# RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY v. BAIJNATH BAJORIA

- **Citation:** [1950] 1 S.C.R. 840
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1948-05-30
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1950
- **Bench:** Shri Harilal Kania C.J, Patanjali Sastri, Das
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-kamala-ranjan-roy-v-baijnath-bajoria-158
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Conlract~Specific perforn"nce-0.ff:r
to purchase leasehold
right-Stipulation that lesse'J sho-uld obtain consent of lessor-Lessor
ttnreasonably refflsing consent-Lessee, 1vhethe'· relieved of liribility
f0 assign-Suit for
sp-1cifi~ verformince by purchasftr-Maintain.•
abilitr1-Lea.s9 deed-Covenant prohibitin1 assignm;nt of lease without
l
.
"
l
_f!s~or s co:isent,
Sit' i co 1isent,
lunv,~v~r, not to b3 11,11reasonably u·i hhJld in case of respectable p!rso'i "-llieaniru; and effect of co1,>!':1tant.
(1) 47 Ca.I. 48-'i, at p. 494.
-
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
The defendant had obtained certain premises on lease under
a deed which contained a covenant by the lessee "not to assign
the demised premises or any port thereof without first obtaining
the written consent of the lessor, such consent, however, not to
be unreasonably withheld in the case of respectable or responsi·
hie person", After some offers and counter offers the plaintiff
finally made an offer to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest on certain terms one of which was that " the consent of the
landlord will be obtained by yon before the completion of the
sale"; and the offer was nnconditionally accepted by the defendant. The defendant subsequently refused to assign on the ground
that the lessor had withheld bis consent, and the plaintiff sued
for specific performance of the agreement :
Held, (i) that the agreement was not, for its coming into
being, conditional or contingent on the obtaining of the lessor's
consent, the obligation ta obtain the lessor's consent being only
a term of the agreement which the defendant had to fulfil; (ii) tho
words
11 such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld
in the case of a respectable or responsible person " in the lease·
deed did not amount to a. separate or indepGndent covenant by
the lessor that he would not refuse consent except on reasonable
groundR in the case of a reBpectable or responsible person, but
only limited or qualified the lessee's covenant not to assign with.
out the lessor's consent, by relieving him from the burden of the
covenant if the lessor withheld hie consent unreasonably in the
case of proposed assignment to a respectable or responsible person ; (iii) that, as the plaintiff was admittedly a respectable and
responsible person and on the facts of the case the lessor's refusal
to give consent was unreasonable, the defendant could validly
assign the lease without such consent ; (iv) that the court could
come to a decision on this matter even though the lessor was not
a party to the suit and the decision might not bind him ; (v) that
the defendant could not under these circumstances plead the
absence of the lessor's consent as relieving him from the obligation to perform his part of the agreement if the plaintiff insisted
on bis carrying out the agreement even though the lessor had
not given his consent; and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to
a decree for specific performance of the agreement.

## Text

1950
Manann Lal
Deas hi
'·
Mohammad
Moi.nul Haque
& Others.
Patanjali
Saatri J,
1950
Dec, 1.
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1950]
thereafter. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee
in H emanta K uinar' s case (1)
"An agreement for a
lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to
include, must, in their Lordships' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a
lease ...... The phrase which in the context where it
occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in
their opinion relate to some document which creates
a present and immediate interest in the land."
The compromise decree expressly provides that unless
the sum of Rs. 8,000 was paid within the stipulated
time the Singhs were not to execute the decree or to
take possession of the disputed property. Until the
payment was made it was impossible to determine
whether there would be any underlease or not. Such
a contingent agreement is not within clause (d) and although it is covered by clause (b), is excepted by clause
(vi) of sub-section (2). \Ve therefore agree with the conclusion of the High Court though on different grounds
and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant: P. K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the respondent : Sukumar Glzose.
RAJA KAMALA RANJAN ROY
v.
BAIJNATH BAJORIA.
(SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI
and DAS JJ.)
