# RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH v. THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1056
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-05-10
- **Bench:** Patanjali Sastr! C.J, Mehr Chand Mahajan, MuKHERJEA, DAs, Chandrasekhara Aiyar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/raja-suriya-pal-singh-v-the-state-of-u-p-and-another-209
- **Pages:** 35

## Headnote

Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
(I of 1951 )-Law for abolition of zamindaries and intermediate
tenures-Validity-Provision for compensation and public purpose
-Necessity of-Right of eminent domain-Jurisdictfrm of Court
to enquire into validity of Act-Constitution of India,
1950--
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B,
362; Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36, List l/l, entry 42-De/egation of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Spirit of the
Constitution-Meanings of "public purpose
11
, "law", "legislature" -
Compulsory acquisitiq_n of Crown grants, charities and private
pro~
perty of Rulers under covena~t of merger-Legality.
Held by the ·Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA,
DAs
and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AtYAR
JJ.).-The
Uuar Pradesh
Za1nindari Abolition
and
Land
Reforms
Act,
1950,
is
valid in its entir.ety. The jurisdiction of the court to
question its validity on the ground that it does not provide for
payment of compensation is barred by arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B
of the Constitution. The said Act is not a fraud on the Constitution ;
it does not delegate
essential
legislative
power
to
the
executive ; and is not liable to be impugned on the ground of
absence of a public purpose.
Per
MAHAJAN J.-(i) The expression
"public purpose" is
not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning.
It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
The definition of the expression is elastic and takes its
colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying
with the time and the state of society and its needs.
The point
to be determined in each case is whether it is in the interest of
the community as distinguished from the private interest of an
individual.
(ii) There, _is nothing in law to prevent the subject-matter
of a Crown grant being compulsorily acquired for a public pur~
pose and land held by the taluqdars of Oudh does not therefore
stand on a higher footing than that of other owners of Oudh.
(iii) Property dedicated to charity by a private individuals is
not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire
property for a public purpose.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1057·
(iv) Recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution
when its provisions are explicit ; and when the fundamental law
has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the
general powers conferred on the legislature it is not proper to
~ deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in
the spirit of the Constitution.
(v) The provisions of art. 31(2) do not stand repealed by
art. 31-A.
On the other hand the proviso to art. 31-A keeps them
->
alive.
The only difference is that with regard to estates the
'-' President
has
been
constituted
the
sole
judge for
deciding
whether a State law has complied with art. 31(2).
(vi) When a whole estate is being acquired and payment of
_...
compensation is based on the net income of the whole estate, it
cannot be said that the legislation is of a confiscatory character
merely because there are non-income fetching properties also in
the estate.
DAs J.-(i) The
existeince
of
a
public
purpose
and
the
necessity for payment of compensation cannot be said to be an
inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of Government.
;, The Indian Constitution has in art. 31 (2) recognised these two
c
elements as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the po~rer of eminent
domain, and as the impugned Act has been expressly
taken
out
J
of the operation of those provisions,
the
question
of
invoking
any
imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained.
·
The invocation of such an imaginary spirit will run counter to
the express letter of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B.
(ii)
The claim
~
of the Rulers with regard to their private properties is not within
•
art. 362; by offering compensation their ownership is recognised;
in any event, art. 362 imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or

## Text

_Characters 0–39,897 of 74,878. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39897 for what follows._

1952
May 2, 5.
1056
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER
(AND OTHER CASES)
[PATANJALI SASTR! C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
(I of 1951 )-Law for abolition of zamindaries and intermediate
tenures-Validity-Provision for compensation and public purpose
-Necessity of-Right of eminent domain-Jurisdictfrm of Court
to enquire into validity of Act-Constitution of India,
1950--
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B,
362; Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36, List l/l, entry 42-De/egation of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Spirit of the
Constitution-Meanings of "public purpose
11
, "law", "legislature" -
Compulsory acquisitiq_n of Crown grants, charities and private
pro~
perty of Rulers under covena~t of merger-Legality.
