# RAI BAHADUR SETH TEOMAL v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND THE COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 301
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 384 and 385 of 1957
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, J. L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rai-bahadur-seth-teomal-v-the-commissioner-of-income-tax-and-the-commissioner-1649
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Income Tax-Place of Assessment-Transfer of assessee's case
to a different Commissioner of Income-tax-Assessment by Incometax Officer-Jurisdiction-Indian Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of
I922), SS. 5, 64.
The appellant was carrying on the business of a railway
contractor in a place in the district of R. In April 1943, the
Income-tax Officer of R which was under the charge of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal (Mufassil), served a notice
under s. 22(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, on the appellant who in pursuance of the notice filed the return on February
28, 1944. The Income-tax Officer then served notices on him
under ss. 22(4) and 23(2) of the Act for the production of books,
etc., but before the final assessment was made, the Central Board
of Revenue by an order passed under s. 5(2) of the Act, transferred the appellant's case along with some other assessment
cases, to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta.
On February 11, 1948, the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, to whom
the appellant's case was assigned, issued notices again under
ss. 22(4) and 23(2) of the Act and after making the usual enquiries
made the assessment order on March 15, 1948. The appellant's
appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to
the Appellate Tribunal raising objections to the legality of the
transfer of his case to Calcutta and to the jurisdiction of the
Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, were dismissed. The Appellate
Tribunal held that as the objection related to the place of assessment it was not competent for the Tribunal to go into that
question. The appellant then made an application to the Commissioner of Income-tax for reference under s. 66(1) of the Act,
but this was dismissed on the ground that the assessee never
raised any objection before the Income-tax Officer to his jurisdiction and that, in any case, the question of jurisdiction could
not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. An application filed by
the appellant to the High Court under s. 66(2) of the Act was
dismissed and though the order of dismissal was not taken up
on appeal, the appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court
against the order of the Appellate Tribunal. It was contended
for the appellant that under s. 64(1) and (2) of the Act he was
entitled to be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area
within which the place of his business was situate, that the
r959
March z.
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp._
'959
assessment by the Income-tax Officer of Calcutta was illegal
assumption of jurisdiction and that, in any case, the order of
Seth Teomol
transfer by the Central Board of Revenue under s. 5(2) of the
v.
Act was not valid because, if it wanted to transfer the assessConunissioner of ment proceedings from the file of one Income-tax Officer to ·
Income-tax
another it could be done only under s. 5(7A) and not under
s. 5(2).
Held: (1) Sub-section (7A) of s. 5 which confers on the Central Board of Revenue the power to transfer any case from one
Income-tax Officer to another is not a provision which in any
way modifies or cuts down the power given to the Central Board
of Revenne under sub-s. 2 of s. 5 which enables it to specify as
to which of the Commissioners would perform functions in respect of different areas, persons, incomes or cases or classes thereof. The two sub-sections are complementary and operate in two
separate spheres.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 233 and
Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, [1956] S.C.R. 267, distinguished.
In the present case, the Central Board of Revenue directed
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta, to exercise
his functions in respect of certain cases including the case of the
appellant and that fell under s. 5(2) and not under s. 5(7A). The
order of transfer was, therefore, valid.
(2) The jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, to
make the assessment on the appellant cannot be challenged, in
view of sub-s. 5(a) of s. 64 of the Act, under which sub-ss. (1)

## Text

(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
RAI BAHADUR SETH TEOMAL
v.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS
TAX
(B. P. SINHA, J. L. KAPUR and
M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Income Tax-Place of Assessment-Transfer of assessee's case
to a different Commissioner of Income-tax-Assessment by Incometax Officer-Jurisdiction-Indian Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of
I922), SS. 5, 64.
