# RAJ A BAHADUR MOTILAL POON A MILLS v. TUKARAM PIRAJI MASALE

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 939
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1953-07-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1955
- **Bench:** Bhagwati, Venkatarama Ayyar, S. K. Das, GovINDA MENON
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raj-a-bahadur-motilal-poon-a-mills-v-tukaram-piraji-masale-1285
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Industrial Dispute-Strike-Change in the existing system of
working-Workers obiecting as illegal change and going on strikeStrike, whether illegal-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946
( Bom. XI of 1947 ), s. 97(1)( c).
By s. 97(1)(c) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946:
"A strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for
the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of
any standing order or has made an illegal change".
The management of the appellant Mill desiring to make a
change in the existing system of working started making an exper~
ment by asking a few workmen who had volunteered to work at
the rate of four looms to a weaver for a period of two months. The
other workers objected that this was an illegal change on the ground
that the management could not legally introduce any change with·
out first going through the procedure prescribed by the Act, and
went on strike. The question was whether the strike was illegal.
Held, that as the workmen had gone on strike only for the reason that the change or experiment made by the appellant was an
illegal change, their action came within the express terms of s.
97(1)(c) of the Act and the strike was illegal.

## Text

.....
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
RAJ A BAHADUR MOTILAL POON A MILLS
v.
TUKARAM PIRAJI MASALE.
[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S. K. DAS and
GovINDA MENON JJ.]
Industrial Dispute-Strike-Change in the existing system of
working-Workers obiecting as illegal change and going on strikeStrike, whether illegal-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946
( Bom. XI of 1947 ), s. 97(1)( c).
By s. 97(1)(c) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946:
"A strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for
the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of
any standing order or has made an illegal change".
The management of the appellant Mill desiring to make a
change in the existing system of working started making an exper~
ment by asking a few workmen who had volunteered to work at
the rate of four looms to a weaver for a period of two months. The
other workers objected that this was an illegal change on the ground
that the management could not legally introduce any change with·
out first going through the procedure prescribed by the Act, and
went on strike. The question was whether the strike was illegal.
Held, that as the workmen had gone on strike only for the reason that the change or experiment made by the appellant was an
illegal change, their action came within the express terms of s.
97(1)(c) of the Act and the strike was illegal.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 323 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July
2, 1953 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil
Application No. 159 of 1953.
r1
R.J. Kolah and A.G. Dave, for the appellant.
H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Ghaudhury and M. R. Rangaswamy, for respondent No. 2.
1956. October 31. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GOVINDA MENON J.-On July 20, 1954, the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay granted a certificate
of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution
7956
October 3/,
1956
Raja Bahadttr
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tttkara1n Piraji
Jf.lasale
GotJinda Mcno1~ J.
940
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
that the judgment of that court dated July 2, 1953,
.passed in Special Civil Application No. 159 of 1953,
was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court as it
involved a substantial question of law, and it is in
pursuance of such certification that the above appeal
is now before this court. A brief resume of the facts
and circumstances, which led to the application for a
writ of certiorari in the High Court, becomes necessary for a correct appreciation of the question of
law involved and may, therefore, be shortly stated.
The appellant which may hereafter, for the purpose
of convenience, be called "The Mill", is a limited
company owning and possessing a Cotton Textile
Spinning and Weaving Mill situated in Poona, employing a large number of workmen who have a union
of theirs.
The first respondent is a workman employed by the Mill and the second respondent is the
Poona Girni Kamagar Union of which the first respondent is a member.
Respondents 3 to 5 were formally added as parties in the first instance, but their
names were struck off as unnecessary at the time of
the hearing.
·
The appellant was running 580 looms, for working
which one weaver had been allotted at the rate of
two looms; and when things were in that state on
August 29, 1951, the Management issued a notice to
the effect that from September 1, 1951, it was desired
to carry on an experiment of four looms to a weaver
for a period of 2 months, on 16 looms. If at the end
of that period or before the expiry of the same it
was found that the working was successful, the
Management would introduce the scheme after giving
the notice of change required under the Act. The
object of this notice was ostensibly to introduce
rationalization or rather efficiency system of work,
if and when the suggested experiment proved successful.
