# Raja Bahadu,. Motilal Poona Mills v. Tukaram Piraji Ma sale Govinda Menon J

- **Citation:** [1956] 1 S.C.R. 948
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-09-05
- **Bench:** Jagannadhadas, B.P. Sinha, Fer Imam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-bahadu-motilal-poona-mills-v-tukaram-piraji-ma-sale-govinda-menon-j-1287
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Preventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina
of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories
found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion badJammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss. 8(2)
and 12(1).
The petitioner was detained by virtue of an order of detention
passed by the District Magistrate, Jammu, under s. 3(2) of the
Ja.mmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 and tbat order
was'confirmed and continued by an order passed by the Government
of the State of Jammu and K"shmir under s. 12(1) of the Act after
taking the opinion of the Advisory Board.
The order recited tl!at
it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community and was based on
the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential
goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan. It was
'-
found that shaffon cloth and znri were not essential goods.
It was
not established that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was
substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards
shaffon cloth· and zari was of an inconsequential nature.
Held, that the order was bad and must be quashed. The sub·
jective satif:;faction of the detaining authority must be properly
based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based.
If some
out of those reasons are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the
Court cannot predicate what tbe subjective satisfaction of the
authority would have been on the exclusion of those rea&ons.
To
-
-
~
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
uphold the order on the remaining reasons would be to substi ·
tute the objective standards of the Court for the ilubjective satisfaction of the authority. The Court must, however, be satisfied
that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might
reasonably have affected the subjective satisfac1ion of the authority.
Keshav 'l.'alpade v. The King Emperor ([1943] F.C.R. 88), Atma
Ram Sridhar Vaidya's case ([1951] S.C.R. 167), Dr. Ram Krishan
Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi ((1953] S.C.R. 708) and Shibban Lal
Saksena v. The State of U.P. ([1954) S.C.R. 418), relied on.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 172 of
1956.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ
in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
S. N. Andely, amicus curiae, for the petitioner.
Porus A. Mehta, T. M. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for
the respondent.
1956. November 1.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
JAG.ANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under
article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus against the State of
Jammu and Kashmir by the petitioner who was under
detention by virtue of an order dated the 5th September, 1956, isRued by the Government of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir under sub-section (2) of section 3 taken with sub-section (1) of section.12 of
Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner
was first placed under detention by virtue of an order
passed by the District Magistrate, J ammu, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act on the 1st May,
1956', and that order was confirmed·and co·ntinued on
the 5th September, 1956, under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act by the Government after taking
the opinion of the Advisory Board. The two orders
of detention, one of the District Magistrate dated the
1st May, 1956, and the other of the Government dated
the 5th September, 1956, recited that the petitioner
is directed to be detained because it was necessary to
make such an order "with a view to preventing him
19SIS
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jammu and
Kashmir
1956
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jamniu and
Kashmir
Jagannadhadasj.
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community". The grounds of deten

## Text

1956
Raja Bahadu,.
Motilal Poona
Mills
v.
Tukaram Piraji
Ma sale
Govinda Menon J,
1956
November 1.
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
counsel for the appellant himself has drawn our attention to the agreement. In view of that it is n9t
necessary for us to decide in this case whether it was
open to the Bombay High Court to pass any order
about costs in this Court while granting a certificate
of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution, and
we direct that the appellant should pay to the respondents the costs of this appeal in one set and bear its
own·costs thereof.
Appeal allowed.
DW ARKA DASS BHATIA
v.
THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR.
[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]
Preventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina
of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories
found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion badJammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss. 8(2)
and 12(1).
The petitioner was detained by virtue of an order of detention
passed by the District Magistrate, Jammu, under s. 3(2) of the
Ja.mmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 and tbat order
was'confirmed and continued by an order passed by the Government
of the State of Jammu and K"shmir under s. 12(1) of the Act after
taking the opinion of the Advisory Board.
The order recited tl!at
it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing
him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community and was based on
the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential
goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan. It was
'-
found that shaffon cloth and znri were not essential goods.
It was
not established that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was
substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards
shaffon cloth· and zari was of an inconsequential nature.
Held, that the order was bad and must be quashed. The sub·
jective satif:;faction of the detaining authority must be properly
based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based.