The appellant was carrying on the business of a railway
contractor in a place in the district of R. In April 1943, the
Income-tax Officer of R which was under the charge of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal (Mufassil), served a notice
under s. 22(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, on the appellant who in pursuance of the notice filed the return on February
28, 1944. The Income-tax Officer then served notices on him
under ss. 22(4) and 23(2) of the Act for the production of books,
etc., but before the final assessment was made, the Central Board
of Revenue by an order passed under s. 5(2) of the Act, transferred the appellant's case along with some other assessment
cases, to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta.
On February 11, 1948, the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, to whom
the appellant's case was assigned, issued notices again under
ss. 22(4) and 23(2) of the Act and after making the usual enquiries
made the assessment order on March 15, 1948. The appellant's
appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to
the Appellate Tribunal raising objections to the legality of the
transfer of his case to Calcutta and to the jurisdiction of the
Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, were dismissed. The Appellate
Tribunal held that as the objection related to the place of assessment it was not competent for the Tribunal to go into that
question. The appellant then made an application to the Commissioner of Income-tax for reference under s. 66(1) of the Act,
but this was dismissed on the ground that the assessee never
raised any objection before the Income-tax Officer to his jurisdiction and that, in any case, the question of jurisdiction could
not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. An application filed by
the appellant to the High Court under s. 66(2) of the Act was
dismissed and though the order of dismissal was not taken up
on appeal, the appellant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court
against the order of the Appellate Tribunal. It was contended
for the appellant that under s. 64(1) and (2) of the Act he was
entitled to be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area
within which the place of his business was situate, that the
r959
March z.
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp._
'959
assessment by the Income-tax Officer of Calcutta was illegal
assumption of jurisdiction and that, in any case, the order of
Seth Teomol
transfer by the Central Board of Revenue under s. 5(2) of the
v.
Act was not valid because, if it wanted to transfer the assessConunissioner of ment proceedings from the file of one Income-tax Officer to ·
Income-tax
another it could be done only under s. 5(7A) and not under
s. 5(2).
Held: (1) Sub-section (7A) of s. 5 which confers on the Central Board of Revenue the power to transfer any case from one
Income-tax Officer to another is not a provision which in any
way modifies or cuts down the power given to the Central Board
of Revenne under sub-s. 2 of s. 5 which enables it to specify as
to which of the Commissioners would perform functions in respect of different areas, persons, incomes or cases or classes thereof. The two sub-sections are complementary and operate in two
separate spheres.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 233 and
Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, [1956] S.C.R. 267, distinguished.
In the present case, the Central Board of Revenue directed
the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta, to exercise
his functions in respect of certain cases including the case of the
appellant and that fell under s. 5(2) and not under s. 5(7A). The
order of transfer was, therefore, valid.
(2) The jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, to
make the assessment on the appellant cannot be challenged, in
view of sub-s. 5(a) of s. 64 of the Act, under which sub-ss. (1)
and (2) of s. 64 have no application to an assessee in respect of
whom an order has been made by the Central Board of Revenue
nnder s. 5(2) of the Act.
(3) Objections as to the place of assessment cannot be raised
in appeal either before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or
before the Appellate Tribunal.
Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay, Sind and Baluchistan,. [1945] F. C. R. 65 and
Seth
Kanhaiyalal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1936] 5 I.T.R. 739,
relied on.
Dayaldas Kushiram v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Central),
[1939] 8 I.T.R. 139 and Dina Nath Hem Raj v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, (1927) I.L.R. 49 All. 616, distinguished.
Consequently, as the question as to the place of assessment
could not arise out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal no
such question of law could be referred to the High Court.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 384 and 385 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the Order dated
November 28, 1952, of the Income-ta:8: Appellate
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT :REPORTS
30S
Tribunal (Calcutta Bench) in LT.A. No. 4067 and
E.P.T. Appeal No. 391of1951-52.
N. 0. Chatterjee, B. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant.
K. N. Rajagopala Sastri, R.H. Dhebar and D. Gupta,
for the respondents.
