# RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR

- **Citation:** [2014] 8 S.C.R. 1100
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-09-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 8434 of 2014
- **Bench:** Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, V. Gopala Gowda
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raghubir-singh-v-general-manager-haryana-roadways-hissar-29925
- **Pages:** 42

## Headnote

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
s. 10(1 ), 11 A - Termination of service - Misappropriation
of ticket amount by conductor-workman - Order of termination
-
Criminal case resulting in acquittal -
Subsequently,
employee reporting to join for duty but informed that his
0 services were terminated -
Industrial dispute before
Conciliation Officer but the same failed - Reference of dispute
to labour court by State Government, as regards termination
order - Labour court passing award against employee that
reference of industrial dispute as time barred - In writ petition,
E award not interfered with by the High Court- On appeal, held:
Even assuming that there was delay and /aches on the part
of the workman in raising the industrial dispute and getting
the same'"referenced for adjudication, rejection of the
reference by the labour court by answering the additional
issue regarding the delay /aches and limitation without
F adjudicating the points of dispute referred to it on the merits,
amounts to failure to exercise its statutory power uls. 11 A - .
Furthermore, workman continuously remained absent from
his duties, however, termination order was passed without
conducting an enquiry as required in law - Also no show
G cause notice issued to the workman - Conductor being a
workman as defined uls. 2(s) is an employee of the respondent
authorities and was governed by the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 but the disciplinary proceedings
were initiated u/r. 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment
H
1100
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER,
1101
HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR
and Appeal) Rules, 1987 - Thus, the principles of natural
A
justice were not followed - Out of the period of unauthorised
absence of around five months, conductor was under judicial
custody for two months due to the criminal case filed against
him at the instance of the respondent - In view thereof and
facts of the case, the unauthorised absence period treated as
B
leave without wages - Order of termination passed by the
employer, the award passed by the labour court and the
judgment of the High Court set aside - Employee to be
reinstated, with back wages and other consequential benefits
- Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 311(2)(b).
c
s. 10(1) - Power under - Reference of industrial dispute
by the State Government to the labour court for adjudication
- Held: As per s. 10(1), the appropriate government 'at any
time' may refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, if it is of
the opinion that such an industrial dispute between the
D
workman and the employer exists or is apprehended - On
facts, no doubt there was a delay in raising the dispute by the
conductor; the labour court nevertheless has the power to
mould the relief accordingly·- Reference of the industrial
dispute by the State Government to the labour court to
E
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties
was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed.
Doctrines/Principles - 'Doctrine of Proportionality' -
Principle of - Held: Is to ensure that the action of the employer
against employees/workmen does not impinge their
fundamental and statutory rights - The Doctrine is to be
followed by the employer/employers at the time of taking
disciplinary action against their employees/workmen to satisfy
G
the principles of natural justice and safeguard the rights of
employees/workmen - On facts, doctrine to be applie.:J to the
facts of the case - Order of termination disproportionate to the
gravity of misconduct, thus, employee entitled to
reinstatement, back wages and other benefits.
F
H
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 8 S.C.R.
A
The
appellant-conductor was
arrested
for
misappropriating the amount collected from tickets. A
criminal case was registered and the appellant was
arrested. Thereafter, services of the appellant were
terminated. The appellant then was released on bail with
B an oral assurance that he would be reinstated after his
acq

## Text

_Characters 0–39,930 of 81,034. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39930 for what follows._

A
B
c
[2014] 8 S.C.R. 1100
RAGHUBIR SINGH
v.
GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR
(Civil Appeal No. 8434 of 2014)
SEPTEMBER 3, 2014
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
s. 10(1 ), 11 A - Termination of service - Misappropriation
of ticket amount by conductor-workman - Order of termination
-
Criminal case resulting in acquittal -
Subsequently,
employee reporting to join for duty but informed that his
0 services were terminated -
Industrial dispute before
Conciliation Officer but the same failed - Reference of dispute
to labour court by State Government, as regards termination
order - Labour court passing award against employee that
reference of industrial dispute as time barred - In writ petition,
E award not interfered with by the High Court- On appeal, held:
Even assuming that there was delay and /aches on the part
of the workman in raising the industrial dispute and getting
the same'"referenced for adjudication, rejection of the
reference by the labour court by answering the additional
issue regarding the delay /aches and limitation without
F adjudicating the points of dispute referred to it on the merits,
amounts to failure to exercise its statutory power uls. 11 A - .
