# RAJA RAMESHWAR RAO AND ANOTHER v. RAJA GOVIND RAO

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 618
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 399 of 1957
- **Bench:** P. B. Gaje~Dragadkar, K. N. Wanohoo
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-rameshwar-rao-and-another-v-raja-govind-rao-2154
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

J agir-Grant made by Nizam-Adverse possession-Claim of
limited right as permanent lessee-M aintainability-J ndian Limitatio11 Act, r908 (9 of r908), art. r44.
Although title to a limited interest in property can be
acquired by adverse possession, no limited interest in the nature
of a permanent lease can be ordinarily acquired in a jagir which
must initially be presumed to enure for the life-time of the
grantee unless the grant itself shows otherwise.
Sankaran v. Periasami, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 467, Thakore
Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal, (1903) l.L.R. 27
Born. 515, Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261 an<l Gulabdas.J14gjivandas v.
The Collector of S14rat, (1878) L.R. 6 I.A 54, referred to.
Although in the former State of Hyderabad a son might. in
.1ormal course be allowed to succeed to the father's jagir, it could
not be said that jagirs granted by the State were therefore
permanent and hereditary in character, for the State generally
had the right to resume the grant.
Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin, v. Raje Shriniwasrao
Nemiwant Brahmin, l.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526 and Ahmad-un-Nissa
Begum v. State, A.LR. 1952 Hyd. 163, referred to.
Where, therefore, a grant was continued in a family from
generation to generation, each grantee must be taken to hold it
for his life and limitation against each must start from the date
of his title.
Since a jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his lifetime
unless specifically empowered by the sanad or the law of the
State, the period of adverse possession against one jagirdar
could not be tacked to that against another for the purpose of
art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. ln this respect a jagirdar
stood on a different footing from that of the manager of a temple.
]agdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan,.A.l.R. 1946
P.C. 59, referred to.
Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periyannan
Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261, distinguished.

## Text

Jl.-Iarch a8,
618
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
RAJA RAMESHWAR RAO AND ANOTHER
v.
RAJA GOVIND RAO
(P. B. GAJE~DRAGADKAR and K. N. WANOHOO, JJ.)
J agir-Grant made by Nizam-Adverse possession-Claim of
limited right as permanent lessee-M aintainability-J ndian Limitatio11 Act, r908 (9 of r908), art. r44.
Although title to a limited interest in property can be
acquired by adverse possession, no limited interest in the nature
of a permanent lease can be ordinarily acquired in a jagir which
must initially be presumed to enure for the life-time of the
grantee unless the grant itself shows otherwise.
Sankaran v. Periasami, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 467, Thakore
Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal, (1903) l.L.R. 27
Born. 515, Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periayanan Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261 an<l Gulabdas.J14gjivandas v.
The Collector of S14rat, (1878) L.R. 6 I.A 54, referred to.
Although in the former State of Hyderabad a son might. in
.1ormal course be allowed to succeed to the father's jagir, it could
not be said that jagirs granted by the State were therefore
permanent and hereditary in character, for the State generally
had the right to resume the grant.
Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin, v. Raje Shriniwasrao
Nemiwant Brahmin, l.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526 and Ahmad-un-Nissa
Begum v. State, A.LR. 1952 Hyd. 163, referred to.
Where, therefore, a grant was continued in a family from
generation to generation, each grantee must be taken to hold it
for his life and limitation against each must start from the date
of his title.
Since a jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his lifetime
unless specifically empowered by the sanad or the law of the
State, the period of adverse possession against one jagirdar
could not be tacked to that against another for the purpose of
art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. ln this respect a jagirdar
stood on a different footing from that of the manager of a temple.
]agdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan,.A.l.R. 1946
P.C. 59, referred to.
Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periyannan
Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261, distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
399 of 1957.
Appeal from .the judgment and decree dated July
27, 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad in Civil Appeals Nos. 1 and 2 of 1954-55.
)
t
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
S. T. Desai, C. Krishna Reddi, T. Ramachandra Rao
and M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants.
Raja Rameshwat
Sadashiv Rao, J.B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley, Rao & Another
for the respondent.
v.
Raja Govind Ran
1961. March 28.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
granted by the former High Court of Hyderabad. A
suit was brought by the respondent in 1920 with respect to village Timmapet. The case of the respondent
was that the village had been granted to his ancestor
Harinarayan alias Ifaja Nemiwant Bahadur by the
Nizam in 1787.
