# RAJA HARISH CHANDRA RAJ SINGH v. THE DEPUTY LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1960-03-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 25 and 26of1958
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-harish-chandra-raj-singh-v-the-deputy-land-acquisition-officer-and-another-2159
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Limitation-Land Acquisition-Award by Collector-Notice
of award not given-Application for reference to Court-Time for
making-Land Acq,.isition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), s. 18.
Certain lands belonging to the appellant were compulsorily
acquired. The Collector made an award with respect to the
amount of compensation, signed and filed it in his office as
required by s. 12(1) Land Acquisition Act on March 19, 1950.
But no notice of the award, as required bys. 12(2), was given to
the appellant. The appellaht came to know of the award on or
about January 13, 1953. and on February 24, 1953, he filed an
application under s. 18 requiring that the matter be referred for
the determination of the Court. The proviso to s. 18 prescribes
that in cases where a person was not present or represented at
the time of the making of the award the application under s. 18
shall be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from
the Collector under s. 12(2), or "within six months from the
date of the award", whichever shall expire first.
The appellant's application was dismissed as time barred on the ground
that it was made beyond six months of the date of the award.
Held, that the application made by the appellant under
s. 18 of the Act was not beyond time. The award of the Collector was not a decision but an offer of compensation on behalf of
the Government to the owner of the property and it was not
effective until it was communicated to the owner. The making
of the award did not consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or filing it in the office of the Collector; it also involved the communication of the award to the
owner either actually or constructively.
Consequently, the
expression "the date of the award" in the proviso to s. 18
meant the date when the award was communicated to the
owner or is known by him either actually or constructively.
The application in the present case was made within six
months of the date when the appellants came to know of
the award and was within the period prescribed.
Ezra v. The Secretary of State, (1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 36 and
Ezra v. Secretary of State for India, (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 605,
applied.
Magdonald v. The Secretary of State for India in Council,
(1905) 4 Ind. C. 914 and Hari Das Pal v. The Municipal Board,
Lucknow, (1914) 22 Ind. C. 652, approved.
,
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
]ahangir Bemanji v. G. D. Gaikwad, A.LR. r954 Born. 4r9
1961
and State of Travancore-Cochin v. Narayani Amma Ponnamma,
A.LR. r958 Kerala 272, disapproved.
llaja I!ad;h
0. A. 0. A. M. Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income- Chandrn Raj Singh
tax, Madras, LL.R. r951 Mad. 815, Annamalai Chetti v. Co!.]. G. n, n,;~t Land
Cloeta, (r883) LL.R. 6 Mad. 189. and E. V. E. Swaminalhan 4
. ·r Y 0
Alias Chidambaram Pillai v. Letchmanan Chettiar, (1930) l.L.R. · cquisi ion
'ffic<r
53 Mad. 49r, referred to.

## Text

March 30.
•
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
RAJA HARISH CHANDRA RAJ SINGH
v.
THE DEPUTY LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
AND ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Limitation-Land Acquisition-Award by Collector-Notice
of award not given-Application for reference to Court-Time for
making-Land Acq,.isition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), s. 18.
Certain lands belonging to the appellant were compulsorily
acquired. The Collector made an award with respect to the
amount of compensation, signed and filed it in his office as
required by s. 12(1) Land Acquisition Act on March 19, 1950.
But no notice of the award, as required bys. 12(2), was given to
the appellant. The appellaht came to know of the award on or
about January 13, 1953. and on February 24, 1953, he filed an
application under s. 18 requiring that the matter be referred for
the determination of the Court. The proviso to s. 18 prescribes
that in cases where a person was not present or represented at
the time of the making of the award the application under s. 18
shall be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from
the Collector under s. 12(2), or "within six months from the
date of the award", whichever shall expire first.
The appellant's application was dismissed as time barred on the ground
that it was made beyond six months of the date of the award.
