# Raja Bahadur /(. C. Deo Bhanj v. Raghunath ilfisra and Others

- **Citation:** [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1955
- **Bench:** Jafer Imam, S. K. DAs, J. L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-bahadur-c-deo-bhanj-v-raghunath-ilfisra-and-others-1686
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Hindu Law-Widow in possession of husband's propertyAdopted son getting into possession-Adoption invaUd-Wheti}er
widow is in constructive possession-•• Property possessed by a
female Hindu", Meaning of-Hindu Succession Act, r956 (30 of
~~
r956), s. I4.
Sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
provided : "Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be
held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner."
A suit instituted by the nearest reversioner of K for a
declaration that the adoption made by K's widow was invalid,
was dismissed and during the pendency of the appeal filed
against the decree dismissing the suit, the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, came into force. At the hearing of the appeal the respondent raised the preliminary objection that even if the adoption
were held to be invalid, the appellant's suit must fail in view oi
the provisions of s. 14 of the Act under which K's widow, who
was a party to the suit and the appeal, would be entitled to a
full ownership of her husband's properties; while it was urged
for the appellant that s. 14 of the Act did not apply to the facts
of the case because the properties were not in the possession of
K's widow, but were only with the 11dopted son at the time the
Act came into force.
'
Held, that the word "possession" in s. 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, is, used in the widest connotation and it
may be either actual or constructive or iq any form recognised
by law.
-·
<
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, A.LR. 1957 Cal. 557,
1958
}
approved.
In the present case, if the adoption was invalid K's widow
Kottmuswami.
would be the full owner of K's estate, and even if it be assumed
v.
that the adopted son was in actual possession <ilf the estate, his
Vuravva
possession was merely permissive and K's widow must be regarded as being in constru<>tive possession of it through him. Accordingly, s. 14 was applicable and as K's widow became a full owner
of her husband's estate, the appellant's suit was not maintainable.

## Text

Raja Bahadur
/(. C. Deo Bhanj
v.
Raghunath ilfisra
and Others
Imam].
December I9.
968
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
any corrupt practice under s. 123 had been established
in the case and the election of the appellant could not
be set aside on the only ground on which his election
had been set aside by the High Court. The appeal is
accordingly allowed with costs and the election petition of respondent No. l is dismissed.
Appeal allowed.
GUMMALAPURA TAGGINA MATADA
KOTTURUSWAMI
v.
SETRA VEERA VV A AND OTHERS
(JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAs and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Hindu Law-Widow in possession of husband's propertyAdopted son getting into possession-Adoption invaUd-Wheti}er
widow is in constructive possession-•• Property possessed by a
female Hindu", Meaning of-Hindu Succession Act, r956 (30 of
~~
r956), s. I4.
Sub-section (1) of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,
provided : "Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be
held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner."
A suit instituted by the nearest reversioner of K for a
declaration that the adoption made by K's widow was invalid,
was dismissed and during the pendency of the appeal filed
against the decree dismissing the suit, the Hindu Succession Act,
1956, came into force. At the hearing of the appeal the respondent raised the preliminary objection that even if the adoption
were held to be invalid, the appellant's suit must fail in view oi
the provisions of s. 14 of the Act under which K's widow, who
was a party to the suit and the appeal, would be entitled to a
full ownership of her husband's properties; while it was urged
for the appellant that s. 14 of the Act did not apply to the facts
of the case because the properties were not in the possession of
K's widow, but were only with the 11dopted son at the time the
Act came into force.
'
Held, that the word "possession" in s. 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, is, used in the widest connotation and it
may be either actual or constructive or iq any form recognised
by law.
-·
<
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
Gostha Behari v. Haridas Samanta, A.LR. 1957 Cal. 557,
1958
}
approved.
In the present case, if the adoption was invalid K's widow
Kottmuswami.
would be the full owner of K's estate, and even if it be assumed
v.
that the adopted son was in actual possession <ilf the estate, his
Vuravva
possession was merely permissive and K's widow must be regarded as being in constru<>tive possession of it through him. Accordingly, s. 14 was applicable and as K's widow became a full owner
of her husband's estate, the appellant's suit was not maintainable.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
No. 120 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March
25, HJ49, of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 55
of 194:6, arfaing out of the judgment and decree dated
November 26, 1945, of the Court of the District
Judge of Bellary in Original Suit No. 39of1943.
·
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Ohaudhury for
B. K. B. Naidu, for the appellant.
K. N. Rajagopala Sastri and M. S. K. Sastri, for tho
respondents.
