# r96r Berar Swadeshi Vanaspathi v. Municipal Committee, Shegaon Kapur ]. March aB. Hukum Singh

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 601
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 165 of 1960
- **Bench:** K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/r96r-berar-swadeshi-vanaspathi-v-municipal-committee-shegaon-kapur-march-ab-2152
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Criminal Trial-Criminal Trespass-Right of private defence
of property-Degree of-Trespasser, if must abide by the directions
of the aggrieved party-Common object-Conclusion of-Indian
Penal Code (Act 45 of I86o), s. r49.
The appellants one of whom was armed with hatchet and
others with lathis, on being prevented by one 'H' and his supporters through whose field they were committing cri1ninal trespass
with the common object to reach a public passage with two load-
,__ ed carts, are alleged to have attacked 'H' and his supporters, as
76
r96r
Berar Swadeshi
Vanaspathi
v.
Municipal Committee, Shegaon
Kapur ].
March aB.
Hukum Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Raghubar
Dayal].
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
a result of which 'H' died. The defence was that on 'H's protest the appellants asked to be excused and pleaded to be allowed to cross the remaining small portion of the field to reach the
public passage, whereupon they were attacked and in self defence they attacked back.
The appellants' case was that H's right
of private defence of the property had ceased for the reasons
that the criminal trespass was over on the appellants having
indicated their intention to do so, and they were no more an unlawful assembly as their common object had ceased and thereafter all were not responsible for acts of another.
Held, that when a criminal trespass had been committed it
did not come to an end on the trespasser's expressing regret and
then pleading to be allowed to proceed further with a view to
end such a trespass. The aggrieved party had the right to prevent the trespasser from continuing to commit such further
criminal trespass, and his directions had to be abided by by the
trespasser, whatever be the degree of patience required; the
trespasser had no right to insist on proceeding further even if
not allowed to move in any direction in order to leave the
field.
Held, further, that when several persons were with lathis
and one of them was armed with hatchet and were agreed to
use these weapons in case they were thwarted in the achievement
of their object, it would be concluded that they were prepared
to use violence in prosecution of their common object and that
they knew that in the prosecution of such common object it
was likely that some one might be so injured as to die as a
result of those injuries.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 165 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December 19, 1958, of the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1010 of 1956.
Jai Gopal Sethi, 0. L. Sareen and R. L. Kohli, for
the appellants.
G. 0. ~Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondent.
1961. March 28.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special
leave, is by four persons against the order of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing their
appeal and confirming their conviction for several
offences including one under s. 302 read with s. 149, ...
I.P.C., by the Sessions Judge, Sa.haranpur.
' '
•
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
These appellants, along with three other persons,
were alleged to have forcibly taken two carts loaded
with sugarcane from the field of Suraj Bhan through
the field of Harphool, in transporting the sugarcane
from the field, about a furlong and a half away, to the
public passage running by the side of Harphool's field,
and to have beaten Harphool and others on Harphool's protesting against the conduct of the appellants'
party at the damage caused to his wheat and gram
crop. Ram Chandar, one of the appellants, was armed
with a hatchet (kulhari) and the others were armed
with lathis. Harphool and others who came to his
help struck the appellants' party also in self-defence.
Harphool died as a result of the injuries received in
this incident.
The appellants admitted their taking the carts
through Harphool's field and alleged that at Harphool's protest they asked to be excused, promised not
to take the carts through the fields i

## Text

.. '
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
601
the imposition of the octroi duty which in the context
'must mean imposition of the tax because the very
first rule states:-
. Rule 1 "Octroi shall ordinarily be levied on commodities included in the following classes and specified in the schedule hereto annexed and at the rates
therein entered".
The various classes of articles and commodities on
which octroi was to be levied are then set out and then
the exceptions and explanations are given. With
these rules are the schedules specifying the goods
under each class which are liable to octroi duty and
the rate at which the octroi duty was chargeable.
This notification therefore clearly is one which directs
imposition of octroi and falls within sub-s. (7) of s. 67
and having been notified in the Gazette it is conclusive evidence of the tax having been imposed in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and it
cannot be challenged on the ground that all the necessary steps had not been taken.
In our opinion this appeal is without force and is
therefore dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
HUKUM SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(K. SUBBA RAO and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Criminal Trial-Criminal Trespass-Right of private defence
of property-Degree of-Trespasser, if must abide by the directions
of the aggrieved party-Common object-Conclusion of-Indian
Penal Code (Act 45 of I86o), s. r49.