On the death of Raja Harinarayan,
the village was conferred by another sanad on his son
Raja Govind Narayan in 1811. Ever since then the
village had continued in the possession of the descendants of Raja Govind Narayan. In 1817, Raja Govind
Narayan granted this village on Tahud (i.e., lease) to
Raja Rama Krishna Rao, ancestor of the defendants.
Inam inquiries with respect to this village started in
190 l and then an objection was made on behalf of the
appellants that the village had been granted to their
ancestors by tho Nizam and the respondent was only
entitled to the pan mukta of the village and no more.·
Pan mukta means a fixed sum which is payable in
perpetuity for any land granted by the Ruler or the
jagirdar to any person. The respondent's case further
was that the lease money was being regularly paid,
though some time before the suit there was some
default.
The respondent had to file a suit to
recover the lease money which was decreed and
the decretal amount was recovered. In 1917 disputes
arose between the parties and consequently in 1918
the respondent asked the appellants to vacate the
village.
They, however, refused to do so.
Thereupon the present suit was filed in 1920 and the
respondent's case was that the lease granted to the
appellants was not a permanent lease and could
only enure for the lifetime of the grantor and therefore the respondent was entitled to possession of the
~Vanchoo ].
620
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
village, particularly as the appellants had begun to
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assert a title adverse to the respondent.
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Rao o;. Another
e smt was res1ste
y
e appe an s, an
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main defence was that the village had been granted
Raja Govi"d Rao as bilmakta with a fixed pan makta in their favour by
the Nizam and therefore the respondent was only
Wanchoo f.
entitled to the fixed pan makta per year and could not
claim to dispossess them from the village. As an
alternative, defence of limitation was also pleaded,
though the written statement did not make it clear
whether the bar of limit.ation was under art. 142 or
art. 144 of the Limitation Act. There were other
defences also with which we are however not conce111ed in the present appeal.
The trial court framed a large number of issues,
which were answered in favour of the respondent and
the suit was decreed and the plaintiff was held ent.itled to obtain possession of the village as well as to
recover mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 931-12-0 0. S.
per year. On the two main defences, the trial court
held that the village had not been granted by the
Nizam to the appellants as claimed by them and the
appellants were liable to ejectment as they could not
claim the rights of a permanent lessee under the lease
granted to their ancestor by the respondent's ancestor. Further on the question of limitation, the trial
court hold that the suit was not barred by art. 142.
It does not appear that the case of adverse possession
was put forward in the trial court.
There were two appeals to the High Court; one
of them was by the appellants and the other
by the respondent.
The respondent's appeal was
confined only to the rate of mesne profits while
the appellants reiterated their two main contentions
as to the nature of their right and limitation. The
appeals were heard by a Division Bench of the High
Court, the Judges composing which however differed.
Schri pat Rau, J ., agreed with the trial court as
to the nature of the rights of the respondent as _
well as on the question of limitation and was of the
opinion that the appeal of the appellants should be
dismissed. It appears that in the High Court a plea
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
of adverse possession was also raised in the matter of
'96'
limitation; but that plea was also negatived ?Y Sc~ri- Raja Rameshwa'
pat Rau, J. ·Further Schripat Rau, J., was of the view Rao & Another
that the appeal of the respondent should be allowed
v.
and the amount of mesne profits per year should be Raja Govind Rao
raised to Rs. 4,381-12-11.
The other learned Judge,
Khalilulzaman Siddiqu, J., seems to have held in
Wanchoo J.
favour of the appellants both on the questions of title
and adverse possession and was of the view that the
suit should be dismissed in toto. There was then a
reference to a third learned Judge, Ansari, J. He
agreed with Schripat Rau, J., on the questions of title
and limitation; but as by the time he came to deliver
judgment the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, No. LXIX of 1358-F had come into force from
1951 and possession could not be granted to the respondent, Ansari, J., held that the respondent would
be entitled to the compensation payable on the abolition of jagirs.
As Ansari, J., had per force to differ from Schripat
Rau, J., as to the part of the relief to be granted to
the respondent because of the abolition of jagirs, the
case was referred to a Full Bench of three Judges in
view of s. 8 of the Hyderabad High Court Act. The
Full Bench held that as Ansari and Schripat Rau, JJ.,
were in agreement on the questions of title and limi.
tation these matters did not fall to be decided before
them and would be concluded by the judgment of
Ansari, J. But on the nature of relief on which
Ansari, J., per force had to differ from the view of
Schripat Rau, J., the Full Bench upheld the view of
Ansari, J. Thereafter the appellants applied for a
certificate for leave to appeal to this Court, which was
granted; and that is how the matter has come up
before us.
