# RAJA RAM v. JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [2019] 12 S.C.R. 112
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2019-09-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2896 of 2009
- **Bench:** Navin Sinha, Indira Banerjee
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-ram-v-jai-prakash-singh-and-others-33136
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Contract Act, 1872: s. 16 - Undue influence - Inference of -
Execution of sale deed by father in favour of his son-respondent -
Allegation by appellant-son that respondent no. 1 exercised undue
influence over the father in having the sale deed executed in favour
of respondent because of physical infirmity of the father on account
of his old age and that the father was living with the respondents -
Held: To infer undue influence merely because a sibling was looking
after the family elder, is an extreme proposition which cannot be
countenanced in absence of sufficient and adequate evidence -
On facts, pleadings in the plaint are completely bereft of any details
or circumstances with regard to undue influence exercised by
respondents over the deceased - Mere bald statement is attributed
to the infirmity of the deceased father - Deceased was not completely
physically and mentally incapacitated - Respondents were in a
fiduciary relationship with the deceased - Their conduct in looking
after the parents in old age may have influenced their thinking -
But that per se cannot lead to the conclusion that the original
respondents were thus, in a position to dominate the will of the
deceased or that the sale deed executed was unconscionable - Onus
would shift upon the original respondents u/s. 16 r/w s. 111 of the
Evidence Act, only after plaintiff would have established a prima
facie case - Sale deed being a registered instrument, there shall be
a presumption in favour of the respondents - Onus for rebuttal lay
on the appellant which he failed to discharge - First appellate court
erred in appreciating the facts and evidence in the case - Cases
cannot be decided on assumptions or presumptions - Thus, the order
of the High Court setting aside the order of the first appellate court
which had set aside the order dismissing the appellant's suit does
not call for interference - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 111.
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Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The deceased undisputedly was over 80 years
and above in age. The plaintiff pleaded that by reason of age and
sickness, the deceased was unable to move and walk, with
deteriorated eye sight due to cataract. The mental capacity of
the deceased was impaired. The impairment in relation to a human
being is defined as total or partial loss of a body function, total or
partial loss of a part of the body, malfunction of a part of the body
and malfunction or disfigurement of a part of the body. Except for
a bald statement in the plaint that the deceased was mentally
impaired there is no evidence whatsoever of his mental status.
There can be no presumption with regard to the same only
because of old age to equate it with complete loss of mental
faculties by senility or dementia. Ageing is a process which affects
individuals differently at distinguishable ages. The sale deed
executed by the deceased in favour of two people, two years
earlier in 1968 has not been assailed by the appellant on the
ground that the deceased was devoid of the power of reasoning,
because of mental impairment. There is no evidence of any such
rapid deterioration in the condition of the deceased in these two
years. [Para 9][119-A-D]
Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Third
Edn Reprint, 2009 - referred to.
1.2 The deceased on account of his advanced age may have
been old and infirm with a deteriorating eye sight, and unable to
move freely. There is no credible evidence that he was bed ridden.
Hardness of hearing by old age cannot be equated with deafness.
The plaintiff, despite being the son of the deceased, except for
bald statement in the plaint, has not led any evidence in support
of his averments. It is an undisputed fact that the deceased
appeared before the sub-registrar for registration. It demolishes
the entire case of the plaintiff that the deceased was bed ridden.
He had put his thumb impression in presence of the sub-registrar
after the sale deed had been read over and explained to him. The
dece

## Text

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 12 S.C.R.
 [2019] 12 S.C.R. 112
112
RAJA RAM
v.
JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 2896 of 2009)
SEPTEMBER 11, 2019
[NAVIN SINHA AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Contract Act, 1872: s. 16 - Undue influence - Inference of -
Execution of sale deed by father in favour of his son-respondent -
Allegation by appellant-son that respondent no. 1 exercised undue
influence over the father in having the sale deed executed in favour
of respondent because of physical infirmity of the father on account
of his old age and that the father was living with the respondents -
Held: To infer undue influence merely because a sibling was looking
after the family elder, is an extreme proposition which cannot be
countenanced in absence of sufficient and adequate evidence -
On facts, pleadings in the plaint are completely bereft of any details
or circumstances with regard to undue influence exercised by
respondents over the deceased - Mere bald statement is attributed
to the infirmity of the deceased father - Deceased was not completely
physically and mentally incapacitated - Respondents were in a
fiduciary relationship with the deceased - Their conduct in looking
after the parents in old age may have influenced their thinking -
But that per se cannot lead to the conclusion that the original
respondents were thus, in a position to dominate the will of the
deceased or that the sale deed executed was unconscionable - Onus
would shift upon the original respondents u/s. 16 r/w s. 111 of the
Evidence Act, only after plaintiff would have established a prima
facie case - Sale deed being a registered instrument, there shall be
a presumption in favour of the respondents - Onus for rebuttal lay
on the appellant which he failed to discharge - First appellate court
erred in appreciating the facts and evidence in the case - Cases
cannot be decided on assumptions or presumptions - Thus, the order
of the High Court setting aside the order of the first appellate court
which had set aside the order dismissing the appellant's suit does
not call for interference - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 111.