1958. December 19. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
IMAM, J.-This 3.ppeal is before us on a certificate
granted by the High Court as according tu that Court
a substantial question of law arose in the case which
was dtated by it to be " Is the adoption of the seooad
defendant invalid, as the approval or consent of the
five trustees mentioned in paragraph 14 of the will of
Kari Veerappa, Exbt. l?-2(a) was not obtained; and is
the authority to adopt at an end if any one of those
five persons did not accept the trusteeship or died
before the adoption or refui>ed to give their.approval".
In view of certain 1ha.tters about to be stated, the
question of law as propounded by the High Court
does not require to be considered.
Kari Veerappa was the last male owner of the estate
mentioned in his will, Exbt. P-2(a), which he executed
on October 10, 1920. Under this will he authorised
his wife Setra. Veeravva., first defendant, to adopt a
son for ·the purpose of continuation of his family as
lrnam J.
K ottsu uswan1i
v.
Veeravv!l
lma111 ].
970
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
he had no issue.
The authority to adopt was in the
following terms :
"I have given her permission to adopt as many
times as would be necessary, should the previous
adoption be unsuccessful. But Veeravva must adopt
only a boy approved by the respectable persons
appointed by me in paragraph 14; should Veeravva
die before making any adoption, the persons becoming
trustees should arrange for the adoption of a boy for
the continuation of my family in accordance with my
kulachara (family usage)".
At this stage it is unnecessary to refer to the other
provisions of the will of Kari Veerappa. This gentleman died on October 23, 1920.
After his death, his
widow made two attempts to adopt a son in accordance with bis will.
The first attempt was in 1939
which did not accomplish the purpose of the will as
the person alleged to have been adopted died.
The
validity of this adoption was being questioned, but as
the boy said to have been adopted had died, efforts to
dispute the adoption did not materialise. Veeravva
thereafter, on October II, 1942, adopted second defendant, Sesalvada Kotra Basayya. Two documents in
this connection are on the record.
The first document
is Exbt. D-25 dated the 18th of September, 1942,
which was a registered agreement to adopt the second
defendant. The second document is also a. registered
document, which is described a.s the deed of adoption
and is dated June 23, 1943.
This clearly states that
on October II, 1942, Veeravva had adopted the 2nd
defendant. Reference was also made in this document
to the agreement of September 18, 1942. The appellant claiming to be the nearest reversioner of Kari
Veerappa filed the present suit asking for a declaration
that the adoption of the second defendant by Veera vva was invalid and not binding on the appellant or
the other reversioners to the estate of the late Kari
Veerappa.
The suit filed by the appellant was heard by the
District Judge of Bellary who dismissed it. The
a.ppellant appealed to the High Court of Madras. His
appeal was dismissed and the decision of the District
....
•
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
Judge was substantially affirmed. The High Court
did not allow compensatory costs granted by the
District Judge, nor did it agree with his finding that
the appellant had failed to prove the relationship he
had propounded and that he was not a reversioner at
all, far less the nearest reversioner.
In the opinion of
the High Court, the appellant was a relative and a
reversioner, though he had not pl'oved that he was
the neal'est l'eversioner alive at the time the appeal
was heal'd and that he need not prove this until he
actually sought to recover possession of ihe property
after Veeravva's death.
When this appeal came on for hearing the learned
Advocate for the respondents took a preliminary
objection that the suit filed hy the plaintiff must in
any event fail, having regard to the provisions of s. 14
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
Hence the present
appeal arising out of that suit must also fail.
lt was
contended on behalf of the respondents that either
there was a valid adoption or there was not. If
there was a valid adoption and the decisions of the
High Court and the District Judge on this question
were correct, then obviously the suit of the appellant
must be dismissed.
If, on the other hand, it was
found that the adoption of the second defendant by
Veern.vva was either invalid or, in fact, had not taken
place, then under the provisions of s. 14 of the Act,
Veeravva became the full owner of her husband's
estate and was not a limited owner thereof. Consequently, the appellant's suit was not maintainable.
In view of this submission we are of the opinion that
the point raised by way of preliminary objection must
first be considered and decided. It is well settled that
an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration any change in the law (vide the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri (1).
Section 14 of the Act states:-
" 14(1)
Any property possessed by a female
Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner
thereof and not as a limited owner.
(1) (1940] F.C.R 84.
I\ ol/urnswa"'l
v.
C' eeravua
[mam ].
h·oJlutuswatni
v.
Veeravva
Imam].