As a resut of this notice on September 4, 1951,
the Secretary of the Union wrote to the Manager of
the appellant Mill intimating that under the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act the Management could not
legally introduce any change in the existing system
of working without first giving notice of the change
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
941
in the prescribed form to the representatives of the
Union and workers and without going through the
.other procedure prescribed by the Act; and the
Management were further informed that if they insisted in carrying on the change illegally, the work-
• men would be free to move the proper courts. The
notice also stated that the introduction of the new
system would affect the workers' wages and cause
great hardship; and that if anything untoward happened, the blame would be wholly on the management, as it would be impossible for the Union to control the workers in the matter.
Four workers volunteered to work the experiment
and started working accordingly on the 16 looms on
September 6, 1951, whereupon the other workmen
raised an objection and the four loyal workmen were
prevented from continuing with the experimental
work. But the Management did not withdraw the
notice and none except the 4, was required by the
Management to take part in the experiment. The
second shift among the workmen also refused to work
with the result that there was a complete strike in the
Mills between the 6th and the 26th of September,
1951.
On September 10, 1951 the appellant filed an application under sections 78 and 97 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born. XI of 1947), praying that the strike resorted to by the weavers working on both the shifts commencing on September 6,
1951, and continuing till the presentation of the
application be declared illegal being in contravention
of the provisions of the said Act. On September 16,
1951 the Vice-President of the Mill Mazdoor Sabha
filed a written statement in answer to the above complaint stating that the workers did not strike work
in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations
Act and that the weavers never refused to do their
proper and usual work but refused only to do the
illegal work insisted on them by the employers; in
other words, they were agreeable to have two looms
per weaver and not to work the attempted experiment.
Within three days of the filing of the 11,bove written
1956
Raja Balladur
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tttkaratn Piraji
Masale
GovifJda Menon J.
1956
Raja Bahadur
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tukaram Piraji
Masale
Govinda Menon J.
942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
statement, two of the workers filed an application
under sections 78 and 98 of the Bombay Industrial
Relations Act before the same Labour Court against
the Management praying for a declaration that the
action of the Management had resulted in an illegal
lockout in contravention of the Act, and, therefore, •
~
the Management should be ordered to withdraw the
said illegal change.
The appellant filed a written
statement countering the allegations contained in
the application for the declaration of an illegal
lockout and stated that their action was not in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
as it did not constitute an illegal change.
The Labour Court at Bombay heard both the
applications together and by a combined order dated
September 26, 1951, held that since the Management
had not compelled any one to accept any work,
their action could not be considered ari illegal lockout. At the same time, it held that the workers did
not create a situation amounting to an illegal strike.
The result of these findings was the negation of the
grant of the prayers contained in the respective applications, but in addition the court declared that the
action of the Management was an illegal change and,
therefore, the notice whereby the experiment was
attempted to be tried, should be withdrawn.
The workers were content with the outcome of
their application but the Management ha.;,ing been
aggrieved by the declaration that their action
amounted to an 'illegal change' filed an appeal before
the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Bombay (Appeal
No. 293 of 1951) upon which the learned Judges of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal took the view that
the strike by the workmen was illegal. They also
concluded that there was no lockout on the part of
the Management. That being the case, the order of
the Labour Court declaring that there was an illegal
change was set aside with the declaration that the
strike in question was illegal with the necessary consequences.
In order to get the said- order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal quashed, an application for a writ
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
of certiorari under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitu7956
tion was filed by the two of the workers before the , R . 8 h d
High Court of Bombay where Chagla C.J. and Dixit
;:t~raz°P;:;
J., took the view that since the decision of the AppelMills
late Tribunal was erroneous, the same should be
v.
quashed, with the result that the ·decision of the Tukaram Piraji
Labour Court was upheld. It is this judgment that
Masale
is under appeal before us as a result of the certificate Govinda Menon J.
granted by the High Court of Bombay.
A reading of the relevant portions of the statute
is necessary to find out whether the order appealed
against is justified or not. The Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, 1946 was enacted to regulate the relations of employer and employees, to make provisions
for the settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for certain other purposes. This statute repealetl
the Bombay Trade Disputes Conciliation Act, 1934
and the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938.
Section 3(8) defines "change" as meaning an alteration in an industrial matter and sub-s. (15) contains
a definition of 'illegal change' as meaning an illegal
change within the meaning of sub-ss. (4) & (5) of
s. 46 which are in the following terms:-
" (1) ............................................... .
(2) ............................................... .
(3) ............................................... .
(4) Any change made in contravention of the
provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be
illegal.
