# RAJA BIRAKISHORE v. THE STATE OF ORISSA

- **Citation:** [1964] 7 S.C.R. 32
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964-03-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-birakishore-v-the-state-of-orissa-3125
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

196~
.Jl•rch 6
-
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
RAJA BIRAKISHORE
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA
' [1964
IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,
4
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI JJ.]
1
Fundamental rights-Interference with religious affairs of
Temple-Constitution of India,
Art. 31(2)-Applicability-Shri
Jagannath· Tempie Ah, 1954 (No. II of 1955), ss. 8, 11, 18, 21, 21A
and 3()-Validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 19, 26(d), 27
and 28.
A writ petition was filed in the Orissa High Court by the
father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954.
The petition was dismissed by High
Court which held that the Act was valid and constitutional
except s. 28(2)(f). The High Court struck down that provision
and upheld the constitutionality of the rest of the Act. The appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness
to appeal to Supreme Court.
The contentions raised b'efore this Court were that the Act
was discriminatory. as the Jagannath Temple alone had been
singled out for special treatment as compared to other temples
in the State of Orissa. The Act took away the sole management of
the Temple which had so far .been vested in the appellant or his
ancestors. S. 15(1) of the Act interfered with the religious affairs
of the temple. The valiclity of ss. 11, 19, 21, 21A and 30 of the Act
was also attacked. Dismissing the appeal,
Held: There is no violation of Art. 14 af the Constitution.
The J agannath Temple occupies a unique position in the State
of Orissa, and is a temple of national importance and no other
temple in that State can compare with it. It stands in a class by
itself and considering the fact that it attracts pilgrims from all
over India in large numbers, it could be the subject of special
consideration by the State Government. A law· may be constitutional even though it related to a single individual if on
account of special circumstances or reasons applicable to him
and not
applicable to others, that single individual may be
treated as a class by himself.
.
(ii) There was no violation of Art. 19(1) (f) or Art.. 31(2) of
the Constitution. All that the Act has done is that it has taken
away the sole right of the appellant to manage the property of
the Temple and another body has been set up in its olace with
the appellant as its Chairman. Such a process cannot be said to
constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of the
vesting of the rights in the person holding that office. The appellant occupied a dual position as Superintendent and. Adya
Sevak. His position as Superintendent has gone and in that place
he has become the Chairman of the Committee set up under s. 6.
The position of the applicant as Adya Sevak is safeguarded by
s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as the rights and privileges in respect of
Gajapati Maharaja Seva a.re protected even though he may cease
to be Chairman on account of his minority or on· account of some
other reason.
·
·
(iii) S. l5(1) of the Act does not interfere with the religious
affairs of the Temple. Sevapuja of the Temple has two aspects.
One aspect is the provision of materials and that is a secular
'
-, ,
-·
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
function. The second aspect is the performance of the Sevapuja
1964
and other rights as required by religion. S. 15(1) has nothing
--
to do with the second aspect which is the religious aspect of Seva-Raja Birakishore
puja. Whiles. 15(1) imposes a duty on the committee to look after
, v.
.
the secular aspect of the Sevapuja, it leave the religious part The State of Or1Bsa
entirely untc,uched.
-
(iv) Ss. 11, 19 and 21 were valid provisions and could not be
attacked as ss. 5 and 6 constitut'ng the committee in place of
the Raja, were valid. Ss. 21A and 30 were also valid.
Arts. 27 and 28 had nothing to do with the matter dealt with
under Act. It was not open to the appellant to argue that the
Act was bad as it was hit by Art. 26(d). No such contention wa•
properly raised in the High Cou

## Text

_Characters 0–39,327 of 48,253. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39327 for what follows._

196~
.Jl•rch 6
-
32
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
RAJA BIRAKISHORE
v.
THE STATE OF ORISSA
' [1964
IP. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, c. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH,
4
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR ANDS. M. SIKRI JJ.]
1
Fundamental rights-Interference with religious affairs of
Temple-Constitution of India,
Art. 31(2)-Applicability-Shri
Jagannath· Tempie Ah, 1954 (No. II of 1955), ss. 8, 11, 18, 21, 21A
and 3()-Validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 13, 19, 26(d), 27
and 28.
A writ petition was filed in the Orissa High Court by the
father of the appellant challenging the validity of Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954.
