# RAIPUR MANUFACTURING CO. LTD v. OKHABHAI DEVRAJBHAI PATNI

- **Citation:** [1976] 2 S.C.R. 818
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-11-26
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1102 of 1975
- **Bench:** P. N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P. N. Shinghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raipur-manufacturing-co-ltd-v-okhabhai-devrajbhai-patni-6556
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, ss. 42( 4), 78(1) (A) (a)(i) and
79(1) and (3) and r. 53 of rhe Rules made thereunder-Scope of-Power to
extend period after expiry of the initial period-"Mutua//y fixed", meaning
of.
A combined reading of ss. 42(4), 78(1)(A)(a)(i), 79(1) and (3) of the
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and r. 53 of the Rules made under the
Act, sh.ows that an application under s. 79( 1) to the Labour Court, in respect
of a dispute falling und.er s. 78(1)(A)(a)(i) must be made within 3 months
of the arising of the dispute; and that the dispute would be deemed to have
arisen if, within a period of 15 days from the receipt of a letter of approach
under s. 42(4) by the employer, o.r within such further period as may
be
mutually fixed by the employer and the employee, no agreement is arrived at in
Tespect of the change desired by the employee.
In the present case, the letter of' approach under s. 42(4) claiming that his
age was only 56 years and so he should not be retired, was sent bY the employ-ee
(respondent) to the etnployer (appellant) on February 13, 1973. Since there
was no response, the respondent requested the Labour Commissioner. on March
17, 1973, to intervene. The Labour Officer of the appellant appeared before
the Labour Commissioner and took adjournment in order to compromise the
dispute. As no compromise was arrived at, the respondent filed his application
under s. 78(1)(A)(a)(i) read :withs. 79.(1) before the Labour Court on June
7, 1973. The Labour Court and on appeal,.the Industrial Court, held, that the
period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the letter of approach expired
on February 28, 1973; that the dispute between the parties should be deemed to
have arisen at the latest on March l, 1973; that the application under s. 79(1)
to the Labour Court sliould have been filed within 3 months of that date, that
is, on or before June 1, 1973; and that, therefore, the application filed on June
7, 1973, was barred under s. 79(3)(a). The High Court, however. took the
view that by reason of the Labour Officer of the appellant asking for adjournment
for compromising the matter on or after March 17, 1973, there was an extension of the period to some date beyond March 17, 1973 by mutual agreement between the parties, and that therefore. the application filed on June 7,
1973, was within 3 months of the arising of the dispute.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that (1) there was no valid
extension of the .period for settlemept as such extension should have been fixed
before the expiry of the initial period of 15 days, and (2) no period was
111utua 1ly fixed between the parties.
Allowing the appeal on the second ground,
HELD: (1) The further period f'or arriving at a settlement under r. 53(2)
can be mutually fixed between the parties even after the expiration of the initial
period of 15 days; and in such a case, the dispute would be deemed to have
arisen only on the expiration of the extended period if within that time no
settlement is arrived at.
[824·G]
(a) There is nothing in the rule which provides that the further period
should be fixed before the expiration of the initial period.
The words in the
rule "within 15 days of the receipt of the application by the employer or within ;uch further period as may be mutually fixed between the employer and
the employee" are suff!cie!'l!y wide to. c.oyer a s!tuation where the further period
jq fixed after the exp1rat10n of the m1bal penod. [824 B.C.].
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RAIPUR JVVNUFACTURING co. v. OKHABHAI (Bhagwati, !.) 819
(h) T)1e object of the rule is that; as far as possible, the employer and the
.employee should arrive at an agreement by negotiation in respect _of the cha!1ge
-desired by the employee and it is, only where such an agreement is n?t poss1b\e
,that the employee should approach the Labour Court for ad1ud1ca11on.
It 1s
possible that even after the expiry of the initial period, the parties may arrive
.at a settlement an

## Text

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RAIPUR MANUFACTURING CO. LTD.
v.
OKHABHAI DEVRAJBHAI PATNI
November 26, 1975
(P. N. BHAGWATI, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND
P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.]
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, ss. 42( 4), 78(1) (A) (a)(i) and
79(1) and (3) and r. 53 of rhe Rules made thereunder-Scope of-Power to
extend period after expiry of the initial period-"Mutua//y fixed", meaning
of.
