the notification."
Mandi Dabwali where the petitioners carry on business is one of the local areas in the district of Hissar
set .;mt in the Schedule annexed. We might here note
that the main grievance of the petitioners appears to
be that it has not been brought into force in neighbouring local areas and that this disparity in the regulations is acting to the disadvantage of people carrying on business in the areas set out in the Schedule.
This, however, cannot obviously be a ground of constitutional grievance and learned Counsel therefore
very properly did not rely on it except merely to draw
our attention to this fact.
Section 2(iv) defines a 'a commercial establishment'
to which the Act applies as meaning "any premises
wherein any business, trade or profession is carried
on for profit", omitting the unnecessary words. Section 2(v) defines 'day' as meaning "the period of
twenty-fou~ hours beginning at midnight", again omitting what is immaterial. The operative provisions of
the Act which were attacked in the petition are ss. 7
and 9 and it would be convenient to set out their
material terms:
"7. Hours of employment.-(1) Subject to the
Ramdhandas
v.
State of Punjab
Ayyangar ].
Ranidhandas
v.
State of Punjab
Ayyangar}.
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'
-·
provisions of this Act, no person shall be employed
about the business of an establishment for more
than forty-eight hours in any one week and nine
hours in any one day.
II
(2) . ······ ...................................................... .
(3) ...•..........................................................
(4) ............................................................. .
(5) ............................................................. .
9. Opening and closing hours.-No establishment
._
shall, save as otherwise provided by this Act, open
earlier than ten o'clock in the morning or close
later than eight o'clock in the evening;
Provided that any customer who was in the establishment before the closing hour may be served
•
during the period of fifteen minutes immediately
•
following such hour;
Provided further that the State Government may,
by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing,
allow an establishment attached to a factory to
open at eight o'clock in the morning and closA at
•
six o'clock in the evening.
Provided further that the State Government may,
by notification in the official Gazette, fix such other
opening and closing hours in respect of any establishment or class of establishments, for such period
and on such conditions, as may be specified in such
notification."
For the sake of completeness and to understand
the scheme of the enactment we would set 'out the
terms of s. 10 also, which reads:
"10. Close day.-(1) Save as otherwise provided
• '
by this Act, every establishment shall remain close
on every Sunday:
Provided that, in the case of an establishment attached to a factory, the employer may
substitute the close day of such establishment
so as to correspond to the substituted close day of
the factory in the same manner and subject to the '
same conditions as are laid down in this behalf in
the Factories Act, 1948.
(2) (i) The employer of an establishment shall in
, iJ
the prescribed form intimate to the prescribed
....
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1 S .. C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
authority the working hours and the period of interz96z
val of the employed persons within fifteen days. of
Ramdhandas
the date of registration of the establishment.
v.
(ii) The employer of an establishment may change state of Punjab
the working hours and the period of interval once
in a quarter of the year by giving intimation in the
Ayyangar J.
prescribed form to the prescribed authority at least
fifteen days before the change is to take place.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), the employer of an establishment may
open his establishment on the close day if-
(a) such day happens to coincide with a festival; and
(b) employees required to work on that day are
paid remuneration at double the rate of their normal wages calculated by the hour".
It is urged by Mr. Chatterji-learned Counsel for the
petitioners-that having regard to the nature of the
petitioners' business, whose features we have set out
earlier, it would be impossible for them to carry it on
in the manner in which they have been doing up to
now, unless the Act permitted the first petitiouer to
work without regard to the restrictions imposed by
the limitation as to hours of work of employees imposed by s. 7(1) of the Act, and both the petitioners
without regard to the hours for the opening and closing of the "establishments" under s. 9.
Before entering on a discussion of the constitutional
propriety of the restrictions imposed we may point
out that the provisions of the Act contemplate that
establishments might fall under three categories: (1)
where it is necessary in the public interest, and having regard to the service which they render to the community, that the normal hours of working should'not
be subject to the restrictions imposed by ss. 9 or 10, (2)
those in which there is no need for complete freedom
from these restrictions, but in which an adjustment
merely as regards the hours set out in s. 9 is sufficient,
(3) those in which neither the requirements of the
trade nor, of course, the interest of the general public
108
Ramdhandas
v.
