# RA VI KHULLARAND ANR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2007] 4 S.C.R. 598
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2007-03-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1704 of2007
- **Bench:** B.P. Singh, Al Tamas Kabir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ra-vi-khullarand-anr-v-union-of-india-and-ors-22777
- **Pages:** 30

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
Sections 4 and 6-Land acquisition- 'Public purpose' Planned
C development of Delhi-A Notification under Section 4 was issued for
acquisition of lands in a village for a public purpose, namely planned
development of Delhi-Another Notification under Section 4 was made for
acquisition of land in a village for public purpose namely, development of
Pa/am airport-Thereafter, the lands were given to the International Airport
D Authority of India (IAAI) for development of an international airport-Writ
petitions filed challenging the said acquisition of lands-It was contended
that the lands having been acquir_ed for the planned development of Delhi,
could not be given to the IAAI since the development of the Pa/am Airport
was not within the contemplation of.the notification under Section 4-lt was
further contended that the acquisition proceeding was bad for non-compliance
E with the provision of Chapter VII of the Act-The High Court held that the
procedure laid down in Chapter VII of the Act was not attracted since the
acquisition was not for any 'company' within the meaning of Chapter VII of
the Act-The High Court further held that the only difference was that
initially the development work was undertaken by the Delhi Development
F Authority (DDA) and after constitution of /AA!, the said development work
was entrusted to IAAI-Some writ petitions were dismissed on account of
delay and !aches-The High Court also held that there was nothing to show
that the writ petitioners had filed applications to the competent authority for
allotment of alternate sites-Correctness of-Held: The planned development
of Delhi for which purpose the land was acquired under Section 4 of the
G Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is wide enough to include the development and
expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi-Thus it cannot be said that
the land is actually being utilized for any purpose other than that for which
it was acquired-Acquisition of land could net be invalidated only on .ihe
ground that the public purpose was sought to be achieved through another
H
598
~·
,-
~
--t-
--,;.
:.-
RAVIKHULLARv. U.0.1.
599
agency-There was no good reason explaining the delay in moving the High A
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction and hence writ petitions rightly
dismissed on account of delay and [aches-Owners of land were entitled to
only compensation and, therefore, the question of allotment of alternative
sites did not arise-Hence, lands in question were validly acquired.
Section 11 A-Land acquisition-Award-Made more than 2 years from B
the date of the publication of the declaration-Validity of -Held: The
acquisition proceeding lapsed for failure to make an award within the
period prescribed by Section 11 A of the Act
Limitation Act, 1963:
c
Section 12~ertified copy of judgment-Time requisite to obtainExclusion of-Applicability of acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act-Held· In the matter of computing the period of limitation
three situations may be visualized, namely-(a) where the Limitation Act
applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with D
or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c)
where the special statute itself prescribes the period of /imitation and provides
for extension of time and or condonation of delay-There is no scope for
importing into Section l lA of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of
Section 12 of the Limitation Act-The provisions of the Limitation Act have
E
not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.
A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
issued for acquisition of lands in a village for a public purpose, namelyPlanned Develot1ment of Delhi. A declaration under Section 6 oftbe Act was
made in respect of the said land. Another Notification under Section 4 of the F
Act was made for acquisition of land in a village for public purpose namelyDevelopment of Palam Airport. A

## Text

_Characters 0–39,880 of 79,588. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39880 for what follows._

A
RA VI KHULLARAND ANR
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
MARCH 30, 2007
B
[B.P. SINGH AND AL TAMAS KABIR, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
Sections 4 and 6-Land acquisition- 'Public purpose' Planned
C development of Delhi-A Notification under Section 4 was issued for
acquisition of lands in a village for a public purpose, namely planned
development of Delhi-Another Notification under Section 4 was made for
acquisition of land in a village for public purpose namely, development of
Pa/am airport-Thereafter, the lands were given to the International Airport
D Authority of India (IAAI) for development of an international airport-Writ
petitions filed challenging the said acquisition of lands-It was contended
that the lands having been acquir_ed for the planned development of Delhi,
could not be given to the IAAI since the development of the Pa/am Airport
was not within the contemplation of.the notification under Section 4-lt was
further contended that the acquisition proceeding was bad for non-compliance
E with the provision of Chapter VII of the Act-The High Court held that the
procedure laid down in Chapter VII of the Act was not attracted since the
acquisition was not for any 'company' within the meaning of Chapter VII of
the Act-The High Court further held that the only difference was that
initially the development work was undertaken by the Delhi Development
F Authority (DDA) and after constitution of /AA!, the said development work
was entrusted to IAAI-Some writ petitions were dismissed on account of
delay and !aches-The High Court also held that there was nothing to show
that the writ petitioners had filed applications to the competent authority for
allotment of alternate sites-Correctness of-Held: The planned development
of Delhi for which purpose the land was acquired under Section 4 of the
G Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is wide enough to include the development and
expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi-Thus it cannot be said that
the land is actually being utilized for any purpose other than that for which
it was acquired-Acquisition of land could net be invalidated only on .ihe
ground that the public purpose was sought to be achieved through another
H
598
~·
,-
~
--t-
--,;.