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Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The deceased undisputedly was over 80 years
and above in age. The plaintiff pleaded that by reason of age and
sickness, the deceased was unable to move and walk, with
deteriorated eye sight due to cataract. The mental capacity of
the deceased was impaired. The impairment in relation to a human
being is defined as total or partial loss of a body function, total or
partial loss of a part of the body, malfunction of a part of the body
and malfunction or disfigurement of a part of the body. Except for
a bald statement in the plaint that the deceased was mentally
impaired there is no evidence whatsoever of his mental status.
There can be no presumption with regard to the same only
because of old age to equate it with complete loss of mental
faculties by senility or dementia. Ageing is a process which affects
individuals differently at distinguishable ages. The sale deed
executed by the deceased in favour of two people, two years
earlier in 1968 has not been assailed by the appellant on the
ground that the deceased was devoid of the power of reasoning,
because of mental impairment. There is no evidence of any such
rapid deterioration in the condition of the deceased in these two
years. [Para 9][119-A-D]
Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Third
Edn Reprint, 2009 - referred to.
1.2 The deceased on account of his advanced age may have
been old and infirm with a deteriorating eye sight, and unable to
move freely. There is no credible evidence that he was bed ridden.
Hardness of hearing by old age cannot be equated with deafness.
The plaintiff, despite being the son of the deceased, except for
bald statement in the plaint, has not led any evidence in support
of his averments. It is an undisputed fact that the deceased
appeared before the sub-registrar for registration. It demolishes
the entire case of the plaintiff that the deceased was bed ridden.
He had put his thumb impression in presence of the sub-registrar
after the sale deed had been read over and explained to him. The
deceased had acknowledged receipt of the entire consideration
in presence of the sub-registrar only after which the deed was
executed and registered. The wife of the deceased had
RAJA RAM v. JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS
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accompanied him to the office of the sub-registrar. The sale deed
being a registered instrument, there shall be a presumption in
favour of the defendants. The onus for rebuttal lay on the plaintiff
which he failed to discharge. [Para 10][119-E-G]
1.3 The pleadings in the plaint are completely bereft of any
details or circumstances with regard to the nature, manner or
kind of undue influence exercised by the original defendants over
the deceased. A mere bald statement has been made attributed
to the infirmity of the deceased. The deceased was not completely
physically and mentally incapacitated. There can be no doubt that
the original defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with the
deceased. Their conduct in looking after the deceased and his
wife in old age may have influenced the thinking of the deceased.
But that per se cannot lead to the only irresistible conclusion that
the original defendants were therefore, in a position to dominate
the will of the deceased or that the sale deed executed was
unconscionable. The onus would shift upon the original defendants
under Section 16 of the Contract Act read with Section 111 of the
Evidence Act, only after plaintiff would have established a prima
facie case. [Para 11][120-B-D]
1.4 In every cast, creed, religion and civilized society,
looking after the elders of the family is considered a sacred and
pious duty. Today it has become a matter of serious concern. The
Parliament taking note of the same enacted the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. In the changing
times and social mores, that to straightway infer undue influence
merely because a sibling was looking after the family elder, is an
extreme proposition which cannot be countenanced in absence
of sufficient and adequate evidence. Any other interpretation by
inferring a reverse burden of proof straightway, on those who
were taking care of the elders, as having exercised undue
influence can lead to very undesirable consequences. It may not
necessarily lead to neglect, but can certainly create doubts and
apprehensions leading to lack of full and proper care under the
fear of allegations with regard to exercise of undue influence.