Furthermore, workman continuously remained absent from
his duties, however, termination order was passed without
conducting an enquiry as required in law - Also no show
G cause notice issued to the workman - Conductor being a
workman as defined uls. 2(s) is an employee of the respondent
authorities and was governed by the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 but the disciplinary proceedings
were initiated u/r. 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment
H
1100
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER,
1101
HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR
and Appeal) Rules, 1987 - Thus, the principles of natural
A
justice were not followed - Out of the period of unauthorised
absence of around five months, conductor was under judicial
custody for two months due to the criminal case filed against
him at the instance of the respondent - In view thereof and
facts of the case, the unauthorised absence period treated as
B
leave without wages - Order of termination passed by the
employer, the award passed by the labour court and the
judgment of the High Court set aside - Employee to be
reinstated, with back wages and other consequential benefits
- Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 311(2)(b).
c
s. 10(1) - Power under - Reference of industrial dispute
by the State Government to the labour court for adjudication
- Held: As per s. 10(1), the appropriate government 'at any
time' may refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, if it is of
the opinion that such an industrial dispute between the
D
workman and the employer exists or is apprehended - On
facts, no doubt there was a delay in raising the dispute by the
conductor; the labour court nevertheless has the power to
mould the relief accordingly·- Reference of the industrial
dispute by the State Government to the labour court to
E
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties
was made within a reasonable time, considering the
circumstances in which the workman was placed.
Doctrines/Principles - 'Doctrine of Proportionality' -
Principle of - Held: Is to ensure that the action of the employer
against employees/workmen does not impinge their
fundamental and statutory rights - The Doctrine is to be
followed by the employer/employers at the time of taking
disciplinary action against their employees/workmen to satisfy
G
the principles of natural justice and safeguard the rights of
employees/workmen - On facts, doctrine to be applie.:J to the
facts of the case - Order of termination disproportionate to the
gravity of misconduct, thus, employee entitled to
reinstatement, back wages and other benefits.
F
H
1102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 8 S.C.R.
A
The
appellant-conductor was
arrested
for
misappropriating the amount collected from tickets. A
criminal case was registered and the appellant was
arrested. Thereafter, services of the appellant were
terminated. The appellant then was released on bail with
B an oral assurance that he would be reinstated after his
acquittal by the court. Thereafter, the appellant was
acquitted but when he reported to join his duty, he was
informed that his services were terminated. The appellant
then served a demand notice upon the respondent but
c the same was not acceded to. The appellant raised an
industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer and the
same failed. The State Government in exercise of power
u/s. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred
the dispute to the Labour Court, as regards termination
0 of the appellant from services. The Labour Court holding
that the termination of the appellant from service was
illegal, passed an award of re-instatement with back
wages. The High Court set aside the award and
remanded back the case for fresh adjudication. The
Labour Court passed an award against the appellant on
E the ground that the reference of the industrial dispute
was time barred. The appellant filed a writ petition
challenging the award. The High Court dismissed the
same. The appellant then filed Letters Patent Appeal. The
Division Bench dismissed the same on the ground that
F the services of the appellant were terminated by the
respondent in the year 1994 in exercise of the power
conferred upon it u/ Art. 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution
whereas the appellant raised the dispute via demand
notice in the year 2002. Hence the instant appeal.
G
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The dispute was raised by the workman
after he was acquitted in the criminal case which was
initiated at the instance of the respondent. Raising the
H
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER,
1103
HARYANA ROADWAYS, HISSAR
industrial dispute belatedly and getting the same referred
from the State Government to the Labour Court is for
justifiable reason. Even assuming that there was a certain
delay and laches on the part of the workman in raising
the industrial dispute and getting the same referenced for
adjudication, the Labour·Court is statutorily duty bound
to answer the points of dispute referred to it by
adjudicating the same on merits of the case and it ought
to have moulded the relief appropriately in favour of the
workman. That has not been done at all by the Labour
Court. Both the Single Judge as well as the Division
Bench of the High Court in its Writ Petition and the Letters
Patent Appeal have failed to consider this important
aspect of the matter. The award of the Labour Court and
A
B
c
the judgment and order of the High Court are highly
erroneous in law. Therefore, the same is interfered with
0
by this Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction as
there is miscarriage of justice for the workman. Therefore,
the order of termination passed by the respondent, the
award passed by the Labour Court and the judgment and
order of the High Court are liable to be set aside. The
workman must be reinstated. However, due to delay in
raising the industrial dispute, and getting it referred to the
Labour Court from the State Government, the workman
would be entitled in law for back wages and other
consequential benefits from the date of raising the
industrial dispute till reinstatement with all consequential
benefits. [Para 41, 42] [1139-F; 1140-A-E]
E
F
2.1. According to Section 10(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, the appropriate government 'at any
G
time' may refer an industrial dispute for adjudication, if it
is. of the opinion that such an industrial dispute between
the workman and the employer exists or is apprehended.