:.-
RAVIKHULLARv. U.0.1.
599
agency-There was no good reason explaining the delay in moving the High A
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction and hence writ petitions rightly
dismissed on account of delay and [aches-Owners of land were entitled to
only compensation and, therefore, the question of allotment of alternative
sites did not arise-Hence, lands in question were validly acquired.
Section 11 A-Land acquisition-Award-Made more than 2 years from B
the date of the publication of the declaration-Validity of -Held: The
acquisition proceeding lapsed for failure to make an award within the
period prescribed by Section 11 A of the Act
Limitation Act, 1963:
c
Section 12~ertified copy of judgment-Time requisite to obtainExclusion of-Applicability of acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act-Held· In the matter of computing the period of limitation
three situations may be visualized, namely-(a) where the Limitation Act
applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with D
or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c)
where the special statute itself prescribes the period of /imitation and provides
for extension of time and or condonation of delay-There is no scope for
importing into Section l lA of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of
Section 12 of the Limitation Act-The provisions of the Limitation Act have
E
not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.
A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
issued for acquisition of lands in a village for a public purpose, namelyPlanned Develot1ment of Delhi. A declaration under Section 6 oftbe Act was
made in respect of the said land. Another Notification under Section 4 of the F
Act was made for acquisition of land in a village for public purpose namelyDevelopment of Palam Airport. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was
made in respect of the said land. Thereafter, the lands were given to the
International Airport Authority of India (IAAI) for development of an
international airport.
The appellants filed several writ petitions before the High Court. It was G
contended that the lands having been acquired for the planned development of
Delhi, could not be given to the IAAI since the development of the Palam
Airport was not within the contemplation of the notification under Section 4
of the Act. It was further contended that the acquisition proceeding was bad
for non-compliance with the provision of Chapter VII of the Act
H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2007) 4 S.C.R.
A
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions and held that the planned
development of Delhi was wide enough to include the development and
expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi. The High Court also held
that the procedure laid down in Chapter VII of the Act was not attracted since
the acquisition was not for any 'company' within the meaning of Chapter VII
B of the Act. The High Court further held that the only difference was that
initially the development work was undertaken by the Delhi Development
Authority (DDA) a·nd after constitution of IAAI, the said development work
was entrusted to IAAI. Certain writ petitions were filed after a lapse of21
years from the date of preliminary notification. The High Court dismissed
these writ petitions on the ground of delay and !aches. Some writ petitions
C were filed to claim allotment of alternative sites in lieu of the land acquired
but the High Court dismissed these writ peti~ions on the ground that there
was nothing to show that the writ petitioners had filed applications to the
competent authority for allotment of alternate sites. Hence the appeals.
On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the award made by the
D. 'Collector in the instant case was barred by limitation under Section 11-A of
the Act inasmuch as it was not made within a period of2 years from the date
of the publication of the declaration after excluding the period during which
an order of stay granted by the High Court operated.
E
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The planned development of Delhi for which purpose the land
was acquired under Section 4 ilf the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is wide enough
to include the development and expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi.
Thus it cannot be said that the land is actually being utilized for any purpose
F other than that for which it was acquired. The only difference is that whereas
initially the development work would have been undertaken by the Delhi
Development Authority or any other agency employed but it, after the
constitution of the International Airport Authority oflndia (IAAI), the said
development work had to be undertaken by the newly constituted authority.