The petition was dismissed by High
Court which held that the Act was valid and constitutional
except s. 28(2)(f). The High Court struck down that provision
and upheld the constitutionality of the rest of the Act. The appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate of fitness
to appeal to Supreme Court.
The contentions raised b'efore this Court were that the Act
was discriminatory. as the Jagannath Temple alone had been
singled out for special treatment as compared to other temples
in the State of Orissa. The Act took away the sole management of
the Temple which had so far .been vested in the appellant or his
ancestors. S. 15(1) of the Act interfered with the religious affairs
of the temple. The valiclity of ss. 11, 19, 21, 21A and 30 of the Act
was also attacked. Dismissing the appeal,
Held: There is no violation of Art. 14 af the Constitution.
The J agannath Temple occupies a unique position in the State
of Orissa, and is a temple of national importance and no other
temple in that State can compare with it. It stands in a class by
itself and considering the fact that it attracts pilgrims from all
over India in large numbers, it could be the subject of special
consideration by the State Government. A law· may be constitutional even though it related to a single individual if on
account of special circumstances or reasons applicable to him
and not
applicable to others, that single individual may be
treated as a class by himself.
.
(ii) There was no violation of Art. 19(1) (f) or Art.. 31(2) of
the Constitution. All that the Act has done is that it has taken
away the sole right of the appellant to manage the property of
the Temple and another body has been set up in its olace with
the appellant as its Chairman. Such a process cannot be said to
constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or of the
vesting of the rights in the person holding that office. The appellant occupied a dual position as Superintendent and. Adya
Sevak. His position as Superintendent has gone and in that place
he has become the Chairman of the Committee set up under s. 6.
The position of the applicant as Adya Sevak is safeguarded by
s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as the rights and privileges in respect of
Gajapati Maharaja Seva a.re protected even though he may cease
to be Chairman on account of his minority or on· account of some
other reason.
·
·
(iii) S. l5(1) of the Act does not interfere with the religious
affairs of the Temple. Sevapuja of the Temple has two aspects.
One aspect is the provision of materials and that is a secular
'
-, ,
-·
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
function. The second aspect is the performance of the Sevapuja
1964
and other rights as required by religion. S. 15(1) has nothing
--
to do with the second aspect which is the religious aspect of Seva-Raja Birakishore
puja. Whiles. 15(1) imposes a duty on the committee to look after
, v.
.
the secular aspect of the Sevapuja, it leave the religious part The State of Or1Bsa
entirely untc,uched.
-
(iv) Ss. 11, 19 and 21 were valid provisions and could not be
attacked as ss. 5 and 6 constitut'ng the committee in place of
the Raja, were valid. Ss. 21A and 30 were also valid.
Arts. 27 and 28 had nothing to do with the matter dealt with
under Act. It was not open to the appellant to argue that the
Act was bad as it was hit by Art. 26(d). No such contention wa•
properly raised in the High Court.
Tilkayat, Shri Govindlal ii v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1963)
S.C. 1638, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 135
of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 30, 1958,
of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 321 of 1955.
M. C. Setalvad, Sarjoo Prasad and A. D. Mathur, for the
appellant.
'
S. V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, M. S. K. Sastri
and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
March 5, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
byw ANCHOO, J .--1 his appeal on a certificate gra\lted by
Wanc/ioo J.
the Orissa High Court raises the question of the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954, No. II of
1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The challenge to
the Act was made by the father of the present appellant by
a writ petition filed in the High Court of Orissa. The appellant
was substituted for his father on the death of the latter while
the writ petition was pending in the High Court. The case
put forward in the petition firstly was that the Shri Jagannath Temple (hereinafter referred to as the Temple) was the
private property of the petitioner, Raja· of Puri, and the Act,
which deprived the appellant of his property was unconstitutional in view of Art. 19 of the Constitution. In the alternative it was submitted that the appellant had the sole right
-of superintendence and management of the Temple and that
that right could not be taken away without payment of compensation, and the Act inasmuch as it took away that right
without any compensation was hit by Art. 31 of the Constitution. It was further pleaded that the right of superintendence
was property within the meaning of Art. 19 (I) (f) and inasmuch as the appellant had been deprived of that property
·by the Act, it was an unreasonable provision which was not
L'P(ll)l~CJ-2 ...
1964
Raja Biralcisliore
v.
The Slafe of Orissa
Wanehoo, J.
