# RAINBOW STEELS LTD. AND ANR v. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR

- **Citation:** [1981] 2 S.C.R. 727
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1981-01-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 337 of 1981
- **Bench:** V. D. Tulzapurkar, R. S. Pathak
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rainbow-steels-ltd-and-anr-v-commissioner-of-sales-tax-uttar-pradesh-and-anr-8159
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948 S. 3A-State Government nptifying
"Sale of old discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery" as liable to
tax--Sale vf ti/Ci 111al power plant in running condition-Whether exigible
to
.tax.
InterpretatiOI/ of Statutc:c.-Principle of noscitur a
sociis-When
can
be
invoked.
Jn exercise of the power under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948
the State Government, issued a notification dat~d May 30, 1975 which provided
that the tu1nover in respect of "old, discarded,
unserviceable
or
obsolete
machinery, stores or vehicles etc." shall be liable to tax at the point of sale at
the rate of five per cent.
A Thermal Power Plant together with its associate auxiliaries, components
and accessories belonging to the State Electricity Board was sold in a working
condition to the Appellant No. 1, who paid sales tax on the sale under protest
The power plant was used by Appellant No. l and as the power position in the
State improved, Appellant No.
1 discontinued the
generation of electricity
through this power plant and negotiated its sale to Appellant No. 2.
Since there was dilTerence of opinion between the parties as to the pa•yment
of sales tax on the machinery the question was referred for clarification to the
Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 35 of the Act. The Commissioner
·was of the view that the four words, "old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete"
had been used disjunctively and each adjective had its own meanin& and seme
and that since the power plant had been used before its sale
it
was "old"
machinery and the sale was liable to tax under the said Entry.
The order of thP. Comn1issioner was confirmed by the High Court.
E
In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of the Appe1lants it was submitted
invoking the principle of no"Seitur a sociis that th~ expression 'old' which is
G
more general should be restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general expressions. namely "discardedi unserviceable or obsolete,, and read in this
manner the sale of the power plant could not be re.i.;arded as sale
of "old"
m:ichinerv falling within the Entry.
On behalf of the Respondents it was contended that the
four
adjectives
occurring in the Entry have· been used disjunctively and each must be given
H·
its own separate meaning, 3nd 'that the principle of noscitur a sociis would nm:
apply to the construction of the expression
1old'.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
Allowing the appeal,
8
c
D
E
F
G
n
HELD : 1. The thermal power plant was in perlect running condition and
was 1:iold as such.
Jt would not faII within Entry No. 15 of the Notification.
[733D]
2. The four adjectives "old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete·" which
are susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed
together
while
qualifying
machinery in the Entry. The first adjectiv~ 'old' is clearly more. general than
the other three and as such all the four would take their colour from
each
othc.:r. the meaning of the more general adjective 'old' being restriicted to a
sense analogous to that of the less general namely "disca•rded, unserviceable or
obsolete".
All the four adjectives ·which qualify the word "machinery" have
been used disjunctively. The adjective 'old' by itself is vague,
imprecise
and
ambiguous for there is no indication as to how n1uch old the machinery should
be before it could be described as 'old machinery'--one day old, one month
old, one yea.r old, five years old or even ten years old (the degree of oldness
being a relative concept).
l732F-733A]
3. In the absence of any indication that the adjective 'old' has been deliberately used in a wider sense ¥.1hcn the expression 'old' is by
itself
vague,
imp1ecise and ambiguous, being too general, the principle of noscitur a sociia
will have to be applied i.e. all the associated words will take colour from each
other.
[733Bj
4. (i) The principle of noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable to the cons~
truction of the expression ·old' occurring in Entry No. 15, and th

## Text

727
RAINBOW STEELS LTD. AND ANR.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR.
January 30, 1981
[V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ]
Uttar Prlldcsh Sales Tax Act 1948 S. 3A-State Government nptifying
"Sale of old discarded, unserviceable or obsolete machinery" as liable to
tax--Sale vf ti/Ci 111al power plant in running condition-Whether exigible
to
.tax.