In the instant case, no doubt there was a delay in raising
the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court
H
1104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 8 S.C.R.
A nevertheless has the power to mould the relief
accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute
referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it
does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The
appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power
B under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial
dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. Therefore,
the State Government rightly exercised its power under
Section 10(1 )(c) of the Act and referred the points of
c dispute to the Labour Court. [Para 11, 13] (1115-B, C;
1117-G-H; 1118-A-B]
2.2. In view of the legal principles laid down by this
Court in S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.case that the workman cannot
be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in
D raising the dispute, the reference of the industrial dispute
by the State Government to the Labour Court to
adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the
parties was made within a reasonable time, considering
the circumstances in which the workman was placed,
E firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him
and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman
that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the
criminal case but the respondent did not adhere to its
assurance. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the
F industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and
referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss
or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay.
Thus, the delay in raising the industrial dispute and
referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication
G is not gravely erroneous and it does not debar the
workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
It cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the
appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to
the Labour Court by the State Government. (Para 14, 16)
H (1118-G; 1119-A-C; 1120-E]
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1105
ROADWAYS, HISSAR
Avon Services Production Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
A
Industrial Tribunal, Haryana & Ors. 1979 ( 2 ) SCR 45:
(1979) 1 SCC 1; S. M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District
Manager, Karnataka 2003 ( 3 ) SCR 156 : (2003)4 SCC 27
- relied on.
Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota v. Mohan Lal 2013 (9)
SCR 91 : (2013) 14 SCC 543 - distinguished.
B
Sapan Kumar Pandit v. UP. State Electricity Board &
Ors. 2001 ( 3 ) SCR 1081: (2001) 6 SCC 222; Ajaib Singh
C
v. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing
Service Society Limited & Anr. 1999 ( 2) SCR 505 : (1999)
6 sec 82 - referred to.
2.3. The Labour Court on an erroneous assumption o
of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation
in raising the dispute and its reference by the State
Government to the Labour Court. The Labour Court
ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court. The
award passed by the Labour Court was accepted
erroneously by both the Single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Writ Petition
and the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the
case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power
of the State Government under Section 10(1 )(c) and the
object and intendment of the Act. The rejection of the
reference by the Labour Court by answering the
additional issue no. 2 regarding the delay laches and
limitation without adjudicating the points of dispute
referred to it on the merits amounts to failure to exercise
E
F
its statutory power under Section 11A of the Act. Not G
adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits
between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption
of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost
important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same
H
1106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2014] 8 S.C.R.
A would affect the public interest at large. [Para 17, 31]
[1120-F-H; 1121-A; 1127-H; 1128-A]
2.4. From the reason mentioned in the termination
order, it is clear that the appellant continuously remained
8 absent from his duties for more than five months. Despite
the publication of the notice, the appellant neither joined
his duty nor did he submit his reply. Therefore, the
respondent straight away passed an order of termination
without conducting an enquiry as required in law against
the appellant to prove the alleged misconduct of
C unauthorised absence by placing reliance upon Article
311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. It is clear that no
enquiry was conducted by the appellant against the
workman to prove the alleged misconduct of
unauthorised absence from his duties. The reason.for
D dispensing with the enquiry is not at all forthcoming in the
order of termination which refers to the said constitutional
provision. [Para 20, 21] [1121-G-H; 1122-A-B]
2.5. The disciplinary proceedings initiated by the
E respondent under Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 are not only
untenable in law but also contrary to the legal principles
laid down by this Court. There is neither any tenable
explanation nor any material evidence produced by the
F respondent before the courts below to justify its adoption
of the said Rules for initiating the disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant-workman. In the
absence of plea and material documents produced by the
respondent, the proceedings initiated and passing of the
G order of termination is bad in law. The appellant being a
workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act is an
employee of the respondent therefore, he would be
governed by the Model Standing Orders framed under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and
the principles of natural justice are required to -be
H followed by the respondent for initiating disciplinary
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1107
ROADWAYS, HISSAR
proceedings and taking disciplinary action against the
A
workman. Since the respond,ents have not followed the
procedure laid down therein from the beginning till the
passing of the order of terminatibn, the same is vitiated
in law. [Para 22, 23, 24] [1122-E; 1123-8-F]
2.6. The respondent, both before the Labour Court B
and the High Court erroneously placed reliance on the
order of termination passed against the workman without
producing any evidence on record to justify the alleged
misconduct of unauthorised absence of the appellant.