Thus there has been no change of purpose of the acquisition. All that has
G happened is that the development work is undertaken by another agency since
constituted, which is entrusted with the special task of _maintenan~e of
airports. Since the said authority was constituted several years after the .. ·
issuance of the Notification tinder Section 4, the acquisition cannot be .
invalidated only on the ground that the public purpose is sought to be achieved
H through another agency. This was necessitated by the change of
-1--·
'
-
.......
lJ
_,;._
,>
....
~
...,.
__. _,
RA VI KHULLAR v. U.0.1.
601
circumstances in view of the creation of the authority i.e. IAAI. Moreover, A
· · since there is no change of public purpose for which the acquired land is
being utilized, the acquisition cannot be invalidated on that ground. The
purpose for which the lands are being utilized by a governmental agency is
also a public purpose and would come within the ambit of the public purpose
decla~ed in Section 4 Notification. Therefore, the acquisition cannot be B
challenged on the ground that the acquired lands are not being utilized for
the declared public purpose. Having regard to the facts of the case it cannot
be contended nor has it been contended that the Notification under Section 4
of the Act was issued ma/a fide. [Para 23] [612-F-H; 613-A-C]
Gutam Mustafa v. The State of Maharashtra, [1976] 1 SCC 800, Mangat c
Oram v. State of Orissa, [1977] 2 SCC 46, Union of India v. Jaswant Rai
Kochhar, [1996] 3 SCC 491 and State of Maharashtra v. Mahadeo Deoman
Rai @Kalal, [1991] 3 SCC 579, relied on.
Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1999] 2 SCC 384 and Northern
India Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh, [2003] SCC 334, referred to.
D
2.1. The High Court has rightly noticed that the acquisition was
challenged almost 21 years after the issuance of the Notification under Section
4 of the Act Indeed the writ petition was initiated after the award was declared.
[Para 26] [613-F-G[
E.
Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR (1974) SC 2077, Tilockchand
Motichan v. H. B. Munshi, AIR (1970) SC 898, Indrapuri Griha Nirman
Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR (1974) SC 2085, Pt.
Girharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar, [1980] 2 SCC 83 and H. D. Vora v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR [1984] SC 866, referred to.
F
2.2. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay
and laches. In the facts and circumstances of the case no exception can be
taken to the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition. There was
no good reason explaining the delay in moving the High Court in exercise of
its writ jurisdiction. [Para 26] [613-H; 614-A]
G
3.1. It will be seen that in the writ petition the quesfion of rehabilitating
an industrial unit did not come up for consideration. So far as the allotment
of residential site is concerned, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents
that if the appellant was eligible for allotment in terms of the scheme
formulated for the purpose, it could as well have asked for allotment of H
r
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007) 4 S.C.R.
A alternative site, but the appellant was not interested in allotment of alternative
.. .....
_,..
plot for residence. Its demand was that a site should be given to it for
establishing an industry, which was not contemplated under the scheme. There
is substance in the contention of the respondents that so far as the aforesaid
decision goes it only related to allotment of alternative sites for residence of
B
the displaced persons and not for relocation of an industry. The respondents
on the other hand relied on at least 3 documents and contended that at no
time any decision was taken to allot alternative sites with a view of relocating
the displaced industrial units. [Para 39) [618-C-E]
/..,,
)...
Ramanand v. Union of India, AIR [1994) Del 29 and New Reviera
c Cooperative Housing Society v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1966) 1
sec 731, referred to.
3.2. After considering all aspects of the matter, the IAAI was burdened
with the cost of rehabilitation of the displaced persons from the village abadi,
meaning thereby to provide them land for residence over which the villagers
D could construct houses at their own cost. So far as industrial structures are
concerned, it was clearly decided that the owners of industrial structures
~
would not be provided with any assistance beyond what they may be entitled to
......
as compensation under the Act. [Para 41) [619-E]
3.3. The documents relied upon by the respondents do establish that
E though at different stages the question of rehabilitation of the affected persons
as a result of the acquisition was considered, no firm decision was ever taken
to rehabilitate the industries affected thereby. The decision was taken only to
provide alternative sites for residence of the oustees from a certain village.