Held by the ·Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA,
DAs
and
CHANDRASEKHARA
AtYAR
JJ.).-The
Uuar Pradesh
Za1nindari Abolition
and
Land
Reforms
Act,
1950,
is
valid in its entir.ety. The jurisdiction of the court to
question its validity on the ground that it does not provide for
payment of compensation is barred by arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B
of the Constitution. The said Act is not a fraud on the Constitution ;
it does not delegate
essential
legislative
power
to
the
executive ; and is not liable to be impugned on the ground of
absence of a public purpose.
Per
MAHAJAN J.-(i) The expression
"public purpose" is
not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning.
It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
The definition of the expression is elastic and takes its
colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying
with the time and the state of society and its needs.
The point
to be determined in each case is whether it is in the interest of
the community as distinguished from the private interest of an
individual.
(ii) There, _is nothing in law to prevent the subject-matter
of a Crown grant being compulsorily acquired for a public pur~
pose and land held by the taluqdars of Oudh does not therefore
stand on a higher footing than that of other owners of Oudh.
(iii) Property dedicated to charity by a private individuals is
not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire
property for a public purpose.
•
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1057·
(iv) Recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution
when its provisions are explicit ; and when the fundamental law
has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the
general powers conferred on the legislature it is not proper to
~ deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in
the spirit of the Constitution.
(v) The provisions of art. 31(2) do not stand repealed by
art. 31-A.
On the other hand the proviso to art. 31-A keeps them
->
alive.
The only difference is that with regard to estates the
'-' President
has
been
constituted
the
sole
judge for
deciding
whether a State law has complied with art. 31(2).
(vi) When a whole estate is being acquired and payment of
_...
compensation is based on the net income of the whole estate, it
cannot be said that the legislation is of a confiscatory character
merely because there are non-income fetching properties also in
the estate.
DAs J.-(i) The
existeince
of
a
public
purpose
and
the
necessity for payment of compensation cannot be said to be an
inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of Government.
;, The Indian Constitution has in art. 31 (2) recognised these two
c
elements as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the po~rer of eminent
domain, and as the impugned Act has been expressly
taken
out
J
of the operation of those provisions,
the
question
of
invoking
any
imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained.
·
The invocation of such an imaginary spirit will run counter to
the express letter of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B.
(ii)
The claim
~
of the Rulers with regard to their private properties is not within
•
art. 362; by offering compensation their ownership is recognised;
in any event, art. 362 imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament or State Legislature, and art.
363
bars
the
jurisdiction
of the court with respect to disputes 'arising out of covenants
of merger.
•
-t
CIVIL APPELLATE
JuRrsmcTION.
Cases Nos. 283
to
295 of 1951.
Appeals under article 132(1) of the Constitution of
India from the judgment and decree dated 10th May,
1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
(Malik C. J., Mootham, Chandiramani, Agarwala and
Bhargava JJ.) in Writ Application Nos. 23, 25, 3330,
3329, 3331 and 3332 of 1951 and Miscellaneous Judicial <;ases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1951 and Civil Miscellaneous
Nos. 335, 340, 345 of 1951 (Luck.now Bench) and from
the judgment and order dated
9th
July,
1951,
of
Sapru and Agarwala JJ.
in Writ Application No. 3403
of 1951.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
u. p.
and Another.
Mahajan].
1058
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
The facts that gave rise to these appeals and petitions are stated in the judgment.
P. R. Das and S. K. Dar (B. Sen and Nanakchand,
with them) for the appellants in Cases Nos. 283 to
286, 289 and 290 of 1951.
B. R. Ambedkar and Bishan Singh for the appellants
in Cases Nos. 285 and 288 of 1951.
N. P. Asthana and
(K. B. Asthana, with him) for
the appellants in Cases Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951.
Prem Mohan Varma for the
appellants
in
Case
No. 295 of 1951.
M.
C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
Kanhaiya Lal Misra ( Gopalji Mehrotra
and Lakshmi
Saran, with them) for the respondents.
1951. May 2, 5. The judgment of the CHIEF JusncE
printed at pp. 893-916 supra covers these cases also.
MAHAJAN,
MuKHERJEA,
DAS and
CHANDRASEKHARA
ArYAR JJ. delivered separate jugdments.
MAHAJAN J.-These appeals under article 132(1) of
the Constitution concern the constitutionality
of
an
Act known as the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act I of 1951), and fan
be conveniently disposed of by one judgment.
The appellants in most of them are owners and proprietors of extensive landed properties in the State of
Uttar Pradesh.
