# Ra1nchand Manji1nal v. Gove.rdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand, L.R

- **Citation:** [1969] 2 S.C.R. 699
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1968-11-15
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Petitions Nos. 4011 and 4012 of 1968
- **Bench:** J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, G. K. Mitter, K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ra1nchand-manji1nal-v-gove-rdhandas-vishindas-ratanchand-l-r-4584
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 133-lntflrim injunction granted tn suit
whether a 'final order' for purpose of Article.
M/s Tarapore & Co. who were plaintiffs in a suit applied for an
interim injunction restraining the first defendant in the suit from taking
any steps in pursuance of a letter of credit opened in favour of the
second defendant.
A single judge of the High Court granted an interim
injunction restraining encashment of the letters of credit pending disposal
of the suit.
In appeal5 under the Letters Patent preferred by the second
defendent, the High Court of Madras set aside that order.
Against the
orders passed in the two appeals, the
plaintiffs
applied for
certificate
under Arts. 133(1) (a) and 133(1) (b) of the Constitution. The High
Court observed that an order
granting interim
injunction "is a final
order, " far as this Court is concerned, determining the rights of parties
within this /is or proceeding, which is independent though ancillary to
the suit", and they were competent to grant certificate. In this Court the
defendants applied for
revocati\Jn of the certificate.
HELD : The certificate must be revoked.
An order passed by the High Court in appeal which does not finally
dispose of a suit or proceeding and leaves the rights and
obligations ot
the parties for determination in the suit or pr.::iceeding from which the
appeal has arisen, is not final within the meaning of Art. 133(1)(a)
and (b). The order refusing to grant an interim injunction did not
determine the rights and obligations of
the parties in relation to
the
matter in dispute in the suit. It could not be held that because
the
plaintiffs suit as a result of the order of the High Court may become
infructuous as framed and the plaintiff may have to amend his plaint
to obtain effective relief an orde.r which is essentially an interlocutory
order may be deemed final for the purpose ot Art. 133(1) of the Constitution. [704 HJ
Mohan/al Magan/al Thakkar's ca>e makes no departure from the
earlier judgments of the judicial Committee, the Federal Court and this
Court.
Ra1nchand Manji1nal v. Gove.rdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand, L.R.
47 I.A. 124; Salaman v. Warner, [1891] I Q.B. 734; Bazson v. Altri11cham
Ur/;an District Council, [1903] 1 K.B. 547; Isaacs v.
Selbstein, [19'161
2 K.B. 139, Abdul Rahman v. D. K, Cassim & Sons, L.R. 60 I.A. 76;
S. Kuppusami Rao v. The King, [1947] F.C.R. 180; Mohammad Amin
Brothers Ltd, and Others v. Dominion of Indla and Others, [1949-50]
F.C.R. 842; Sardar Syedna Toher
Saifuddin
Saheb v. The State
of
Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1007; Srinivasa Prasad Singh v. Kesho
Prasad
Singh 13 C.L.J. 681 and Druva Coal Company v .. Benaras Bank, 21 Cal.
L.J. 281, referred to.
Mohan/a/ Magan/a/ Thakkar v. State of Gujarat,
A.LR.
1968 s:c.
733, explained.
•
..
700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S.C.R

## Text

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TARAPORE & CO.
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M/S. V /0 TRACTORS EXPORT, MOSCOW & ANR.
November 15, 1968
[J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI, G. K. MITTER, K. S. HEGDE AND
.
A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 133-lntflrim injunction granted tn suit
whether a 'final order' for purpose of Article.
M/s Tarapore & Co. who were plaintiffs in a suit applied for an
interim injunction restraining the first defendant in the suit from taking
any steps in pursuance of a letter of credit opened in favour of the
second defendant.
A single judge of the High Court granted an interim
injunction restraining encashment of the letters of credit pending disposal
of the suit.
In appeal5 under the Letters Patent preferred by the second
defendent, the High Court of Madras set aside that order.
Against the
orders passed in the two appeals, the
plaintiffs
applied for
certificate
under Arts. 133(1) (a) and 133(1) (b) of the Constitution. The High
Court observed that an order
granting interim
injunction "is a final
order, " far as this Court is concerned, determining the rights of parties
within this /is or proceeding, which is independent though ancillary to
the suit", and they were competent to grant certificate. In this Court the
defendants applied for
revocati\Jn of the certificate.
HELD : The certificate must be revoked.