If some
out of those reasons are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the
Court cannot predicate what tbe subjective satisfaction of the
authority would have been on the exclusion of those rea&ons.
To
-
-
~
...
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
uphold the order on the remaining reasons would be to substi ·
tute the objective standards of the Court for the ilubjective satisfaction of the authority. The Court must, however, be satisfied
that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might
reasonably have affected the subjective satisfac1ion of the authority.
Keshav 'l.'alpade v. The King Emperor ([1943] F.C.R. 88), Atma
Ram Sridhar Vaidya's case ([1951] S.C.R. 167), Dr. Ram Krishan
Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi ((1953] S.C.R. 708) and Shibban Lal
Saksena v. The State of U.P. ([1954) S.C.R. 418), relied on.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 172 of
1956.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ
in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
S. N. Andely, amicus curiae, for the petitioner.
Porus A. Mehta, T. M. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for
the respondent.
1956. November 1.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
JAG.ANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under
article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ
in the nature of habeas corpus against the State of
Jammu and Kashmir by the petitioner who was under
detention by virtue of an order dated the 5th September, 1956, isRued by the Government of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir under sub-section (2) of section 3 taken with sub-section (1) of section.12 of
Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner
was first placed under detention by virtue of an order
passed by the District Magistrate, J ammu, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act on the 1st May,
1956', and that order was confirmed·and co·ntinued on
the 5th September, 1956, under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act by the Government after taking
the opinion of the Advisory Board. The two orders
of detention, one of the District Magistrate dated the
1st May, 1956, and the other of the Government dated
the 5th September, 1956, recited that the petitioner
is directed to be detained because it was necessary to
make such an order "with a view to preventing him
19SIS
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jammu and
Kashmir
1956
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jamniu and
Kashmir
Jagannadhadasj.
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1956]
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community". The grounds of detention as communicated
to the petitioner' on the 31st May, 1956, by the District Magistrate, Jammu, are as follows:
"l. That you carried on smuggling of essential
goods to Pakistan through the Ferozpur and Amritsar
border, but since the tightening of said borders you
have recently shifted your smuggling activities to
Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan borders in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir and are carrying on illicit
smuggling of essential goods such as cloth, zari and
mercury to Pakistan through this border (thus affecting the economic condition of the public in Kashmir
State adversely).
2.
That for the said purpose of smuggling of
goods to Pakistan you went to village Darsoopura
on 7th April, 1956, and contacted Ghulam Ahmed son
of Suraj Din resident of Darsoopura Tehsil Ran birsinghpura and one Ram Lal son of Frangi resident
of Miran Sahib Tehsil Ranbirsinghpura and others
who similarly are addicted to carrying on such a
smuggling business and with their aid made arrangements for export ofShaffon cloth worth Rs. 2,500 t<
Pakistan through Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan border.
3.
That on 11-4-1956, you booked 3 bales of silk
cloth through Messrs Jaigopal Rajkumar Shegal of
Amritsar to Jammu Tawi and got thege bales on
address of yourself, and on the same day you got one
package of Tila booked through S. Kanti Lal Zarianwalla of Amritsar and got this package also addressed
"To self" for Jammu Tawi.
That after booking these packages as aforesaid
you came over to Jammu and waited for their arrival
and contacted Ghulam Ahmed and Ram Lal the above
mentioned persons.
That on the 15th April, 1956, you tried to get the
transport receipt from the Punjab National Bank but
did not succeed in doing so as it was a public holiday.
Meanwhile your activities leaked out and the goods
. -
•
-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
were seized by the Central Customs and Excise Depart1956
ment of India.
Pwarka Dass
2.
There are other facts also but those cannot
Bhatia
be given as I consider their disclosure would be against
v.
the public interest.
The State of
That by resorting to the above activities you
J~::~~,:i~d
have been and are acting in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of the supplies and services essential JagminadhadasJ.
to the community".