Conlract~Specific perforn"nce-0.ff:r
to purchase leasehold
right-Stipulation that lesse'J sho-uld obtain consent of lessor-Lessor
ttnreasonably refflsing consent-Lessee, 1vhethe'· relieved of liribility
f0 assign-Suit for
sp-1cifi~ verformince by purchasftr-Maintain.•
abilitr1-Lea.s9 deed-Covenant prohibitin1 assignm;nt of lease without
l
.
"
l
_f!s~or s co:isent,
Sit' i co 1isent,
lunv,~v~r, not to b3 11,11reasonably u·i hhJld in case of respectable p!rso'i "-llieaniru; and effect of co1,>!':1tant.
(1) 47 Ca.I. 48-'i, at p. 494.
-
-
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
The defendant had obtained certain premises on lease under
a deed which contained a covenant by the lessee "not to assign
the demised premises or any port thereof without first obtaining
the written consent of the lessor, such consent, however, not to
be unreasonably withheld in the case of respectable or responsi·
hie person", After some offers and counter offers the plaintiff
finally made an offer to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest on certain terms one of which was that " the consent of the
landlord will be obtained by yon before the completion of the
sale"; and the offer was nnconditionally accepted by the defendant. The defendant subsequently refused to assign on the ground
that the lessor had withheld bis consent, and the plaintiff sued
for specific performance of the agreement :
Held, (i) that the agreement was not, for its coming into
being, conditional or contingent on the obtaining of the lessor's
consent, the obligation ta obtain the lessor's consent being only
a term of the agreement which the defendant had to fulfil; (ii) tho
words
11 such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld
in the case of a respectable or responsible person " in the lease·
deed did not amount to a. separate or indepGndent covenant by
the lessor that he would not refuse consent except on reasonable
groundR in the case of a reBpectable or responsible person, but
only limited or qualified the lessee's covenant not to assign with.
out the lessor's consent, by relieving him from the burden of the
covenant if the lessor withheld hie consent unreasonably in the
case of proposed assignment to a respectable or responsible person ; (iii) that, as the plaintiff was admittedly a respectable and
responsible person and on the facts of the case the lessor's refusal
to give consent was unreasonable, the defendant could validly
assign the lease without such consent ; (iv) that the court could
come to a decision on this matter even though the lessor was not
a party to the suit and the decision might not bind him ; (v) that
the defendant could not under these circumstances plead the
absence of the lessor's consent as relieving him from the obligation to perform his part of the agreement if the plaintiff insisted
on bis carrying out the agreement even though the lessor had
not given his consent; and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to
a decree for specific performance of the agreement.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4
of 1950.
Appeal from the High Court of Judicature of Cal.
cutta (Sir Trevor Harries C.J. and Mukherjea J.) from
a judgment and decree dated .May 30, 1948, in Appeal
No. 21 of 1947 confirming with modifications the decree
of a single Judge of the same High Court (Ormond J.)
dated January 24, 1947, in suit No. 1031 of 1945.
!OS
1900
Eaja Kamala
Ranjan Roy
v.
Baiinatlt
Bajoria,
1950
Rr1ja Kamala
Ranjan Roy
v.
Baijnath
Bajoria.
Das J.
842
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
N. C. Chatterjee (Samarendra Nath f.fukherjee, with
him) for the appellant.
P. L. Banerjee (Upendra Chandra f.fullick, with
him) for the respondent.
1950. December 1. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
DAs J.-This is an appeal by the defendant in a
suit for specific performance against the judgment
and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort
William in Bengal (Sir Trevor Harries C. J.
and
Mukherjea J.) dated May 30, 1948, dismissing his
appeal and confirming, with certain modifications, the
judgment and decree for specific performance passed
by Ormond J. on January 24, 1947.
There is no substantial dispJite as to the facts leading up to the suit
out of which the present appeal has arisen and they
may shortly be stated :
Maharaja Sris Chandra Nandy of Cossimbazar is the
owner of premises No. 374 Upper Chitpur Road in the
town of Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as the "said
premises"). By an Indenture of lease made on April
27, 1931, the Maharaja as manager of the Cossimbazar
Raj Wards Estate which was then under the management of the Court of Wards demised the said premises
to one Madan Gopal Daga for a term of 51 years commencing from May 1, 1931, at and for the monthly
rent of Rs. 1,083-5-3 and upon terms and conditions
contained therein.