A combined reading of ss. 42(4), 78(1)(A)(a)(i), 79(1) and (3) of the
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and r. 53 of the Rules made under the
Act, sh.ows that an application under s. 79( 1) to the Labour Court, in respect
of a dispute falling und.er s. 78(1)(A)(a)(i) must be made within 3 months
of the arising of the dispute; and that the dispute would be deemed to have
arisen if, within a period of 15 days from the receipt of a letter of approach
under s. 42(4) by the employer, o.r within such further period as may
be
mutually fixed by the employer and the employee, no agreement is arrived at in
Tespect of the change desired by the employee.
In the present case, the letter of' approach under s. 42(4) claiming that his
age was only 56 years and so he should not be retired, was sent bY the employ-ee
(respondent) to the etnployer (appellant) on February 13, 1973. Since there
was no response, the respondent requested the Labour Commissioner. on March
17, 1973, to intervene. The Labour Officer of the appellant appeared before
the Labour Commissioner and took adjournment in order to compromise the
dispute. As no compromise was arrived at, the respondent filed his application
under s. 78(1)(A)(a)(i) read :withs. 79.(1) before the Labour Court on June
7, 1973. The Labour Court and on appeal,.the Industrial Court, held, that the
period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the letter of approach expired
on February 28, 1973; that the dispute between the parties should be deemed to
have arisen at the latest on March l, 1973; that the application under s. 79(1)
to the Labour Court sliould have been filed within 3 months of that date, that
is, on or before June 1, 1973; and that, therefore, the application filed on June
7, 1973, was barred under s. 79(3)(a). The High Court, however. took the
view that by reason of the Labour Officer of the appellant asking for adjournment
for compromising the matter on or after March 17, 1973, there was an extension of the period to some date beyond March 17, 1973 by mutual agreement between the parties, and that therefore. the application filed on June 7,
1973, was within 3 months of the arising of the dispute.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that (1) there was no valid
extension of the .period for settlemept as such extension should have been fixed
before the expiry of the initial period of 15 days, and (2) no period was
111utua 1ly fixed between the parties.
Allowing the appeal on the second ground,
HELD: (1) The further period f'or arriving at a settlement under r. 53(2)
can be mutually fixed between the parties even after the expiration of the initial
period of 15 days; and in such a case, the dispute would be deemed to have
arisen only on the expiration of the extended period if within that time no
settlement is arrived at.
[824·G]
(a) There is nothing in the rule which provides that the further period
should be fixed before the expiration of the initial period.
The words in the
rule "within 15 days of the receipt of the application by the employer or within ;uch further period as may be mutually fixed between the employer and
the employee" are suff!cie!'l!y wide to. c.oyer a s!tuation where the further period
jq fixed after the exp1rat10n of the m1bal penod. [824 B.C.].
-"! -
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)
RAIPUR JVVNUFACTURING co. v. OKHABHAI (Bhagwati, !.) 819
(h) T)1e object of the rule is that; as far as possible, the employer and the
.employee should arrive at an agreement by negotiation in respect _of the cha!1ge
-desired by the employee and it is, only where such an agreement is n?t poss1b\e
,that the employee should approach the Labour Court for ad1ud1ca11on.
It 1s
possible that even after the expiry of the initial period, the parties may arrive
.at a settlement and such settlement should not be discouraged by compelling the
·employee to apply to the Labour Court within 3 months of the expiration of
the initial period of 15 day~. [824 D-F]
[Obiter : The further period cannot, however, be fixed after 3 months have
·elapsed from the expiration of the initial period oi' 15 days and the application
has become barred under s. 79(3)(a).] [825 BJ
(2) But, it cannot be said in the present case that the further period was
mutually fixed by the appellant and the respondent before the Labour Com:
missioner.
[825-C]
(a) There must be a specific period agreed upon between the parties but
there is no reference to any specific period in the present case.
[825-E]
(b) Even on a liberal view that the Labour Commissioner granred
the
adjournment tO' the Labour Officer of the appellant for arriving at a settlement
up to a specific date implying a specific period, there is no averment in the
application under s. 79. to the Labour Court, that such specific period was
mwually fixed between the parties, nor even a remote suggestion to that effect.
It is not even stated that the respondent consented to the adjournment as to
enable an inference of mutual" agreem~nt to be made.