The appellants one of whom was armed with hatchet and
others with lathis, on being prevented by one 'H' and his supporters through whose field they were committing cri1ninal trespass
with the common object to reach a public passage with two load-
,__ ed carts, are alleged to have attacked 'H' and his supporters, as
76
r96r
Berar Swadeshi
Vanaspathi
v.
Municipal Committee, Shegaon
Kapur ].
March aB.
Hukum Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Raghubar
Dayal].
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
a result of which 'H' died. The defence was that on 'H's protest the appellants asked to be excused and pleaded to be allowed to cross the remaining small portion of the field to reach the
public passage, whereupon they were attacked and in self defence they attacked back.
The appellants' case was that H's right
of private defence of the property had ceased for the reasons
that the criminal trespass was over on the appellants having
indicated their intention to do so, and they were no more an unlawful assembly as their common object had ceased and thereafter all were not responsible for acts of another.
Held, that when a criminal trespass had been committed it
did not come to an end on the trespasser's expressing regret and
then pleading to be allowed to proceed further with a view to
end such a trespass. The aggrieved party had the right to prevent the trespasser from continuing to commit such further
criminal trespass, and his directions had to be abided by by the
trespasser, whatever be the degree of patience required; the
trespasser had no right to insist on proceeding further even if
not allowed to move in any direction in order to leave the
field.
Held, further, that when several persons were with lathis
and one of them was armed with hatchet and were agreed to
use these weapons in case they were thwarted in the achievement
of their object, it would be concluded that they were prepared
to use violence in prosecution of their common object and that
they knew that in the prosecution of such common object it
was likely that some one might be so injured as to die as a
result of those injuries.
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 165 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December 19, 1958, of the Allahabad
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1010 of 1956.
Jai Gopal Sethi, 0. L. Sareen and R. L. Kohli, for
the appellants.
G. 0. ~Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondent.
1961. March 28.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special
leave, is by four persons against the order of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing their
appeal and confirming their conviction for several
offences including one under s. 302 read with s. 149, ...
I.P.C., by the Sessions Judge, Sa.haranpur.
' '
•
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
603
These appellants, along with three other persons,
were alleged to have forcibly taken two carts loaded
with sugarcane from the field of Suraj Bhan through
the field of Harphool, in transporting the sugarcane
from the field, about a furlong and a half away, to the
public passage running by the side of Harphool's field,
and to have beaten Harphool and others on Harphool's protesting against the conduct of the appellants'
party at the damage caused to his wheat and gram
crop. Ram Chandar, one of the appellants, was armed
with a hatchet (kulhari) and the others were armed
with lathis. Harphool and others who came to his
help struck the appellants' party also in self-defence.
Harphool died as a result of the injuries received in
this incident.
The appellants admitted their taking the carts
through Harphool's field and alleged that at Harphool's protest they asked to be excused, promised not
to take the carts through the fields in future and
pleaded for the carts being allowed to cross the very
small portion of the field which remained to be covered before reaching the public passage. The accused
state that in spite of all this meek conduct on their
part, Harphool and his companions attacked them
and that then they also struck Harphool and others
in self-defence.
Both the learned Sessions Judge and the learned
Judges of the High Court arrived at concurrent findings of fact and held that (i) there was no passage
through or along the boundary of Harphool's field;
(ii) when the carts were near the passage and Harphool protested, the appellants' party began the attack;
and (iii) the appellants' party had no right of private
defence of person but had formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing criminal
trespass over Harphool's field and using force to the
extent of causing death, if necessary, in case they
were prevented from taking the carts through the
fields. They accordingly convicted the appellants of
the various offences .
.
~ •·
Mr. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellants, has
raised four contentions: (i) Any right of private
r96I
lluku1n Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Raghubar
Dayal ].
Huhum Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Raghubar
Dayal].
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
defence of property which Harphool had against the
offence of criminal trespass committed by the appellants' party, had ceased when the criminal trespass
was over or when the trespassers indicated their
intention to cease the criminal trespass; (ii) If one of
the rioters causes injury for which the other rioters
are to be liable under s. 149, 1.P.C., the injury must
have been caused in prosecution of the common
object; (iii) An assembly ceases to be an unlawful
assembly after the completion of its common object
and only that member of the unlawful assembly
would be liable for any criminal act committed later,
who has actually committed it; and (iv) The learned
Judges of the High Court mis-directed themselves in
ra.ising certa.in inferences from the facts found.