An order passed by the High Court in appeal which does not finally
dispose of a suit or proceeding and leaves the rights and
obligations ot
the parties for determination in the suit or pr.::iceeding from which the
appeal has arisen, is not final within the meaning of Art. 133(1)(a)
and (b). The order refusing to grant an interim injunction did not
determine the rights and obligations of
the parties in relation to
the
matter in dispute in the suit. It could not be held that because
the
plaintiffs suit as a result of the order of the High Court may become
infructuous as framed and the plaintiff may have to amend his plaint
to obtain effective relief an orde.r which is essentially an interlocutory
order may be deemed final for the purpose ot Art. 133(1) of the Constitution. [704 HJ
Mohan/al Magan/al Thakkar's ca>e makes no departure from the
earlier judgments of the judicial Committee, the Federal Court and this
Court.
Ra1nchand Manji1nal v. Gove.rdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand, L.R.
47 I.A. 124; Salaman v. Warner, [1891] I Q.B. 734; Bazson v. Altri11cham
Ur/;an District Council, [1903] 1 K.B. 547; Isaacs v.
Selbstein, [19'161
2 K.B. 139, Abdul Rahman v. D. K, Cassim & Sons, L.R. 60 I.A. 76;
S. Kuppusami Rao v. The King, [1947] F.C.R. 180; Mohammad Amin
Brothers Ltd, and Others v. Dominion of Indla and Others, [1949-50]
F.C.R. 842; Sardar Syedna Toher
Saifuddin
Saheb v. The State
of
Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1007; Srinivasa Prasad Singh v. Kesho
Prasad
Singh 13 C.L.J. 681 and Druva Coal Company v .. Benaras Bank, 21 Cal.
L.J. 281, referred to.
Mohan/a/ Magan/a/ Thakkar v. State of Gujarat,
A.LR.
1968 s:c.
733, explained.
•
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700
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S.C.R
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Misc. Petitions Nos.
4011 and 4012 of 1968.
Applications by respondent no. 1 for revocaticn of the certificate granted by the Madras High Court on 15th October, 1968
under Art. 133(1) (a) & (b) of the Constitution of India.
AND
Civil Appeals Nos. 2183 and 2184 of 1968.
Appeals from the judgment at11d order dated October 9, 1968
of the Madras High Court in 0.S.A. No. 25 and 27 of 1968.
M. C. Setalvad. V. P. Raman, D. N. Mishra, and J. B. Dada·
chanji, for the appellant.
S. Mohan Kumaramangalam. M. K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala
Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for respondent No. 1.
Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. M/ s. Tara pore & Company-hereinafter called the
plaintiffs-applied in Suit No. 118 of 1967 for an interim injunction restrainmg the Bank of India Ltd.-the first de.fendant in the
suit-from taking any steps in pursuance of a letter of credit
opened in favour of M/s. V /0 Tractors Export, Moscow, the
second defendant.
Ramamurthi, J., by order dated April 12,
1968, granted an interim injunction restraining encashment of the
letters of credit pending dis;>osal of the suit. ln appeals under the
Letters Patent preferred by the second defendant, the High Court
of Madras set aside that order. Against the orders passed in the
two appeals, the plaintiffs applied for certificate under Arts.
133(l)(a) and 133(1)(b) of the Constitution. The High Court
observed that an order granting interim injunction "is a fiiral
order, as far as this Court is concerned, determining the rights
of parties within this lis or proceeding, which is independent though
ancillary to the suit'', and they were competent to grant the certificate.
By our order dated October 28, 1968, we ordered that the
certificate granted by the High Court do stand revoked. We set
out the reasons in support of that order. Article 13 3 (1) provides,
insofar as it is material :
" ( 1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from
any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding
of a High Court in the territory of India if the High
. Court certifies-
·
. (a) that the amount or vai!ue of the subject matter
of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in
dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in
that behalf by Parliament by law; or
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TARAPORE & CO. V. TRACTORS EXPORT (Shah, J.)
7 0 l
(b) that the judgment, decree or final
order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question
respecting property of the like amount or value; or
" ( c) ........ where the judgment, decree or final
order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court
immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub-clause ( c), if the High Court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question
of law."
The suit filed by the plaintiffs is a civil proceeding, and the suit
involves some claim or question respecting property of not less
than twenty thousand rupees. That is a matter not in dispute.
The expression "judgment" in Art. 133 ( 1) in the context in
which it occurs means a final adjudication by the Court of the
rights of the parties, ·and that an interlocutory judgment even if it
decides an issue or issues without finally determining the rights
and liabilities of the parties is not a judgment, however cardinal
the issue may be. In the present case not even an issue has been
decided, and it is not contended that the order of the High Court
amounts to a judgment or a decree. The expression "final order"
it has -been held by a long course of authorities, occurring in s. 205
of the Government of India Act, 1935, s. 109 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and Art. 133 ( 1) of the Constitution means a final
decision on the rights of the parties in dispute in a suit or proceeding; if the rights of the parties in dispute in the suit or proceeding
remain to be tried, after the order, the order is not final.
In Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas RatanChand ('), it was held by the Judicial Committee that an order
of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind vacating an order of stay
granted under s. 19 o;f the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, and refusing to stay a proceeding was not a final order within the meaning of s. l 09 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Viscount Cave
referred to Salaman v. Warner('); Bozson v. Altrincham Urban
District Council ( 3) and Issacs v. Salbstein ( 4 ) and observed:
"The effect of those and other judgments is that an
order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the
parties.
The orders now under appeal do not finally
dispose of those rights, but leave them to be determined
by the Courts in the ordinary way."
In Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim & Sons(') the Judicial
Committee observed that the expression "final order" within the
meaning of s. 109(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is an
(I) L.R. 47 f.A. 124.
(2) [1891] l Q.B. 734.
(l) [!903] 1 K.B.547;
(4) [1916] 2 K.B. 139.
(.l) L.R. 60 I.A. 76.
L4Sup. C.I./69-12
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 2 S.C.R
order which .finally disposes of the rights of the parties in relation
to the whole suit. In Abdul Rahman's case(') a suit was instituted by D. K. Cassim and Sons claiming damages against the appellant Abdul Rahman. Soon after the suit was instituted the plaintiff furn was adjudicated insolvent and the official assignee was
impleaded as an additional plaintiff.
The official assignee declined to proceed with the suit, and the suit was dismissed by the
trial court. In appeal it was· held by the High Court of Calcutta
that the cause cl action was personal to the insolvents and did not
vest in the assignee, and accordingly they set aside the decree and
remanded the suit for trial. Against that order an appeaJ was preferred to the Judicial Committee which was held not maintainable.
In S. Kuppusami Rao v. The King( 2 ) The Federal Court held
that the expression "final order" in s. 205 (1) of the Government
of India Act, 1935, means an order which finally determines the
points in dispute and brings the case to an end. The test of finality, according to the court, is whether the order finally disposes
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of the rights of the parties, and not whether the order decides an
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important point or even a vital issue in the case.
Mukherjea, J., in interpreting the
expression
"judgment,
decree or final order" m s. 205 of the Government of India Act,
1935, in Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. and others v. Dominion
of India and others(3 ) observed :
"The expression "final order" has been used in contraE
distinction to what is known
as "interlocutory order"
........ If the decision on an issue puts an end to the
suit, the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but if the
suit is still left alive and has got to
be tried in the
ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order."
In Mohammad Amin Brother>' case(3 ) an issue was decided by
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the trial court in a petition for winding up of a Company as to
the maintainability of a claim for recovery of income-tax dues. In
appeal the High Court overruled the objection raised by
the
Company about the maintainability of the claim, and finding that
a bona fide dispute was pending before the Income-tax authorities
relating to a substantial part of the debt on which the application
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for winding up was made and that the solvency of the Company
could not be determined before that dispute was decided, set aside
the order of the Trial Judge and remanded the case to hirn. The
Federal Court held that the order appealed against was not a
"final order".
.
·In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb. v. The State of BomH
bay ( 4 ) a suit was filed for a declaration that .tlie. .order of ex-
(I) L.R. 60 I.A. 76
(3) {1949-50] F.C.R. 842.
<2) [1947] F.c.R. 180.
(4) [19S8] S.C.R. 1007.
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TARAPORE & CO. V. TRACTORS EXPORT (Shah, J.)
703
communication passed by the appellant-religious head of a com·
munity-was invalid. During the pendency of the suit the Bom·
bay Prevention of Ex-communication Act 42 of 1949 was enacted
and one of the issues raised in the suit was whether the order of
ex-communication was invalid. This issue was tried as a prelimi·
nary issue and as it raised the question of the vires of the Bombay
Prevention of Ex-communication Act, 1949, the State of Bombay
was impleaded as a party-defendant in the suit. The trial court
decided the issue against the appellant and the order was confirm·
ed in appeal by the High Court of Bombay.
Against the order
deciding the issue, an appeal was preferred to this Court with
certificate granted by. the High Court under Art. 132 and
Art. 133 of the Constitution, and it was held that the appeal was
not maintainable since the decision on the issue did not finally
dispose of the dispute between the parties.