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964}
saved under Art. 19(5). The Act was further attacked on
the ground that i~ was discriminatory and was therefore hit
by Art. 14 of the Constitution, as the Temple had been singled out for special legislation, though there was a general law
in force with respect to Hindu religious endowments, namely,
the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. II of 1952.
Reliance was placed on Arts. 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution to invalidate the Act. though the appellant did not
indicate in the petition how those Articles hit the Act. Lastly,
it was urged that the utilisation of the Temple funds for purposes alien to the interest of the deity as proposed under the
Act was illega.1 and ultra vires.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State and it
was urged that the Temple was not the private property of
the appellant. The case of the State was that it was a public
temple and the State always had the right to see that it was
properly administered. Before the British conquered Orissa
in 1803, the Temple had for a long time been managed by
Muslim Rulers directly, though through
Hindu employees.
After 1803, the Temple began to be managed directly by the
British Government, though by Regulation IV of 1809 the
management was made over to the Raja of Khurda (who
is now known as the Raja of Puri). who was appointed as
hereditary superintendent in view of his family's connection
in the past with the Temple. Even so, whenever there was
mismanagement in the Temple during the course of the last
century and a half, the Government always intervened and
many a time administered the secular affairs of the Temple
directly through one of its officers in whose favour the then
Raja was made to execute \l power of attorney divesting himself completely of all powers of management. The case of
the State further was that in view of the reported mismanagement of the Temple, the State legislature passed the Puri
Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act, (No. XIV of
1952) for the appointment of a Special Officer fer the preparation of a record pertaining to the rights and duties- of
different sevaks" and pujaris and such other persons connected
with the seva, puja or management of the Temple and its
endowments in order to put the administration of the Temple
on a suitable basis. A Special Officer was
accordingly appointed who submitted his report on March 15, 1954, which
disclosed serious mismanagement of the affairs of the Temple
and in consequence the Act was passed in 1955. The Stlte
contended that the Act was perfectly valid and constitutional
and did not offend any constitutional provision.
When the matter came to be argued before the High
Court, the appellant gave up the plea that the Temple was his
private property and 1t was conceded that it was a public u:m·
pie, the properties of which were the properties of the ddty
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREM.F. COURT REPORTS
35
.
.
fhR' fPur'I'
1964
and not the private properties o t e
a1a o
1. n view
--
-0f this concession, the attack on the constitutionality of the Raj<! Birakiahore
Act was bas~~ mainl_y on the ground that it took awar theTheSta1e'::1on ...
Ra ja's perqms1tes which had been found to belong to bun m
--
the record of rights prepared under the Act of 1952. It may
Wanclwo, J.
be mentioned that the Raja of Puri had two-fold connection
with the Temple. In the first place, the Raja is the adya
sevak, i.e., the chief servant of the Temple and in that capacity he has certain rights and privileges. In addition to that,
. he was the sole superintendent of the Temple and was incharge of the management of the secular affairs of the Temple.
The main contention of the appellant before the High Court
was that the Act not only took away the management of
the secular affairs of the Temple from the appellant but also
interfered with his rights as adya sevak and was therefore
unconstitutional. The High Court repelled ail the submissions
on behalf ot the appellant and held that the Act was valid
and constitutional except for one provision contained in
s. 28(2)(f) thereof. The High Court therefore struck down that
provision and upheld the constitutionality of the rest of the
Act. Thereupon the appellant applied for a certificate which
was granted; and that is
how the appeal has come up
before us.
Before we consider the attack on the constitutionality of
the Act we should like to indicate briefly what the scheme
of the Act is and what it provides with respect to the management of the Temple. Section 1 provides for its commencement. Section 2 provides for certain repeals. Section 3 provides
that the Orissa Act XIV of 1952 shall be deemed to be a
part of the Act and delegates to the committee constituted
under s. 6 of the Act all powers of the State Government
under the 1952-Act from such date as the. State Government may notify. Section 4 is the definition section. Section
5 vests the administration and the governance of the Temple
and its endowments in a committee called the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee. The Committee shall be
a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common
seal and may by the said name sue and be sued. Section 6
provides for the constitution elf the committee with
the
Raja of Puri as its chairman. No person who does not profess the Hindu religion shall be eligible for membership. Besides providing for some ex officio members. the other members of the committee are all nominated by the State Government, one from among the persons entitled to sit on the
mukti-mandap, three from among the sevaks of the Temple
recorded as such in the record of rights, and seven from
among those who do not belong to the above two classes.