It is clear, from the first three contentions raised,
that they are all based on the supposition that the
criminal trespass which the appella.nts' party was
committing had come to an end when Harphool is said
to have prevented them from committing criminal
trespass and that it was Harphool who began the
attack. There is no such finding recorded by the High
Court. The two carts had not left Harphool's field
and reached the public passage. They were inside
the field when the incident took place. They were
near the boundary of Harphool's field.
They must,
in the circumstances, have been several yards inside
the field.
Criminal trespass had not therefore come
to an end and therefore Harphool had the right to
prevent the appellants' party from continuing to commit criminal trespass for whatever short distance they
had still to cover before reaching the public pathway.
It is true that the a.ppellants' party had to get out of
the field and that this they could not have done without committing further criminal trespass. But it does
not follow that this difficult position in which the
party found itself gave them any right for insisting
that they must continue the criminal trespass. They
had to abide by the directions of Harphool, whatever
be the degree of patience required in case they were
not allowed to move in any direction in order to leave
the field. If Harphool had started the attack in the
' '
•
.. ..
•
.)
I S.C.R. SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
605
circumstances alleged by the appellants, there may
have been some scope for saying that he acted
unreasonably in taking recourse to force in preference
to taking recourse to public authorities or to such
action which a less obstinate person would have taken
and had therefore lost any right of private defence of
property against the offence of criminal trespass. We
are therefore of opinion that the three propositions of
law which, as abstract propositions of law, are sound
to some extent, do not arise in the present case.
The fourth contention is really directed againt the
view of the High Court that the common object of the
appellants' party was to force their way through the
fields of Harphool and to use force to the extent of
causing death, if necessary, and that the death of
Harphool was caused in prosecution of that common
object.
We do not agree with the contention. It is
clear from the site plan, and has been so held by the
Courts below, that the appellants' party could have
taken their carts to the same public passage by going
northwards from Suraj Bhan's sugarcane field.
In so
doing, they would have had to cover a shorter distance
up to the public pathway and would have had the necessity to trespass through one field only, and that too, of
one of their own community Sandal Raj put. The other
fields lying on the way were of Suraj Bh:i,n himself.
Their choosing a longer route which made them take
their carts through the fields of several Sainis including Harphool, could not be justified. It must have
been obvious to them th:i,t in so doing they would
cause d:i,mage to the crops growing in the number of
fields through which they would have to pass. Such
damage must give rise to protests by the persons to
whom loss is caused. It could be expected that some
such persons might object to the passing of the carts
and that unless they be prepared to cover back the
distance to their own field, they would have to insist
on proceeding through the objector's field.
Such
instances must lead to a clash and to the use of
violence. The objector is not expected to be prepared
for such a conduct of the appellants' party and therefore for using force.
Huku111 Singh
v.
The State of
Uttar Pradesh
Raghuba,-
Dayal].
Hu!tum Singh
v.
Tke State of
U liar Pradesh
Raghubar
Dayal ].
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
The appellants' party consisted of a number of persons one of whom was armed with a hatchet. It is
therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the appellants' party was prepared to use force against such an
objector to achieve their object of taking the carts to
the public pathway by a short-cut. The northern
route, previously mentioned, was certainly shorter to
reach the public passage, but that route, along with
the longer portion of the public passage to be covered
before reaching the spot near which the incident took
place, was longer than the westerly route through the
field which the party had taken. \V'hen several persons
are armed with lathis and one of them is armed with
a hatchet and are agreed to use these weapons in case
they are thwarted in the achievement of their object,
it is by no means incorrect to conclude that they were
prepared to use violence in prosecution of their common object and that they knew that in the prosecution of such common object it was likely that some
one may be so injured as to die as a result of those
injuries. Harphool did receive seven injuries one of
which was an incised wound, bone deep, on the right
side of the head. Another injury consisted of a contused wound, bone deep, on the left side of the head.
Harphool died within twenty-four hours of his receiving injuries. The death was due to shock and
haemorrhage caused by the injuries of the skull bone
and brain on account of the wounds on the head. The
offence made out on account of the death of Harphool
caused by the concerted acts of the members of the
appellants' party has been rightly held to be the
offence of murder.
In view of what we have stated we do not see any
force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.