By sub-clause (6) of clause 2 of the
said Indenture the lessee covenanted, amongst other
things, ''not to assign the demised premises or any
part thereof without first obtaining the written consent
of the lessor, such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of respectable or
responsible person ......... "
There was the usual proviso for re-entry for non-payment of rent for three
months or for breach of any of the lessee's covenants,
without prejudice to the lessor's right of action for
such breach. On March 25, 1943, Madan Gopal Daga,
with the written consent of the lessor, assigned the
unexpired residue of the lease to the defendant who
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
was accepted as the lessee by the lessor.
By an agreement said to have been arrived at by correspondence
exchanged between the plaintiff and the defendant and
their respective solicitors between January 27, 1945,
and February 2, 1945, the defendant is alleged to have
agreed to assign the said lease to the plaintiff for the
unexpired residue of the term with effect from February
1, 1945, at and for the price of Rs. 1,80,000 and upon
terms and conditions contained in the correspondence
to which reference will be made in greater detail hereafter. On February 21, 1945, the defendant wro!e a
letter to the lessor intimating that he had agreed to
assign his interest in the lease to the plaintiff and
requesting the lessor to give his consent in writing to
such assignment. On March 5, 1945, the lessor replied
that the question of his giving consent to the transfer
of the lease could not be entertained as he had already
determined the lease and that in the circumstances the
whole initiative was in the hands of the defendant.
This letter clearly indicated that the lease had been
determined for non-payment of rents and it obviously
implied that it was for the defendant to get the lease
revived by paying up the arrears of rent so that the
question of giving consent to an assignment of the
lease might be considered by the lessor.
On March 8,
1945, the defendant by his solicitors' letter informed
the plaintiff's solicitors that the defendant had ap
proached the lessor but had failed to secure his consent
and that, as no valid transfer could be made without
such consent and the agreement for sale was subject
to such consent being obtained, the defendant was
reluctantly compelled to cancel the agreement. The
plaintiff by his solicitors' letter of March 10, 1945,
maintained that the agreement was not subject to the
alleged condition and that the defendant was. not
entitled to cancel the agreement. It was pointed out
that under the terms of the lease the lessor could not
refuse his consent to the transfer of the lease to a respectable or responsible person which the plaintiff
undoubtedly was. It is not necessary to refer to the
further correspondence that followed in which each
1950
Raja Kan1ala
Rtlnjati Boy
v,
Baijnath
Bajoria.
Das J.
1950
Raja Kamala
Ranjan Roy
v.
Ba;jnath
Bajoria.
Das J.
844
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950)
party maintained his own contention.
On March 17,
1945, the lessor filed a suit (being suit No. 425 of 1945)
in the High Court against the defendant for the recovery of the demised premises on the ground that
the lease had been determined. It was during the
pendency of that suit that on July 4, 1945, the suit for
specific performance of the agreement to assign the
lease out of which the present appeal has arisen was
filed by the plaintiff against the defendant.
On July 13, 1945, the lessor's suit for ejectment was
settled by the defendant consenting to a decree for
Rs. 59,213-11-0 for arrears of rent which was paid up.
There is no dispute that the forfeiture of the lease for
non-payment of rent was waived and the lease was
accordingly revived. Shortly after the settlement of
the ejectment suit the defendant on August 6, 1945,
applied to the lessor for his consent to the assignment of
the lease and on the same day the lessor in reply
declined to give his consent without assigning any
reason whatever. The suit for specific performance
came up for disposal before Ormond J. in November 1946
when it was heard in part and was adjourned. It was
eventually further heard in January 1947 and finally
disposed of on January 23, 1947, when Ormcnd J.
passed a decree against the defendant for specific
performance of the agreement.
The decree provided
that in the event of the defendant being unable within
a fortnight from the date of the decree to obtain the
written consent of the lessor the assignment should be
made without such consent.
The defendant appealed.