1959. March 2.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
KAI'UR', J.-These two appeals pursuant to special
leave are brought against two orders of the Income.
tax Appellate Tribunal (Calcutta Bench) dated N ovember 28, 1952, passed in appeal No. I. T. A. 4067 of
1951-52 in respect of income-tax assessment for the
assessment year ending 31st March, 1944, and in
appeal No. E. P. T. A. 391 of 1951-52 in respect of
Excess Profits tax assessment of the appellant for the
chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1943.
The original assessee was R. B. Seth Teomal who was
the manager of a Hindu undivided family. On Seth
Teomal's death on May 30, 1944, Seth Ottanmal became the manager. He is now the appellant representing the Hindu undivided family. He will be termed
as the appellant in these appeals. Seth Teomal was
carrying on the businesss of a railway contractor at
Lalmonirhat in the district of Rangpur which is now in
Pakistan. In April 1943 a notice was served on him
under s. 22(2) of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter
called the Act). He filed the return on February 28,
1944. The Income-tax Officer, Rangpur, served notices
on him under ss. 22(4) and 23(2) for production of
books, etc. It appears that assessment proceedings
continued before the Income-tax Officer, Rangpur,
but no final assessment was made.
According to an affidavit which has now been filed
in this Court the Central Board of Revenue by an
order passed under sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of the Act assigned the appellant's case along with some other assessment cases to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta. The order contains the following endorsements which give an indication of the reason for
the case being assigned to the Commissioner of Incometax {Central) :
1959
Seth Teomal
v.
Commissioner of
I nco1ne~tax
J(apur ].
t959
Seth Teomal
v.
Com1nissioner of
Income·tax
Ilapur ].
ao4
StJPREME COURT Rli:PORTS (1959J Supp.
" Copy forwarded to :-
(1) ..... .................................................... ···•··
(2) Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta. These cases are reported to have E. P. T.
liabilities ".
Thus the appellant's case which was before an Incometax Officer within the area in charge of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal (Mofussil) was withdrawn from him and was assigned to the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta. On February 11,
1948, the Income-tax Officer District N -C (I. T. cum
E.P.T.) to whom it appears the appellant's assessment
case was assigned issued notice again under ss. 22(4)
and 23(2) of the Act. That officer after making the
usual enquiries made the assessment order on March
15, 19,l8. The order for Excess Profits Tax assessment. was made on March 30,1948.
.
Against these orders two appeals were taken to the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner on April 30, 1948.
In the appeal against income-tax assessment the
appellant inter alia raised the following two grounds
in regard to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer,
Calcutta:
"5. For that the petitioner is not aware of
any order passed for the transfer of the case from
Rangpur to Calcutta and it is submitted that without
such an order and communication of such order the
assessment is challengeable for want of jurisdiction ".
"32. For that the appellants challenge the jurisdiction as there was no proper order of transfer and
the business was carried on outside Calcutta and
assessments had never before been made in Calcutta''.
But no such ground was taken in the appeal against
Excess Profits Tax assessment. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed both these appeals. In
regard to jurisdiction he held :-
"It however appears from records on hand that
the principal place of business of the concern was at
Rangpur and as the income attracted E. P. T. liability
the case was transferred to Calcutta under Orders of
C. B. R. Hence there is no substance in the contention of the learned Advocate which fails".
•
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
The appellant then took two appeals to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal. In the appeal against incometax assessment he took two objections in regard to
jurisdiction :
" For that the objection taken before the learned
A. A. C. on jurisdiction should not have been summa- ·
rily disposed of by passing reference to an order of
transfer of the case from Rangpur to Calcutta without
at the same time discussing when the question of
jurisdiction was seriously raised and how and under
what circumstances and to whom was the case transferred and for what purpose".
"2. For that the appellant begs leave to repeat
that transfer was not legal or proper and was not
made by any proper authority to legalise such transfer".