C
Therefore, the points of dispute referred to the Labour
Court should have been answered affirmatively by it and
an award granting the reliefs as prayed by the appellant
should have been passed. This aspect of the matter was
not examined by the High Court either in the Writ Petition
or in the Letters Patent Appeal. [Para 23, 24] [1122-G-H;
1123-A-B]
D
2.7. The Labou·r Court and the High Court erred in not
deciding the industrial dispute between the parties on the
basis of admitted facts, firstly, the enquiry not being
E
conducted for the alleged misconduct of unauthorised
absence by the appellant from 02.04.1993 and secondly,
the en·quiry being dispensed with by invoking Article
311 (b)(2) of the Constitution of India without any valid
reason. Moreover, an order stating the impossibility of
F
conducting the enquiry and dispensing with the same
was not issued to the appellant. The reasoning assigned
in the order of termination is bad in law. [Para 25] [1123G-H; 1124-A]
2.8. Before passing the order of dismissal for the act
G
of alleged misconduct by the workman-appellant, the
respondent should have issued a show cause notice to
the appellant, calling upon him to show cause as to why
the order of dismissal should not be passed against him.
The appellant being an employee of the respondent was
H
1108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 8 S.C.R.
A dismissed without conducting an enquiry against him
and not ensuring complia'nce with the principles of
natural justice. The second show cause notice giving an
opportunity to show cause to the proposed punishment
before passing the order of termination was also not
s given to the appellant-workman by the respondent which
is mandatory in law. [Para 27] [1125-E-G]
Calcutta Dock Labour Board and Ors. v. Jaffar Imam and
Ors. 1965 SCR 453: AIR 1966 SC 282; Union of/ndia and
others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan 1990 ( 3 ) Suppl. SCR 248
C : (1991)1 SCC.588; Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, v.
Karunakar 1993 ( 2) Suppl. SCR 576: (1993) 4 SCC 727
- relied on.
2.9. The appellant was on unauthorised absence only
D due to the fact that he had genuine constraints which
prevented him from joining back his duties. The
unauthorised absence of the appellant which lead to his
termination was due to the fact that he was falsely
implicated in the criminal case filed at the instance of the
E respondent and that he must have had reasonable
apprehension of arrest and was later in judicial custody.
It is to be noted that out of the total period of the alleged
unauthorised absence, .the appellant was under judicial
custody for two months due to the criminal case filed
F against him at the instance of the respondent. Having
regard to the period of unauthorised absence and facts
and circumstances of the case, the unauthorised
absence period is treated as leave without wages. The
termination order is vitiated since it is disproportionate
G to the gravity of misconduct alleged against him. The
employment of the appellant-workman with the
respondent is the source of income for himself and his
family members' livelihood, thereby their liberty and
livelihood guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
is denied. [Para 28, 29] [1126-A-C, E, F]
H
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1109
ROADWAYS, HISSAR
Olga Te//is & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and
A
Ors. 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 51 :(1985) 3 SCC 545 - referred
to.
2.10. The appellant workman is a conductor in the
respondent-statutory body which is an undertaking
8
under the State Government of Haryana thus, it is a
potential employment. Therefore, his services could not
have been dispensed with by passing an order of
termination on the alleged ground of unauthorised
absence without considering the leave at his credit and
further examining whether he is entitled for either leave
C
without wages or extraordinary leave. Therefore, the
order of termination passed is against the fundamental
rights guaranteed to the workman under Articles 14, 16,
19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and against the
statutory rights conferred upon him under the Act as well
D
as against the law laid down by this Court. [Para 30) [1127D-G]
2.11. Once the reference is made by the State
Government in exercise of its statutory power to the
Labour Court for adjudication of the existing industrial
E
dispute on the points of dispute, it is the mandatory
statutory duty of the Labour Court under Section 11A to
adjudicate the dispute on merits on the basis of evidence
produced on record. Section 11A was inserted to the Act
by the Parliament by the Amendment Act 45 of 1971
F
(w.e.f. 15.12.1972) with the avowed object to examine the
important aspect of proportionality of purjishment
imposed upon a workman if, the acts of misconduct
alleged against workman are proved. The object of
insertion of Section 11 A is traceable to the International
G
Labour Organisation resolution. [Paras 33, 34) [1130-BD; 1131-F]
Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company
of India v. Management & Ors. 1973 ( 3) SCR 587: 1973(1)
SCC 813 - referred to.