InterpretatiOI/ of Statutc:c.-Principle of noscitur a
sociis-When
can
be
invoked.
Jn exercise of the power under section 3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948
the State Government, issued a notification dat~d May 30, 1975 which provided
that the tu1nover in respect of "old, discarded,
unserviceable
or
obsolete
machinery, stores or vehicles etc." shall be liable to tax at the point of sale at
the rate of five per cent.
A Thermal Power Plant together with its associate auxiliaries, components
and accessories belonging to the State Electricity Board was sold in a working
condition to the Appellant No. 1, who paid sales tax on the sale under protest
The power plant was used by Appellant No. l and as the power position in the
State improved, Appellant No.
1 discontinued the
generation of electricity
through this power plant and negotiated its sale to Appellant No. 2.
Since there was dilTerence of opinion between the parties as to the pa•yment
of sales tax on the machinery the question was referred for clarification to the
Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 35 of the Act. The Commissioner
·was of the view that the four words, "old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete"
had been used disjunctively and each adjective had its own meanin& and seme
and that since the power plant had been used before its sale
it
was "old"
machinery and the sale was liable to tax under the said Entry.
The order of thP. Comn1issioner was confirmed by the High Court.
E
In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of the Appe1lants it was submitted
invoking the principle of no"Seitur a sociis that th~ expression 'old' which is
G
more general should be restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general expressions. namely "discardedi unserviceable or obsolete,, and read in this
manner the sale of the power plant could not be re.i.;arded as sale
of "old"
m:ichinerv falling within the Entry.
On behalf of the Respondents it was contended that the
four
adjectives
occurring in the Entry have· been used disjunctively and each must be given
H·
its own separate meaning, 3nd 'that the principle of noscitur a sociis would nm:
apply to the construction of the expression
1old'.
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
A
Allowing the appeal,
8
c
D
E
F
G
n
HELD : 1. The thermal power plant was in perlect running condition and
was 1:iold as such.
Jt would not faII within Entry No. 15 of the Notification.
[733D]
2. The four adjectives "old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete·" which
are susceptible to analogous meaning are clubbed
together
while
qualifying
machinery in the Entry. The first adjectiv~ 'old' is clearly more. general than
the other three and as such all the four would take their colour from
each
othc.:r. the meaning of the more general adjective 'old' being restriicted to a
sense analogous to that of the less general namely "disca•rded, unserviceable or
obsolete".
All the four adjectives ·which qualify the word "machinery" have
been used disjunctively. The adjective 'old' by itself is vague,
imprecise
and
ambiguous for there is no indication as to how n1uch old the machinery should
be before it could be described as 'old machinery'--one day old, one month
old, one yea.r old, five years old or even ten years old (the degree of oldness
being a relative concept).
l732F-733A]
3. In the absence of any indication that the adjective 'old' has been deliberately used in a wider sense ¥.1hcn the expression 'old' is by
itself
vague,
imp1ecise and ambiguous, being too general, the principle of noscitur a sociia
will have to be applied i.e. all the associated words will take colour from each
other.
[733Bj
4. (i) The principle of noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable to the cons~
truction of the expression ·old' occurring in Entry No. 15, and that expression
will have to be given a restricted 1neaning-a sense a·nalogous to that of the less
gene!·al \.Vottls clubbed \.Vith it.
[732A]
(ii) ]f the \:vider words used are in themselves va.gue imprecise or ambiguou~ and there is no indication that thesei have been deliberately used to
infu~e \vider n1eaning then the rule of noscitur a sociis can be invoked.
[732E]
State of Bombay & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. [1960] 2
S.C.ll. 866 and l'he Corporation of the City of Nagpur
v.
Its
En1ployee3
[1960] 2 S.C.R. 942 referred to.
Letang v. Cooper [1965] I Q.B. 232 distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 337 of 1981.
