# RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH v. THE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW

- **Citation:** [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1150
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1956-02-28
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1957
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-ganga-pratap-singh-v-the-allahabad-bank-ltd-lucknow-1401
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

1967
Bombay Dyri!SQ <b
MtJ/nujar.Mdinq
.co.1W.
\".
The State o/
Bum.bay umd Ol/u:r8
V~nkaWama
Aiytn' J.
1968
JanVGry 22.
1150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
stated above. The appeal succeeds in part, but as it is stated
that "unpaid accumulations" form by far the most substantial
portion of the claim, we direct the respondents to pay half the
costs of the appellant here and in the Court below.
Appeal allowed in part.
RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH
v.
THE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW
\S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAll, B. P. SINHA,
J. L. KAPUR and A. K. SARXAll JI.)
Statute, Constitutional validity of-Whether a question of
inteTPretation of the Conltitution-Severabilitl/, if 1hottld be
considered before deciding question of validitv-Dutii of Court
-Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), s. 113 proviso-Con1Utution of India, An. 228.
The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the appellant for
recovery of money under a mortgage. The appellant claimed
reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt
Reduction Act, 1953. An advance or debt due to a scheduled
bank was excluded from the definition of "debt" lliven In the
Act. The appellant contended that the definition In so far as It
excluded certain debts offended Art. 14 of the Constitution as it
made an arbitrary distinction between several cluses of debton.
The appellant applied to the court under the proviso to 1. 113
of the Code of Civil Procedure prayinc that a case be stated
for the opinion of the High Court as to the validity of the impugned portion of the definition. The Court rejected the application. The appellant made an application in revision to the High
Court and also an application under Art. 22.8 of the Constitution for withdrawing the case for a decision of the question of
the validity of the definition. The Higb Court dismiased the aPplications. The Courts below held that in eitber view of the
question as to the validity of the impu&ned portion of the definition, the appellant would be left without the remedy which he
sought, because that portion of the definition was not severable
from the rest and the whole definition would have to be excluded and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question
to dispose of the case :
S.C.R.
SUPREME coun:r REPORTS
1151
Held, that the question raised by the appellant came both
1968
within the proviso to s. 113 of the Code and Art. 228 of the Con-
.
-
stitution. The question whether the impugned part of the defini-8".111 ~
8
.
~alt:lp
tion contravened Art. 14 was a question as to the interpretation
"""
of the Constitution and that question must be decided first. The
PT.e.Ji.kabad
question of severability could arise only after that question had
Bank Lt<l
been decided and the impugned part field invalid,
Luolma111 .,
CIVJL APPELLATE JuRJSDJCTTON:
Civil Appeal No. 357
of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated February 28, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Misc. Case No. 4 of 1955 and Civil Revision
No. 189 of 1955, arising out of the order dated August 6, 1955
of the Civil Judge, Sitapur in Suit No. 16 of 1953.
Vidya Sagar. for the appellant.
Iqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for
the respondent.
1958, January 22. The following Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SARKAR J.-The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the
SarkGr J.
appellant in the court of the Civil Judge, Sitapur ·m Uttar
Pradesh, for the recovery of money due under an instrument
of mortgage. The appellant contested the suit on several
grounds one of which was that he was entitled to relief under
the Uttar Pradesh Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act (U.P.
XV of 1953) which reduced the amount recoverable on a debt
as defined in it. Now a debt was defined in the Act in these
terms:
2(f) : "debt" means an advance in cash or in kind and
includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does
not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first
day of July, 1952 or a debt due to-
'U) the Central Gove

## Text

1967
Bombay Dyri!SQ <b
MtJ/nujar.Mdinq
.co.1W.
\".
The State o/
Bum.bay umd Ol/u:r8
V~nkaWama
Aiytn' J.
1968
JanVGry 22.
1150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
stated above. The appeal succeeds in part, but as it is stated
that "unpaid accumulations" form by far the most substantial
portion of the claim, we direct the respondents to pay half the
costs of the appellant here and in the Court below.
Appeal allowed in part.
RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH
v.
THE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW
\S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAll, B. P. SINHA,
J. L. KAPUR and A. K. SARXAll JI.)
Statute, Constitutional validity of-Whether a question of
inteTPretation of the Conltitution-Severabilitl/, if 1hottld be
considered before deciding question of validitv-Dutii of Court
-Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), s. 113 proviso-Con1Utution of India, An. 228.