Learned counsel for the appellants has urged only
two points before us. In the first place, he submits
that on the evidence it has been proved that the
Nizam granted a bilmakta sanad to the appellants
which inc_luded this village also and therefore the
appellants were entitled to the possession of the village
permanently subject only to the payment of pan
622
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96r
makta to the respondent.
In the second place, he
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submits that even if it be held that the Nizam did not
a;a 11 aines war
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k
.
.
Rao & Another grant a
i ma ta sanad mcludmg this village, the
v.
appellants had perfected their title by adverse posses.
Raja Govind Rao sion to the limited right of being permanent lessees
-
under the respondent subject to payment of a fixed
Wanchoo J.
amount of rent per year.
The first question therefore that arises is whether
the appellants' case that this village is included in the
bilmakta sanad granted to them by the Nizam and
therefore by virtue of that sanad they are entitled to
hold this village permanently subject only to the payment of a certain sum annually to the respondent, is
proved. It is now no longer in dispute that the village
was granted in jagir to the ancestors of the respondent.
It is also not in dispute that in 1817 Raja Govind
Narayan granted a kowl in favour of the appellants'
ancestor. Under the terms of that kowl the village
was granted on Tahud (lease) for the fixed sum of
Rs. 1027-10-0 per year to the appellants' ancestor. No
term is mentioned in the kowl as to its duration; but
after reciting that the village had been granted on
Tahud for a certain fixed amount annually, the kowl
goes on to say that the grantee should with entire
confidence rehabilitate old and new ryots and pay the
amount of Tahud annually as per fixed instalments in
every crop season. As one reads the kowl, on its plain
terms it cannot be read to confer on the appellants'
ancestor a permanent lease on a fixed sum which was
not liable to be varied at all. But the appellants claim
that they had been in uninterrupted possession since
·~
1817 for over 100 years on the same rent when the
suit was filed and this shows that the village must
have been granted to them as a permanent lease. We
cannot accept this contention and the fact that the
appellants and their ancestors have continued in
possession over 100 years on the same rent would not
make the kowl of 1817 a permanent lease in the face
of its plain terms. The courts below were therefore
right in the view that the kowl does not show a grant
of' a permanent lease on a fixed annual payment to
,. 4Jll
the appellants.
j
•
\
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT gEPORTS
623
The appellants however relied on what happened
1 96'
soon after the kowl was granted to them. It -appears Raja Rameshwar
that soon after 1817 the appellants' ancestor made a llao & Anoth"
va.iab-ul-arz (i.e., application to the Nizam) with
v.
various prayers. One of the prayers was for grant of Raja Govind Rao
bilmakta sanad. This was obviously with respect to
certain Government lands, which the ancestors of the
Wanchoo f.
appellants held. In para. 6 of the vajab-ul-arz it is said
that "in these days your devotee has regularly paid
Government dues and expects that he should receive
sanads of bilmakta with the seal of Diwani". In para 3
it is said that "from out of the Government Talukas
whichever is entrusted on Tahud, your petitioner. will
pay the Tahud amount and will look after and
improve the Taluka". On a fair reading of the vajabul-arz there can be little doubt that the ancestor of
the appellants was praying that he should be granted
a bilmakta sanad of lands held by him from the
Government. To this vajab-ul-arz was appended a list
of villages which apparently the ancestor of the
appellants held. This list contained 88 villages. There
is no difficulty about 85 of these villages which were
apparently held by the ancestor of the appellants
from the Government; but about three villages there
was a special mention in the list. These were:
(1) Timmapet, Jagir Raja Nemivant, Makta of Zamindar of Sugur. It may be mentioned that the ancestor
of the appellants was the Zamindar of Sugur and
that is how he prayed for a sanad of bilmakta; (2) the
village Korotkal, attached to J agir Bahrami, makta
Zamindar Sugur; and (3) Palmur, including hamlet
Gattalpalli. These three villages were obviously not
of the same kind as the other 85 villages. Village
Timmapet was in the jagir of the ancestor of the
respondent and could not therefore ordinarily be
granted .to the ancestor of the appellants.