The proposal to allot lands for setting up the displaced industrial units was
F always turned down and it was decided that owners of such industries would
.::
only be entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. Having
ltregard to the material on record this Court is satisfied that no scheme was
ever framed for rehabilitation of industrial units. The scheme was framed
only for the affected villagers of a certain village and that too for residential
purpose. [Para 44] [620-F-G]
G
4.1. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations
may be visualized, namely---(a) where the Limitation Act applied by its own
force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without
:._- -
modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special
''
H
statue itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of
time and or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed
..
RAVIKHULLARv. U.O.I.
603
by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in A
making an award does net act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation
Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the
provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to proceedings
under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under
Section llA of the Act. However, Section llA of the Act does provide a period
oflimitation within which the Collector shall make his award. The explanation B
thereto also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order
of a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into
Section 1 lA of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the
Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also C
confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a
certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required
to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc. challenging the
impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section llA of the
Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the
judgment and order. The court has, therefore, no option but to compute the D
period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of
Section llA of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under
the explanation to Section llA of the Act (Para 54] [624-B-F]
4.2. Section 1 lA of the Act was inserted by Act 68 of 1984 with effect
from 24.09.1984. Similarly, Section 28A was also inserted by the Amendment E
Act of 1984 with effect from the same date. In Section 28A the Act provides
a period of limitation within which an application should be made to the
Collector for redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of
the award of the Court [Para 55] [624-G-H]
4.3. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered F
necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in Section 12
of the Limitation Act It bas done so expressly in Section 28A of the Act while
it has consciously not incorporated this rule in Section HA even while
providing for exclusion of time under the explanation. The intendment of the
legislature is, therefore, unambiguous and does not permit the Court to read G
words into Section l lA of the Act so as to enable U to read Section 12 of the
Limitation Act into Section llA of the Land Acquisition Act.
(Para 56) (625-B-C]
N. Narasimbhaiah v. State of Karnataka, [1996] 3 SCC 88, General
Manager, Department of Communications v. Jacob, (2003) 9 SCC 662 and H
604
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007] 4 S.C.R.
A Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR [1969] SC 575, referred to.
4.4. The acquisition proceeding against the land of th~ appellant lapsed
for failure to make an award within the period prescribed by Section llA of
the Act. [Para 61] (627-C]
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1704 of2007.
c
D
.
.
.
From the Final Judgment and Order datd 13 .02.2003 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CWP No. 2672 of 1996.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 1705-1707 of2007.
J.L. Gupta, T.R. Andhyarujina, Rakesh Dwivedi, U.U. Lalit, Hidesh Gupta,
Vinod Shukla, S. Janani, Baljit Choudhary, Lalit Mohini Bhat, Anitha Shenoy
and Naveen R. Nath for the Appellants.
. Gopal Subramanium and Vikas Singh, ASGs., K.K. Venugopal and T.S.
Doabia;· Rachana Joshi Issar, Indra Sawhney, Vikas Sharma, Anil Katiyar,
Geeta Luthra, Sanjeev Sahai, Pinky Anand, D.H. Goburdhan, V.B. Saharya (for
Mis. Saharya & Co.), Atul Sharma, Munish Sharma, Ravi Verma, Milanka
Chaudhury, Haripriya, Vibuthi Kabra, M.A. Chinnasamy, Pareena Sarup, 0.S.
E Mehra and Vivek K. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered ;-y
B.P. SINGH, J. 1. Special leave granted.
F
2. In the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6093 0!2003; 6095 of2003
and 6384 of 2003 the appellants have impugned the common judgment and
order·ofthe High Court of Delhi dated February 13, 2003 disposing of Civil
Writ Petition Nos. 2672 ofl996; 1851of1986 and 2003of1986.
3. In the appeal arising out SLP © No. 8574 of 2003, Mis. Punjab
G Potteries has assailed the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi in
C.W.P. No.2168 of2003 dated 26th March, 2003.
H
4. The High Court dismissed all the writ petitions preferred by the
appellants herein.
5. A few broad facts may be noticed at the threshold to appreciate the
.....
~
RAVIKHULLARv. U.0.1. [B.?. SINGH,J.]
605
contentions urged on behalf of the parties in these appeals.