Law and life run together. If certain members of the family are
looking after the elderly and others by choice or by compulsion
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of vocation are unable to do so, there is bound to be more affinity
between the elder members of the family with those who are
looking after them day to day. [Para 11][120-E-H; 121-A]
1.5 The first appellate court erred in appreciation of the
facts and evidence in the case. There can be no application of the
law sans the facts of a case. The primary ingredients of the law
need to be first established by proper pleading supported by
relevant evidence. Cases cannot be decided on assumptions or
presumptions. The instant case does not call for exercise of any
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
[Para 16][122-E]
Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul and anr. v.
Patima Maity and Ors. (2004) 9 SCC 468 : [2003] 3
Suppl. SCR 496 - distinguished.
Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558 : [2006]
1 Suppl. SCR 659; Jamila Begum (D) thr. L.Rs. v. Shami
Mohd. (D) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 727;
Bishundeo Narain and Ors. v. Seogeni Rai and
Jagernath [1951] SCR 548; Subhas Chandra Das
Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib and Ors. [1967]
1 SCR 331; Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan
Kul and Anr. v. Patima Maity and Ors. (2004) 9 SCC
468 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 496 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 659
referred to
Para 5
(2019) 2 SCC 727
referred to
Para 5
[1951] SCR 548
referred to
Para 5
[1967] 1 SCR 331
referred to
Para 5
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 496
distinguished
Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2896
of 2009
RAJA RAM v. JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS
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From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, U.P. in Second Appeal No. 2095 of
1975.
Ms. Garima Prashad, Advs. for the Appellants.
Anubhav Kumar, Ankit Agarwal, Abhishek Swarup (For M/s.
Manoj Swarup and Co.), Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
NAVIN SINHA, J.
1. The appellant is aggrieved by the order allowing the second
appeal preferred by the defendants. The High Court set aside the order
of the First Appellate Court which had allowed the appeal of the appellant
and set aside the order dismissing the appellants suit.
2. The plaintiff and defendant no.2 are brothers. Defendant no.1
was the wife of defendant no.2. Respondents nos.1 to 3 are sons of
deceased defendant no.1. Original plaintiff no.2, another brother, has
chosen not to pursue the appeal. The plaintiffs alleged that the original
defendants obtained the sale deed dated 02.03.1970 from their father
Vaijai, since deceased, in favour of defendant no.1, fraudulently, by deceit
and undue influence because of old age and infirmity of the deceased
and who was living with the defendants. The suit was dismissed. The
appellate court allowed the appeal holding that the defendants had failed
to discharge their burden of being in a position to dominate the will of the
deceased by undue influence. The High Court reversed the order of the
first appellate court and restored the dismissal of the suit.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the deceased
was old, infirm, bedridden and sick for approximately the last 8 to 10
years. His mental faculties were also impaired. He was therefore entirely
dependent on the original defendants who were therefore in a position to
exercise undue influence over him. The deceased expired on 21.04.1971
within ten months of the execution of the sale deed. The witnesses to
the sale deed were related to defendant no.2. It had not been established
that full consideration had been paid. Defendant no.1 had no source of
income to pay the purchase price. The wife of the deceased has not
been examined as witness. The defendants did not lead the evidence of
the Sub-Registrar who had registered the sale deed. The deceased had
not sold any land to third persons in the year 1968 as contended by the
defendants.
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4. Learned counsel for the respondent/defendants submitted that
under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the initial onus lay on the
plaintiffs by establishing a prima facie case for undue influence and only
then the onus would shift to them. The necessary pleadings in respect of
the same were completely lacking. The First Appellate Court wrongly
shifted the burden upon the respondents. The deceased may have been
old and infirm, but he was not deprived of his mental faculties so as not
to know the nature of documents executed by him. He was alive
approximately for ten months after the execution of the deed, but never
questioned the same. The deceased had executed another sale deed
two years earlier in 1968, Exhibit 10 in favour of third persons which has
not been questioned by the appellant. It establishes that the deceased
was not in a condition where undue influence could be exercised over
him. There can be no presumptions merely on account of his old age.
DW-1 was a witness to the sale deed and was present at the time of
registration. The deceased admitted before the sub-registrar having
received a sum of Rs.2,000/- earlier and Rs.4,000/- was paid at the time
of registration. The Sub-Registrar has not recorded any adverse
inferences about the condition or capacity of the deceased at the time of
registration. A registered instrument will carry a presumption about its
correctness unless rebutted.
5. Reliance in support of the submissions was placed on Anil
Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558, Jamila Begum (D) thr.