In the Excess Profits Tax appeal also this time an
objection was taken as to jurisdiction :
"For that the assessment is bad in law having
been made without jurisdiction".
The Appellate Tribunal held against the appellant in
a short paragraph:
"So far as the fi:r;st objection is concerned, in our
opinion, it is not within our jurisdiction to go into
this. matter. The objection relates to the place of
assessment. As held in 1945 I. T. R. 39 (Wallace
Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Bombay, Sind and Baluchistan, Federal Court) the
question as to the proper place of assessment is not
one for adjudication by a Court or by any Appellate
Authority. Consequently we overrule the first contention of the Assessee."
The Tribunal thus held that as the objection related to
the place of assessment the Tribunal was not competent
to go into that question. Upon this the appellant
applied for a reference to be made under s. 66(1)
of the Act and prayed for five questions to be
referred. The two questions relating to jurisdiction
were:-
(1) "Had the Income-tax Officer (Non-Companies Income-tax cum Excess Profits Tax District, Calcutta, jurisdiction to make the assessment ?
39
I959
Seth Teomal
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax
J{apur ].
I
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
'959
(2) Was the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal correct in the circumstances in helding that it bas no jurisSeth Teomal
d' t'
t d t
·
th
t
f b I
v.
IC 10n o e ermme
e compe ence o t e ncome-tax
Commissioner of Officer in making the assessment ? "
.
Income-tax
In 'the " facts of the case " attached to the grounds of
· Appeal it was stated that the accounts were produced
Kapuy 1·
before the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta, under protest
because the jurisdiction of that officer was being challenged. In reply to this the Commissioner after refer.-
ring to Wallace Brothers' case (') stated that it did not
appear from the assessment record that the assessee
ever raised any objection to the jurisdiction of the
Income-tax Officer and if it had been taken the matter
would have been referred by the Income-tax Officer to
the Commissioner as required by law. This' application
under s. 66(1) was dismissed on the ground that the
question of jurisdiction could not arise out of the order
of Tribunal and reliance was placed on Wallace Brothers' case (1) and Seth Kanhaiyalal v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (2).
The appellant applied to the High
Court under s. 66 (2) of the Act and prayed for the
following two questions and some others to be referred:-
(i) "Had the Income-tax Officer (N. C. I. T.
Cum E. P. T. District Calcutta) jurisdiction to make
the assessment ?
·
·
(ii) Was the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
correct in the circumstances in holding that it hatl no
jurisdiction to determine the competence of the Income-tax Officer in making the assessment ?"
The High Court dismissed this application on July 23,
1954. No appeal has been filed in this Court against
the order of the High Court but an appeal has been
filed against the order passed by the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal.
On behalf of the Revenue a preliminary objection
was taken that as no appeal had been filed against
the order of the High Court that order had become
final and this Court, therefore, should not entertain
the appeal against the order of the Tribunal and reliance was placed on the observations of Venkatarama
(r) .[1945] F.C.R. 65; 13 I.T.R. 39.
' (2) [r936] 5 I.T.R. 739.
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
Aiyar, J., in Govinda Rajulu M·udaliar v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1).
At p. 810 it was observed:-
"The present appeal is against the decision of the
Tribunal itself. It is no doubt true that this Court
has decided in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (2) that an
appeal lies under article 136 of the Constitution of
India. to this court against a decision of the Appellate
Tribunal under the Indian Income-tax Act. But
seeing that in this case the appellant bad moved the
High Court and a decision has been pronounced
adverse to him and this has become final, obviously it
would not be open to him to question the correctness
of the decision of the Tribunal on grounds which
might have been taken in an appeal against the judgment of the High Court.
All the points urged before
us were taken in the reference under s. 66 (2) of the
Indian Income-tax Act. It would therefore follow
that these grounds are not open to the appellant ".