State of Punjab
Ayyangar ].
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
would suffer if the establishment adjusted its operations in conformity with the Act.
The first head is dealt with by s. 4 of the Act which
reads:
"4. Provisions of sections 9 and 10 not applicable
to certain establishments.-N othing in sections 9
and 10 shall apply to-
(a) clubs, hotels, boarding houses, stalls and refreshment rooms at the railway stations;
(b) shops of barbers and hair-dressers;
(c) shops dealing mainly in meat, fish, poultry,
eggs, dairy produce (except ghee), bread, confectionery, sweets, chocolates, ice, ice-cream, cooked
food, fruit, flowers, vegetables or green fodder;
( d) shops dealing mainly in medicines or medical
or surgical requisites or appliances and establishments for the treatment or care of the sick, infirm,
destitute or mentally unfit;
(e) shops dealing in articles required for funerals,
burials or cremations;
(f) shops dealing in pans (betel leaves), biris or
cigarettes, or liquid refreshments sold retail for consumption on the premises;
(g) shops dealing in newspapers or periodicals,
editing and despatching sections of the newspaper
offices and offices of the news agencies;
. (h) cinemas, theatres and other places of public
entertainment;
(i) establishments for the retail sale of petrol and
petroleum products used for transport;
(j) shops in regimental institutes, garrison shops
and troop canteens in cantonments;
(k) tanneries;
'(1) retail trade carried on at an exhibition or
show, if such retail trade is subsidiary or ancillary
only to the main purpose of the exhibition or
show;
(m) oil mills not registered under the Factories
Act, 1948;
(n) brick and lime kilns;
(o) commercial establishments engaged in the
manufacture of bronze and brass utensils so far as
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859
)
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it is confined to the process of melting in furnaces; and
(p) saltpetre refineries."
Similarly by notification of the State Government
dated June 1, 1958, the following classes of establishments were exempted from the provisions of ss. 9
and 10:
"(l) establishments dealing in the retail sale of
Phullian,
Murmura,
sugar-coated grams and
Reoris;
(2) commercial colleges of shorthand and typewriting.
(vide Punjab Government notification No. 6567.
S-Lab. 58/1737-RA, dated June 1, 1958.)
( 3) all booking offices of the Transport Services.
(vide Punjab Government notification No. 6147/
5815-C-Lab-58/1741-RA, dated June 1, 1958)."
(2) The second category of cases are those covered
by the second and third provisos to s. 9.
Action has
been taken under the third proviso to s. 9, by a notification which was issued at the same time as when the
Act was brought into force which runs in the following terms:
"The following categories of establishments in
the State of Punjab shall not open earlier than eight
o'clock in the morning or close later than six o'clock
in the evening during the period from 1st May to
thirty-first August every year:-·
(1) establishments dealing in timber, manufacture
of furniture, tents, supply of furniture or tents on
hire, cycles or their repairs, or painting or dyeing;
(2) establishments, other than tailoring establishments, which include 'workshops' or other establishments where articles are produced, adapted or
manufactured, with a view to their use, transport
or sale; and
·
·
(3) establishments dealing in agricultural produce
brought for sale by producers.
(vide Notification No. 6567. S-Lab,58/1735-RA,
dated June 1, 1958)."
(3) Those outside s. 4 and which are not covered
by notifications under the provisos to s. 9 have, of
Ramdhandas
v.
State of Punja'fJ
Ayyangar ] .
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962] . ' ' -
I96I
course, to adjust their business in accordance with the
requirements of the Act. It is in the context of these
Ramdhandas
v.
exceptions and the elasticity for which provision is
state of Punjab made to meet the imperative requirements of particular types of business, that the constitutional objecAyyangar }. tion has to be considered.
The constitutional objection is that, the impugned
provisions impose unreasonable restrictions on the
fundamental right of the petitioners "to carry on
their trade or business". The regulation of contracts of
labour so as to ameliorate their conditions of work is
in reality a problem of human relationship and social
control for the advancement of the community. The
public and social interest in the health and efficiency
of the worker is, at the present day, beyond challenge.