1964
Raja Birakishorl
v.
Tlie Swte of Orisso
Wanckoo. ,J,
36
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19641
The Collector of the district of Puri is an ex officio member
and is designated as the vice-chairman of the
committee.
Section 7 provides for the appointment of a chairman during
the minority of the Raja of Puri or during the time when
the Raja is suffering from any of the disabilities mentioned
· in s. 10(1) clauses (a) to (e) and (g) thereof. Section 8 lays
down that nothing in s. 7 shall be deemed to affect the rights
and privileges of the Raja of Puri in respect of the Gajapati
Maharaj Seva merely on the ground that the Raja has ceased
to perform the duties of the chairman for the time being.
Section 9 provides for the terms of office of members and
s. l 0 gives power to the State Government to remove any mem·
her of the committee other than the ex officio members on
the grounds specified in els. (a) to (g) thereof. No member
can be removed from his membership . unless he has been
given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his:
removal. Section 11 provides for dissol'ution -·and supersession of the committee in certain contingencies, such as incompetence to perform the duties imposed upon it by' the
Act pr making of default in. performing such duties. The
committee is given an opportunity to show cause against any
such action before it is taken, and provision iS made for
continuing the management during .the time the committee
is superseded or has been dissolved. Section 12 provides for
casual vacancies, s. 13 for the meetings of the committee and
s. 14 for allowances to the members of the committee payable
from the Temple fund, but no member of the committee other
than the administrator is to be paid any salary or other remuneration from the Temple fund except such travelling and
daily a.llowances as may be prescribed. Section 15 provides
for the duties of the committee and it may be quoted in full
as it is the main target of attack: -
"15. Subject to the provisions of this Act and the ruleS'
made thereunder, it shall be the duty of the Committee--
(1) to arrange for the proper performance of sevapujah and of the daily and periodical Nitis of the
Temple in accordance with the Record-of-Rights~
(2) to provide. facilities for the proper performance
of worship by the pilgrims;
(3) to ensure the safe custody of the funds, valuable
securities and jewelleries and for 1he p(reserva.
tion and management of the properties vested in
the Temple;
·
(4) to ensure maintenance of order and discipline
and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and'
of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in
the offerings made therein;
I
'il
'
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
37
(5) to ensure that funds of the specific and religious
H64
endowments are spent according to the wishes, Raja Bimkithort
so far as may be known, of the donors;
v.
The State of 0.-iaaa
(6) to make provision for the payment of suitable
-
emoluments to its salaried staff; and
Wanchoo, J.
(7) to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs
of the Temple and its endowments and the convenience of the pilgrims."
Section 16 provides a ban on the alienation of Temple
properties subject to certain conditions. ~ection 17 lays down
that the committee shall have no power to borrow money from
any person except with the previous sanction of the State
Government. Section 18 provides for an annual administration
report to be submitted to the Government. Section 18-A gives
power to the committee with the prior approval of the State
Government to delegate its functions to the Collector of the
district or, as the case may be, to the officer who happens to
·be a member of the committee in place of such Collector.
Section 19 gives power to the State Government to appoint
an administrator for the Temple. Section 20 provides for the
qualifications and conditions of service of the administrator
and s. 21 for the powers and duties of the administrator. As
this section is specially attacked we quote it here in full.
"S.21. (I) The Administrator shall be Secretary of the Committee and its chief executive officer and shall subject to the control of the committee have powers
to carry out its decision in accordance with the
provisions of this act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section .(1) or in
section 5, the Administrator shall be responsible
for the custody of all records and properties of the
Temple, and shall arrange for proper collections
of offerings made in the Temple and shall have
power-
(a) to appoint all officers and employees of the
Temple;
(b) to lease out for a period not exceeding one year
at a time the lands and buildings of the Temple
which are ordinarily leased out;
(c) to call for tehders for works or supplies and accept such tenders when the amount or value
,"'
thereof does not exceed two thousand rupees;
id> to order for emergency repairs;
{e) to specify, by general or special orders, such
conditions and safeguards as he deems fit, sul\
ject to which any sevak, office-holder or servant
1964
Raja Birakiahore
v.
Tll< Slat< of Orisaa
Wanclaoo, J.