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
'
Explanation.-In this sub.section, "property"
includes both movable and
immovable property
acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise,
or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears
of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a.
relative or not, before, at or 11ofter her marriage, or by
her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also
any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2)
Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall
apply to any property acquired by way of gift or
under a will or any other instrument or under a deeree
or order of a civil court or under an award where' the
terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree,
order· or award prescribe a restricted estate in such
property."
On behalf of the appellant it. was urged that s. 14
of the Act did not apply to the facts of the present
case because the estate of Veerappa was not in possession of his widow Veeravva but was in possession of
the second defendant at the time the Act came into
force and, secondly, because under sub-s. (2) of s. 14
Vreravva got a restric:Led esl,>tte nnder the will Exbt.
P-2(a) arnl the agreement to adopt, Exbt. D-25. It
was submitted that the widow's power of n,doption did
not depend on her ownership of the estate of her husband. That power in the present case was derived
under the Hindu law eithf'r from the anthority ·conferred by her husband or the consent of his agnates.
The Act <lid not enlarge her power of adoption and
did not render an invalid adoption made by her
immune from attack by the reversioners during her
life time. The aet of Veeravva in the present case
was to bring in a stranger. The appellant as a reversioner was, therefore, entitled during the life time of
Veeravva to bring the present suit to obtain a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant was
invalid.
·The question raised by the preliminary objection
taken by the respondents must be considered on the
assumption that the adoption of the second defendant
..
,
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
wa.s invalid. The provisions of s. 14 of the Act would
not a.rise for consideration, if the second defendant had
been validly adopted. It is necessary, therefore, to
determine whether the provisions of s. 14 apply to
the facts of the present case.
It was strongly urged on b0half of the appellant
that the words "any propert,y possessed by a female
Hindu" in s. 14 of the Act referred to actual possession of the property whether the property was acquired before or after the Act came into force.
This
wa.s a condition precedent to the applicability of the
provisions of s. 14 to the present case. Since the Act
·~came into force on Juue 17, 1956, and the decision of
the High Court was given on March 25, 1955, the
question as to who was in actual possession of the
estate of Veerappa did not arise for consitleration on
the case of the appellant set out in his plaint. The
appellant should accordingly be given an opportunity
to have a finding recorded on this question after the
t.aking of evidence in that respect. On behalf of the
respondepts it was urged that the. words "any property possessed by a female Hindu " did not refer
merely to actual physica.l possession only bnt to
ownership and possession in law as well.
It was further urged on behalf of the rospondents
that even if it be assumed that the words " possessed
by a female Hindu" mean actua.I possession then, in
the present case, it had been proved that Veeravva
was in actual possession of the estate of Veerappa
when the Act came into force. It could not be disputed that on the death of V cerappa, Veera.vva came into
possession of his estate and that she remained in
possession at least until 1942 when the adoption of the
second defendant is said to have taken place. But
even on the adoption of the second defendant, the
agreement to adopt dated September 18, 1942, stated
that Veeravva was to remain in possession of her
husband's estate during her life time in spite of the
adoption. In the written sttt.tement filed by Veeravva
and the second defendant it was clearly stated in para. 6
thereof that Veeravva. came into possession of her
husband's property and that she recovered possession
Kofluruswami
v.
Ve1ravvo
Imam J.
Kolfuru.~wami
v.
Vaetavva
Imam _/.
974
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp.
of the property covered by the decree in 0. S. 20
of 1921 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court,
Bellary, and that she had been in sole possession of
the said property up-to-date and that although she
had adopted the second defendant on October 11, 1942,
it was subject to retention of the enjoyment, possession
and management by her of her husband's property
during her life time.
An affidavit had been filed in
this Court by the second defendant in which he has
clearly admitted that Veeravva is still in possession of
his adoptive father's estate in pursuance of the agreement of Septem her 18, 1942. This was an admissi·on
against his own interest by the second defendant
which he was not likely to make unless it was a fact
that Veeravva was in possession of the estate since her
husband's death up to the present. In answer to the
affidavit of the second defendant and Veeravva that
she was in actual possession, the appellant had failed
to file an affidavit with any clear assertion that to
his knowledge Veeravva was not in possession. The
affidavit filed by the appellant was in the nature of
submissions made to the Court rather than an affidavit in which facts to his knowledge were asserted. In
para. 2 he had made the significant statement "I
understand that the possession of the suit properties
has been and is now, in truth and in fact, with the
alleged adopted son, the second petitioner. He is in
possession of these properties and is dealing with
them." He did not disclose how he came to understand this. He certainly did not assert that all that
was stated in para. 2 was to his knowledge.