Village
Korotkal was an attached jagir which was handed
over to one Bakhshi Ismail Khan while village Palmur
had been granted to the ancestor of the appellants
himself in lieu of seri. Strictly speaking these three
villages which stood apart should not have been
included in the list of villages for which bilmakta
624
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
z96r
sanad was prayed for.
Anyhow the order of the
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Government on this vajab-ul-arz was that a sanad
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Rao &
Anoth" WI
sea o
1a at 1wam e grante .
e actual.
v.
sanad which was granted by virtue of this order has
Raja Govind Ilao not been strictly proved, though a copy of it appears
in a judgment copy of which has been filed.
We do
Wanchoo f.
not therefore propose to refer to this copy. lt appears
however that in 1880 a bilmakta sanad was again
granted by the Nizam himself to the ancestor of the ·
appellants on the death of the previous holder. · The
amount of bilmakta (i.e., fixed annual payment) was
fixed at Rs. 1,05,412. This amount is made up of the
revenue of 85 villages out of the 88 villages which
were included in the list along with the vajab-ul-arz.
The remaining three villages which w.e have mentioned above, were also shown in the schedule to this
sanad under the heading "Deduct 3 villages of separate
Jagir". The three villages· under this heading are
Timmapet, Korotkal and Palmur.
It is the meaning
of these words under the heading of which these
villages appear which: required interpretation in the
present suit. The contention of the respondent was
that the heading showed that the bilmakta sanad
granted liy the Nizam excluded these villages, for the
revenue of these villages amounting to Rs. 2,101 was
not included in the bilmakta amount of Rs. 1,05,412.
It is further contended on behalf of the respondent
that the reason why these three villages were mentioned in this' manner in the schedule attached to the
bilmakta sanad was that the appellants' ancestor· had
wrongly included these villages in his list filed with
the vajab-ul-arz and ever since• then these villages
were included in the schedule to the sanads but were
always shown as deducted from the bilmakta. We are
of opinion that this contention of the respondent is
correct and the courts below were right in accepting
the respondent's contention in this behalf. The very
fact that the revenue of these villages is not included
in the bilmakta amount of Rs. 1,05,412 shows that
they could not be part of the bilmakta grant by the
Nizam. We cannot accept the argument on behalf of
the appellants that the revenue of these villages was
·. '
I
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
not,included because the ancestor of the appellants
1961
had to pay the amount of this revenue in the case of R .
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h
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•J• Rameshwar
T1mmapet and Korotkal to t e Jagir ars an
t e Rao o; Another
revenue of Palmur was given to hini free in seri. The
v.
· very fact that these three villages appear under the Raja Govind Rao
heading "deduct three villages of separate jagir" along
with the fact that their revenue is not included in the
Wanchoo J.
bilmakta grant of Rs. 1,05,412 shows that they were
not part of the bilmakta sanad. It is true that they have
been mentioned in the schedule, and strictly speaking
.they should not have been so mentioned there; but
the reason for that in our opinion is that the appellants' ancestor had included them in his list and they
see)ll to have been put down in the schedule to the
sanad from that list. But the way in which they were
put in the schedule to the sanad shows that they were
not .part qf the sanad granted by the Nizam. Our
·attention was also drawn to the Avarja said to have
been prepared in 1836 in which also these three
villages are included. But Avarja is merely a paper in '
which a note of the sanads issued)ach day is mentioned.
The fact therefore that these three villages were
mentioned in the Avarja can be easily explained by
the fact that they were mentioned in the sanads
which were prepared from the list of villages supplied
by the appellants' ancestor along with his vajab-ul-arz.
The presence of these three villages in the ,Avarja
would not establish that the villages were granted as
bilmakta by the Nizam to the appellants' ancestor,
unless the sanads granted by tho Nizam establish it.
We have already examined the sanad of 1880 which
is on the record and have no difficulty in agreeing
with the courts below that the bilmakta sanad excluded
these villages and was only confined to the remaining
villages for which. the appellants' ancestor paid
Rs. 1,05;412 to the Nizam as the fixed annual amount.
It was urged on behalf of the appellants that the
Nizam was an absolute Ruler and it was open to him
to take away any land from a jagirdar and grant it to
any other person. That is undoubtedly so; but even
where an absolute Ruler takes away some land from
79
626
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96z
a jagirdar and gives it to another person, it seems to
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us clear that he would inform the jagirdar that he had
a;a
a1nes war
k
.
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.