A
6. A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') was issued by the Lieutenant Governor of iJelhi on
January 23, 1965 for acquisition oflands measuring 6241bighas12 biswas in
village Mahipalpur which was required for a public purpose, namely - Planned
B
Development of Delhi. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to
4759 bighas 1 biswa was made on December 12, 1966 and another declaration .
..
relating to 1459 bighas 18 biswas ·was made on December 26, 1968. Another
-~
Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on December 3, 1971
for acquisition of land in Village Nangal Dewat for a public purpose, namely
- Development of Palam Airport. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was c
made with respect to the said lands on July 16, 1972.
7. The case of the appellants is that the matter remained pending for a
considerable period and it appears from various documents which have been
brought on record that the lands acquired were really for the benefit of the
'
International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). Reliance is placed on a D
.......
Resolution dated September 10, 1981 of the Delhi Development Authority
,J..
regarding change of land user from "Green Belt and Agriculture Cultivable
Land" to "Circulation Airport". The Resolution recites that the Delhi
Development Authority had approved the change of land user so that the
land could be utilized for the purpose of development of the Palam Airport. E
This was subject to the condition that the IAAI prepared a detailed plan
which should include the proposal for rehabilitation/resettlement of the villagers
to be affected by the proposed expansion of the Airport, and the plan be
discussed with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Delhi Electric
....
Supply Undertaking. It also appears from the record that the notice issued
under Section 9(1) of the Act on June 22, 1983 was challenged in several writ F
_,
petitions filed before the High Court in which an interim order was passed
directing maintenance of status quo with regard to possession of the lands
but permitted the acquisition proceeding to continue. Reliance has been
placed on the correspondence exchanged between the various statutory
authorities to indicate that it was really for the purpose of IAAI that the lands
G
were being utilised. The letter of the Land Acquisition Officer dated July 1,
1986 indicates that IAAI had supplied details ofkhasra numbers to be acquired
. .....
Ci
for the expansion of the Delhi Airport which had been discussed. A statement
enclosed with the aforesaid communication showed that the lands to be
acquired were in villages Mahipalpur, Nangal Dewat and Nangal Dewat Village
abadi measuring 69 bighas 11 biswas, which included some of the khasra H
·-)--.
\
606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007) 4 S.C.R.
A numbers belonging to some of the appellants herein .. A communication from
~
the Secretary, Department of Civil Aviation, addressed to the Lieutenant
L..-
Governor of Delhi dated September 15, 1986 emphasised the need to acquire
immediately the industrial structures in the Mahipalpur and Nangal Dewat
area in the overa.ll interest of security and development of Delhi Airport. The
B
IAAI was said to be willing to accept the suggestion for provision of land
for land, provided alternative land was acquired by the Delhi Administration/
Delhi Development Authority and no further liability was imposed on IAAI
for payment of additional compensation for acquired industrial. structures.
(
>..
c
8. On September 19, 1996 an Award under Section 11 of the Act was
declared by the Land Acquisition Collector.
9. On December 23, 1986 a Notification was issued under Section 4 of
the Act for acquisition of land for a public purpose, namely for rehabilitation
of the persons displaced or affected due to the expansion/development of the
D Palam Airport. The lands mentioned therein are in village Malikpur Kohi
Rangpuri.
,...
,,.._
10. Since the challenge to the acquisition failed and the appellants were
not provided alternative sites under the rehabilitation package, they·approached
the High Court for relief which, as noticed earlier, has been :refused .by the
E High Court. It. will, however, be necessary to deal with each writ petition
separately since the facts of each case are different as also the pleas raised
therein.
APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ©NO. 6093 OF'2003
-
F
11. The appellants before us are the son and daughter of Late Balraj
Khullar. The lands in question in village Mahipalpur measuring23.bighas.and
~
18 biswas (approximately 5 acres) devolved upon the appellants· after the
death of their father. Late Balraj Khullar had constructed a factory over the
lands in question in the year 1955 which went into production later after
G obtaining registration on July 27, 1960. He carried on ·the business of
manufacture of ceramic goods in the name and style of Mis. Pelican Ceramic
Industries. On January 23, 1965 the aforesaid lands of the appellants were
notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act for the public purpose of
:.~
~-
planned development of Delhi. According to the appellants, when the factory
was established and became functional, there was no Master Plan of Delhi,
H which came into existence only in the year 1962 in which the lands were
RAVIKHULLAR v. U.0.1. [B.P. SINGH,J.]