38
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
shall have the right to be in possession of jewels
or other valuable belongings of the temple;
(f) to decide disputes relating to the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and
other recepits in cash or in kind received from
the members of the public;
(g) to decide disputes relating to the rights, privileges,
duties and obligations of sevaks, office·holders
and servants in respect of sevapuja antl nitis,
whether ordinary or special in nature;
(h) to require rvarious sevaks and other persons to
do their legitimate duties in time in accordance
with the Recor,d-of-Rights; and
(i) in the absence of any sevak or his substitutes or
on the failure on the part of any such person to
perform his duties, to get the niti or seva
performed in accordance with the record-ofrights by any other person.
(3) The administrator may subject to such conditions,
if any, as the committee may, by general or special
order impose, afford facilities on payment of fees
for special darshan or for any special service,
ritual or ceremony, such darshan, service, ritual or
ceremony not being inconsistent with the custom
and usage of the Temple and he shall have power
to determine the portion, if any, of such fees which
shall be paid to the sevaks, office-holders or servants of the Temple."
Section 21:A provides that all sevaks, office-holders and
servants attached to the Temple or in receipt of any emoluments or perquisites therefrom shall, whether such service is
hereditary or not, be subject to the control of the administrator who may, subject to the provisions of the Act and the
regulations made by the committee in that behalf, after giving
the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard
withhold the receipt of emoluments or perquisites, impose a
fine, suspend or dismiss any of them for breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of lawful orders, neglect of or wilful
absence from duty, disorderly behaviour or conduct derogatory to the discipline or dignity of the temple or for any other
sufficient cause: Section 22 provides for extraordinary powers
of the administrator who is directed to take action in emergency and report forthwith to the committee the action taken
and the reasons therefor. Section 23 provides for the establishment schedule and s. 24 provides for an appeal to the committee against an order of the administrator under s. 21 (2)(f)
or (g) ors. 21-A. Sections 25 to 27 provide for the preparation
of annual budget and auc\it. Section 28 provides for a Temple
fund and how it is to be utilised. Section 29 bars suits against
7 s.c R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
39
the State Government or against the committee or the adminis1964
trator for anything done or purported to be done by any of
Roja Birakisl•>r<
them under the provisions of the Act. Section 30 gives power The 1. •· 10 .
f
1
.
d
f h T
1
d 't
d
ctate
0
'"'"
o genera supermten ence o t e
emp e an
1 s en ow_
ments to the State Government which may pass any orders
lfonchoo, J.
for the proper maintenance or administration of the Temple
or its endowments or in the interest of the general public
worshipping in the Temple. It also gives power to the State
Government to examine the records o( the administrator or
of the committee in respect of any proceedings with a view
to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the
correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order made
therein; and if in any case it appears to the State Government
that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled,
reversed or remitted, for reconsideration, it may pass orders
accordingly. The State Government is also given the power
to stay the execution of any such decision or order in the
meantime. Section 30-A creates an offence which is punishable
on conviction with fine which may extend to Rs. 500 whenever any person having duties to perrorm in respect of the
nitis of the Temple or sevapuja of the deity raises any claim or
dispute and fails or refuses to perform such duties, knowing
or having reasons to believe that the non-perforinance of the
said duties would cause delay in the performance of the niti
or sevapuja or inconvenience or harassment to the public or
any section thereof entitled to worship in the Temple and
wilfully disobeys or fails to comply with the orders of the
administrator directing him to perform his duties without prejudice to the results of a proper adjudication of such claim or
dispute. Section 31 gives power to the committee to frame regulations as to the conditions of service of office bearers and
employees of the Temple, procedure for transfer of sevapuja.
chuli or panti in the Temple, observance of nitis and other
usages in the Temple in the absence of specific mention in the
record of rights; and any other matters for which regulations
are required to be made for the purposes of the Act. Section
32 gives power to the State Government to frame rules. Section 33 lays down that "the committee shall be entitled to take
and be in possession of all movable and immovable properties,
including the Ratna Bhandar and funds and jewelleries, records, documents and other assets belonging to the Temple"
and also lays down the procedure to be followed in case of
resistance in obtaining such possession. Section 34 lays down
that "all public officers having custody of any record, register,
report or other documents relating to the Temple or anv
movable or immovable property th~reof shall furnish
such
copies of or extracts from the same as may be required by the
administrator". Section 35 lays down that "no act or proceeding of the CO!Jlmittee or of any person acting as a member of
the comn.ittee shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only
40
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964)
1964
of a defect in the establishment or constitution of the commitRa.i• BirMillore tee or on the ground that any member of the committee was
'"
not entitled to hold or continue in such office by reason of any
The State•!°""" disqualification or by reason of any irregularity or illegality in
w...;;;, J.
his appointment or by reason of such act having been done
or proceeding taken during the period of any vacancy in the
office of member of the committee." Similar protection is
given to an act or proceeding of the administrator. Section 36
provides for the removal of difficulties by the Sta.te Government so long as the order passed in that behalf is not inconsistent with the Act or the rules made thereunder.