Appeal by Special Leave from
18-4-1979 of the Allahabad High
F.A.F.O. No. 39/77.
the Judgment and
Court
(Lucknow
Order dated
Bench)
in
V. M. Tarkunde and B. R. Sabharwal for the Appellant.
S. Markandey for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TULZAPURKAR, J. This appeal by special leave raises the question
whether on true construction of Entry No. 15 of the Notification No.
/1
'
,
•
)
RAINBOW STEEL v. C.S.T. (Tulzapurkar, !.)
729
ST-II-4949/X-10(2)-74 dated May 30, 1975 issued under S.3A of
A
U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948, the negotiated sale of a Thermal Power
Plant by appellant No. 1 to aiwellant No. 2 is exigible to sales tax
thereunder?
The short facts giving rise to the question may be stated : A
Thermal Power Plant at Rampur comprising seven boilers, five tur8
bines together with its associate auxiliaries components and accessories
originally belonged to the U.P. State Electricity Board. The Board,
after selling it in working condition to appellant No. 1 on May 29,
1974 for Rs. 41.31 lakhs called
upon the fatter to pay sales tax
thereon which was paid under protest.
Appellant No. 1 used it for
generating electricity from May 29, 1974 to September 30, 1975.
C
As the power position improved in the State of U.P. appellant No. 1
discontinued the generation of electricity through this power plant
and finding it expedient to realise its investment negotiated a sale
thereof in perfect working condition to appellant No. 2.
Appellant
No. 1 desired to charge sales tax on the said negotiated sale but appellant Ne. 2 informed appellant No. 1 that it had obtained considered
D
opinion that no sales tax on such a transaction was leviable inasmuch
as the sale was not of "old, discarded,
unserviceable or obsolete
machinery," falling within Entry No. 15 of the concerned Notification
dated May 30, 1975.
Both the appellants thereupon referred the
question for clarification to the Commissioner of Sales Tax
U.P.,
Lucknow under Section 35 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act 1948. It was
E
contended on their behalf that the word (adjective) "old" occurring
in the Entry would take colour from the other words
(adjectives)
that follow it and the cumulative effect of all the words taken together
showed that those words were either synonymous or near synonymous
suggesting that the machinery in order to fall within the Entry should
become non functional or non usable and that since the power plant
in question had not become "old" in that sense and was in perfect
working condition it would not fall within the Entry and the
sale
thereof by ajppellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2 was not exigible to
tax.
The Commissioner by his order dated February 19, 1977 negatived the contention holding that the four words
"old,
discarded,
unserviceable or obsolete" had
been used
disjunctively and each
adjective had its own meaning and sense and that since the power
plant had been used before its sale by appellant No. 1 to appellant
No. 2 it was cild machlnery and the sale thereof was liable to tax
under the said Entry.
F
G
Feeling aggrieved by that order the aP1Pellants preferred an appeal
H
to the Allahabad High Court being F.A.F.O. No. 39 of 1977 and
a learned single judge of the Lucknow Bench on April 18, 1979 dis-
A
.B
·C
D
E
F
730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[198!] 2 S.C.R.
missed the appeal and confirmed the Commissioner's view that since
the concerned power plant had been purchased by appellant No. 1
long ago and had been put to use it was "old machinery" within the
meaning of the Entry, observing that "the degree of oldness has to
be greater than recently manufactured machinery used only for
the
some time".
The Commissioner's view as confirmed by the High
Court is challenged by the appellants before us in this appeal.
Section 3A of tbe U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 empowers the State
Government to specify the rates of taxes and the point at which the
tax can be imposed, subject to a maximum of 12 per cent, on the
turn over in respect of the goods specified in the First Schedule to
the Act and clause (b) empowers the State Government to amend the
entries in the Schedule. In exercise of the aforesaid power the State
Government issued tbe Notification No.
ST-II-4949/X-10(2)-74
dated May 30, 1975 which provided that witb effect from June 1,
1975 the turn over in respect of the goods specified in column II of
the Schedule to this Notification shall be liable to tax at the point
of sale and at the rate specified respectively in columns III and IV
thereof :
SI.