The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the appellant for
recovery of money under a mortgage. The appellant claimed
reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt
Reduction Act, 1953. An advance or debt due to a scheduled
bank was excluded from the definition of "debt" lliven In the
Act. The appellant contended that the definition In so far as It
excluded certain debts offended Art. 14 of the Constitution as it
made an arbitrary distinction between several cluses of debton.
The appellant applied to the court under the proviso to 1. 113
of the Code of Civil Procedure prayinc that a case be stated
for the opinion of the High Court as to the validity of the impugned portion of the definition. The Court rejected the application. The appellant made an application in revision to the High
Court and also an application under Art. 22.8 of the Constitution for withdrawing the case for a decision of the question of
the validity of the definition. The Higb Court dismiased the aPplications. The Courts below held that in eitber view of the
question as to the validity of the impu&ned portion of the definition, the appellant would be left without the remedy which he
sought, because that portion of the definition was not severable
from the rest and the whole definition would have to be excluded and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question
to dispose of the case :
S.C.R.
SUPREME coun:r REPORTS
1151
Held, that the question raised by the appellant came both
1968
within the proviso to s. 113 of the Code and Art. 228 of the Con-
.
-
stitution. The question whether the impugned part of the defini-8".111 ~
8
.
~alt:lp
tion contravened Art. 14 was a question as to the interpretation
"""
of the Constitution and that question must be decided first. The
PT.e.Ji.kabad
question of severability could arise only after that question had
Bank Lt<l
been decided and the impugned part field invalid,
Luolma111 .,
CIVJL APPELLATE JuRJSDJCTTON:
Civil Appeal No. 357
of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated February 28, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Misc. Case No. 4 of 1955 and Civil Revision
No. 189 of 1955, arising out of the order dated August 6, 1955
of the Civil Judge, Sitapur in Suit No. 16 of 1953.
Vidya Sagar. for the appellant.
Iqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for
the respondent.
1958, January 22. The following Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
SARKAR J.-The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the
SarkGr J.
appellant in the court of the Civil Judge, Sitapur ·m Uttar
Pradesh, for the recovery of money due under an instrument
of mortgage. The appellant contested the suit on several
grounds one of which was that he was entitled to relief under
the Uttar Pradesh Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act (U.P.
XV of 1953) which reduced the amount recoverable on a debt
as defined in it. Now a debt was defined in the Act in these
terms:
2(f) : "debt" means an advance in cash or in kind and
includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does
not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first
day of July, 1952 or a debt due to-
'U) the Central Government or Government of any
State;
(ii) a local authority;
(iii) a scheduled bank;
(iv) a co-operative society; and
1968
Raj" f)anga Pralap
Singh
v.
The
.1lllahabwl
&•nk Ltd.,
Lucknow
1152
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS
[1958]
(v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose only.
(vi) a person, where the debt was advanced on his behalf by the Court of Wards to a ward.
As the respondent was a scheduled bank the debt due to it
from the appellant was not a debt within this definition and
consequently, no relief would appear to be available to . the
appellant under the Act in respect of that debt. The appellant,
however, contended that the definition in so far as it excluded
certain debts offended Art. 14 of the Constitution in as much
as it made an arbitrary distinction between several classes of
debtors and denied the excluded debtors, the equal protection
of the law and that hence that portion of the definition which
excluded certain debts was invalid and should be struck out
and the rest of the definition should be left as operative. If
the appellant\ contention was justified, the definition would
have to run as follows:
"debt" means an advance in cash CJr in coin and includes
any transaction which is in substance a debt,
and would then include the debt due by the appellant to tte
respondent. If this was the correct position, then the appellant would be entitled to all the reliefs granted by the Act.
This defence, therefore, raised a question as to the vali-·
<lity of a provision in the Act. So the appellant made an applicatibn to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, under the proviso to s. 113
of the Code of Civil Procedure asking him to state a case for
the opinion of the High Court at Allahabad to which he was
subordinate as to the invalidity of the impugned portion of
the definition. That proviso is in these terms:
Provided that where the Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involyes a question as to the validity of any Act,
Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an
Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which .is
necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that
such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to
S.C.R.
SUPRFJl\IE COUR'f REPORTS
1153
Ganga Prnla7
Sing!,
v.
which that Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the
Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons Baja
therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court.
The learned Civil Judge took the view that the impugned
ponion of the definition infringed art. 14 of the Constitution
The .t1.Zlal1«bw
Bank L~I ..