But counsel for the appellant relied on Dhakeswari
Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2)
where the scope of appeals under Art. 136 were set
out by the learned Chief Justice. In this case however it is not necessary to go into this .question
because in our opinion there is little substance in the
appeal itself.
Counsel for the appellant has urged two grounds in
support of his appeal: (1) that his place of business
WftS Lalmonirhat and under s. 64 (1) and (2) of the
Act he was entitled to be assessed by the Income-tax
Officer of that area and (2) that assessment by the
Income-tax Officer of Calcutta was an illegal assumption of jurisdiction and therefore he was entitled to
have the order of assessment quashed. In order to
decide these questions reference has to be made to the
scheme of the Act. The provisions relevant to the
issue of jurisdiction are ss. 5 and 64.
The former is
headed "Income-tax authorities" and the latter
"Place of assessment".
Assessment is made by the
Income-tax Officer under s. 23 (3).
Against an order
of assessment or the liability to be assessed an appeal
(1)
[1958] 34 LT.R. 807, 810.
(2)
[1955] l S.C.R. 941, '/49·
z959
Seth Teomal
v.
Commissioner of
Income tax
Kapur ].
308 SUPREME COURT REPOI'tTS [1959] Supp.
1959
lies under s. 30 to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and a further appeal to Income-tax Appellate
Seth Tcomal
v.
Tribunal under s. 33 of the Act. And then a reference
commissioner of can be. made by the Tribunal to the High Court under
Income·tax
s. 66 (1) of the Act and if the Tribunal does not make
such reference the High Court can under s. 66 (2)
Kapu' J.
be moved and it can then direct that such reference
be made.
The heading of s. 64 is" Place of assessment". Subsection ( l) of s. 64 provides that the assesseo shall
be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in
which he carries on his business. Sub.section (2) lays
down that in all other oases an assessee shall be
assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in
which he resides.
Under these two sub-sections therefore the appellant, because he was carrying on business at Lalmonirhat, had to be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of that area, i.e., by the Income.tax
Officer of l'tangpur. Sub-section (3) of that section
provides that if a question as to the place of assessment arises, it is to be determined by the Commissioner of Income-tax or by Central Board of Revenue
according as the case may be. Under the first proviso
to this s.ub.section before the question as to the place
of assessment is determined the assessee bas to have
an opportunity of representing his views and under
the second proviso the place of assessment cannot he
called into question by the assessee if he has made a
return in response to the notice under sub-s. (1) of
s. 22 and has stated therein the principal place where
he .carries on his business or if he has not made such
a return, the time specified in the notice has expired.
The third proviso to this sub.section is :
"Provided further that if the place of assessment
is called in question by an assessee the Income Tax
Officer shall, if not satisfied with the correctness of the
claim, refer the matter for determination under this
sub-section before assessment is made".
Thus urtder s. 64(3) the question of determination as
to the place of assessment only arises if an objection is
taken by the assessee and the Income Tax Officer has
any doubts as to the matter. But the determination
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
is to be by the Commissioner of Income Tax or the
Central Board of Revenue. The Act does not contemplate any other authority.
It was contended on behalf of the assessee that he
produced his accounts before the Income Tax Officer
at Calcutta under protest. There is no mention of
this protest in the assessment file and that is what
was stated by the Commissioner of Income Tax in his
reply which he gave on March 3, 1953, before the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and which has been
set out above. If such an objection had been raised
the question would have been referred by the Incometax Officer to the Commissioner as required under
s. 64(3). That stage never arose because the objection does not seem to have been taken at the stage
when it should have been taken, i.e., before the
Income-tax Officer, Calcutta.
But it is contended by counsel for the appellant
that in the present case there is an illegal assumption
of jurisdiction as the officer who made the assessment
had no jurisdiction at all to make the assessment. It
was also contended that if the Central Board of
Revenue wanted to transfer the assessment proceedings from the Income-tax Officer, Rangpur, to the
Income-tax Officer at Calcutta, it could only exercise
that jurisdiction by making an order under s. 5(7 A)
and not under s. 5(2) of the Act. He relied on Taylor
v. Taylor (1) where it was held that if a mode of exercise of power is laid down in the statute it has to be
exercised in that way and no other. He also relied
on Nazir Ahmad v. The King Emperor (2). He further
contended that this was not a case which fell under
s. 5(2) of the Act.