Rao .., Another ta en away m w o e or m part what he had granted
v.
to him and would also make it clear by proper words
Raja Govind Rao in the sanad granted to the other person that he was
giving him the land taken away from the jagirdar. In
Wanchoo f.
any case where the land was granted earlier to the
jagirdar, there must be a clear indication in the sanad
to another person that what had been granted to the
jagirdar had been taken away and was being granted
to this other person. As we read the sanad of 1880 we
find no clear indication in it that the village of
Timmapet which was granted along with other villages
as jagir to the respondent's ancestor was being taken
away-at any rate in part-and that in future the
respondent's ancestor would only be entitled to a fixed
sum from the appellants' ancestor with respect to this
village and no more. On the other hand, in the recital
of the sanad unfortunately there is nothing clear for
the words "etc." appear therein in more than one
place as to the land granted. We have therefore to
turn to the schedule for whatever help we can get from
it. The schedule shows that these three villages were
under the heading "deduct three villages of separate
jagir". From that the only inference can be that these
three villages were not being included in the bilmakta
sanad. In any case we cannot infer from that that
the Nizam was intending to take away a part of the
rights of the respondent's ancestor in village Timmapet and confer them on the appellants' ancestor.
Further there is nothing to show that the respondent's
ancestors were ever informed that the Nizam had
taken away part of their rights in village Timmapet.
If anything, as late as 1918 village Timmapet along
with others was conferred perpetually in favour of the
respondent as zat jagir subject to the payment of 2 per
centum of haq malkana. At that time the appellants'
ancestor had raised some dispute about his right; as
bi!maktadar of Timmapet but that was left undecided.
On a review therefore of the evidence in this case the
conclusion is inescapable that the appellants' ancestor
was never granted bilmakta sanad by the Nizam which
•
,_
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•
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
627
included the village of Timmapet. Their rights in
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this village therefore depend entirely on the kowl of R . Rh
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d
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a;a
anies war
1817, which, as we have already pomte out,
1
not Rao ;;. Another
confer a permanent lease. The case of the appellants
v.
therefore based on their title on the sanads granted to Raja Govind Rao
them by the Nizam must fail.
We now turn to the question of limitation. The
Wanchoo f.
case put forward before us in that connection is that
the appellants have prescribed for the limited right of
being permanent lessees of this land by adverse
possession and the genesis of this is traced to what
happened in 1875. It appears that there was trouble
between the then ancestors of the parties about this
village about that time. The ancestor of the respondent appears to have made an application to the
Government and the Revenue Member had issued
orders for delivery of possession of this village to him.
Thereupon the ancestor of the appellants made a representation to the Prime Minister against that order
in which it was said that the ancestor of the respondent had conferred the said village on the ancestor of
the appellants by way of bilmakta (i.e., on a fixed
amount) more than eighty years ago and the ancestor
of the appellants had been in possession all along and
had been regularly paying the amount due; the ancestor of the appellants therefore prayed that the order
of delivery of possession of the land to the respondent's ancestor be set aside. It is remarkable that in
this representation the case put forward was that the
village had been granted bilm'Lkta by the ancestor of
the respondent to the appellants' ancestor and not by
the Nizam or the Government· to the appellants'
ancestor. However that may be, the Prime Minister
ordered that as the ancestor of the appellants had
been in possession for a long time, no order could be
passed dispossessing him.
The ancestor of the respondent then tried to get this order of the Prime
Minister changed but failed and in consequence the
appellants' ancestor remained in possession thereof.
It is urged that this shows that the ancestor of the
appellants asserted that he was entitled to possession
as a permanent lessee against the respondent's ancestor and this claim was resisted by the respondent's
628
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96z
ancestor and the resistance failed.
Therefore it must
.
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be held that adverse possession of this limited
Ra;a Rames war k' d
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h
k
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f h
Rao .., Anolher
m was asserte
to t e
now e ge o t e responv.
dent's ancestor and in consequence twelve years after
Raja Govind Rao 1875 the adverse title would be perfected and art. 144
would bar the present suit for ejectment.
Wanchoo J.
There is no doubt that there can be adv,erse possession of a limited interest in property as well as of the
full title as owner: see Sankaran v. Periasami('); Thakore
Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal(');
and Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v.
Periayanan Chetti ('). The present however is a case
where the original kowl was granted by a jagirdar and
the question arises whether in the case of a jagir there
can be adverse possession of a limited interest in the
nature of a permanent lease. In that connection one
has to look to the incidents of a jagir; and the first
incident of a jagir is that it must be taken prima facie
as an estate granted for life: Gulabdas J ugjivandas v.