In Srinivasa Prasad Singh v. Kesha Prasad Singh(') an order
deciding that circumstances had not been established such as would
justify an order for stay of execution of a decree under appeal was
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not a 'final order" and was on that account oot appealable to the
Judicial Committee. Similarly in Druva Coal Company v. Benaras
Bank(') it was held that an order by the High Court reversing the
order of the Coun of First Instance granting a temporary injunc·
ti on was not a final order within the meaning of s. 109 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
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There is, therefore, abundant authority in support of the view
that an order is final within the meaning of Art. 13 3 oi the Cons·
titution, under s. 109 Code of Civil Procedure or s. 205 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, if it amounts to final decision·on
the rights of the parties in dispute in the suit or proceeding; if
after the order is made, the suit or proceeding stilJ remains to be
tried, and the rights in disputes have to be determined, the order
is interlocutory.
Counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon a recent judgment of this Court in Mohan/al Magan/al Thakkar v.
State of
Gujarat(') and contended that the view expressed in the earlier
cases is superseded. In Mohan/al Thakkar's case(8) after an enquiry under s. 476 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, a Magistrate
ordered that a complaint be filed against a person in respect of
offences under ss. 205, 467 and 468 read with s. 114 I.P. Code.
In appeal the Additional Sessions Judge held that the complaint
was competent only in respect of the offence under s. 205 read
with s. 114.
The High Court dismissed a revision application
against the order of the Coun of Session. Certificate was there-
(!) 13 C.L.J. 681.
(2) 21 Cal. L.J. 281.
(3) A.l.R. 1968 S.C. 733.
704
SUPllllME COURT REPORTS
[1969) 2 S.C.R.
after issued by the High Court under Art. 134(1) (c) of the ConA
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stitution for leave to appeal against the order. The competence o.
the High Court to grant the certificate was challenged at the hearing of the appeal. This Court held (Bachawat & Mitter JJ., dissenting) that the order passed was a final order within the meaning
of Art. 134 ( 1 )( c) since the controversy between the parties whether the complaint in respect of offences under ss. 467 and 468
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read with s: 114 I.P. Code was disposed of by the order of dismiss-
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al and the proceeding regarding that question was finally decided.
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It was observed that the finality of that order was not to be judged
by co-relating it with the controversy in the complaint, viz., whether the appellant had committed the offence charged against him
therein.
There is nothing in that judgment which supports the c
contention that this Court has departed from the principle of the
earlier decisions or has suggested a different test for determining
the finality of orders. The Court in that case was concerned
merely with an order passed by the High Court which maintained
the order of the Additional Sessions Judge that a complaint under
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s. 205 read withs. 114 I.P. Code could be filed against the appel-
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!ant. The order of the High Court finally disposed of the proD
ceeding in the Magistrate's court relating to the expediency of
instituting criminal proceedings against the appellant.
It was
thereafter for the court trying the complaint to decide whether
the offence complained of was committed by the appellant. The
proceeding for filing a complaint under s. 4 7 6 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was a self-contained proceeding and was,
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finally disposed of by the order directing the filing of •a complaint
under s. 205 read with s. 114 LP. Code.
The proceeding insti-
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tuted on the complaint was not part of or incidental to the proceed1
ing for an enquiry whether a complaint should be filed.
The
Court in that case expressly approved of the earlier view at p. 736,
where after referri.ng to Kuppusami Rao's case(') observed :
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Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb's case( 2) observed:
" ...... these were cases where the impugned orders
were passed in appeals or revisions and since an appeal
or a revision in continuation of the original suit or pro-
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ceeding the test applied was whether the order disposed
...
of the original suit or proceeding. If it did not, and the
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suit or proceeding was a live one, yet to be tried, the
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order was held not to be final.
Different tests have
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been applied, however, to orders made in proceeding
independent of the original or the main proceeding."
In our judgment an order passed by the High Court in appeal
which does not finally dispose of a suit or proceeding and leaves
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the rights and obligations of the parties for determination in the
,,Isuit or proceediDg from which appeal has arisen, is not finaJ. within
(1) [1947) F.C.R. 180.
(2) [1958) S.C.R. 1007.
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TARAPORE & CO. V. TRACTORS EXPORT (Shah, J.)
705
the meaning of Art. 13 3 (1 )(a) and ( b) . The order refusing to
grant an interim injunction did not determine the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the matter in dispute in the
suit. We are unable to hold that, because the plaintiff's suit as a
result of the order of the High Court may become infructuous as
framed, and the plaintiffs may have to seek amendment of the
plaint to get effective relief, an order which is essentially an interlocutory order may be deemed final for the purposes of Art.
133(1) of the Constitution. In our judgment, Mohan/al Magan/al
Thakkar's case(') makes no departure from the earlier judgments of the Judicial Committee, the Federal Court and this
Court. The plaintiffs will pay the costs of the petitioners oi the
application for revocation of the certificate.
G.C.
Certificate revoked.
(I) A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 733.