It will be seen from the above grounds that the reason
for the detention is the alleged "illicit smuggling of
essential goods such as Cloth, zari and mercury to
Pakistan through the border, thereby affecting the
economic condition of the public in Kashmir State
adversely". From the particulars set out in paragraph 2 of the grounds, it appears that the cloth
referred to in paragraph 1 is Shaff on cloth. The High
Court of Jammu and Kashmir, to whom a similar
application was filed by this petitioner along with a
number of others similarly detained for illicit smuggling of goods, has in its. judgment dated the 21st
June, 1956, held that Shaffon cloth is not within the
category of an essential commodity as defined in the
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance of
Jammu and Kashmir. There is no indication in the
High Court judgment whether zari is or is not an
essential commodity in the same sense. But in answer
to a qu~ry from this Court, Shri Porus Mehta who
appeared before us on behalf of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir has stated, on instructions, that zari
which is obviously a luxury article is not one of the
commodities declared essential under the above Ordinance. The High Court, when it dealt with the batch
of applications, of which the application of the petitioner before us was one, set aside the detention of
number of others on the ground that the smuggling
attributed to the individuals concerned in those cases
was not of essential goods. So far as this petitioner
is concerned the High Court held as follows:
"The case of Dwarika Das Bhatia stands on &
1956
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jqmm1t and
/{ashmir
952
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
different footing altogether.
The allegation against
him is that he smuggled into Pakistan some goods
such as cloth and zari along with a certain quantity
of mercury.
Mercury is a non-ferrous metal and according to the definition of an essential commodity
given in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Ordinance, mercury is an essential commodity. This
being so, Dwarika Das Bhatia's detention cannot be
J agannadhadas J, challenged".
The point raised before us is that since the detention is based on the assumption that Shaf!on cloth
and zari as well as mercury; are all essential goods and
since two out of the three categories of the goods
with reference to the smuggling of which the detention has been directed, are found not to be essential
goods, the entire order is illegal, although one of the
items, viz., mercury is an essential commodity. In
support of this contention, the cases of this Court in
Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi('),
and Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U. P.(') are
relied upon. Learned counsel for the State of Jammu
and Kashmir contends that the principle of these
decisions has no application to the present case, and
attempts to distinguish the same. In order to understand the principle underlying these two cases, it is
necessary to examine them in some detail.
In Dr. Ram Krishan f3hardwaj's case (supra) the two
points that were raised were (1) whether an order of
detention is invalid if the grounds supplied in support thereof are vague, and (2) whether the vagueness of one or some of the various grounds vitiates
the entire order. The argument advanced in that case
was based on the view adopted by this Court in the
decision in Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya's case('), viz.,
that the obligation cast on the detaining authority
to supply grounds is for the purpose of enabling a
detenue to make a fair representation to the authority concerned and to the Advisory Board, against
the order uf detention.
The argument was that in a
(1 ! [1953] S.C.R. 708.
(21 [1954] S C.R. 418.
13) [1951] S C.R. 167.
-
-
·-
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
case where one or more of the grounds a.re vague, the
1956
petitioner is handicapped in making an adequate
Du,arka Dass
representation as regards that ground and his repreBhatia
sentation even if effective in respect of the other
v.
grounds, may fail to carry conviction as regards the
The State of
ground which is vague and that this might result in
Jammtt and
the detention being confirmed. The Court stated that
Kashmir
that argument was not without force and held as J g
-dh d sJ
f 11
a anna
a a
•
0 ows:
"The question however is not whether the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in the
matter of securing his release by his representation,
but whether his constitutional safeguard has been
infringed. Preventive detention is a serious invasion
of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as
the Constitution has provided against the improper
exercise of the power must be jealously watched and
enforced by the Court.
. ....... We are of opinion that
this constitutional requirement must be satisfied
with respect to each of the grounds communicated
to the person detained, subject of course to a claim
of the privilege under clause (6) of article 22.
That
not. having been done in regard to the ground mentioned, ........ the petitioner's detention cannot be held
to be in accordance with the procedure established
by law within the meaning of article 21".
Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U. P. (supra) is a
case where the question arose in a different form.
The grounds of detention communicated to the detenue were of two-fold character, i.e., fell under two
different categories, viz., (1) prejudicial to maintenance of supplies essential to community, and (2)
injurious to maintenance of public order. When the
matter was referred to the Advisory Board, it held
that the first of the above grounds was not made out
as a fact but upheld the order on the second ground.
The question before the court was whether this
confirmation of the original order of detention, when
one of the two grounds was found to be non-existent
by the Advisory Board, could be maintained. Their
Lordships dealt with the matter as follows:
124
954
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
1Ps6
"It has been repeatedly held by this court that
the power to issue a detention order under section 3
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
of the Prevent~ve Detention Act depends entirely
v.
upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority
Th, state of
specified in that section. The sufficiency of the
Jarnmuand
grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be
Kashmir
based, provided they have a rational probative value
JagannadhadasJ and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the
· legislative provision cannot be challenged in a court
of Jaw, except on the ground of mala fides.