Section 5(7A) gives to the Central
Board of Revenue the power to transfer any case
from one Income-tax Officer to another which can be
made at any stage of the proceedings and does not
necessitate the reissuing of a notice under s. 22(2) if it
had already been issued by the Income-tax Officer
from whom the case is transferred and in the explanation the word 'case' in relation to any person
whose name is specified in, the order of transfer means
(1) (1875) l Ch. D. 426, 431.
(2) (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 372.
1959
Seth Teomal
v.
Commissioner of
lncoma-tax
Hapur ].
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
z959
all proceedings under the Act which may be pending
Seth T'omal
?n theh~ahte of thbe transfer andd jnfcludehs all proceed.
mgs w JC
may
e commence
a ter t e date of the
v.
c
Comtniss£oner of transier •
Income-tax
Section 5 although headed ' Income-tax authorities ' also gives to the Central Board of Revenue and
Kapu' J.
the Commissioners of Income-tax certain powers in
regard to withdrawing of cases from one area into
other and from one Income-tax Officer to another.
Suh-section (2) of this section gives power to the
Central Government to appoint as many Commissioners of Income-tax as it thinks fit and they have
to perform their functions in respect of different areas,
persons and cases or classes thereof.
The relevant
portion of the sub-section is as follows :-
S. 5(2) "The Central Government may appoint as
many Commissioners of Income-tax as it thinks fit
and they shall perform their functions in respect of
such areas or of such persons or classes of persons or
of such incomes or classes of incomes or of such cases
or classes of cases as the Central Board of Revenue
may direct ............... "
In the present case there are more than one Commissioner of Income-tax in Bengal and the Central Bpard
of Revenue assigned certain cases including the case
of the appellant to the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Central) at Calcutta for the exercise of his functions
as Commissioner.
Now this is a power which the
Central Board of Revenue did possess under sub-s. (2)
of s. 5.
As to which Income-tax Officer was to deal
with that case was for the Commissioner of Incometax to designate.
Sub-section 7 A of s. 5 confers on the Central Board
of Revenue the power to transfer any case from one
Income-tax Officer to the other which can be done at
any stage of the· proceedings. This sub.section is not
a provision which in any way modifies or cuts down
the power given to the Central Board of Revenue
under s. 5(2). The two sub-sections are complementary
,
and operate in two separate spheres.
Sub-section (2)
is for the purpose of specifying as to which of the
Commissioners would perform functions in respect of
(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
different areas, persons, incomes or cases or classes
thereof.
It was argued that s. 7 A is a special provision and it
necessarily excludes the operation of sub-s. (2) but as
we have saiq above the two sections are not mutually
exclusive. They operate in two different spheres, their
areas of operation are different and therefore the
power which the Central Board of Revenue exercised
in the present case cannot be said to be illegal. It
was not transferrin'g the appellant's case from the
Income-tax Officer, Rangpur, to the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta. It directed the Commissioner of Incometax (Central), Calcutta, to exercise his functions in
respect of certain cases including the case of the
appellant and that falls under s. 5(2) and not under
s. 5(7A).
Reference was made to Pannalal Binjraj v. Union
of India (1).
But that was a case in which the question raised was of constitutional validity of sub-s. 7 A
of s. 5 and it was held that it was a measure of administrative convenience and was v.alid and neither infringed the fundamental rights under Art. 14 nor
under Art. 19(l)(g).
There are no observations in
that case which militate against the view that subss. (2) & (7 A) operate in different areas nor did that
question arise in that case.