607
shown as 'green area'. Late Balraj Khullar objected to the acquisition but A
without considering his objections, a declaration under Section 6 was made
en December 26, 1968. A notice under Section 9(1) of the Act was issued on
June 23, 1983. Upon receipt of the notice late Balraj Khullar challenged the
acquisition by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, being Civil
Writ Petition No. 1550 of 1983 primarily on the ground of inordinate delay in
completing the acquisition proceeding and other illegalities in Section 4 B
Notification. Notice was issued in the said writ petition on July 26, 1983 and
an interim order was passed for maintenance of status quo with regard to
possession. The interim order dated July 26, 1983 was modified on August
30, 1983 directing maintenance of status quo with regard to possession but
the acquisition proceedings were allowed to continue. During the pendency C
of the writ petition, the award was announced on September 19, 1986 which
was followed by notices under Sections 12(2) and 13(1) of the Act. The total
area acquired measured 23 bighas and 18 biswas. Ultimately the writ petition
filed by late Balraj Khullar was dismissed by the High Court by its order dated
December 14, 2005. On coming to know about the dismissal of the said writ
petition, the petitioners (appellants herein) filed a special leave petition before D
this Court being SLP ©No. 7821 of 1996. The same was, however, withdrawn
on a statement being made on behalf of the petitioners that they would file
a review petition before the High Court. It appears from the special leave
petition filed by the petitioners that a contention was raised before this Court
that the lands having been acquired for the planned development of Delhi, E
could not be given to the IAAI since the development of the Palam Airport
was not within the contemplation of the notification under Section 4 of the
Act. Accordingly the petitioners filed the review petition being Review Petition
No.42 of 1996 before the High Court in which several fresh grounds were also
urged but the said review petition was dismissed by the High Court by its
order of May 24, 1996 observing that the new points sought to be raised in F
the review petition had not been pleaded in the original writ petition. The
High Court also rejected the contention of the petitioners that on discovery
of new facts a review petition was maintainable. No appeal was preferred
against the order dismissing the review petition and hence the proceeding
initiated by filing of C.W.P. No. 1550 of 1983 challenging the acquisition G
proceeding got a quietus by dismissal of the review petition by the High
Court. Apparently, therefore, the petitioners cannot be pennitted to challenge
the same acquisition proceeding.
12. However, the petitioners filed another writ petition, being Writ Petition
No. 2672 of 1986 again questioning the acquisition proceeding. The said writ H
r
608
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007] 4 S.C.R.
A petition was dismissed by order dated July 4, 1996. It appears from the record <
'
that the point sought to be urged in the aforesaid writ petition was that the
acquisition proceeding was bad for non compliance with the provision of
Chapter VII of the Act. The submission proceeded on the basis that the
acquisition was for the purposes of a Company within the meaning of that
B
tenn in the Act, namely-the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI).
The same submission has been urged before us as well.
13. We are of the view that the High Court was justified in rejecting this
contention. As noticed by it, the Notification under Section 4 was issued on
_,._
January 23, 1965. The public purpose for which the acquisition was made was
c stated to be "planned development of Delhi". Admittedly at the relevant time
when Section 4 Notification was published, die management of the airport
vested with the Department of Civil Aviation. It cannot be denied that the
words used in the Notification, namely "the planned development of Delhi"
are wide enough to include the expansion and development of the airport.
That is also a "public purpose." Since the IAAI came into existence much
D later only on December 8, 1971 and was vested with the power to manage the
airports, there was no question of the acquisition being made for the purpose
.Aof the IAAI since that body did not exist in the year 1965. The acquisition
.),._
was for the planned development of Delhi and, as observed earlier, the
expansion and modification of the airport is a "public purpose". It so happened
E that after the constitution of the IAAI, the power of management of airports,
was vested in it and, therefore, the development work which otherwise would
have been undertaken by the concerned competent authority in the year 1965,
was to be executed by the IAAI. The submission that the provisions of
Chapter-VII of the Act were not complied with must, therefore, be rejected
because the acquisition purported to be for the planned development of Delhi
lo-'-
F and it is no one's case that the Notification had been issued mala fide. The
procedure laid down in Chapter-VII of the Act was not attracted since the
~
acquisition was not for any "Company" within the meaning of Chapter-VII of
the Act.