A Court
of law is not even competent to enquire into the
truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned
as grounds of detention in the communication to the
detenue under section 7 of the Act."
Posing the situation which arises in such cases where
one of the grounds is found to be irrelevant or unsubstantiated, the Court stated as follows:
"The question is,
whether in such circumstances the original order made under section 3(1)
(a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. The answer,
in our opinion, can only be in the negative. The
detaining authority gave here two grounds for detaining the petitioner. We can neither decide whether
these grounds are good or bad nor can we attempt to
assess in what manner and to what extent each of
these grounds operated on the mind of the appropriate
authority and contributed to the creation of the
satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order
was made. To say that the other ground, which still
remains, is quite sufficient to sustain the order, would
be to substitute an objective judicial test for the
subjective decision of the executive authority which
is against the legislative policy underlying the statute.
In such cases, we think, the position would be the
same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant
for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and
this would vitiate the detention order as a whole.
This principle, which was recognised by the Federal
Court in the case of Keshav Talpade v. The KingEmperor('), seems to us to be quite sound and applicable to the facts of this case".
(1) [19'13] F.C.R. SS.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
In Keshav Talpade's case(1) the learned Judges stated
as follows:
1956
Dwarka Dass
"If a detaining authority gives four reasons for
Bhatia
detaining a man," without distinguishing between
v.
them, and any two or three of the reasons are held
The State 0!
to be bad, it can never be certain to what extent the
1;<::;,·~:;d
bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority
or whether the detention order would have been JagannadhpdasJ.
made at all if only one or two good reasons had been
before them".
The principle underlying all these decisions is this.
Where power is vested in a statutory authority to
deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective
satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if
that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of
grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken together,
and if some out of them are found to be non-existent
or irrelevant, the very exercise of that power 'is bad.
That is so because the matter being one for subjective satisfaction, it must be properly based on all the
reasons on which it purports to be based. If some
out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant,
the Court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the
exclusion of those grounds or reasons. To uphold
the validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity
of some of the reasons or grounds would be to substitute the objective standards of the Court for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority. In
applying these principles, however, the Court must
be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are
such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected
the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. It is not merely because some ground or reason
of a comparatively unessential nature is defective
that such an order based on subjective satisfaction
can be held to be invalid. The Court while anxious
to safeguard the personal liberty of the individual
will not lightly interfere with such orders. It is in
the light of these principles that the validity of the
impugned order has to be judged.
(1) [194JJJ F.C.R. 88.
1956
Dwarka Dass
Bhatia
v.
The State of
Jamm11and
Kashmir
Jagannadhadas J,
1956
NOf.lembet' 6.
956
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1956]
In this case, the order of detention is based on the
ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful
smuggling activities relating to three commodities,
cloth, zari and mercury of which two are found not
to be essential articles. No material is placed before
us enabling us to say that the smuggling attributed
to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury
~-
.~
and that the smuggling as regards the other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature. On the
other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to
the detenue on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth
and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates.that probably the smuggling
of these two items was not of an inconsequential
nature.
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
order of detention in this case is bad and must be
quashed. We have accordingly quashed the order and
directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the
conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956.
Petition allowed.
CENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT
SERVICES LTD.
. v.
RAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN.
[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and
GovINDA MENON JJ.]
Ind,istrial Dispute-Dismissal of Employee/or misconductOriminal prosecutir)n-Acquittal-Applicaticn for reinstatlm.ent and
• .-
compensation-Maintainability-Dismissed Emp/(Jyee, Meaninq ofDispute between employer and an individ1tal employee-Whether an
ind·ustrial dispute-Central Provinces and_ Berar Industrial Disp'ldes
Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P. and Berar XXIII of 1947), ss. 2(10),
(12) and 16-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 2(k).
In June, 1950, goods b~longing to the appellant company were
stolen and as the result of an enquiry the respondent was dismissed
on the ground of gross negligence and misconduct.
He was prosecuted on a charge of theft but was acquitted in March, 1952, and
thereupon he made an application before the Labour Commissioner