L.Rs. vs. Shami Mohd. (D) thr. L.Rs. and ors., (2019) 2 SCC 727,
Bishundeo Narain and Ors. vs. Seogeni Rai and Jagernath, 1951
SCR 548, Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga Prosad Das
Mushib and Ors., 1967 (1) SCR 331 and Krishna Mohan Kul alias
Nani Charan Kul and anr. vs. Patima Maity and ors., (2004) 9 SCC
468.
6. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties.
The primary question for our consideration is the physical condition of
the deceased and his capacity to execute the sale deed. The second
question for our consideration is if the original defendants nos.1 and 2
exercised undue influence over the deceased in having the sale deed
executed in favour of defendant no.1 because of the physical infirmity
of the deceased on account of his old age.
7. Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines 'free
consent' as follows:
RAJA RAM v. JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS
[NAVIN SINHA, J.]
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"14. 'Free consent' defined - Consent is said to be free when it is
not caused by -
(1) xxxxx
(2) Undue influence, as defined in section 16,..."
Section 16 defines 'undue influence' as follows:
"16. 'Undue influence' defined-
(1) A contract is said to be induced by 'undue influence' where
the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of
the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and
uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to
dominate the will of another-
(a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other,
or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or
(b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental
capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of
age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.
(3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of
another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction
appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be
unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not
induced by undue influence shall be upon the person in a position
to dominate the will of the other.
Nothing in the sub-section shall affect the provisions of section
111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)."
8. Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, explains good
faith in transactions as follows:
"111. Proof of good faith in transactions where one party is in
relation of active confidence.-Where there is a question as to
the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom
stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden
of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party who is
in a position of active confidence."
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9. The deceased undisputedly was over 80 years and above in
age. The plaintiff pleaded that by reason of age and sickness, the deceased
was unable to move and walk, with deteriorated eye sight due to cataract.
The mental capacity of the deceased was impaired. The Advanced Law
Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar, third edition reprint,2009 defines
impairment in relation to a human being as total or partial loss of a body
function, total or partial loss of a part of the body, malfunction of a part
of the body and malfunction or disfigurement of a part of the body.
Except for a bald statement in the plaint that the deceased was mentally
impaired there is no evidence whatsoever of his mental status. There
can be no presumption with regard to the same only because of old age
to equate it with complete loss of mental faculties by senility or dementia.
Ageing is a process which affects individuals differently at distinguishable
ages. The sale deed executed by the deceased in favour of one Babu
Ram and Munshi Lal two years earlier in 1968 has not been assailed by
the appellant on the ground that the deceased was devoid of the power
of reasoning, because of mental impairment. There is no evidence of
any such rapid deterioration in the condition of the deceased in these
two years.
10. The deceased on account of his advanced age may have been
old and infirm with a deteriorating eye sight, and unable to move freely.
There is no credible evidence that he was bed ridden. Hardness of hearing
by old age cannot be equated with deafness. The plaintiff, despite being
the son of the deceased, except for bald statement in the plaint, has not
led any evidence in support of his averments. It is an undisputed fact
that the deceased appeared before the sub-registrar for registration. It
demolishes the entire case of the plaintiff that the deceased was bed
ridden. He had put his thumb impression in presence of the sub-registrar
after the sale deed had been read over and explained to him. The deceased
had acknowledged receipt of the entire consideration in presence of the
sub-registrar only after which the deed was executed and registered.
The wife of the deceased had accompanied him to the office of the subregistrar. The sale deed being a registered instrument, there shall be a
presumption in favour of the defendants. The onus for rebuttal lay on
the plaintiff which he failed to discharge. Notwithstanding the finding of
enmity between PW-2 and PW-3 with original defendant no.2, the First
Appellate Court erred in relying upon these two witnesses by holding
that they were independent witnesses and convincing. DW-1, though
related was a witness to the sale deed. His evidence in support of the
RAJA RAM v. JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS
[NAVIN SINHA, J.]
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events before the sub-registrar therefore has to be accepted. The plaintiff
could have led evidence in rebuttal of the sub-registrar but he did not do
so.