Held, that the application made by the appellant under
s. 18 of the Act was not beyond time. The award of the Collector was not a decision but an offer of compensation on behalf of
the Government to the owner of the property and it was not
effective until it was communicated to the owner. The making
of the award did not consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or filing it in the office of the Collector; it also involved the communication of the award to the
owner either actually or constructively.
Consequently, the
expression "the date of the award" in the proviso to s. 18
meant the date when the award was communicated to the
owner or is known by him either actually or constructively.
The application in the present case was made within six
months of the date when the appellants came to know of
the award and was within the period prescribed.
Ezra v. The Secretary of State, (1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 36 and
Ezra v. Secretary of State for India, (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 605,
applied.
Magdonald v. The Secretary of State for India in Council,
(1905) 4 Ind. C. 914 and Hari Das Pal v. The Municipal Board,
Lucknow, (1914) 22 Ind. C. 652, approved.
,
'
'
•
..
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
677
]ahangir Bemanji v. G. D. Gaikwad, A.LR. r954 Born. 4r9
1961
and State of Travancore-Cochin v. Narayani Amma Ponnamma,
A.LR. r958 Kerala 272, disapproved.
llaja I!ad;h
0. A. 0. A. M. Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of Income- Chandrn Raj Singh
tax, Madras, LL.R. r951 Mad. 815, Annamalai Chetti v. Co!.]. G. n, n,;~t Land
Cloeta, (r883) LL.R. 6 Mad. 189. and E. V. E. Swaminalhan 4
. ·r Y 0
Alias Chidambaram Pillai v. Letchmanan Chettiar, (1930) l.L.R. · cquisi ion
'ffic<r
53 Mad. 49r, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals Nos.
25 and 26of1958.
Appeals from the judgments and orders dated
August 7, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court in
Special Appeals Nos. 151 and 152 of 1955.
0. B. Agarwala, A. N. Goyal and Mohan Lal Agarwala, for the appellant.
Gopi Nath Dikshit and 0. P. Lal, for the respondents.
1961.
March 30.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These two appeals arise outGaJcndrngadt.a• J.
of two writ petitions filed by the appellant Raja
Harish Chandra Raj Singh against the respondents
the Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another in
the Allahabad High Court and they were based on
the same facts and asked for the same relief. Both
of them raise a short common question of limitation
the decision of which would depend upon the determination of the scope and effect of the provisions of the
proviso to s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894
(hereafter called the Act).
Since the facts in both the
appeals are substantially the same we would refer to
the facts in Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1958.
Tho decision in this appeal would govern the decision of the
other appeal, Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1958.
The appellant Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh was
the proprietor of a village Beljuri in the District,
of Nainital. It appears that proceedings for compulsory acquisition of land including the said village
for a public purpose were commenced by respondent
2, the State of Uttar Pradesh; notifications under ss. 4
and 6 of the Act were issued in that behalf, and the
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962J
'96'
provisions of s. 17 were also made applicable. AccordR .
H
. k
ingly, after the notice under s. 9(1) of the Act was
Cka:J;. R;·~ingk published possession of land was taken by the Collecv.
tor on March 19, 1960. Thereupon the appellant filed
The Deputy Land his claim to compensation for the land acquired in
Acquisition Offic" accordance with s. 9(2), and proceedings were held by
G . d--dk 1 the Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, respondent 1,
a;en rnga
ar . "
d t
• •
th
t
f
.
I
lOr
e ermmmg
e amoun o
compensat10n.
t
appears that in these proceedings an award was made,
signed and filed in his office by respondent 1 on
March 25, 1951.
No notice of this award was, however, given to the appellant as required by s. 12(2)
and it was only on or about January 13, 1953 that he
received information about the making of the said
award. The appellant then filed an application on
February 24, 1953 under s. 18 requiring that the ""
matter be referred for the determination of the
Court, as, according to the appellant, the compensation
amount determined by respondent 1 was quite inadequate. Respondent 1 took the view that the a pplication thus made by the appellant was beyond time
under the proviso to s. 18 and so he rejected it. The
appellant then filed a writ petition in the Allahabad
High Court on December 21, 1953 in which he claimed
appropriate reliefs in respect of the order passed by
respondent 1 on his application made under s. 18.