Some of them are holders of estates
in Oudh under
taluqdari
sanads
granted
to
their
ancestors by the British Government. H. H. Maharaja
Paramjit
Singh of
Kapurthala,
appellant
in
Appeal No. 285 of 1951, is the holder of an estate in
Oudh, the full ownership, use and enjoyment of which
was guaranteed to him by the
Government of
India
under article XII of the Pepsu Covenant of Merger.
Appeals Nos. 291 to 295 of 1951 have been preferred
by religious institutions
holding
endowed
properties.
On 8th August, 1946, the United Provinces Legislative Assembly passed the following resolution :-
•
•·
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1059
"This Assembly accepts the principle of the abolition of the zamindari system in this Province
which
involves intermediaries between the cultivator and the
State and resolves that the rights of such
int~rmedi
aries should be
acquired
on
payment of
equitable
compensation and that Government should appoint a
committee to prepare a scheme for this purpose."
A committee was appointed to give effect to the resolution and to
prepare
the
necessary scheme.
It
made its report in July, 1948.
A
Bill
was
introduced in the United Provinces Legislative Assembly
on the 7th July, 1949, was referred to a Select Committee which made its report on 9th
January, 1950,
and was read before the Assembly for the first time
on 17th January, 1950.
On the 21st January, 1950,
the Assembly was prorogued.
It reassesmbled on
the
2nd February, the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th
February, 1950, and was read
for
the second time on
28th July, 1950, and for the third time on 4th August
1950.
On 6th September, 1950, it came
before
the
Legislative Council and the Council passed it with certain amendments on the 30th November, 1950.
The
Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th October, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the
Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in
the
Legislative Assembly on 26th December,
1950, and
was
passed
in
its amended form on
10
January,
1951.
It was subsequently passed by
the
Legislative
Council and after having received the assent of the
President came into force on or about the 25th January, 1951.
The Preamble of the Act declares that-
"Whereas it is expedient to provide for the abolition
of the zamindari system
which
involve.<i
intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State
in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their
rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating
to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acquisition and to make
provision
for other
matters
connected therewith."
13-10 S. C. India 71
1952
Raja SNriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahaian f.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and A nothcr.
Mahajan J,
1060
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
Sub-section (1) of section 4 provides that as from
such date as the State Government may by notification declare, all estates situated in the Uttar Pradesh
shall vest in the
Sta~e free from all encumbrances.
"Estate" is defined in section 3 (8) as meaning "the .
area included under one entry in any of the registers
prepared and maintained under clause (a), (b), ( c) or
(d) of section 32 of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, or in the registers maintained under
clause ( e) of the said section in so far as it relates to a
permanent tenure holder and includes share in or of
an estate." Section 6 enacts that subject to certaii:
very minor exceptions, upon the publication of a notification under section 4, the rights, title and interest of
all intermediaries in everv estate in the area referred
to in the notification, and· in all sub-soil in such estates
including rights, if any, in mines and
minerals, shall
cease and shall be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh
free from all
encumbrances.
The expression "intermediary" is defined in section 3(2) as meaning
with
. reference to any estate, "a proprietor, under-proprietor,
sub-proprietor, thekadar permanent lessee
in
Avadh,
and permanent tenure-holder of such estate
or
part
thereof."
The intermediaries whose ;ights, title and
interest
are thus acquired become entitled
to
receive
compensation at eight times the net assets mentioned in
the
Compensation
Assessment
Roll
prepared
in
;ccordance with the provisions of tl1e Act.
The Act
further provides that the State Government shall pay
to every
intermediary other than a thekadar, whose
estate or estates have been acquired under the Act, a
rehabilitation gram
on a
graduated
scale provided
that the land
revenue
payable
by
such
an
intermediary does not exceed Rs. 10,000.
The scale of the
grant is given in
Schedule
I. Save in
the
case of
wakfs, trusts and endowments
which are wholly for
religious or charitable purposes, the highes• :inultiple
is for class paying land revenue up to
!.<s. 25,
the
multiple being twenty, while the lowest is for the class
.•
.
J
-
' >
-
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1061
paying land revenue exceeding Rs. 5,000, but not exceeding Rs. 10,000 when the multiple is one.