11. That leads us to the question of undue influence. The pleadings
in the plaint are completely bereft of any details or circumstances with
regard to the nature, manner or kind of undue influence exercised by the
original defendants over the deceased. A mere bald statement has been
made attributed to the infirmity of the deceased. We have already held
that the deceased was not completely physically and mentally
incapacitated. There can be no doubt that the original defendants were
in a fiduciary relationship with the deceased. Their conduct in looking
after the deceased and his wife in old age may have influenced the
thinking of the deceased. But that per se cannot lead to the only irresistible
conclusion that the original defendants were therefore in a position to
dominate the will of the deceased or that the sale deed executed was
unconscionable. The onus would shift upon the original defendants under
Section 16 of the Contract Act read with Section 111 of the Evidence
Act, as held in Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh (supra), only after the
plaintiff would have established a prima facie case. The wife of the
deceased was living with him and had accompanied him to the office of
the sub-registrar. The plaintiff has not pleaded or led any evidence that
the wife of the deceased was also completely dominated by the original
defendants. In every cast, creed, religion and civilized society, looking
after the elders of the family is considered a sacred and pious duty.
Nonetheless, today it has become a matter of serious concern. The
Parliament taking note of the same enacted the Maintenance and Welfare
of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. We are of the considered
opinion, in the changing times and social mores, that to straightway infer
undue influence merely because a sibling was looking after the family
elder, is an extreme proposition which cannot be countenanced in absence
of sufficient and adequate evidence. Any other interpretation by inferring
a reverse burden of proof straightway, on those who were taking care
of the elders, as having exercised undue influence can lead to very
undesirable consequences. It may not necessarily lead to neglect, but
can certainly create doubts and apprehensions leading to lack of full and
proper care under the fear of allegations with regard to exercise of
undue influence. Law and life run together. If certain members of the
family are looking after the elderly and others by choice or by compulsion
of vocation are unable to do so, there is bound to be more affinity between
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the elder members of the family with those who are looking after them
day to day.
12. In Bishundeo Narain (supra) it was observed as follows:
"We turn next to the questions of undue influence and coercion.
Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It
is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and
separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded.
It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been
furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any
other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties
pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided
on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in
evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an
averment of fraud of which any court ought to take notice however
strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same
applies to undue influence and coercion."
13. In Subhas Chandra (supra), distinguishing between influence
and undue influence, it was observed as follows:
"It must also be noted that merely because the parties were nearly
related to each other no presumption of undue influence can arise.
As was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Poosathurai v. Kappanna Chettiar and others 47 I.A. p. 1 :-
"It is a mistake (of which there are a good many traces in
these proceedings) to treat undue influence as having been
established by a proof of the relations of the parties having
been such that the one naturally relied upon the other for advice,
and the other was in a position to dominate the will of the first
in giving it. Up to that point "influence" alone has been made
out. Such influence may be used wisely, judiciously and helpfully.
But whether by the law of India or the law of England, more
than mere influence must be proved so as to render influence,
in the language of the law, "undue"."
14. In Subhas Chandra (supra), it was further observed that
there was no presumption of imposition merely because a donor was old
and weak. Mere close relation also was insufficient to presume undue
influence, observing as follows:
RAJA RAM v. JAI PRAKASH SINGH AND OTHERS
[NAVIN SINHA, J.]
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"Before, however, a court is called upon to examine whether undue
influence was exercised or not, it must scrutinise the pleadings to
find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars
of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud. See
Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of
the pleading was also given great stress in the case of Ladli Prasad
Jaiswal [1964] 1 SCR 270 above referred to. In that case it was
observed (at p. 295):
"A vague or general plea can never serve this purpose; the
party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise
nature of the influence exercised, the manner of use of the
influence, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other."
15. Krishna Mohan (supra) is distinguishable on its own fact.
The executant was undisputably over 100 years of age. The witnesses
proved that he was paralytic and virtually bedridden. None of the
witnesses could substantiate that the executant had put his thumb
impression.
16. The first appellate court, completely erred in appreciation of
the facts and evidence in the case. There can be no application of the
law sans the facts of a case. The primary ingredients of the law need to
be first established by proper pleading supported by relevant evidence.
Cases cannot be decided on assumptions or presumptions. We do not
think that the present calls for exercise of any discretionary jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution as a fourth court of appeal. In
Pritam Singh vs. The State AIR 1950 SC 169 it was observed:
"9. ...Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave,
unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist,
that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the
case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant
a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case
does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot
interfere with the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must
be dismissed."
17. On a consideration of the entirety of the matter we find no
reason to interfere with the concurrent findings arrived at by two courts.
The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Nidhi Jain
Appeal dismissed.