H
A
1110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 8 S.C.R.
2.12. The principle of 'Doctrine of Proportionality' is
a well recognised one to ensure that the action of the
employer against employees/workmen does not impinge
their fundamental and statutory rights. The doctrine has
to be followed by the employer/employers at the time of
B taking disciplinary action against their employees/
workmen to satisfy the principles of natural justice and
safeguard the rights of employees/workmen. The
"Doctrine should be applied to the fact situation as the
Court is of the firm view that the order of termination, even
C if the same is accepted is justified, it is disproportionate
to the gravity of misconduct. [Paras 35, 36] [1133-A-C]
Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India 2000 (4) Suppl.
SCR 693 :(2001) 2 SCC 386 - referred to.
0
2.13. The lives of the appellant and his family
members have been hampered. Further, on facts, the
order of termination passed is highly disproportionate to
the gravity of misconduct and therefore shocks the
conscience of this Court. Hence, the appellant is entitled
E for the reliefs as prayed by him in this appeal,
reinstatement, back wage and other consequential
benefits. [Para 39, 40] [1136-B; 1139-C-E]
Oeepali Gundu Surwase V. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (0. Ed) and Ors. 2013 (9) SCR 1 : (2013) 10
F SCC 324 - relied on.
Case Law Reference :
2013 (9) SCR 91
Distinguished
Para 12
1979 (2) SCR- 45
Relied on
Para 13
G
2001 (3) SCR 1081
Referred to
Para 11
2003 (3) SCR 156
Relied on
Para 14
1999 (2) SCR 505
Relied on
Para 15, 16
1965 SCR 453
Relied on
Para 26
H
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1111
ROADWAYS, HISSAR
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 248 Relied on
Para 27
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576
Relied on
Para 27
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 51
Referred to
Para 29
1980 (2) SCR 773
Referred to
Para 32
1973 (3) SCR 587
Referred to
Para 33, 34
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 693 Referred to
Para 36, 37,
38
2013 (9) SCR 1
Relied on
Para 39
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8434 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2012 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters
Patents Appeal No. 20 of 2012.
Mohak Bhadana, Priya Puri for the Appellant.
Narender Hooda, Ankit Swarup, Kamal Mohan Gupta,
Chaitali Y. Dhinoja for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.
A
B
c
D
E
2. This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the
order dated 09.01.2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab
F
and Haryana at Chandigarh in LP.A. No. 20 of 2012, whereby
the High Court dismissed the LP.A. and affirmed the order
dated 14.11.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court in the C.W.P. No.20996 of 2011, urging various
grounds.
G
3. The necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to
appreciate the case of the appellant and to ascertain whether
the appellant is entitled for the relief as prayed in this appeal.
In 1976, the appellant joined the Haryana Roadways as a
H
1112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 8 S.C.R.
A conductor. On 10.08.1993, the appellant was charged under
Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code in a criminal case at the
instance of the respondent for alleged misappropriation of the
amount collected from tickets and not depositing the cash in
relation to the same in time. The appellant was arrested by the
B Jurisdictional police and sent to judicial custody on 15.09.1994.
Further, on 21.10 .1994 the services of the appellant were
terminated by the General Manager, Haryana Roadways,
Hissar, the respondent herein. On 15.11.1994, the appellant
upon being released on bail was given an oral assurance by
c the respondent that he will be reinstated to the post after his
acquittal by the Court.