(5) ]'ailure to carry out the terms of any settlement, award (registered agreement or effective order
or decision of a Wage Board), (a Labour Court or the
Industrial Court affecting industrial matters) shall be
deemed to be an illegal change".
Section 42 which speaks of change may also be
quoted so far as it is relevant for our purpose:-
" (1) Any employer intending to effect any change
in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule
II shall give notice of such intention in the prescribed
form to the representative of employees. He shall
send a copy of such notice to the Chief Conciliator,
the Conciliator for the industry concerned for the
1956
Raja Bahadur
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tukaram Piraji
Ma sale
{)44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956)
local area, the Registrar, the Labour Officer and such
. other person as m .. y be prescribed. He shall also affix
a copy of such notice at a conspicuous place on the
premises where the employees affected by the change
are employed for work and at such other place as may
be directed by the Chief Conciliator in any particular
case.
"
Govinda Menon J.
'Industrial matter' has also been defined in the Act
in s. 3(18) in the following words:
" 'Industrial matter' means any matter relating
to employment, work, wages, hours of work, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, or
the mode, terms and conditions of employment, and
includes:-
( a) all matters pertaining to the relationship
between employers and employees, or to the dismissal
or non-employment of any person;
(b) all matters pertaining to the demarcation
of functions of any employees or classes of employees;
(c) all matters pertaining to any right or claim
under or in respect of "()r concerning a registered
agreemerit or a submission, settlement or award made
under this Act;
(d) all questions of what is fair and right in
relation to any industrial matter having regard to
the interest of the person immediately concerned and
of the community as a whole;".
Schedule II, para 4 mentions "rationalization or
other efficiency system of work" and therefore when
any such rationalization is introduced, it is obligatory upon the employer to give notice of such an intention in the prescribed form to the representatives
of the employees.
We may also refer to s. 3(35-A)
defining 'stoppage' in the following terms:-
" 'Stoppage' means a total or partial cessation
of work by the employee in an industry acting in
combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under
a common understanding of employees to continue to
work or to accept work, whether such cessation or
refusal is or is not in consequence of an industrial
dispute;".
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S.C.lt.
SUPltEME COUltT REPORTS
945
Sub-section (36) defines 'strike' as follows:-
" 'Strike' means a total or partial cessation of
work by the employees in an industry acting in combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under
a common understanding of employees to continue to
work or to accept work, where such cessation or
• refusal is in consequence of an industrial dispute".
Chapter XIV of the statute concerns itself with
illegal strikes and lockouts of which s. 97 deals with
illegal strikes, whereas s. 98 deals with an illegal lockout. According to s. 97(1)(c), a strike shall be illegal
if it is commenced or continued only for the reason
that the employer has not carried out the provisions
of any standing order or made "an illegal change".
In considering whether the strike in question was
illegal, the learned Judges of the High Court )lave
expressed the opinion that there is a common law
right for an employee to stop work and that it is only
by statutory prohibition that certain strikes have
been made illegal in the interest of labour relations.
In the present case since there had been no 'illegal
change" effected by the employer, the High Court
took the view that on the very finding of the Appel-
'
late Tribunal that the change was a legal change,
the strike in question did not come within the ambit
of s. 97.
Learned counsel for the appellant has pressed two
arguments before us with regard to the construction
of s. 97(1)( c) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1946.
His first argument is that the High Court was
in error when it held that there was any such right
as a common law right of an employee to go on strike
._""' and s. 97 constituted an inroad on that right. Learned
counsel has submitted that under s. 97(l)(c) a strike
shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only
for the reason that the employer has not carried out
the provisions of any standing order or has made an
illegal change; if a st.rike is illegal when it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has made an illegal change, a fortiori it must
be illegal when it is commenced or continued for a
legal change. The contention of learned counsel is
128
1956
Raja Bahadt1r
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tttkaratn Piraji
Masnl.:
Govinda Menon J.
946
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
that by necessary implication cl. (c) condemns a strike
which is commenced or continued for a change which
Raja Bahadur
MotitatPoona
is not illegal. The second argument of learned counsel
1956
Mills
is that the true scope and effect of cl. (c) is this: the
v.
word 'only' occurring in the clause goes with the word
Tukaram Piraji 'reason', and if the strike is commenced or continued
Masate
for the only reason that the employer has made an
Govinda Me,onJ. illegal change, it shall be illegal. The test is not whether there was a legal or illegal change in fact but
what was the reason for which the employees went
on/strike, and if the employees commenced or continued a strike only for the reason that the employer
had made an illegal change, the strike would be illegal
within the express terms of the clause.