[825-EF]
(c) In fact, it was not the case of the respondent that any further period
was mutually fixed to save the application from the. bar of limitation. On the
contrary, he prayed _for condonation of delay, but th> Labour Court has no
power to condone the delay.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1102
of
1975;
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the
18th September 1974 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Spl. Appln.
No. 1224 of 1974.
F. S. Nariman, V. B. Patel and I. N. Shroff for the appellant.
V. N. Tarkunde, Vimal Dave for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHAGWATI, J.-This appeal, by special leave,
raises
a
short
question of construction of certain provisions of the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts
giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows.
'.fhe ~pp~llant ~arries o~ business of manufacturing cloth in
a
textile mill situate m the city of Ahmedabad.
The respondent was
working as a jobber in the textile mill in the employment of the appellant and, according to the records of the appellant, he was due to
superannua!e _on _7th January, 1971 on reaching the age
of
60
years and mttmat10n to that effect was accorclingly given to him by
the appellant by a notice dated 1st October, 1970 under Standing
Order 19. It appears, however, that the appellant decided to continue the respon?ent in service for a period of one year after the date
of superannuat10n and the appellant accordingly gave a notice dated
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 S.C.R.
24th September, 1970 under Standing Order 19-A continuing
the
service of the respondent for a period of one year and intimating to
him that he would be retired on 8th January, 1972. Thereafter there
was another extension of service granted by the
appellant by
a
notice dated 12th January, 1972 issued under sian<ling Order 19-A
and it was intimated to the respondent that he would .be. retired 011
8th Jani;ary, 1973. The respondent, by his letter dated 5th January,
1973, requested the appellant on compassionate grounds to grant him
further extension of service for a period of two years from 8th January, i973, but the appellant declined to do so and in the result the
service of the respondent came to an end by retirement on 8th January,
1973. The respondent did not at any time until his retirement on 8th
January, 1973 question the correctness of the records of the appellant or challenge the stand of the appellant showing that he had completed the age of 60 years on 7th January, 1971. It was only after
his retirement that the respondent for the first time, by
his
letter
dated 13th February, 1973, gave notice to the appellant that his age
was on)y 56 years on 8th January, 1973 and his retirement
was,
therefore, null and void and he should be reinstated in service. This
was rightly regarded as a letter of approach by the respondent to the
appellant under s. 42 sub-s. ( 4) of the Act requesting for a change
in respect of the order passed by the appellant under Standing Order
l 9 reurmg the respondent.
The appellant did not se~d any reply
to this letter of approach and no agreement was arrived at between
the appellant and the respondent within 15 days of the receipt of the
letter oi approach by the appellant. It appears that since there was
no favournble response from the appellant, the respondent made an
application to the Labour Commissioner on 17th March, 1973 requesting his intervention in the matter. The Labour Officer of the appellant
appeared before the Labour Commissioner pursuant to the notice issued
to the appellant and, to quote the words used by the respondent in his
application before the Labour Court, "took adjournment for making
compromise". But no compromise was arrived at between the parties
and the respondent ultimately on 7th June, 1973 filed an application
before the Labour Court under s. 79(1)
read with s. 78(1) (A)
(a) (i) of the Act praying that the order passed by the appellant
retiring him from service should be treated as null and void and he
should be reinstated in service with all benefits. The appellant resisted the application on various grounds and agart from disputing the
claim of the roopondent on merits, the appellant raised a preliminary
objection that the application was barred by time
under s. 79 ( 3)
(a) of the Act since it was filed more than three months after the
arising of the dispute.
The respondent had also filed along with tbe
application under s. 78 (1) (A) (a) (i) an application for condonar
tion of delay and to this application, the answer given by the appellant was that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to condone the
delay in filing the application udner s. 78(1) (A)
(a)
(i). The
Labour Court took the view that the application of the respondent
under s. 78(1) (A) (a) (i) was barred under s. 79(3) (a) as it
was not filed within three months of the arising of the dispute and the
Labour Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the
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RAIPUR MANUFACTURING co. v. OKHABHAI (Bhagwati, J.)
821
application and in this view, the Labour Court rejected the application without 11oin<> into the merits.