G
14. The High Court has also rejected the submission on the groupd that
it was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. It is not n.ecessary
for us to express any opinion on this issue, in view of our earlier fi~ding, but
"'
the appellants have themselves drawn the attention of this Court to the fact
that the land was being acquired for the purpose of the IAAI as was evident
~
f-'~
from the Resolution of the Delhi Development Authority dated September I 0,
H 1981. The appellants, therefore, admit that they had knowledge of the fact that
:.,
~
.....
~
"
..,
RA VI KHULLAR v. U.0.1. [B. P. SINGH, J.]
609
the land was to be utilized by the IAAI for its own purposes, which according A
to the appellants, was not a part of the planned development of Delhi. Such
being the factual position, the father of the appellants who filed Writ Petition
No.1550 of 1983 ought to have challenged the acquisition on the ground of
non compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act since all the
relevant facts were within his knowledge. He not having done so, we do not B
find that the High Court was in error in holding that the writ petition wa'>
barred also by the principle of constructive res judicata.
15. The question which survives consideration is whether in view of the
public purpose declared in the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, the
lands can be utilized for any other public purpose. While considering this c
question it would be useful to remember that the Notification under Section
4 of the Act was issued in January, 1965 and the declaration made in the
following year. The IAAI came into existence in December, 1971, six years
later, whereafter the task of developing and extending the Palam Airport was
entrusted to the said authority. When the said authority was constituted, the D
acquisition proceeding had already been initiated .
16. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that having regard to the authorities on the subject
the question is no longer res integra. It is not as if lands acquired for a
particular public purpose cannot be utilized for another public purpose. He E
contended that as long as the acquisition is not held to be mala fide, the
acquisition cannot be invalidated merely because the lands which at one time
were proposed to be utilized for a particular public purpose, were later either
in whole or in part, utilized for some other purpose, though a public purpose.
He, therefore, submitted that some change of user of the land, as long as it
has a public purpose, would not invalidate the acquisition proceeding which F
is otherwise valid and legal.
17. In Gu/am Mustafa and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.,
[1976] l SCC 800, this Court noticing the submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner that the excess land out of the lands which were acquired for
G
a country fair was utilized for carving out plots for the housing colony, held
that it did not invalidate the acquisition. This Court observed:-
" ...... Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity,
once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the
Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original H
r
\
610
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007) 4 S.C.R.
A
owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There
is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands
voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public
purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration."
18. The same principle has been reiterated in Mangal Oram and Ors.
B v. State of Orissa. [1977] 2 SCC 46.
19. In Union of India and Ors. v. Jaswant Rai Kochharand Ors., [1996]
3 sec 491, lands which had been acquired for public purpose of housing
),._
scheme were sought to be utilized for a commercial purpose, namely for
c
locating a district center. It was contended before this Court that since the
acquisition was for a housing scheme, the land cannot be used for commercial
purposes. The submission was rejected in the following words:-
" ..... We find no force in the contention. It is conceded by the learned
Counsel that the construction of the D.istrict Centre for commercial
D
purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt it was sought to be
contended in the High Court that in a housing scheme, providing
facilities for commercial purpose is also one of the composite purpose
,...,
A
and that, therefore, acquisition was valid in law. However, the
contention was rejected by the High Court. We need not go to that
part. Suffice it to state that it is a well-settled law that land sought
E
to be acquired for public purpose may be used for another public
purpose. Therefore, when the notification has mentioned that the land
is sought to be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be
used for District Centre, the public purpose does not cease to be
public purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the notification
F
under Section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be a
colourable one. The notification under Section 4(1) could not have
been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be used for
-Ir
District Centre, namely, for commercial purpose. It is obvious that the
lands acquired for a public purpose should serve only the public
purpose of providing facilities of commercial purpose, namely, District
G
Centre as conceded by the learned Counsel in fairness to be a public
purpose. The notification under Section 4(1) cannot be quashed on
the ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in
quashing the notification on the ground of change of user."