The Collector of Surat('). In the present case also
the indication is that the jagir that was granted to
Raja Harinarayan in 1787 was for life, for we find
that on the death of Raja Harinarayan a fresh sanad
was granted to his son Raja Govind Narayan in 1811.
Similar conclusion can be drawn from the fact that
as late as 1880 a bilmakta sanad was granted to
Raja Rameshwar Rao, an ancestor of the appellants
on the death of his father in spite of certain sanads in
favour of previous holders of bilmakta. But the appellants contend that after 1811 no fresh sanads were
granted to the descendants of Raja Govind Narayan
and therefore it must be held that the jagir became
hereditary and :was not merely for the lifetime of the
grantee after Raja Govind N arayan's death. There is
no doubt that there are no sanads on the record which
might have been granted to the descendants of Raja
Govind Narayan; but there is equally no evidence on
behalf of the appellants that no such sanads were in
fact granted to the descendants of Raja Govind Narayan, due to change in State Policy. Reliance has been
(1) (1890) l.L.R. 13 Mad, 467.
(2) (1903) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 515.
(3) (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261; (1936) l.L.R. 59 Mad. 809.
(4) (1878) L.R. 6 I.A. 54.
..
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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
629
placed on behalf of the appellants on a publication of
196'
the Government of Hyderabad called "Jagir Admini- R . R- h
'
" V 1 I
3
h
h f 11
'
•J•
ames WM
strat10n ,
o . , at p. , w ere t e o owmg passage Rao & Anoth"
appears:-
v.
"Zat or personal grants-were originally tenable Ra1a Govind Rao
for lifetime only. If, however, the San ad conferring
such grant contains any words indicative of permaWanchoo J.
nency the grant was treated as one in perpetuity.
Formerly on the death of the grantee, the Jagir was
attached and re-issued in favour of his eldest son
by another Sanad."
It is urged on the basis of this that the system of
attachment of jagir and re-issue of new sanads in
favour of the eldest son fell into disuse in Hyderabad
and therefore jagirs became hereditary. In the first
place this passage does not show when the system of
attachment of jagir and re-issue of another sanad
came to an end. In the second place, even this passage shows that jagirs were tenable only for life unless
there was something in the terms of jagir grant to
show that it was perpetual. The jagir grant of Raja
Govind Narayan is on the record and there is nothing
in it to show that it was granted perpetually. Therefore, it must be held to be a grant for life-time only;
at any rate it is clear that the system of granting
sanads on each succession was certainly in force when
Raja Govind Narayan succeeded, for he was granted a
fresh sanad. In his case it must therefore be held that
the jagir was granted to him only for life. Reliance
was also placed on Raje Vinaykrao N emiwant Brahmin
v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin (1) where a
letter of 1877 from the Government of India, Foreign
Department, is quoted as saying that-
"The Governor-General in Council also accepts
the view that these inams are held in accordance
with the custom of the Hyderabad State, which
permits the continuance of such jagheers to posterity, notwithstanding the absence of specific provision on the point, but at the same time reserves
to the State the right of resuming such grants at
pleasure.''
(1) I.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526.
630
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
But· even this letter shows that the State has got the
Raja Rameshwa. ~tight to trebsum~dthhe grahnt .at pleasure adn? if that isbso
Rao & Another l canno
e sa1 t at t e Jagirs grante rn Hydera ad
v.
were permanent and hereditary, though it may be
Raja Govind Rao that a son was allowed to succeed to the father in the
normal course. The State however had always the
Wonehoo J.
right to resume the grant at pleasure. The nature of
jagirs in Hyderabad came to be considered by a bench
of five judges of the former High Court of Hyderabad
in Ahmad-un-Nissa Begum v. State (1).
Ansari, J.,
after referring to two cases of the Privy Council of the
former State of Hyderabad as it was before 1947 and
certain firmans of the Ruler observed as follows as to
the nature of jagirs in Hyderabad:-
"The cumulative effect of the authorities referred
to above is that the jagir tenures in this State
consisted of usufructuary rights in lands which
were terminable on the death of each grantee, were
inalienable during his life, the heirs of the deceased
holder got the estate as fresh grantees and the right
to confer the estate was vested in the Ruler and
exercisable in his absolute discretion. Nevertheless,
the Jagirdars had during their lives valuable rights
of managing their estates, enjoying .the usufructs
and other important privileges which conferred
considerable monetary benefits on them."