After two days' hearing, "in order to clear up the
matter" the appeal Court "gave the plaintiff an opportunity to examine the Maharaja as a witness in this
case so that all relevant facts might be brought out and
placed before the Court for the purpose of enabling it
to come to a proper decision on this point." The
appeal was accordingly adjourned and the lessor was
examined on commission and his evidence was filed in
the proceedings.
After further hearing the appeal
Court dismissed the defendant's appeal and confirmed
the decree for specific performance of the agreement
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
without the need for obtaining the consent of the lessor
prior to the execution of the deed of assignment in
favour of the plaintiff. This decree was subsequently
amended by inserting therein a provision enabling the
plaintiff to set off from the purchase price the amount
of rent payable as and from February 1, 1945, until the
date of conveyance Jess all outgoings and interest on
the purchase price at four per cent. per annum from
that date to the date of the conveyance. The defendant has now come up before us in appeal from this
judgment and decree of the appeal Court.
The first point urged by learned counsel appearing
in support of this appeal is that, being subject to the
consent of the lessor, the agreement was contingent on
the defendant obtaining such consent and as the defendant could not secure the lessor's consent no effective
agreement came into being which could be ordered to
be specifically performed. The determination of this
question must depend on a correct analysis and ascertainment of the meaning and import of the correspondence by which the agreement is said to have been
arrived at. It was on January 27, 1945, that the plaintiff
offered to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest in
the said premises upon terms and conditions set forth
in the plaintiff's letter of that date. Clauses 3 and 4
of those terms were as follows :
"(3). The lease will be .transferred in my favour
as from the 1st February, 1945, and I shall be entitled
to recover rents from the tenants as from that date
and shall pay the rent to the superior landlord and
municipal taxes from that date.
(4).
You shall have to obtain the necessary consent
for the transfer of the lease in favour of myself or my
nominees from the said l\faharaja of Cossimbazar
before the execution of the transfer of lease in my
favour."
The defendant replied to the plaintiff's above letter
on January 28, 1945.
By this reply the defendant expressed his willingness to transfer the lease to the
plaintiff on terms contained therein. Clauses 3 and 4
of this letter were as follows:
19~0
Raja Kamara
RanJ·an Roy
v.
Baijnath
- Bojoria.
Das J.
1950
Raja Karnala
Ranjan Ro11
v.
Baijnath
Bajoria
Dru J.
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
" (3) If your final acceptance as stated above is
received within 30th January current and if I am
able to obtain the consent of Maharaja Cossimbazar
for transfer of the leasehold interest within the first
week of February, 1945, I agree to your para 3.
(4) Your para 4 is agreed to but the name or names
of the persons to be mentioned in the sale deed for
whom permission is to be taken from Maharaja Cossimbazar should be clearly stated with their respective addresses."
It is quite clear that no agreement was concluded by
these two letters for the defendant's letter was not an
unconditional acceptance of the plaintiff's offer but
amounted in law to only a counter-offer. By clause 3
the defendant offered to transfer the lease to the plaintiff as from February 1, 1945, so as to entitle the
plaintiff to realize the rents from that date and to be
liable to pay the rent to the lessor also from that date
on two conditions, namely, that the plaintiff's acceptance was received within January 30, 1945, and the
defendant was able to obtain the lessor's consent within the first week of February, 1945. This clause did
not make the offer itself contingent on the obtaining
of the lessor's consent but made one of the terms of
the offer, namely, that the lease would be transferred
as from February 1, 1945, conditional on the obtaining of the lessor's consent within the first week of
February, 1945.
Likewise, subject to the name of the
assignee being clearly stated the defendant by clause 4
offered to obtain the lessor's consent to the assignment
of the lease.
Clause 4 of the defendant's letter was
not so expressed as to make the defendant's offer contingent on his obtaining the lessor's consent. On the
contrary, clause 4 constituted one of the terms of the
offer which, on the offer being accepted, would become
binding on the defendant as one of the terms of the
agreement. The plaintiff, however, does not appear
to have accepted the defendant's counter offer but on
January 29, 1945, through his solicitors made a fresh
offer to purchase the defendant's leasehold interest at
Rs. 1,80,000 on the following terms:
--
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
" (a) That the earnest money will be Rs. 5.000
(Rupees five thousand) instead of Rs. 30,000.