"' ..
20. Though not directly in point, the observations of this Court in State
H of Maharashtra v. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and Ors., [1990] 3 SCC
1
RA VI KHULLAR v. U.0.1. [B. P. SINGH, J.]
611
579 are significant to detennine the approach of courts in such matters. In that A
case a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued
for the purpose of establishing a 'tonga' stand. The respondent applied for
permission to raise a construction which was denied on the ground that the
land was reserved for road widening under a Town Planning Scheme which
was being implemented. Since the respondent was prevented from continuing
with the construction work undertaken by him, he initially field a writ petition B
before the High Court which was withdrawn and subsequently filed a suit
claiming damages etc. The Municipal Council took a decision to accord
permission to the respondent as asked for, and the suit was withdrawn. When
the State Government came to know about it, it asked the Municipal Council
to explain the circumstances under which such permission had been granted. C
A High Powered Committee was appointed to examine the entire matter. The
resolution of the Municipal Council granting pennission to the respondent
was rescinded. Another application filed by the respondent was kept in
abeyance which compelled the respondent to file another writ petition which
was allowed by the High Court. The plea of the Municipal Council was that D
it had passed a fresh resolution inter alia deciding to re-plan the scheme with
respect to the area in question in the light of the recommendations made by
the Committee. Consequently the matter was re-opened and the objections
from the affected persons were invited. Even the respondent filed his objections.
This fact was not brought to the notice of the High Court which allowed the
writ petition. This Court, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court E
and observed :-
"Besides, the question as to whether a particular Scheme framed in
exercise of statutory provisions is in the public interest or not has to
be determined according to the need of the time and a final decision
for all times to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve F
the public purpose at a given point of time but due to change of
circumstances it may become essential to modify or substitute it by
another scheme. The requirements of the community do not remain
static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social
life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public G
authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing
needs of the public. At the best for the respondent, it can be assumed
that in 1967 when the resolution in his favour was passed, the
acquisition of the land was not so urgently essential so as to call for
his dispossession. But for that reason it cannot be held that the plots
became immune from being utilised for any other public purpose for H
-~
\.
612
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2007) 4 S.C.R.
(A
--..i
ever. The State or a body like the Municipal Council entrusted with
a public duty to look after the requirements of the community has to
assess the situation from time to time and take necessary decision
periodically. We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated 13-2-1967
was not binding on the Municipal Council so as to disable it to take
B
a different decision later."
21. In Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., [1999] 2 SCC
384 this court upheld an acquisition even when the public purpose to which
,...
:...
the land was put was contrary to the permitted user under the Master Plan.
This Court held that the acquisition was valid but it was for the beneficiary
c of the acquisition to move the competent authority and obtain the sanction
of the said authority for change of user. That it could do only after it got
possession of the land in question.
22. The learned Additional Solicitor General also relied upon the decision
of this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors.,
D [2003] 1 SCC 335 wherein this Court has held that the High Court was not
right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that
....
the land acquired was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired.
"
It was held that after passing of the Award and possession taken under
Section 16 of the Act the acquired land vests with the Government free from
. ..__
'
E
all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it
is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for restoration of
possession.
23. Referring to the facts of the instant case, it cannot be disputed that
the planned development of Delhi for which purpose the land was acquired
,_
F under Section 4 Of the Act is wide enough to include the development and
expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi. Thus it cannot be said that
_,.
the land is actually being utilized for any purpose other than that for which
it was acquired. The only difference is that whereas initially the development
work would have been undertaken by the D.D.A. or any other agency employed
by it, after the constitution of the IAAI, the said development work had to
G be undertaken by the newly constituted authority. Thus there has been no
change of purpose of the acquisition. All that has happened is that the
development work is undertaken by another agency since constituted, which
..
is entrusted with the special task of maintenance of airports. Since the said
...
authority was constituted several years after the issuance of the Notification
H
under Section 4, the acquisition cannot be invalidated only on the ground
----
RAVIKHULLARv. U.O.I. [B. P. SINGH,J.]
613
that the public purpose is sought to be achieved through another agency, A .
This, as we have noticed earlier, was necessitated by change of circumstances
in view of the creation of the authority i.e. IAAI.