'!'his petition was heard by Mehrotra, J. and was
allowed. The learned Judge directed respondent 1 to
consider the application made by the appellant on
the merits and deal with it in accordance with law.
He held that in dealing with the said application respondent 1 should treat the application as filed in time.
Against this decision the respondents preferred an
appeal to a Division Bench of the said High Court.
Mootham, C. J. and Chaturvedi, J., who heard this
appeal took the view that the application filed by the
appellant under s. 18 of the Act was barred by time,
and so they allowed the appeal, set aside the order
passed by Mehrotra, J. and dismissed the writ petition
filed by the appellant. The appellant then moved for
and obtained a certificate from the said High Court
and it is with this certificate that he has come to this
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
Court in the present appeal; and so the short question
1961
which the appellant raises for our decision is whether
R .
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. h
the application filed by him under s. 18 of the Act Cha:J;. R:;~ingh
was in time or not.
v.
Before proceeding to construe the material provi- The n:puty Land
sions of s. 18 it is necessary to refer very briefly to Acqu"'''°" Officer
some other sections of the Act which are relevant in G . d--dk 1
d
.
h b k
d f h
h
.
a1en raga
ar .
or er to appremate t. e ac groun o t e sc eme m
relation to land acquisition proceedings. Section 4
deals with the publication of the preliminary notification and prescribes the powers of the appropriate
officers.
Whenever it appears to the appropriate
Government that land in any locality is needed for
any public purpose a notification to that effect shall
be published in the official gazette and a public notice
of its substance shall be given at convenient places in
the said locality; that is the effect of s. 4(1).
Section 4(2) deals with the powers of the appropriate
authorities. Section 5-A provides for the hearing of
objections filed by persons interested in any land
which has been notified under s. 4(1).
After the
objections are thus considered a declaration that
land is required for a public purpose follows under
s. 6(1).
Section 6(2) provides for the publication of
the said declaration; and s. 6(3) makes the declaration conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a
public purpose. Section 9 requires the Collector to
give public notice in the manner specified stating
that the Government intend to take possession of the
land and calling for claims to compensation in respect
of all interests in such land. Section 9(2) prescribes
the particulars of such notice, and s. 9(3) and (4) provide for the manner of serving such notice. Section 11
deals with the enquiry and provides for the making of
the award by the Collector. Section 12(1) then lays
down that the award when made by the Collector
shall be filed in his office, and shall, except as otherwise provided, be final and conclusive evidence as
between the Collector and the persons interested
whether they have respectively appeared before the
Collector or not, of the true area and value of the
land, and the apportionment of the compensation
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96z
among the persons interested. Section 12(2) is important. It makes it obligatory on the Collector to give
Raja ffarish
.
d'
t'
f h'
d t
h f h
Chandra llaj Singh 1mme 1ate no ice o
1s a war
o sue o t e persons
v.
interested as are not present personally or by their
The Deputy r.andrepresentatives when the award is made. It is comAcquisition Officermon ground that no such notice was given by respon-
--
dent 1 to the appellant. That briefly is the scheme
Gajendrngadlwr f. of the relevant provisions of Part II of the Act which
deals with acquisition.
Part III which deals with reference to Court and
procedure thereon opens with s. 18.
Section 18(1)
provides that any person interested who has not
accepted the award may, by written application to
the Collector, require that the matter be referred by
him for determination of the Court, inter alia, whether the amount of compensation is adequate or not.
It is under this provision that the appellant made an
application from which the present appeal arises.
Section 18(2) requires that the application shall state
the grounds on which objection to the award is taken.