The respondent preferred an apA
peal to the l~du~rial Court, but the Industrial Court also took the
same view and dismissed the appeal. The respondent thereupon preferred a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and on this petition, the High Court reversed the view taken by
the Labour Court and the Industrial Court and held that the appli8
cation fiied by the respondent under s.78 (1) (A) (a) (i) was within
three months of the arising of the dispute and hence it could not be
said to be barred under s. 79(3) (a). The High Court accordingly
set aside the order passed by the Industrial Court and remanded the
application to the Labour' Court to dispose it of on merits.
This decision of the High Court is impugned in the present appeal brought
with special leave obtained from this Court.
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The question which arises for determination in this appeal lies in
a very narrow compass, but in order to appreciate it, it is necessary
to refer to a few relevant sections of the Act.
The first
material
section to which we must refer is s. 42, sub-s. ( 4) which is in the
following terms :
"'42 ( 4). Any employee or a
representative
Union
0
desliring a change in respect of-
( i) any order passed by the employer under Standing
Orders, or
(ii)
(iii)
shall make an application to the Labour Court.
Provided that no such application shall lie unless the
employee or a representative Union has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement
has
been
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arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period."
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What is the 'prescribed period' is to be found in r. 53 of the Rules
made under the Act.
That rule so far as material reads :
,
"53 ( 1). Any employee or a representative Union desiring a change in respect of (i) any order passed by the
employer concerned under Standing Orders .... shall make
an application in writing to the employer.
An application
for change in respect of an order passed by the employer
under standing orders shall be made within a period of six
months from the date of such order. Where such application
is made by an employee it may be made to the employer
direct or through the Labour Officer for the local area or
the ~ep~esentative of employees concerned.
A copy of the
applicat10n shall be forwarded to the
Commissioner
of
Labour and in cases where such application is not made
through the Labour Officer for the local area to that officer.
I 1-Ll 59SCT/76
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
(2) Where an application has been made by an em- :
ployee under sub-rule ( 1) the employer and the employee
may arrive at an agreement within fifteen
days o[
the
receipt of the application by the employer within such further period as may be mutually fixed by the employer and
the employee or the Labour Officer for the local area or
the representative of employee as the case may be.
(3) Where an application has been made by a representative Union under suh rnle (1 ) , the employer and the Resrescntative Union may arrive at an agreement within fifteen
days of the receipt of the application by the employer or
within such further period as may be mutually agreed upon
by the parties."
·Then there is s. 78 which deals with the powers of the Labour
Court and sub-s. (l) (A) (a) (i) of that section provides inter alia :
"78 ( 1) . A Labour Court shall have power toA. decideD
(a) disputes regardingE
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(i) the propriety or legality of an order passed by an
employer acting or purporting to act
under
the
Standing Orders.
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Explanation.-A dispute falling under clause
(a) of
Paragraph A of sub-section ( 1) shall be deemed to have
·arisen if within the prescribed period under the Proviso
to sub-section ( 4) of section 42, no agreement is arrived at
in respect of an order, matter or change referred to in the
said Proviso."
And lastly, sub-ss. (1) l)nd ( 3) (a) of s. 79 provide how and within
what time proceedings before a Labour Court in respect of a dispute
falling under s. 78 (A) ((a) (i) are to be commenced and they read
as follows :
"79(1). Proceedings before a Labour Court in respect'
of dispute falling under caluse (a) of Paragraph A of subsection ( 1) of Section 78 shall be commenced on an application made by any of the parties to the dispute ...
(2)
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(3) An application in respect of a dispute falling under
clause (a) of paragraph A of sub-section (1) of
section 78 shall be made-
(a) if it is a dispute falling under sub-clause (i) or (ii)
of the said clause, within three months of the arising
of the dispute;"
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RAJPUR l\lANUFACTURlNG co. v. OKHABHAI (Bhagwati, J.) 823
lt will be seen on a combined reading of these provisions that au
.application to the Labour Court under s. 79(1) in respect of a dispute falling under s. 78(1) (A) (a) (i) must be made within three
months of the arising of the dispute and the dispute would be deemed to have arisen if, within a period of 15 days from
the receipt
of the letter of approach under s. 42, sub-s. ( 4) by the employer or
within such further period as may be mutually fixed by the employer
.and the employee, no agreement is arrived at in respect of the change
d.esired by the employee.
Here in the present case, the letter of approach under s. 42, sub-s.