This view of Ansari, J., as to the nature of jagirdari
tenure was accepted by the other learned Judges composing the Bench. Therefore the mere fact that
sanads granted to the successors of Raja Govind
Narayan have not been produced in this case or even
the fact that no such sanads were granted to them
would make no difference to the nature of the jagirdari
tenure in Hyderabad. It is only in 1918 for the first
time that we know that this village along with other
villages was conferred in perpetuity on the respondent. There is nothing to show that before that the
respondent's ancestors had permanent hereditary
rights in the jagir. The initial presumption therefore
that jagirs are only for the lifetime of the grantee
must prevail in the present case till we come to the
sanad of 1918. Therefore upto that time it must be
(1) A.LR. 1952 Hyd. 163, 167.
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
held that the jagirs were held by various ancestors of
1961
the respondent only for their lives. In such a case R . ;;;;;eshwar
where a grant is continued in a family from generaR",;0" & Another
tion to generation and each grantee holds it for his
v.
life the limitation against any one grantee starts to Raja Govind Rao
run from the date his title arose. This was recognized
--
by the Privy Council in Jagdish Narayan v. Nawab
Wanchoo J.
Saeed Ahmed Khan (1), where it was observed that
where each grantee holds an estate for his lifetime the
limitation would start to run against an heir from the
date when his title accrued on the death of the previous heir. From the very fact that the grant of a jagir
is only for the life-time of the grantee and that his
son when he gets the jagir gets a fresh grant, it follows
that it was not open to a jagirdar to make an alienation which would enure beyond his lifetime and thus
a jagirdar could not grant a permanent lease, unless
he was specifically entitled to do so, under the sanad
or the law of the State. Similarly in such cases limitation would only run against an heir from the date
when his title accrued on the death of the previous
heir. Consequently the appellants cannot take advantage of what happened in 1875 in the time of Raja
Ramarao as the starting point of adverse possession
against the respondent. So far as the respondent is
concerned, he apparently succeeded to the jagir in
1910 and in his case limitation would start from 1910.
The present suit was brought in 1920 and therefore
so far as the respondent is concerned, there is no question of perfecting even the limited title by adverse
possession as against him.
Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention in this connection to the case of Daivasikhamani ('}, where the Privy Council held that the suits
were barred under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act.
That was however a case where a permanent kowl of
temple lands was granted by a manager. It was held
in view of certain facts proved in that case that the
lessee had acquired permanent rights by adverse possession, even though the manager of a temple has no
authority, except in certain circumstances, to grant a
permanent lease. That case is in our opinion clearly
(1) A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 59·
(2) (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261: (1936) I I.L.R 59 :lhi. 809.
632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
r96r
distinguishable from the facts of the present case. It
. Rh
is true that the manager of a temple has generally
RaJa
an1es war
k'
.
Rao & Another spea mg no authority except in certain circumstances
v.
to grant a permanent lease of temple property; thereRaja Goidnd Rao fore a permanent lease granted by the manager of a
temple may be voidable but is not void ab initio and
Wanchoa J.
so unless it is avoided by the succeeding manager, it
may not be rendered inoperative. Further the temple
in that case was the owner of the property and there
was no question of any succession from father to son.
In the case of a jagir on the other hand, the holder
for the time being is not the owner of the property;
his son when he succeeds holds the property as a
fresh grantee and not on the basis of hereditary succession. A jagirdar has no right to make a permanent "
alienation of any part of the jagir granted to him; if
he makes a permanent alienation even by way of
permanent lease the same may be good in his lifetime,
but it is void and inoperative after his death; the succeeding jagirdar need not avoid it; he can just ignore
it as void. Therefore, while it may be possible in the
case of a permanent lease granted by a manager of a
temple which is the owner of the property to prescribe
for a limited permanent interest by adverse possession
it would be impossible to do so in the case of a jagir,
for the limitation in such a case would start to run
against the heir from the date when his title accrues
on the death of the previous heir and no advantage
can be taken of any running of time against the previous holder of the jagir. Besides, in the case of such
temple grants, long lapse of time may sometimes give
rise to the inference that the alienation was in such
circumstances as would justify a permanent lease.
No such inference is however possible in the case of
permanent leases granted by jagirdars. In this view
therefore the case of the appellants that they have
prescribed for the limited interest of a permanent
lessee against the respondent must fail.
.
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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