In our opinion it 'is unnecessary to decide in this
case whether the first argument of learned counsel
for the appellant is correct or not; because we are
clearly of the opinion that the second argument with
regard to the construction of s. 97 ( 1) ( c) is correct and
should prevail. In this c'ase the workmen themselves
came to court with the plea that the action of the
employer amounted to an illegal change. In their
application to the Labour Court, they said: "That
for the above-mentioned reasons it is prayed that this
Honourable Court be pleased to declare the said lockout by the opponent Mills as illegal being in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
and the opponent be ordered to withdraw the said
illegal change". It is obvious, therefore, that the
workmen in this case struck work only for the reason
that the change or experiment made by the appellant
employer was an iflegal change. The action of the
workmen, therefore, came within the express terms of
s. 97(1)(c) of the Act. The learned Chief Justice did
not consider this aspect of the case, and reached a
conclusion with regard to the legality of the strike on
a reasoning which did not give full effect to the words
used ins. 97(1)(c). In our view, the true test was to
find out the reason for which the strike was commenced or continued, and it was unnecessary to consider or decide whether there was a common law right
of the workmen to go on strike or whether the work-
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S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
947
men had the right to go on strike as a means of collective bargaining against a change which they did
not like.
Mr. Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken
us through the different provisions of the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and has contended
that the workmen have the right to go on strike as a
means of collective bargaining against any measure
adopted by the employer which the workmen may
consider to be detrimental to their interests, provided
the strike does not come within the prohibited ambit
of s. 97. Even assuming that Mr. Gokhale is right in
his contention, it is clear to us that if the wol"kmen
commence or continue a strike for the only reason that
the employer has made an illegal change, they come
within the express terms of s. 97 (1) ( c). It is immaterial
whether the change is subsequently found by the
Labour Court to be a legal change. It is worthy of
note that there is a separate provision for imposing
a penalty on an employer who makes an illegal
change. The relevant consideration, however, with
regard to s. 97(1)(c) is the reason fo:t which the strike
is commenced or continued. That reason in this
particular case is clear enough. The workmen themselves said that they commenced and continued the
strike because the employ~r had made an illegal
change. That being the position, the strike was illegal
within the express terms of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that, on a proper
interpretation of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act, the strike
which was commenced and continued from September
6, to September 26, 1951, was clearly illegal.
The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order
of the High Court dated July 2, 1953, is set aside. The
result, therefore, is that the order of the Labour
Appellate Court dated September 4, 1952, stands,
with the declaration that the strike in question was
illegal with its usual consequences.
In this case, the appellant had agreed, while asking
for a certificate from the Bombay High Court for
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, to pay the
taxed costs of the respondents in one set. Learned
1956
Raja Bahadur
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tukaram Piraji
Ma sale
Govinda MenonJ.
1956
Raja Bahadu,.
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tukaram Piraji
Ma sale
Govinda Menon J,
1956
November 1.
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
counsel for the appellant himself has drawn our attention to the agreement. In view of that it is n9t
necessary for us to decide in this case whether it was
open to the Bombay High Court to pass any order
about costs in this Court while granting a certificate
of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution, and
we direct that the appellant should pay to the respondents the costs of this appeal in one set and bear its
own·costs thereof.
Appeal allowed.
DW ARKA DASS BHATIA
v.
THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR.
[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]
Preventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina
of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories
found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion badJammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss. 8(2)
and 12(1).
The petitioner was detained by virtue of an order of detention
passed by the District Magistrate, Jammu, under s. 3(2) of the
Ja.mmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 and tbat order
was'confirmed and continued by an order passed by the Government
of the State of Jammu and K"shmir under s. 12(1) of the Act after
taking the opinion of the Advisory Board.
The order recited tl!at
it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community and was based on
the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential
goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan. It was
'-
found that shaffon cloth and znri were not essential goods.
It was
not established that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was
substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards
shaffon cloth· and zari was of an inconsequential nature.
Held, that the order was bad and must be quashed. The sub·
jective satif:;faction of the detaining authority must be properly
based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based.
If some
out of those reasons are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the
Court cannot predicate what tbe subjective satisfaction of the
authority would have been on the exclusion of those rea&ons.
To
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