Our Constitution does not protect or guarantee any ,
fundamental right in the nature of the provision in
Art. 1, s. 10(1), of the U.S. Constitution against "impairment of the obligation of contracts". The only
test of constitutional validity therefore is whether the
provision in the impugned law, which is enacted to
avoid physical overstrain of the worker, and so as to
afford him better conditions of work, and more regulated hours, thus ensuring to him a reasonable
amount of leisure-factors which would render the
restrictions in the interest of the' general public, is
unreasonable from the point of view of the employer.
For answering this question it would be necessary to
ask-are the restrictions necessary, or do they go
beyond what is reasonably needed to protect the
worker? Judged by this test, neither the 48-hour
week, nor the specification of the opening and closing
hours can be said to have gone beyond what by
modern standards are necessary for ensuring the
health and efficiency of the employee. It might also
be added that the concept of what is necessary to
secure the welfare of labour, or indeed'of the elements
which determine its content are neither of them fixed
or static, but are dynamic, being merely the manifestation or index of the social conscience as it grows
and develops from time to time.
Besides, this point regarding restrictions of this
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
nature being unreasonable is concluded against the
r96r
petitioners by the decision of this Court in Manohar
Ramdhandas
Lal v. The State of Punjab (1) judgment on which was
v.
delivered on November 11, 1960. The provision there state af Punjab
impugned was s. 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees
Act, 1940, (which, as stated earlier, had been repealed
and re-enacted with modifications by the Act) which
directed that the shops and establishments to which
it applied should remain closed on one day in the
week (corresponding to s. 10 of the Act of 1958). The
appellant before this Court was a small trader who
did not employ any person under him but who, like
the second petitioner before us, himself with the members of his family attended to all the requirements
of his shop. Basing himself on this feature he challenged the validity of the provision which restricted
his right to carry on his business in such manner as
he chose on all the seven days in the week. In
repelling these objections this Court said:
"The ratio of the legislation is social interest in
the health of the worker who forms an essential
part of the community and in whose welfare, therefore, the community is vitally interested. It is in
the light of this purpose that the provisions of the
Act have to be scrutinized ....... The learned Judges
of the High Court have rested their decision on
this part of the case on the reasoning that the
terms of the impugned section might be justified on
the ground that it is designed in the interest of the
·owner of the shop or establishment himself and
that his health and welfare is a matter of interest
not only to himself but to the general public ..... .
A restriction imposed with a view to secure this
purpose would, in onr opinion, be clearly saved by
Art. 19(6)...
Apart from this, the constitutionality of the impugned provision might be sustained
on another ground also, viz., with a view to avoid
evasion of provisions specifically designed for the
protection of workmen employed. It may be pointed out that acts innocent in themselves may be
prohibited and the restrictions in that regard would
(1) (1961] 2 S.C.R. 343·
Ayyangar ].
Ramdhandas
v.,
State of Punjab
Ayyangar J.
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
be reasonable, if the same were necessary to secure
the efficient enforcement of valid provisions. The
inclusion of a reasonable margin to ensure effective
enforcement will not stamp a law otherwise valid
as within legislative competence with the character
of unconstitutionality as being unreasonable."
These observations, in our opinion, clearly apply and
suffice to support the validity of the related provisions here impugned.
The petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
r96r
GLASS CHATONS IMPORTERS & USERS'
April IO.
ASSOCIATION
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. IC SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Import and Export-Decision to canalise import through
specialised channel or agency-Constitutional validity-Import and
Export Control Act, 1947-(XV II of 1947), s. 3 -Imports (Control) Order, 1955, Para. 6(h)-Constitution of India, Arts. 14,
r9(1)(j) & (g) and 3r.
The appellants were importers and users of glass chatons
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<-
the import of which was prohibited except under a licence
granted by the licensing authorities under the Import and Export Control Act, 1947• and the Imports (Control) Order, 1955·
The import was totally prohibited for some time but afterwards it was permitted under the Export Promotion Scheme
and licence was issued in favour of the State .Trading Corporation. The.appellants who made no application for licence contended inter alia that the provisions of para. 6(h) of the Imports
(Control) Order, 1955, that the Central Government or the Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence
or direct any licensing authority not to grant licence if the
licensing authority decided to canalise imports and the distribution thereof through special or specialised agencies or channels are unreasonable restrictions on the right to car
1ry on trade
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