This review of the provisions of the Act shows that broadly speaking the Act provides for the management of the secular affairs of the Temple and does not interfere, with the
religious affairs thereof, which have to be performed according to the record of rights prepared under the Act of 1952 and
where there is no such record of rights in accordance with
custom and usage obtaining in the Temple. It is in this background that we have to consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act. We may first dispose of the attack based on
Art. 14. It is urged that inasmuch as this special Act has been
passed for this Temple and the general Act, namely, the Orissa
Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. II of 1952 no longer
applies to this Temple, there has been discrimination inasmuch
as the Temple has been singled out for special treatment as
compared to other temples in the State of Orissa. There is no
doubt that the Act is in many respects different from Act II
of 1952 and substitutes the committee for the Raja of Puri for
the purpose of management of the Temple, and there would
prima facie be discrimination unless it can be shown that the
Temple stands in a class by itself .and required special treatment. As to that the affidavit on behalf of the State Government is that the Temple is a unique institution in the State of
Orissa and is in a class by itself and that there is no comparison between the Temple and other temples in the State. The
averment on behalf of, the State is that the Temple has been
treated as a special object throughout the centuries because of
i!s unique importance and that there is no other temple which
occupies the unique place whi~h this Temple occupies in the
whole of India. Also there is no other temple in Orissa with
such vast assets or which attracts such a large number of pilgrims which pour into it from the whole of India. It is also
averred that it is absolutely incorrect that there are other
temples in Orissa which are equal to it from the standpoint of
assets or from the standpoint of their all-India character or
from the standpoint of the complicated nature of nitis and
sevapuja affecting the lives, religious susceptibilities and sentiments of millions of people spread all over India. There can be
no doubt after this averment on behalf of the State that the
Temple occupies a unique position in the State of Orissa and
•
i
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
41
is a temple of national importance and no other temple in
that State can compare with it. It stands in a class by itself and
considering the fact that it attracts pilgrims from all over India
in large numbers it must be a subject of special consideration
by the State Government. In reply to these averments on behalf of the State, all that the appellant stated in his rejoinder
was that these averments were not admitted. There was no
denial of the special importance of the Temple as averred on
behalf of the State and we have no doubt therefore that this
Temple stands in a class by itself in the State of Orissa and
therefore requires special treatment. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalj/ v. State of Rajasthan(') where in relation to the temple at
Nathdwara with respect to which a special Act had been passed
by the State of Rajasthan, this Court observed that "a law may
be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual
if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual
may be treated as a class by himself". The attack under Art.
14 on the constitutionality of the law with respect to the temple
at Nathdwara was repelled on the ground that the temple had
a. unique position amongst the Hindu Shrines in the State of
Rajasthan and no temple could be regarded as comparable
with it. The same reasons in our opinion apply to the Temple
in the present case and the Act cannot be struck down under
Art. 14 because the Temple in the present case holds a unique
position amongst the Hindu temples in the State of Orissa and
no other temple can be regarded as comparable with it.
Next we come to the attack on the constitutionality of
the Act on the ground that it has taken away the sole management of the temple which had so far been vested in the appellant or his ancestors. The reasons why the Act was passed
are to be found in the preamble thereof. The preamble say&
that the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has eversince its inception been an institution of unique and national
importance, in which millions of Hindu devotees from regions
far and wide have reposed their faith and belief and ha.ve re5arded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture. It further says that long prior tO' and after the British conquest the
superintendence, control and management of the affairs of the
Temple have been the direct concern of successive rulers,
governments and their officers and of the public exchequer. It
then says that by Regulation IV of 1809 and thereafter by
other laws and regulations in pursuance of arrangements entered into with the Raja, of Khurda, later designated as the
Raja of Puri, the said Raja came to be entrusted hereditarily
with the management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties as superintendent subject to the control and supervision
of the ruling power. It then goes on to say that in view of grave
('J [1964] 1 S.C.R, 561.