As an
alternative, the appellant in para. 4 of his affidavit
had submitted "If I succeed in proving that the
adoption is not true and valid, the petitionets cannot
turn round and say that the possession of the first
petitioner is that of a widow of an intestate and invoke the provisions of s. 14 of the Succession Act."
He had further submitted in this paragraph that, even
on the case of the respondents set out in their petition ·
for adding additional grounds, Veeravva's estate
was divested by the adoption, and as she came into
possession by reason of the ante-adoption agreement
•
;
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
Exbt. D-25, s. 14 of the Act was not applicable.
It seems to us that if it were permissible to decide the
question of Veeravva.'s possession on only the affidavits before us, we would find no difficulty in holding
that she was in possession of her husband's estate
when the Act came into force. It is to be remembered,
howev!:'.r, that this question has arisen now and the
appellitnt has had no real opportunity to establish his
assertion that the second defendant is in actual possession and not Veeravva. It is necessary therefore to
consider the true scope and effect of the provisions of
sub-s. (1) of s. 14 of the Act. If the words " possessed
by a female Hindu " occurring therein refer only to
actual physical possession, it may be necessary to call
for a finding on the question of such possession ; if,
on the contrary, these words have a wide connotation
and include constructive possession or possession in
law, the preliminary objection can be determined on
the footing that Veeravva was in such possession at
the relevant time.
The provisions of s. 14 of the Act have been the sub.
ject of scrutiny and interpretation by variou::1 High
Courts. In the case of Rama Ayodhya Missir v. Raghunath M issir (1) and in the case of Mt. J anki K uer v.
Chhathu Prasad (2) the Patna High Court took the
view that the effect of ss. 14 and 15 of the Act was that
a reversioner recognised as such under the Hindu law
was no more a reversioner, as a female Hindu possessing any property, whether acquired before or after the
commencement of the Act, held not a limited estate
but an absolute estate therein, and after the coming
into force of the Act, he had no right of reversion or
any kind of spes successionis. The High Courts of
Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have
taken a view which does not support the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the aforesaid cases.
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of
Mt. Lukai v. Niranjan (3) dissented from the decisions
of the Patna High Court in the above-mentioned
cases.
Indeed, the Patna High Court in the case of
(1) A.LR. 1957 Pat. 480.
(2) A.l.R. 1957 Pat. 674.
(3) A.LR. 1958 Madh. Pra. 160.
Kotlu,..uswami
v.
v11,avva
Imam J.
Kottu1u~u·ami
,._
Imam j.
976
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1959] Supp.
Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh(') overruled its previous deciRions referred to above, and rightly pointed
out that the object of the Act was to improve the legal
sta1,us of Hindu women, enlarging their limited interest in property inherited or held by them to an absolute interest, provided they were in possession of the
property when the Act came into force and, therefore,
in a position to take ad vantage of its l.ienefidlft.l provisionA; but the Act was not intended to benefit
alienees who with their eyes open purchased the property from the limited owners without justifying
necessity before the Act came into force and at a time
when the vendors had only a limited interest of Hindu
women.
In the case before us, the edsential question for consideration is as to how the words " any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether aquired before
or after the commencement of this Act " in s. 14 of
the Act should be interpreted. Section 14 refers to
property which was either acquired before or after the
commencement of the Act and that such property
should be possessed by a female Hindu. lleferenco to
property acquired before the commencement of the
Act certainly makes the provisions of the section retrospective, but even in such a case the propert.y must
be possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act
came into force in order to make the provisions of the
section applicable. There is no question in the present
case that Veera vva acquired the property of her
deceased husband before the commencement of the
Act. In order that the provisions of s. 14 may apply
to the present case it will have to be further established that the property was possessed by her at the time
the Act came into force. It was the case of the appellant that the estate of Veerappa was in actual possession of the second defendant and not Veeravva at the
relevant time. On behalf of the respondent it was
urged that the words "possessed by " had a wider
meaning than actual physical possession, although
physical possession may be included in. the expression.
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 581.
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
In the case of Gaddam Venkayamma v. Gadda.m Veerayya (11 Viswanatha Sastri, J., with whom Sa.tyanarayana Raju, J., agreed, expressed the opinion that " the
word' possessed' in s. 14 refers to possession on the
date when the Act came into force. Of course, possession referred to in s. 14 need not be actual physical
possession or personal occupation of the property by
the Hindu female but may be possession in law. The
possession of a licensee, lessee or a mortgagee from the
female owner or the possession of a guardian or a
trustee or an agent of the female owner would be her
possession for the purpose of s. 14. The word " possessed " is used in s. 14 in a broad sense and in the context possesRion means the state of owning or having
in one's hands or power. It includes possession by
receipt of rents and profits." The learned Judges expressed the view tha.t even if a trespasser were in
possession of the land belonging to a female owner, it
might conceivably be regarded as being in possession
of the female owner, provided the trespasser had not
perfected his title.