These grounds have been stated by the appellant in his
application. The proviso to s. 18 deals with the question of limitation. It prescribes that every such
application shall be made (a) if the person making it
was present or represented before the Collector at the
time when he made his award within six weeks from
the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases
within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from
the Collector under s. 12(2), or within six months from
the date of the Collector's award whichever shall first
expire. The appellant's case falls under the latter
part of cl. (b) of the proviso. It has been held by
the Allahabad High Court that since the application
made by the appellant before respondent 1 was
made beyond six months from the date of the award
in question it was beyond time.
The view taken by
the High Court proceeds on the literal construction of
the relevant clause. As we have already seen the
award was signed and delivered in his office by respondent 1 on March 25, 1951 and the application by
the appellant was made under s. 18 on February 24,
1953. It has been held that the effect of the relevant
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
clause is that the application made by the appellant
1961
is plainly beyond the six months permitted by the
R .
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. ,
1
d
d
1
. h .
.
.
a1a
ans"
said c a use an so respon ent
was rig t Ill reJectmg Chandra Raj Singh
it as barred by time. The question which arises for
v.
our decision is whether this literal and mechanical The Deputy Land
way of construing the relevant clause is justified in Acquisition Officer
law. It is obvious that the effect of this constructionG . d-dk 1
.
h
"f
d
t k
b
th
k"
f •Jen raga
ar
.
1s t at 1 a person oes no
now a out
e ma mg o
the award and is himself not to blame for not knowing about the award his right to make an application
under s. 18 may in many cases be rendered ineffective.
If the effect of the relevant provision unambiguously
is as held by the High Court the unfortunate consequence which may flow from it may not have a material or a decisive bearing. If, on the other hand, it
is possible reasonably to construe the said provision
so as to avoid such a consequence it would be legitimate for the Court to do so.
We must therefore
enquire whether the relevant provision is capable of
the construction for which the appellant contends,
and that naturally raises the question as to what is
the meaning of the expression "the day of the Collector's award".
In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear
in mind the legal character of the award made by the
Collector under s. 12. In a sense it is a decision of
the Collector reached by him after holding ai;i enquiry
as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia,
in respect of the amount of compensation which
should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the
compensation determined by the Collector to the
owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner
accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to
be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does
not accept the offer s. 18 gives him the statutory
right of having the question determined by Court, and
it is the amount of compensation which the Court
may determine that would bind both the owner and
86
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
x96x
the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus
R .
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. h determined judicially that the acquisition proceedCha:~;,, R:;~:ngh ings would be concluded. It is because of this nature
v.
of the award that the award can be appropriately
The Deputy Land described as a tender or offer made by the Collector
Acquisition Officer on behalf of the Government to the owner of the proG .
--
perty for his acceptance. In Ezra v. The Secretary of
a;endragadkar ]. S
(')
I h
b
h Id h
h
.
tate
.
t as een
e
t at "t e meanmg to be
attached to the word "award" under s. 11 and its
nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere
use of the same expression in both instances but from
the examination of the provisions of the law relating
to the Collector's proceedings culminating in the
award. The considerations to which we have referred
satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter of the
enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an
agent of the Government and not as a judicial officer;
and that consequently, although the Government is
bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are
not concluded by his finding regarding the value of
the land or the compensation to be awarded." Then
the High Court has added that such tender once made
is binding on the Government and the Government
cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer
acting on its behalf should be open to question at its
own instance before the Civil Court. The said case
was taktin before the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India('), and their Lordships have
expressly approved of the observations made by the
High Court to which we have just referred. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no
more than an offer made on behalf of the Government
to the owner of the property then the making of the
award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That
is the normal requirement under the contract law and
its applicability to cases of award made under the
Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered
the date of the award cannot be determined solely by
reference to the time when the award is signed by the
Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must
(1) (1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 36, 86.
(2) (1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 605.
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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
involve the consideration of the question as to when
z96z
it was known to the party concerned either actually
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' 1
If h
b
th t
't"
th
•J• Hansh
or constructive y.
t at e
e rue pos1 IOU
enChandraRajSingh
the literal and mechanical construction of the words
v.