1964
Raja Birakialwre
...
The State of Oriaea
fJ'anchoo, J.
42
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1964
and serious irregularities thereafter the Government had to
Raja Birakiahore intervene on various occasions in the past. Finally the pre-
.
v.
.
amble says that the administration under the superintendent
The Stare•! Om•• has further deteriorated and a situation has arisen rendering it
Wanchoo,
expedient to reorganise the scheme of management of the
affairs of the
Temple
and
its
properties
and
provide better administration and governance therefor in supersession of all. previous laws, regulations and arrangements,
having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals contained in the record of
rights prepared under the 1952 Act. So for all these reasons
the appellant was removed from the sole superintendence of
the Temple and a committee was appointed by s. 6 of the Act
for its management. These statements in the preamble are not
seriously in dispute as will be clear from the reports by G.
Grome dated June 10, 1905 and by the Special Officer appointed under the 1952 Act dated March 15, 1954 and the correspondence which passed from time to time between the officers
of the Government and the predecessors of the appellant. In
these circumstances--if the secular management of the Temple
was taken away from the sole coQtrol of the appellant and
vested in a committee of which he still remains the chairman,
it cannot be said that the provisions contained in the Act for
that purpose are hit either by Art. 31 (2) or by Art. l 9(f). There
is in our opinion a complete parallel between the provisions of
the Act and the Act relating to the temple at Nathdwara in
Rajasthan, which came up for consideration before this Court
in Tilkayat. Govindlalji's case('). If anything, the case of the
appellant is weaker than that of Shri Govindlalji, for the appellant in the present case was conferred with the· power of
superintendence by Regulation IV of 1809 after the British
conquered .Orissa. Whatever may have been his connection
prior to 1809 with the Temple, the history of the Temple shows
that the Muslim Rulers had removed him and were carrying
on the management of the Temple directly through Hindu
officers appointed by them. The right of management was
conferred on the appellant's ancestor after the British conquest by virtue of the Regulation of 1809 and other laws passed ,
thereafter. All that the Act has done is to replace his sole right
of management by appointing a. committee of which he is tl1e
chairman .. Further there can be in the circumstances no question of the application of Art. 31 (2) in the present case. In
the first place the right of superintendence is not property in
this case for it carried no beneficial enjoyment of any property with· it, and in tlie second case, that right has not been
acquired by tile State which Art. 31(2) requires. As was pointed
out in Tilkayat GovindltiBji's case('), all tllat has happened in
the present case is that the sole right of the appellant to
(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561.
7 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
43
1964
manage the property ha~ been extinguished and in its place
another body for the purpose of the administration of the
d I
h
d
h
Raja Birnl·ish.or~
property of the Temple has been create . n ot er war s t e
v.
office of one functionary is brought to an end and ·another TA• Sta<e of Ori,.•
functionary has come into existence in its place. Such a process cannot be said to constitute the acquisition of the extinguished office or the vesting of the rights in the person holding
that office: (see Tilkayat Govindlalji's case(').
As we have already pointed out, the appellant and his
predecessors always had two distinct rights with respect to this
Temple. In the first place, they were the adya sevaks and as
such had. certain rights and privileges and perquisites.
fhe
rights as adya sevak as we shall show later have not been
touched by the Act. The Act has only deprived him of the
second right i.e .. the sole management of the Temple which
carried no beneficial enjoyment of any property with it and
has conferred that management on a committee of which he
still remains the chairman. In view of this clear dichotomy in
the rights of the appellant al)d his predecessors there is no
question of Art. 31(2) applying in the present case at all, insofar as this right of superintendence of the appellant is concerned. The attack on the constitutionality of the Act on the
ground that the sole right of superintendence has been taken
away from the appellant and th11t is hit by Art. 19(1)(0 or
Art. 31 (2) must therefore fail.
This brings us to the other aspect of the rights of the
appellant as adya sevak, and it is urged that those rights have
been taken away by the Act, and insofar as the Act has done
that it is unconstitutional in that the provisions with respect to
those rights are unreasonable and cannot be protected under
Art. 19(5). Now we have already referred to the provisions of
the Act, and if one looks a.t those provisions one finds nothing
in them which takes away the rights of the appellant as adya
sevak. If anything, there are indications in the Act to show
that his rights, other than those of superintendence remain
intact. Wh~n we sa)'. this we are not to b~ understood as saying
that any nghts which the appellant might have had in the
capacity of adya sevak but which were of the nature of secular management of the Temple would still remain in him.