No.
I
Schedule
'M' Stands for sale by manufacturer in Uttar Pradesh.
'I' stands for sale by the importer in Uttar Pradesh.
Description of goods
Point at which
Rate of tax
tax shall be
levied.
II
III
IV
15.
Old, discarded, unserviceable or obsoSale to consu5 per cent
Iete machinery, stores or vehicles inmer
eluding waste products except cinder,
coal ash and such items as are included
in any other notification issued under
the Act.
The question is whether the negotiated sale of tbe Thermal Power
-O
Plant at Rampur by appellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2 falls within
tbe aforesaid Entry so as to attract sales tax at 5 per cent on the sale
price charged by appellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2? In other words
the qnestion is whether it is a sale of "old machinery" within the
meaning of the Entry and what is the true meaning of the expression
"old machinery". It is undisputed that the Thermal Power Plant
11
in question when it was sold by U.P.
State Electricity Board to
appellant No. 1 on May 29, 1974 was in perfect running condition
and tbe Sales tax on that transaction was paid under protest. It is
....
(
•
(
I
•
RAINBOW STEEL v. C.S.T. (Tulzapurkar, J.)
731
further undisputed tlmt awellaut No. 1 used that power plant for
generating electricity for about a year and four months and because
the power position improved in the State of U.P. the appellant No. 1
negotiated the sale thereof to appellant No. 2 with the view to realise
back its investment and the power plant had been kept in !Perfect
running condition with periodical checks by the Inspector of Factories
as also by the Inspector of Boilers and when sold it was in perfect
working and running condition.
Question is whether such
power
plant could be regarded as "old machinery" within the meaning of
Entry 15.
Counsel for the appellants contended that it could not be regarded
as old machinery in the sense that it had become non-functional or
non-usable whic)l meaning should be given to the expression 'old'
occurring in the Entry.
In other words, he sought to
invoke the
principle of noscitur a sociis for constrning expression 'old' because
of its association with the other expressions like "discarded, unserviceable or obsolete" occurring in the
Entry.
According
to
the
counsel the expression 'old' which is more general should be restricted
to a sense analogous to that of the less general expressions, namely,
"discarded, unserviceable or obsolete" and read in this manner the
sale of the power plant in question could not be regarded as sale of
old machinery falling within the Entry.
On the other hand counsel
for the respondents supported the view taken by the Commissioner
of Sales Tax as well as by the High Court, for, according to him the
principle of noscitur a sociis would not apply to the construction of
the eXjpression 'old' occurring in the Entry. He urged that the four
adjectives have been used disjunctively and each must be given its
own separate meaning and pointed out that in two decisions, namely,
State of Bomhy & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors.(')
and The Corporation of the City of Nagpur v.
Its Employees(')
this Court refused to apply the said principle while construing the
definition of 'industry' given in s.2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and in s.2(14) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 respectively, and that in Letang v. Cooper(')
Diplock, L. J., has observed thus : "The maxim noscitur a sociis is
always a treacherous one unless you know the societas to which the
socii belong." According to 1rim further the ejusdem generis principle would be clearly inapplicable inasmuch as it was not a case
where some general words follow any particular, generic or specific
words.
(1) [1960] 2 SCR 866.
(2) [1960] 2 SCR 942.
(3) [l 965] l Q.B. 232.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1981] 2 S.C.R.
Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions
urged before us, we are clearly of the view that the principle of
noscitur a sociis is clearly applicable to the construction of the expression 'old' occurring in Entry No. 15, and that eXJPression will have
to be give a restricted meaning-a sense analogous to that of the less
general words clubbed with it. The principle is explained in MaxweN
on the Interpretation of Statutes
(12th Edn.) at page 289 thus :
"Where (Wo or more words which are susceptible of analogous
meaning are coupled together,
noscitur a socfis,
they are
understood to be used in their cognate sense.