We do not think that it is necessary in the present case to go to the extent to which
the learned Judges went. It is sufficient to say that
"possessed" in s. 14 is used in a broad sense and in
the context means the state of owning or having in
one's hand or power. In the case of Gostha Behari v.
Haridas Samanta (2), P. N. Mookherjee, J., expressed
his opinion as to the meaning of the words " any property possessed by a female Hindu" in the following
words:-
"The opening words in " property possessed by a
female Hindu" obviously mean that to come within
the purview of the section the property must be in
possession of the female concerned at the date of the
commencement of the Act. They clearly contemplate
the female's possession when the Act came into force.
That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law, but unless
the female Hindu, whose limited estate in the disputed
property is claimed to have been transformed into
(1) A.LR. 1957 Andh, Pra. 280.
123
(2) A.LR. 1957 Cal. 557, 559.
Kotturuswami
v.
ve~ravva
Imam].
Kotturuswami
v.
Veeravva
Imam j.
978
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1959] Supp.
absolute estate under this particular section, was at
least in such possession, taking the word " possession "
in its widest connotation, when the Act came into
force, the section would not apply".
In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct
view as to how the words " any property possessed by
a female Hindu " should be interpreted. In the pre·
sent case if the adoption was invalid, the full owner
ofVeerappa's estate was his widow Veeravva and
even if it be assumed that the second defendant was
in actual possession of the estate his possession· was
merely permissive and Veeravva must be regarded as
being in constructive possession of it through the
second defendant. In this situation, at the time when
the Act came into force, the property of Veerappa
must be regarded in law as being possessed by
Veeravva.
It was suggested that according to the will of
Veerappa, Exbt. P-2(a), in the properties mentioned in
para. 4 of that will, V eera vva got only a restricted
estate. The provisions of para. 4 of the will, however,
make it clear that they would come into force only if
the trustees mentioned in the will and Veeravva
should disagree.
No material was shown to us that,
in fact, the trustees and Veeravva had disagreed and
that the provisions of para. 4 were given effect to.
Paragraph 12 of the will also showed that if the
adoption was invalid, the property devolved on
Veeravva as in intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that
the provisions of para. 4 are of no assistance to the
appellant in applying the provisions of sub-s. (2) of
s. 14 of the Act. Reference was also made to the contents of the agreement, Exbt. D-25, dated September
18, 1942, in this connection. It is clear, however, that
by this agreement no estate was conferred on Veeravva and she did not thereby acquire any estate,
much less a restricted estate. All that this document
stated was that there was an agreement between the
guardians of the boy to be adopted and V eera vva
that even if the boy is adopted, Veeravva would remain in possession and enjoyment of her husband's
estate during her life time. In our opinion, there is
•
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
no material on the record by which it can reasonably
be said that the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 14 of the
Act applied to the present case.
It was urged that the act of Veeravva in adopting
the second defendant was to bring in a stranger and
this action of hers could be questioned by a reversioner,
as any aVenation made by her, during her life time.
Reference was made to s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act,
Illustration (f). In our opinion, this is of no avail to
the appellant, because Illustration (f) obviously refers
to a Hindu widow's estate and has no reference to a
full owner. The right of a reversioner as one of the
heirs under s. 42, Specific Relief Act, is limited to the
question of preserving the estate of a limited owner
for the benefit of the entire body of reversioners; hut
as against a full owner, the reversioner has no such
right. In our opinion, under the Act Veeravva becoming a full owner of her husband's estate, the suit could
not succeed and the appeal must accordingly fail.
In our opinion, the appellant's suit was not maintainable~ having regard to the provisions of s. 14 of
the Act, even if it be assumed that there was no valid
adoption of the second defendant. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Kolturuswami
v.
Veeravva
Imam].
THE ASIATIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LTD.
x959
V •
January u.
SUB-LT. ARABINDA CHAKRA V ARTI
(SYED JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.)
Shipping-Collision-Negligence-" Standing on"
vessel-
" Giving way" vessel-Rights and duties-Nautical assessorsAdvice not binding on Court-Merchant Shipping Act, I894 (57 &
58 Viet. c. 60) Regulations of I9IO, Arts. 2I, 23, 25, 27, 29.
On December 13, 1940, in the afternoon, a cargo ship, N,
left Madras harbour bound for Calcutta heading for the open
sea. She was being navigated in a swept channel outside the