(4) was sent by the respondent to the appellant on 13th February,
1973 and it may be presumed that it was received by the appellant
on the same day.
The period of 15 days calculated from the date
of the receipt of the letter of approach by the appellant, therefore,
expired on 28th February, 1973 and
admittedly until that time no
agreement was arrived at between the appellant and the respondent in
respect of the change desired by the respondent.
There can, therefore, be no doubt that if nothing further had transpired, the dispute
between the parties would be deemed to have arisen at the latest on
1st March, 1973 and the application under s. 79, sub-s. (1) read with
s. 78(1) (A) (a) (i) should have been filed within three months
from that date, that is, on or before 1st June, 1973 and in the circumstances, the application made by the respondent on 7th June,
1973 would be clearly barred under s. 79(3) (a). Both the Labour
Court and the Industrial Court accepted this view and rejected the
application of the respondent in limine without examining the merits
of the case.
The High Court, however, took a different view and
held that by reason of the Labour Officer of the appellant asking
for adjournment on or after 17th March, 1973 in order to compromise the dispute between the parties, the period of 15 days was extended by mutual agreement between the parties to some date beyond
17th March, 1973 and the application filed by the respondent on 7th
June, 1973 was, therefore, within three months of the arising of the
dispute and was accordingly saved from the bar of s. 79 (3) (a).
The question is : whether this view taken by the High Court is correct,
or it suffers from any infirmity and requires to be set aside ?
Now, it is obvious that the view taken by the High Court can
be sustained only if it can be shown that, though no settlement in respect of the change desired by the respondent was arrived at within
a period of 15 days from the receipt of the letter of approach by
the appellant, further period upto some date beyond 7th March, 1973
was mutually fixed between the appellant and the respondent, for then
the dispute would be deemed to have arisen on or after that date and
iu that event, the application filed by the respondent on 7th June,
1973 would be within three months of the arising of the dispute and
hence within time.
The appellant submitted that
two
conditions
were required to be satisfied for this purpose : ( 1)
further period
for arriving at a settlement must have been fixed. before the expiration of the initial period of 15 days, and (2) it must have been
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 2 S.C.R.
mwually fi~!!d between the appellant and the respondent.
The respondent conceded that the sef_ond was a necessary condition, but so
far as the firs.t condition was concerned, the re~pondent contended
that it was not necessary that the further period should have been
fixed before the expiration of the initial perjod of 15 days.
It wa:;
sufficient to attract the applicabjlity of the provision, said the respondent, even if the further period was fixed after the expiration of thi.:
initial period of 15 days, so long as that was done before the period
of three months expired and the application of the respondent became
barred under s. 79(3)(a).
We think there is great force in the contention of the respondent.
We do not find anything in rule 53(2)
which provides that further period should be inμtually fixed by
the
employer and the employee bef9re the expiration of the initial period
of 15 days from the receipt of tbe letter of ap12roach by the employer.
The words used by the rule ma_king authority are "within 15 days of
the receipt of the application by the employer or within such further
period as may be mutually fixed between the employer and the employee" and these words are sufficiimtly wide to cover
a
situation
where further period is mutually fixed after the expiration
of
the
initial ~iod of 15 days.
There is really no warrant for reading in
the words used by the rule making authority any restriction that further period n.rnst be mutually filled before t~e expiration of the initial
period of 15 days. It must be remembered that the object of this
provision is that, as far as possible, the employer and the employee
should arrive at an agreement in respect of the change desired by the
employee and it is only where an agreement is not possible that the
employee should be allowed to approach the Labour
Court.
The
provisions of the Act arc intended to bring about settlement of disputes between the employer and the employees and so far
as
the
methodology or mechanics of the resolution of such disputes is concerned, the greatest importance is attached by the legislature to settlement by negotiations. It is only where settlement through negotiations fails that other modes of resolution of disputes are provided by
the legislature in the different provisions of the Act. It is in the light
of this philosophy underlying the provisions of the Act and this policy
and principle to promote, as far as possible, settlement by negotiations.
and avoid adjudication, that the words used by
the
rule
making
authority in rule 53 (2) must be construed and if that is done, therecan be little doubt that further period may be mutually fixed between
the employer and the employee even after the initial period of 15 days
has expired.
It is quite possible that even after the expiration of the
initial period of 15 days, the employer and the employee may come
together and arrive at a settleme[lt.