(b) Our client will have the conveyance in his own
favour.
The consent of the landlord will be obtained
by you before the completion of sale.
(c) That your client will complete the conveyance
within a month after the receipt by us of all the
original title deeds with you.
(d) That the transfer of the property in favour of
our client will take effect on and from the I st February, 1945, irrespective of the date of the conveyance, he
being entitled to all the rents, issues and profits and
being liable for all the liabilities in respect thereof
since the said date.
(e) That our client will not be liable to pay your
Solicitor's Bill of cost in respect of the sale."
Again, it will be noticed that by clause (b) the offer
was not made contingent on the obtaining of the
lessor's consent but the plaintiff insisted on the
defendant's obtaining such consent as a substantive
term of his offer so that if the offer by being accepted
ripened into an agreement the defendant would be
bound to obtain the lessor's consent as a term of such
agreement. The defendant by his solicitors' letter
dated February 1, 1945, purported to accept the
plaintiff's last
offer
with a slight reservation,
namely,-
" As regards clause ( d) of your said letter, it is distinctly understood that the same should be given
effect to only in case the conveyance is completed in
terms of clause (c) of your said letter."
On February 2, 1945, the plaintiff by his solicitors'
letter of that date unconditionally accepted this reservation and so a concluded agreement was arrived at
between the parties. This agreement was not, for its
coming into being, contingent or conditional on the
obtaining of the lessor's consent. The obligation to
obtain the lessor's consent was cast upon the defendant as a term of the agreement.
In our judgment the
Court below was right in holding that the agreement
'
1950
Raja Kamala
Ranjan Roy
v,
Bai.inn th
Bajoria,
Da.~ J.
1950
Raja Kamala
Ranjan Roy
v.
Baifnnth
Baforia
Das J.
848
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
itself was not contingent as contended for by the
appellant.
The contentions next advanced by learned counsel
for the appellant relate to the lessee's covenant contained in sub-clause (6) of clause 2 of the lease to
which reference has already been made. The legal
incidents of such a covenant are now well established
by judicial decisions referred to in the judgment of the
High Court and it is not necessary to refer to them in
detail. Suffice it to say, that the words" such consent, however, not to be unreasonably withheld in the
case of respectable or responsible person" contained
in the covenant do not amount to a separate or independent covenant by the lessor that he would not
refuse consent except upon reasonable grounds in the
case of respectable or responsible person, but that
those words limit or qualify the lessee's covenant not
to assign the demised premises without the consent in
writing of the lessor.
In other words, those words
have the effect of relieving the lessee from the burden
of this covenant if the lessor withholds his consent
unreasonably in case of proposed assignment to a respectable or responsible person.
In this view of the
matter, the plaintiff contended that he being a respectable and responsible person the lessor had unreasonably withheld his consent to the proposed assignment to him and had consequently relieved the
defendant from the burden of his covenant so that
the defendant could legally and validly assign the
lease to him without such consent of the lessor.
The first objection taken by the appellant to this
contention of the plaintiff is that in his plaint the
plaintiff insisted on the defendant obtaining the
lessor's consent and that he should not have been permitted to make this new case at the hearing. Both
the trial Court and the appeal Court held that there
was, strictly speaking, no element of surprise, particularly because the plaintiff relied upon facts admitted
and proved by the defendant himself and that it was
open to him to take this point. We may also add that
lthis point was in a manner indicated in the plaint
>
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
itself for in paragraph 11 thereof it was pleaded that
the plaintiff was a responsible and respectable person
and that if consent to assign in his favour was withdrawn such withdrawal would be unreasonable and
would not be valid and binding. In view of such
pleading we are unable to say that the point raised
by the plaintiff at the trial was an entirely new point
or that the defendant was ta.ken by surprise.