They take, as
it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of
the
more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of
the less general."
Moreover, even in the two decisions relied upon by counsel for the
respondents where this Court refused
to
apply the
principle of
noscitur a sociis while construing the definition of 'industry' in the
two concerned enactments because the Legislature bad deliberately
used wider words in order to make the scope of defined word correspondingly wider, the Court has observed that "it is only
when the
intention of the Legislature in associating wider words with words of
narrower significance is doubtful or is otherwise not clear that
the
present rule of construction can be usefully applied." In other words,
if the wider words used are in themselves vague, imprecise or ambiguous and there is no indication that these have been deliberately
used to infuse wider meaning then this rule of construction can be
invoked.
Dealing with the Entry in question, in the first place it cannot be
disputed that the four adjectives which are susceptible to analogous
meaning are clubbed together while qualifying 'machinery' in the
Entry. Secondly, it cannot be disputed that the first adjective 'old' is
clearly more general than the other three and as such all the four
G
would take their colour from each other, the meaning of the more
general adjective 'old' being restricted to a sense analogous to that of
the less general, namely,
"discarded, unserviceable or obsolete".
Thirdly, it is true that all the four adjectives which qualify the word
'machinery' have been used disjunctively but it is precisely for
that
reason that the adjective 'old' becomes vague, imprecise and ambigB
nous,
being too general.
The adjective 'old' by itself i~ certainly
vague, imprecise and ambiguous, for there is no indication as to how
much old the maahinery should be before it could be described as
•
•
RAINBOW STEEL v. C.S.T. (Tulzapurkar, 1.)
7 33
old machinery. A machinery could be one day old, one month old,
on~ year old, five years old or even ten years old, (the degree of oldness being a relative concept) and which one is intended to be ill.eluded in the Entry has not been made clear at all. And, lastly, there is
nothing in the Entry to indicate that the adjective 'old' has been deliberately used in a wider sense. In the absence of any indication to
that effect and when the expression 'old' is by itself vague, imp~se,
and ambiguous,
being too general, the principle of noscitur a sociis
will have to be applied i.e. all the associated words will take colour
from each other, the meaning of the more general, adjective viz. 'old'
being restricted to a sense analogous to the less general adjectives "discarded, unserviceable or obsolete". In other words in order to fall
within th~ expression 'old machinery' occurring in the Entry, the
machinery mnst be old machinery in the sense that it has become non•
functional or non-usable. In our view, therefore, on true construction
the sale of the Thermal Power Plant which at the time of sale by appellant No. l to appellant No. 2 was in perfect running condition and
which was sold as such would not fall within the aforesaid Entry No.
15 of the concerned Notification dated May 30, 1975.
A
B
c
D
The English decision of the Court of Appeal in Letang v. Cooper
(supra) relied upon by counsel for the respondents is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as it dealt with a statute which referred to "negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue
E
of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision)," and when it was argued that because the cause of action in both nuisance and negligence
included
the infliction of actual damage as an essential element,
"breach of duty" should also be understood as confined to causes of
a~tion in which actual damage was likewise essential the said contenF
tion was rejected by Diplock, L.J., by observing thus :
"It is clear, however, that 'breach of duty' cannot be restricted to those giving rise to causes of action in which the
infliction of actual damage is an essential element, for the
words in parentheses expressly extend to a duty which exists
by virtue of a contract and the infliction of actu_al damage is
not an essential element in an actfon for breach of contractual
duty."
In other words, it was a case of a statute where the parentheticel porG
tion occurring therein expressly indicated the contrary intention-conH
trary to the contention urged and, therefore, the principle of noscitur a
sociis was not applied.
14-152SCl/81
A
734
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1981] 2 S.C.R.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the view of the lower anthorities is set aside and the sale in question is declared to be not exigible to tax under Entry No. 15 of the concerned Notification dated May
30, 1975 .. In the circumstance, there will be no order as to costs.
N.V.K.
Appeal allowed.
>
(