The contention there
raised was that sub-s. 7 A conferred arbitrary and uncontrolled powers of transfer and was discriminatory
and violative of the provisions of Art. 14 and imposed
an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on
trade or business in contravention of Art. 19 (l)(g).
Counsel referred to Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of
India (2)
But that case also does not deal with the
matter now before us.
The simple question to be
decided is whether the Income-tax Officer, Calcutta,
could make the assessment in the appellant's case.
The submission that there was illegal assumption of
jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer of Calcutta is
not well-founded. If the Central Board of Revenue
had the power to direct the Commissioner of Incometax (Central), Calcutta, to exercise his functions in
(1) [1957} S.C.R. 233, 266.
(2) [1956} S.C.R. 267.
z959
Seth Teomal
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax
[{ajn<r ].
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
'959
respect of several cases including the appellant's
Seth Teomal
mentioned in the ordei: dated November 29, 1946, as
v.
indeed it had under s. 5(2), then neither that order could
commissionu of be challenged nor the power of the Income-tax Officer,
In'ome-tax
Calcutta, to make the assessment.
After an order by
J(apur ].
the Central Board of Revenue under s. 5(2) of the Act
the provisions of sub-ss. (I) and (2) of s. 64 have no
application because of sub-s. (5a) of s. 64 which is as
follows:
Sub-s. 5 "The provisions of sub-section (I) and subsection (2) shall not apply and shall be deemed never
at any time to have applied to any assessee-
(a) on whom an assessment or reassessment for the
purposes of this Act has been, is being or is to be
made in the course of any case in respect of which a
Commissioner of Income-tax appointed without reference to area under sub-section (2) of section 5 is exercising the functions of a Commissioner of Incometax ''.
In view of this provision no objection can be taken on
the ground of sub-sections (I) and (2) of s. 64.
Counsel for the appellant relied on a judgment of
the Bombay High Court in Dayaldas Kushiram v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) (1 ), where it was
held that s. 64 was intended to ensure that as far as
practicable the assessee should be assessed locally, i.e.,
by the Income-tax Officer of the area in which the
assessee carries on business and there must, so far as
the exigencies of the case allow, be some reasonable
relation to the place where the assessee carries on
business or resides. In that case the assessee was
carrying on business in C Ward and the proper officer
under s. 64 to assess him was the Income-tax Officer
of that Ward. As a result of the coming into force of
s. 5(2) the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) was
created without reference to the area. The case of the
assessee on whom the notice had been served but had
not been assessed in due course assigned to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) who designated an
Income-tax Officer for assessment of the 11.ssessee. The
assessee thereupon made an application under s. 45 of
(1) [1939] 8 I.T.Il. 139.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
the Specific Relief Act and prayed for direction to the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) and the Incometax Officer to whom his case had been assigned to forbear from continuing the proceedings on the grounds
that the Income-tax Officer had ·no jurisdiction having
regard to s. 64 of the Act. It was held that the
Income-tax Officer was not the Income-tax Officer of
the area in which the assessee was carrying on business. It was also held that in spite of the insertion of
s. 5(2) of the Act such assessment was without jurisdiction because there was no amendment of s. 64. As
a result of this judgment Ordinance IX of 1939 was
promulgated which subsequently was enacted as subs. 5 of s. 64. After· the Ordinance the assessee Dayaldas Kushiram was assessed by the same Officer and
after unsuccessful appeals to the Commissioner of
Income-tax and the Appellate Tribunal he made an
application under s. 66(1) on three questions: (1) Whether the order passed by the Commissioner of Incometax deciding the place of assessment of the assessee
could be the subject matter of appeal to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal ; (2) vVhether the Tribunal had
the power to entertain an appeal on the question as to
the place of assessment of an assessee even in the absence of the order of Commissioner of Income-tax and
(3) whether the question as to the place of assessment
is a question of law arising out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. It was held that the order of the Commissioner was made under s. 5(2) and not under s. 64(3)
and as the Ordinance had retrospective effect these
questions did not arise and that the assessment of the
assessee was validly made by the Income-tax Officer
and the Ordinance removed the invalidity of the
orders made prior to the passing of the Ordinance so
far as they related to the assessee.