JA,,;k/,,.·.;·
a~ it made an <irbitrary distinction between several classes of
debtors and was therefore invalid, but he held that it was not
ne&ssary for the disposal of the case to decide such question
t~ invalidity because even if it was decided in favour of the
appellant, the result would be to exclude the entire definition
from the Act as the offending portion was not severable from
the rest and the appellant would, therefore, be in any event
left without the protection of the Act. In this view of the matter he held that the proviso to s. 113 of the Code did no't apply
and dismissed the application under it.
The appellant then made an
application to the High
Court at Allahabad for a revision of the order of the learned
CiviLJudge. He at the same time made another application
to the High Court under Art. 228 of the Constitution. That
Mticle is in these terms:
If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a
court subordinak to it' involves a substantial question of law
as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination
nf which is necessary for the disposal of the case. it shall
withdraw the case and may-
(a) either dispose of the case itself, or
(b) determine the said question of law and return the case
to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn together with <i copy of its judgment on such question, and the
.~<iid court shall on receipt thereof proceed to dispose of the
case in conformity with such judgment.
The appeilant in the latter application prayed that the High
Court might be pleased to withdraw the case and either dispose it of itself, or determine the question of the validity of the
definition of debt in the Act and return the case to the court
Sa'rl:nr .1.
1154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l95R]
1968
of the Civil Judge, Sitapur, for final disposal in accordance
&;a c;,,.,.. P""°I' with such determination .
• 'liftflh
Th<
;ilnM•~
The High Court disposed of both the applications by one
f::.!'4" judgment. It held that there was no dispute as to the constitutional principle which was clear, namely, that every citizen
was entitled to the equal protection of the laws and that any
enactment which infringed that principle, is to that extent
void, and that the only dispute was whether the impugned
portion of the definition of a "debt" in the Act was severable
from the rest and that was not a question of the interpretation
of any provision of the Constitution but one of the construction of the Act itself. The High Court also held that even if
any question of the interpretation of the Cons.titution arose, a
determination of that question was not necessary for the disposal of the case. In this view of the matter the High Court dismissed the application in revision and also that under Art.
228. From this judgment the present appeal has been filed.
Sar/car J.
It seems clear to us that the question raised by the appellant in this case comes within the proviso to s. 113 of the Code
. as also art. 228 of the Constitution. The question contemplated by the proviso to s. 113 of the Code is as to the validity of
an Act or of a provision in it while Art. 228 of the Constitution has in view a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Now the question raised in the present case is as to
the validity of a provision in the Zamindar's Debt Reduction
Act This question is, however, also a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution, for the validity of the provision
is challenged on the ground that it contravenes an article of
the Constitution.
The point that really arises in this appeal is whether it
is necessary for the disposal of the case to decide the question
of the validity of a portion of the definition of a debt in the
Act. All other conditions necessary for an order being made
under the proviso to s. 113 of the Code or Art. 228 of the Con-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1155
stitution exist and as to this there is no serious dispute. It is
l9S8
not necessary for us therefore to discuss these conditions.
Raja Ganga Pratap
Singh
The courts below held that in either view of the question
v.
The .AUaliabad
of the validity of the impugned portion of the difinition of a
Bank Ltd.,
debt, the appellant would be without the remedy which he
Lucknoto
sought, because that portion of the definition was not sever·
Sarkar J.
able from the rest, and therefore it was not necessary to
decide that question to dispose of the case. We are unable to
agree with this view. The question of the validity of the defini·
tion in so far as it excluded certain debts having been raised
.and pressed by the appellant, it had . to be decided by the
court. Without a decision of that question the case could not
be disposed of. The fact that in the view of the court the impugned part of the definition was not severable from the rest
and therefore in any view of the questioo as to the validity of
the impugned part, the appellant would not get any relief, did
not alter the position. The question a.s to the severability of
the impuped part of the definition from the rest would arise
only after it had been decided that the impugned part was invalid and so to be able to say that the impugne'd part of the
definition was not severable from the rest, it had first to be
held that that part was invalid. It could not be said that as
the impugned part wa~ not severable from the rest it was not
necessary for the disposal of the case to decide the question
of the validity of the impugned part. We, therefore, bold that
it is necessary to decide the question of the validity of the impugned part of the definition to dispose of the case.
This appeal is hence allowed. The High Court will withdraw the case and either dispose it of itself or determine 'the
question o~ the validity of the definition of a debt in the
Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act and return the case to the
Civil Judge, Sitapur, for disposal in accordance with its deter-
. mination of the question. The appellant wilf get the costs of
this appeal.
Appeal allowed.