"the date of the award" occurring in the relevant The Deputy Land
section would not be appropriate.
Acquisition Officer
There is yet another point which leads to the same G . d
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administraaJen ragadkar f .
tive decision taken by the Collector in the matter of
the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it
is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the
rights of the owner of the property and in that sense,
like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially
fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party
affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied
before the decision can be brought into force.
Thus
considered the making of the. award cannot consist
merely in the physical act of writing the award or
signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector;
it must involve the communication of the said award
to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of
the party whose rights are affected by it it can be said
to be made when pronounced. If the date for the
pronouncement of the award is communicated to the
party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date pre,
viously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not
actually present on the date of its pronouncement.
Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not
present the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of
the party affected by the award, either actual or
constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice tho expression "the date of
the award" used in the proviso must mean the date
when the award is either communicated to the party
•
or is known by him either actually or constructively.
In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
construe the words "from the date of the Collector's
R .
F'
. h
award" used in the proviso to s. 18 in a literal or
a;a
Jans
h
. l
Chandra Raj Singh mec amca way.
v.
In this connection it is material to recall the fact
The Deputy Land that under s. 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to
Acquisition Offiw give immediate notice of the award to the persons
G . d-dk 1 interested as are not present personally or by their
a1en raga
ar .
t t'
h
h
d .
d
Th'
represen a 1ves w en t e a war 1s ma e.
1s requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The Legislature recognised that the making of the award under
s. 11 followed by its filing under s. 12( 1) would not
meet the requirements of justice before bringing the
award into force. It thought that the communic<>tion
of the award to the party concerned was also necessary, and so by the use of the mandatory words an
obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate
the award immediately to the person concerned. It is
significant that the section requires the Collector to
give notice of the award immediately after making it.
This provision lends support to the view which we
have taken about the construction of the expression
"from the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso
to s. 18.
It is because communication of the order is
regarded by the Legislature as necessary that s. 12(2)
has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the
relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light
of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the
literal and mechanical construction of the said clause
would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a
very curious result that the failure of the Collector to
discharge his obligation under s. 12(2) should directly
tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make
an application under s. 18, and this result could not
possibly have been intended by the legislature.
It may now be convenient to refer to some judicial
decisions bearing on this point. In Magdonald v. The
Secretary of State for India in Council (1) Rattigan and
Shah Din, JJ. held that under the proviso to s. 18
until an award is announced or communicated to the
parties concerned it cannot be said to be legally made.
(1) (1905) 4 Ind. C. gr4.
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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
685
An award under the Act, it was observed in the
' 96'
judgment, is in the nature of a tender and obviously
Raja Harish
no tender can be made unless it is brought to the Chandra Raj Singh
knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The
v.
learned Judges observed that this proposition seemed The D'.puty Land
to them to be self-evident. The same view has been Acquisition Officer
expressed by the Oudh Judicial Commissioner in Hari Gajendragadkar ;.
Das Pal v. The Municipal, Board, Lucknow (1 ).
On the other hand, in Jehangir Bomanji v. G.D.
Gaikwad (') the Bombay High Court has taken the
view that the element of notice is only an essential
ingredient of the first part of cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 18
which prescribes the period of limitation as six weeks
from the date of the receipt of the notice from the
Collector, not of the second part which prescribes the
maximum period of six months from the date of the
Collector's award in absolute terms. According to that
decision, as far as the limitation under the latter part
is concerned it runs from the date of the award and
the date of the award has nothing whatever to do
with the notice which the Collector has to give under
s. 12(2). In our opinion this decision is based on a
misconstruction of the relevant clause in the proviso
to s. 18.
The same comment falls to be made in
regard to the decision of the Kerala High Court in
State of Travancore-Cochin v. Narayani Amma Ponnamma (').