4. On 11.07.2002, upon being acquitted by the Court of
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hissar, in Crl. Case No. 33-1
of 1994, the appellant reported to join his duty, but he was
D informed by the respondent that his services stood terminated
w.e.f. 21.10.1994. The appellant served the demand notice
upon the respondent which was not acceded to and therefore,
the industrial dispute with regard to order of termination from
his services was raised before the conciliation officer. On failure
E of the conciliation proceedings before him, the industrial dispute
was referred by the State Government in exercise of its statutory
power under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
194 7 (for short 'the Act') to the Labour Court, Hissar for
adjudication of the existing industrial dispute in relation to the
F order of dismissal of the appellant from his services. After
adjudication of the points of dispute referred to it, the Labour
Court vide its award dated 22.05.2009 declared that the
termination of the appellant from his services was illegal and
passed an award of reinstatement of the appellant with 60%
G back wages from the date of issuance of demand notice till
publication of the award and full back wages thereafter, till
reinstatement.
5. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent-Haryana
Roadways filed C.W.P. No. 13366 of 2009 before the Highj
H Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The High Court
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1113
ROADWAYS, HISSAR [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
vide its order dated 01.04.2010 set aside the award dated
A
22.05.2009 and remanded the case back to the Labour Court
for fresh adjudication in the light of the applicability of the
provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, to the
appellant/workman.
6. The Labour Court vide its award dated 17.05.2011 in
R.M. No.3 of 2010 answered the reference by passing an
award against the appellant on the ground that the reference
of the industrial dispute is time barred. The appellant challenged
8
the correctness of the said award by filing a Civil Writ Petition
C
No.20996 of 2011 before the High Court, which was dismissed
on 14.11.2011 by the learned single Judge of the High Court
holding that the decision of the disciplinary authority of the
respondent is in the public interest and therefore, the same
does not warrant interference.
7. The appellant thereafter filed Letters Patent Appeal No.
20 of 2012 before the Division Bench of the High Court against
the order of the learned single Judge. The same was dismissed
vide order dated 09.01.2012 on the ground that the services
D
of the appellant were terminated by the respondent on
E
21.10.1994 in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under
the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India,
whereas the appellant had raised the industrial dispute vide the
demand notice in the year, 2002. The Division Bench of the
High Court found no illegality or irregularity in the impugned
F
judgment passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court.
8. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated
09.01.2012 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, the
appellant has filed this appeal urging various grounds.
G
9. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the
appellants that the services of the appellant was illegally
terminated from his services on the ground of alleged
misconduct of unauthorised absence, and no enquiry was
conducted before the· termination of services of the appellant.
H
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[2014) 8 S.C.R.
A
Further, it is contended that the reasons accorded by the
respondent are not justified for dispensing with the inquiry
procedure in relation to the allegations against the 'appellant
and invoking the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the
Constitution of India and the respondent had terminated the
B services of the appellant without complying with the principles
of natural justice.
10. The learned Additional Advocate General for the State
of Haryana, Mr. Narender Hooda has vehemently contended
C that the Labour Court was right in rejecting the reference of the
industrial dispute being on the ground that it was barred by
limitation by answering the additional issue No. 2 by placing
reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Assistant
Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, SubDivision, Kata v. Mohan La/1 wherein this Court has held as
D under:-
E
F
G
"19. We are clearly of the view that though Limitation Act,
1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but delay in raising industrial
dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the
Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of
discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has
been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down
by
this
Court
in
Assistant
Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and
Anr. v. Gitam Singh (2013) 5 SCC 136 that before
exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to
keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and
manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of
service, the ground on which termination has been set
aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before
grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably
followed."
H
1.
c2013) 14 sec 543.
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1115
ROADWAYS, HISSAR [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
11. In our view of the facts and circumstances of the case
A
on hand, the reference was made by the State Government to
the Labour Court for adjudication of the existing industrial
dispute; it has erroneously held it to be barred by limitation. This
award was further erroneously affirmed by the High Court, which
is bad in law and therefore the same is liable to be set aside.
B
According to Section 10(1) of the Act, the appropriate
governm'ent 'at any time' may refer an industrial dispute for
adjudication, if it is of the opinion that such an industrial dispute
between the workman & the employer exists or is
apprehended. Section 10(1) reads as follows:
c
"10(1)[Where the appropriate government is of opinion that
any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at
any time], by order in writing-
(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement
D
thereof; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or
relevant to the dispute to a court for inquiry; or
(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to
any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour
Court for adjudication; or
(d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
connected with, or relevant to, the dispute , whether it
relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or
the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication."
E
F
Thus, it is necessary for us to carefully observe the phrase
'at any time' used in this section. Therefore, there arises an
G
issue whether the question of limitation is applicable to the
reference of the existing industrial dispute that would be made
by the State Government either to the Labour Court or Industrial
Tribunal for adjudication at the instance of the appellant. This
H
1116
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[2014] 8 S.C.R.