Beaumont, C. J.,
held that the Income-tax Act did not determine the
place of assessment but the officer who had to assess
and that there could be no appeal under the Act
against the order of the Commissioner as to the place
of assessment, but only against the order of assessment
of the Income-tax Officer.
r959
Seth Teomal
v.
Commissioner of
Income-tax
Kapu,. ].
314
SUPREME COURT RE;E'ORTS
[1959] Supp.
r959
Counsel for the appellant also relied on the judgSeth Teomal
ment of the Allahabad High Court in Dina Nath Hem
v.
Raj v. Commissioner of Income-tax(').
In that case
Commission" of the assessee was carrying on business at Calcutta and
Income-tax
he was sought to be assessed at Kanpur and an objection was taken to the Income-tax Officer, Kanpur,
making the assessment. The Income-tax Officer did
not proceed in accordance with s. 64(3) and therefore
it was held that assessment made by him was without
jurisdiction. In the present case no question has
been raised as to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax
Officer who made the assessment and apart from that
the order was made by the Central Board of Revenue
under s. 5(2) of the Act and s. 64(5) becomes operative
and sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s. 64 are inoperative. See
also Seth Kanhaiya"lal v. Commissioner of Income.
tax (2).
'
The question then arises whether the objection as
to the place of assessment, i. e., by the Income-tax
Officer of Calcutta could be challenged in appeal to
the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then before
the Appellate Tribunal. In our opinion it could not be.
The scheme of the Act shows that no appeal in regard
to the objection to the place of assessment is contemplated under the Act.
Under s. 64(3) of the Act a
question as to the place of assessment, when it arises,
is determined by the Commissioner.
Any such order
cannot be made a ground of appeal to the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner under s. 30 of the Act which
provides for appeals against orders of assessment and
other orders enumerated in s: 30 but no appeals is
there provided against orders made under s. 64(3).
Similarly appeals to the Appellate Tribunal which lie
under s. 33 of the Act also do not provide for any
appeal on the question of the place of assessment. In
Wallace Brothers' case (3 ) at p. 79 Spens, C. J., after
referring to s. 64(3) and the proviso thereto said:
"These provisions clearly indicate that the matter is more one of administrative convenience than of
(1) (1927) I.LR. 49 All. 616.
(2) [1936] 5 l.T.R. 739.
(3) [1945] F.C.R. 65: 13 I.T.R. 39.
(2) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
jurisdiction and in any event it is not one for adjudiz959
c~tion by thhe Cohurt ..... f ... h .... A ... Thdis confirms us in
1
the
Seth Teomal
view that t e sc eme o t e ct
oes not contemp ate
v.
an objection as to the place of assessment being raised conmiissione• of
on an appeal against the assessment after the assessIncome-tax
ment has been made. As we have already pointed
out, the objection was not raised in the present case
l(apur J.
even before the Appellate Income-tax Officer but only
before the Appellate Tribunal".
There is nothing in the Bidi Supply case (1) which in
any way detracts from the efficacy of the decision of
the Federal Court in Wallace Brothers' case (2).
We
have already said that Bidi Supply case (1) deals with
the vires of s .. 5(7 A).
In this view of the matter the question as to the
place of assessment does not arise out of the order of
the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and therefore no
question of law could be referred nor could the High
Court make such order under s. 66(2). In our opinion,
the High Court rightly dismissed the appellant's application for directing the case to be stated under
s. 66(2) of the Act.
The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with
costs. In the circumstances of the case there will be
only one set' of costs.
Appeals dismissed.
(2) [1945] F.C.R. 65; 13 I.T.R. 39.