It may, however, be pertinent to point out that the
Bombay High Court has taken a somewhat different
view in dealing with the effect of the provision as to
limitation prescribed by s. 33A(2) of the Indian
Income-tax Act. This provision prescribes limitation
for an application by an assessee for the revision of the
specified class of orders, and it says that such an
application should be made within one year from the
date of the order. It is significant that while providing for a similar period of limitation s. 33(1) specifically lays down that the limitation of sixty days
therein prescribed is to be calculated from the date on
which the order in question is communicated to the
(r) (1914) 22 Ind. C. 652.
(2) A.I.R. 1954 Born. 419.
(3) A.LR. (1958) Kerala 272.
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
r95r
assessee. In other words, in prescribing limitation
R . H . h s. 33(1) expressly provides for the commencement
Cha:~;.R:;~ingh of the period from the date of the communication
v.
of the order, whereas s. 33A(2) does not refer to
The D~puty Land any such communication; and naturally the arguAcquisition Officerment was that communication was irrelevant under
G . d-dk 1 s. 33A(2) and limitation would commence as from
aJen raga
ar .
.
.
.
the makmg of the order without reference to its communication.
This argument was rejected by the
Bombay High Court and it was held that it would
be a reasonable interpretation to hold that the
making of the order implies notice of the said
order, either actual or constructive, to the party
affected by it. It would not be easy to reconcile this
decision and particularly the reasons given in its
support with the decision of the same High Court in
the case of J ehar11J.ir Bomanji (' ).
The relevant clause
under s. 33A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act has also
been similarly construed by the Madras High Court in
O.A.O.A.M. Muthia Chettiar v. The Commissioner of
Income-tax, Madras(').
"If a person is given a right
to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order
within a prescribed time", observed Rajamannar, C.J.,
"limitation should not be computed from a date earlier
than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew
of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the
order and therefore must be presumed to have the
knowledge of the order". In other words the Madras
High Court has taken the view that the omission to
use the words "from the date of communication" in
s. 33A(2) does not mean that limitation can start to
run against a party even before the party either knew
or should have known about the said order. In our
opinion this conclusion is obviously right.
A similar question arose before the Madras High
Court in Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J. G. Cloete(').
Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of
1860 limited the time within which a suit may be
brought to set side the decision of the settlement
officer to two months from the date of the award, and
(1) A.I.R. 1954 Baro. 419.
(2) l.L.R. 1951 Mad. 815.
(3) (1883) I.L.R. 6 Mad. 189.
•
•
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,.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
so the question arose as to when the time would begin
'96'
to run. The High Court held that thhe htimed can. begi.n
Raja Harish
to run only from the date on whic
t e
ecis10n ISchandraRajSingh
communicated to the parties. "If there was any deciv.
sion at all in the sense of the Act", says the judgment, The Deputy Land
"it could not date earlier than the date of the com- Acquisition Officer
munication of it to the parties; otherwise they might G . d-dJ
J
be barred of their right of appeal without any knowa;en raga '"' ·
ledge of the decision having been passed". Adopting
the same principle a similar construction has been
placed by the Madras High Court in K. V. E. Swaminathan alias Ghidambaram Pillai v. Letchmanan
Ghettiar (1).
On the limitation provisions contained
in ss. 73(1) and 77(1) of the Indian Registration
Act XVI of 1908. It was held that in a case where
an order was not passed in the presence of the parties
or after notice to them of the date when the order
would be passed the expression "within thirty days
after the making of the order" used in the said sections means within thirty days after the date on
which the communication of the order reached the
parties affected by it. These decisions show that
where the rights of a person are affected by any order
and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the
remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order
by reference to the making of the said order, the
making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party
concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High
Court of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in
the present proceedings was barred under the proviso
to s. 18 of the Act.
In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the
orders passed by Mootham, C. J. and Chaturvedi, J.,
and restore those of Mehrotra, J. In the circumstances of this case there would be no order as to
costs.
Appeal allowed.
(1) (1930) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 491.