Why should that be discouraged by compelling the employee to file an application under s. 78 (1)
(A) (a) (i) within three months of the expiration of the initial period
of J 5 days, on pain of his application becoming time barred.
Such
an interpretation would not l!_dvance the object and purpose of the
Act.
The employer and the employee may very well agree,
even
after the expiration of the initial period of 15 days, that they will try
to negotiate a settlement and that would impliedly mean that during
the time fixed by them for such negotiations, the employee
should
not rush to the Labour Court.
It is only when such period mutually
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RAIPUR M'.ANUFACTURING CO. V. OKHABHAI (Bhagwati, J.) 825
fixed by them expires without any settlement _ha~ing_ been arr~ved . a~
that a dispute can be deemed to arise, for adjudication of which t!~"'
employee may approach the Ll~bour Court under. s. 78(1)(~) (a)(1J ·
We arc therefore of the view that further penod for arnvmg at a
settlem~nt can be 'mutually fixed by the ei:nployer and the
empl_oyec
.even after the expiration of the initial penod of 15 _days and wl'.ere
such is the case, the dispute would be deemed to anse on t~e ex~1ra
.tion of such further period, if within that time no settle~ent 1s arnvcd
at between the parties.
Vfe should of course make it clear
that
prima facie it seems to us that such further period cannot be mutually
fixed after three months have elapsed ·from the expiration of the initial
period of 15 days and the application of the
employee
under
s.
78(1)(A)(a)(i) has already become barred under s. 79(3)(a).
lt would therefore seem clear that if, as a result of what trans-
:pired before' the Labo~r Commissioner,. ft:rtht<r period for arriving at
a settlement in respect of the change desrred by the respondent was
mutually fixed between the appe_llant and the respondent, the dispute
would not be deemed to have arjsen till the expiration of such further
period and in that event, the application made by the respondent on
7th June, 1973 would be within time.
The question, however.
is
whether it can be said at all that further period was mutually fixed
by the appellant and the respondent before the Labour Commissioner.
We do not think this question can be answered in favour of the respondent. If we look at the application of the respondent, we do not
'find in it anything even remotely suggesting that further period for
arriving at a settlement was mutually
agreed
upon between
the
appellant and the respondent.
In the first place, there must be
a
specific period agreed upon between. the parties.
Here we do
not
find any averment of a specific period.
Even if we
construe
the
application of the respondent' most liberally, the
utmost
we
can
extract from it is that adjournment must have been granted by the
Labour Commissioner to the Labour Officer for the purpose of arriving at a settlement upto a specific elate and that would indicate a
specific period.
The difficulty, however, still remains that then~ is
no averment that such specific
period was
mutually fixed by the
parties. The only averment made in the application of the respondent
is that at the hearing before the Labour Commissioner, the Labour
Officer. of the appellant "took adjournment to make a compromise",
but ultimately no compromise was arrived at. It is not even stated
in the applicati~n ~hat the respondent consented to the adjournqient,
so that the application for adjournment by the appellant and the consent to the adjournment by the respondent could be construed as an
agreement mutually fixing further period for arriving at a settlement.
There being absolutely no averment of further period being mutually
fixed between the parties, it is difficult to see how the case of the
respondent could be brought within the latter part of rule 53 (2). It
was never the case· of the respondent that further period was mutually
fixed and that saved his case from the bar of limitation. The relief that
he asked for from the Labour Court as well as Industrial Court was
condonation of delay but so far as this relief is concerned, the Labour
Court has unfortunately no power to condone thl!' delay and hence
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
826
· SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 2 s.c.R.
his request was rejected. We are, therefore, of the view that the High
Court was in error in holding that the application made by the respondent under s. 78(1) (A) (a) (i) was within three months of the
arising oE the dispute and was hence not barred under s. 79 ( 3 )(a).
We accordingly allow the appeal set aside the order passed by the
High Court and restore the order of the Industrial Court rejecting;
the application of the responde,nt as barred under s. 79(3) (a). So far
as the cost of this appeal is concerned, when the appeUant was granted
special leave, it was made a condition that the appelfant would in any
event pay the cost of the respondent. Therefore. the appellant, though
it has succeeded, will pay the cost of the appear to· the respondent .
V.P.S.
: ..
. Appeat allowed.