A Court in Avon Services Production Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
B
c
D
Industrial Tribunal, Haryana & Ors. 2, after interpreting the
phrases 'at any time' rendered in Section 10(1) of the Act, held
thus:-
"? ....... Section 10(1) enables the appropriate Government
to make reference of an industrial dispute which exists or
is apprehended at any time to one of the authorities
mentioned in the section. How and in what manner or
through what machinery the Government is apprised of the
dispute is hardly relevant. ...... The only requirement for
taking action under Section 10(1) is that there must be
some material before the Government which will enable the
appropriate Government to form an opinion that an
industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This is an
administrative function of the Government as the
expression is understood in contradistinction to judicial or
quasi-judicial function ... "
Therefore, it is implicit from the above case that in case
of delay in raising the industrial dispute, the appropriate
E government under Section 10(1) of the Act has the power, to
make reference to either Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, if
it is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended at any time, between the workman and the
employer. Further, in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State
F Electricity Board & Ors. 3, it is held by this Court as under:-
G
"15.There are cases in which lapse of time had caused
fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept
the dispute alive during the long interval it is reasonably
possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute
ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute
remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or
the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not
2.
(1979) 1 sec 1.
H
3.
c2001) 6 sec 222.
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. G.ENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1117
ROADWAYS, HISSAR [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case
A
when the Government have chosen to refer the dispute for
adjudication under Section4K of the U.P. Act the High
Court should not have quashed the reference merely on
the ground of delay: Of course. the long delay for making
the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating
B
authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different
matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone
wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the
Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process
reach its legal culmination."
c
(Emphasis laid by the court)
12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations
made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture
Marketing Board case (supra) upon which the learned
D
Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has
placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the
case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has
erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously
considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the
points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue
regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on
E
the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to
the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions
of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has
categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under
Article 137 has no application .to make reference by the
appropriate government to the Labour CourUlndustrial Tribunal
for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen
and the employer.
13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising
the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has
the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of
adjudication, if the di.spute referred to the Labour Court is not
F
G
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 8 S.C.R.
A adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to
exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory
power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial
dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the
jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by
B this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra.
Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power
under Section 10(1 )(c) of the Act'and referred the points of
dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance
with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan
c Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.
0
14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief
only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the
case of S. M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District Manager,
Karnataka4 it was held by this Court as follows-
"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on
account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants
the High Court was justified in denying relief to the
appellants. We cannot agree ...... In Ratan Chandra
E
Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
Csupra)1993 AIR SCW 2214. it was held that a casual
labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of
remedy available in law by delay itself. lapse of time results
in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would
F
certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence
relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not
available. However, we do not think that the delay in the
case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the
appellants for any relief ..... "
G
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the
above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made
H 4.
(2003) 4 sec 21.
RAGHUBIR SINGH v. GENERAL MANAGER, HARYANA 1119
ROADWAYS, HISSAR [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour
A
Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the
parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the
_pircumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there
was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the
respondent had assured the workman that he would be s
reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover,
it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of
the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no
mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due
to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the c
industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court
for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the
workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.
15. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Operative
Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr5.
D
this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay, stating lhat:-
" 10. It follows. therefore. that the provisions of
Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act. 1963 are not
E
applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the
relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on
the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the
employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by
showing the real prejudice and not as a merely
F
hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can
be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone.
Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing,
the tribunal. labour court or board. dealing with the case
can appropriately mould the ·rielief by declining to grant
G
back wages to the workman till the date he raised the
derriand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or
'
dismissal. The Court may qtso in appropriate cases direct
s.
(1999) 6 sec a2.
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(2014] 8 S.C.R.
A
the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back
wages ..... "
(Emphasis laid by the Court)
16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact
B and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches
on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the
criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in
adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would
be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the
C workman approached the conciliation officer and the State
Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for
adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal
passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal
of the appellant and the date on which he approached the
D conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent
had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had
rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it
cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the
appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the
E Labour Court by the State Government.
17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption
of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in
raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government
to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the
F legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred
to supra. T.he award passed by the Labour Court was accepted
erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition &
the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its
G proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State
Government under Section 10(1 ){c) and the object and
intendment of the Act.