Because the appellant and his predecessors were holding a
dual position of superintendent and adya sevak, there was in
the past a mix-up of his rights flowing from being an adya.
sevak with his rights as a superintendent. But apart from the
rights which vested in him as the sole manager of the Temple
with respect to its management and which have only been
taken away from him by the Act. we find nothing in the Act
which takes away his rights as an adya sevak (i.e. the chief
servant) of Lord Jagannath in the matter of sevapuja, nitis
etc. These rights flow from his position as adya sevak, they
(') [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561. ...
H'anclwo,J.
1964
Raja Biraki&hore
v.
T~e Slate of Orissa
WanchOo, J.
44
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
are religious in character and are refernble to his status and
obligations as sevak. We may in this connection refer to s. ·s
of the Act which lays down that nothing ins. 7 shall be deemed
to affect the ·rights and privileges of the Raja in respect of
Gajapati Maha~aja Seva merely on the ground that the Raja
has ceased to perform the duties of the chairman for the time
being. This provision clearly shows that even though the appellant may not be able to act as chairman of the committee
because of his minority or because of certain disqualifications
mentioned in s. 7 read with s. 10()), his rights and privileges
in respect of the Gajapati Maharaja Seva (i.e., the daily sevapuja of Lord Jaganna.th) remain unaffected, and these were the
Iights which he had as adya sevak. Therefore s. 8 preserves by
the clearest implication the rights of the appellant as adya
sevak in connection with the
sevapuja of Lord Jagannath. In this connection our attention was drawn to s. 14 of
the Act, which provides tha.t it shall be within the power
of the State ~vernment by order to direct from time to time
the payment from out of the Temple fund to the chairman of such allowances at times and in such manner as the
State Government may consider reasonable and proper.
It is said that in view of s. 14, the appellants rights and privileges as adya sevak have gone. We are of opinion that this
is not so. As we have already said, the position of the superintendent and of adya sevak were two different positions, which
the appellant and his predecessors held in this Temple. His
position as a Superintendent has gone and in place of it he has
become the chairman of the committee constituted under s. 6.
When s. 14 speaks of allowances to him, it refers to his position as a chairman, which replaces his position as superintendent before the Act. It has nothing to do with his position
as an adya sevak, which is safeguarded by s. 8 of the Act inasmuch as rights and privileges in respect of the Gajapati Maha-·
raja Seva are protected, even though he may cease to be the
chairman on account of his minority or on account of some
other reason. Therefore. the provisions of s. 14 refer to
allowances on! y as a chairman and have nothing to do with
the rights, privileges and perquisites as an adya sevak. for he
remains as adya sevak even though he may not for certain reasons remain a chairman. His rights, privileges and perquisites
as adya sevak will remain protected under s. 8 even though
he may not be entitled to anything under s. 14 if he ceases to
be the chairman in view of s. 7. No provision in the· Act has
been pointed out to us, which expressly takes away his rights,
privileges and perquisites as adya sevak; on the other hand
there are other provisions which seem to indicate that even
the rights and privileges of sevaks have not been affected by the
Act. If so it is hardly likely in the absence of any specific provision, that the Act would affect the privileges of the appellant as adya sevak. For example, s. 21 (2) .(g) gives power to the
'1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
45
administrator to decide disputes relating to . the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, office-holders and servants in respect of sevapuja and nitis, whether ordinary or
special in nature. This clearly postulates that the rights and
privileges of sevaks remain intact, and if there is any dispute
about them, the administrator has to decide it. Again s. 21(2)(f)
provides that the administrator shall have power to decide disputes relating ta the collection, distribution or apportionment
of offerings, fees and other receipts in cash or in kind received
from the members of the public. This again postulates a right
in some persons who could only be sevaks etc. to a share of
the offerings, fees and other receipts, and if there is any dispute
about its distribution or apportionment, the administrator has
been given the power to decide it. Reading these two clauses
together, there can be no manner of doubt that the Act does
not affect even the rights, privileges and perquisites of sevakas.
If so, in the absence of express provision, it cannot possibly
be argue:! that the Act affects rights, privileges and perquisites
of adya sevak. As we have already indicated, those rights, privileges and perquisities of adya sevak have also been safe
guarded under s. 8 of the Act. Then we may refer to s.