The next objection of the appellant was that this
point should not have been allowed to be raised and
no evidence should have been permitted to be adduced
on this point in the absence of the lessor as a party to
the suit. We do not think that there is any force in
this objection. The Court had to decide whether it
was a case where relief by way of specific performance
should be given. The Court could not force the
defendant to apply to the lessor for his consent nor
could the Court force the lessor to give his consent
and, if: the matter only depended on the consent, the
Court would not have ordinarily, in those circumstances, directed the agreement for assignment to be
specifical1y enforced. The Court, therefore, had also
to consider, for the purposes of this case, as to whether the circumstances were such as would indicate
that the defendant had been relieved of the burden of
his covenant by reason of the lessor having unreasonably withheld his consent. It is true that a decision
on that question in this suit would not be binding on
the lessor, but nevertheless the Court had to come to
a decision on that question for the purposes of this
suit as between the parties thereto in order to award
the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff.
The third objection of the appellant is that the
appeal Court should not have allowed the plaintiff to
adduce further evidence. It will be recalled that the
appeal Court directed the evidence of the Maharaja of
Cossimbazar to be taken during the hearing of the
appeal. The judgment of. the appeal Court clearly
indicates that it was the appeal Court that "required"
the evidence " in order to clear up the matter " and
IQ~
1950
Raja Kamala
&njan Roy
v.
Baijnatk
Bajoria.
Das J.
1950
Raja Kamala
Ran}a'lt Roy
v.
Baijnath
Ba.ioria.
Das J.
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1950]
" for the purpose of enabling it to come to a proper
decision on this point". The matter, therefore, is fully
covered by Order XLI, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and no objection can be taken to the course
adopted by the appeal Court on that ground. We do
not think there is any reason to interfere in the exercise
of the Court's discretion.
The fourth objection is that the High Court was
wrong in holding that the term in the agreement that
the defendant must obtain the consent of the lessor
before executing the assignment to the plaintiff was a
term for the benefit of the plaintiff only. It will be
recalled that that was a term which was introduced
by the plaintiff in his offer that eventually ripened into
an agreement. The term was not expressed in a manner
indicating that it was inserted in the agreement for the
protection of the defendant. In other words, the
objection that the consent of the lessor had not been
obtained was one which could be availed of by the
plaintiff who could rescind the contract and claim
damages for the breach thereof. We cannot see how,
in view of the language used in the correspondence, the
defendant could plead the absence of the lessor's consent
as relieving him from the obligation of performing his
part of the agreement if the plaintiff waived the objection and insisted on his carrying out the agreement.
The absence of consent may amount to a defect in the
title of the defendant, but which the plaintiff was
willing to accept.
Finally it is said that by directing the specific performance of the agreement the Court has exposed the
defendant to the risk of an action for damages for
breach of covenant. If the assignment of the lease by
the defendant to the plaintiff without the lessor's
consent amounted to a breach of covenant, the lessor
could forfeit the lease and sue for possession. Such a
course would affect only the plaintiff but not the
defendant, for he had already parted with the lease for
valuable consideration. It is said that the lessor could
$1.le the defendant for damages for breach of that
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
covenant and the Court should not, by decreeing
specific performance, have put the defendant in that
perilous position. There appear to us to be two
answers to this argument, namely, (I) that the defendant should have, by proper language, made his
obligation to transfer dependent or conditional upoq
his being able to obtain the lessor's consent which he
did not do and (2) that the plaintiff being a respectable
and responsible person of means, the measure of
damages could only be a problematic conjecture.
Indeed, it may have been precisely for this very consideration that the defendant had unconditionally
agreed to obtain the consent of the lessor and to assign
his interest in the lease.
That the plaintiff was a
respectable and responsible person cannot, on the
evidence before the Court, be denied or disputed and,
indeed, learned counsel for the appellant did not so
contend. We find ourselves in agreement with the
High Court that in the circumstances and on the
evidence on record the lessor had unreasonably withheld his consent so as to enable the defendant to assign
the lease without such consent. In the circumstances,
we are satisfied that both the trial Court and the
appeal Court exercised their discretion properly and
no ground has been made out for our interfering with
the judgment of the High Court.
The appeal is
accordingly dismissed. The appellant to pay the costs
of this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant ; P.K. Chatterjee.
Agent for the respondent: S.K. Ghosh.
1950
Raja Kamala
Ranjan Roy
v.
Baijnath
Bajoria.
Das I.