Part I of the Act includes provisions for the vesting
of all estates in the State, for assessment of compensation,
for
payment of
compensation to all intermediaries and of rehabilitation grant to those of them
who pay Rs. 10,000 or less as land revenue and similar
matters.
Part II
deals
with
consequential
changes
that become necessary by reason of the vesting of all
estates in the State and provides for the incorporation
in each
village of a gaon samaj
and the vesting of
certain lands in the gaon samaj ; it divides the cultivators
into
four
classes,
viz., bhumidars,
sirdars,
asamis and
adhivasis,
determines
their
rights
and
provides for the payment of land revenue; it further
contains provisions designed to prevent the fragmentation of holdings or their division into
holdings of
uneconomic size, and to facilitate the establishment of
co-operative farms, and other similar matters.
The following provisions of the Act which came in
for severe criticism during the course of the arguments
addressed to us may be set out in extenso.
Section 6 (a) provides for the vesting in the State of
all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in
every estate in such area including land
(cultivable or
barren), grove land, forests whether within or outside
village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village
abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, wells (other than
private wells in village abadi, holding or grove), tanks,
ponds, water channels, ferries,
pathways, abadi sites,
hats, bazars and melas.
Clauses ( e) and (g) of this
section are in these terms : -
"(e) All amounts ordered to be paid by an intermediary to the State Government under sections
27
and 28 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates
Act,
1934,
and all amounts due from him under the Land
Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or
the
Agricultural
Loans Act, 1884, shall notwithstanding anything contained in the said enactment, become
due
forthwith
and may, without prejudice
to
any
other mode of
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahaian /.
1952
~aia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
,.,.d Another.
Mahaian f.
1062
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
recovery provided tharefore, be realised by
deducting
the amount from
the compensation
money
payable
to such intermediary under Chapter III.
(g) (i) Every mortgage with possessiop
ex1stmg
on any estate or part of an estate on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent
of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed
without
prejudice, to
the
rights
of the State
Government under section 4, to have been substituted
by a simple mortgage ;
(ii) notwithstanding anything
contained in
the
mortgage deed or any other argreement, the amount
declared due on a simple mortgage substituted
under
sub-clause (i) shall carry such rate of interest and from
such date as may be prescribed."
Section 7 saves certain rights at present held by the
proprietors from the purview of the Act.
The
rights
included are in respect of mines which are being worked
by the zamindars.
Section 9 provides
that
private
wells, trees in abadi and buildings situate within the
limits of an estate shall continue to belong to or be held
by such intermediary.
Section 10 makes every tenant
of land belonging to an intermediary and paying land
revenue up to Rs. 250, a hereditary tenant thereof
at the rate of rel).t payable on the date
of vesting.
Section 12 gives the
same
privilege :to
thekadars.
Similarly section 15 confers the status of hereditary
tenants on occupants of lands in which such rights did
not exist.
Section 18 provides that all land
in the
possession of intermediaries as sir, khudkasht
or
an
'intermediary's grove shall be deemed to qe settled by
the State Government with
such
intermediary
etc.,
subject to the provisions of the Act and he will be entitled to possession of it as bhumidar thereof. Land
held by any person as a tenant is deemed to be settled
by the State Government on such person
as
sirdar.
Section 27 and 28 are in these terms ·-
"27. Every intermediary,
whose
rights,
title
or
interest in
any estate are acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to receive and be
paid compensation as hereinafter provided.
I
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1063
28. ( 1). Compensation for
acqms1t10n
under this Act shall be due as from
vesting
subject
to
determination
of
thereof.
of
estates
the date of
the
amount
(2) There shall be paid by the State Government
on the amount so determined interest at the rate of
two and half per centum per annum from the date of
vesting to the date of-
(i) in the case of the amount to be paid in cash,
determination,
(ii) in the case of the amount to be given in
bonds, the redemption of the bonds."
Section 39 lays down the method of determination
of the gross income of the land comprised in a mahal,
while section 42 provides for the determination of the
gross assets of an intermediary.
Section 44 lays down
the manner of assessing the net income of an intermediary. It provides as follows :-
"The net assets of an intermediary in respect of
a mahal shall be computed
by deducting
from
his
gross assets the following, namely :
(a) any sum which was payable by hini in the
previous agricultural year to
the
State
Government
on account of land revenue ............. .
(b) an amount on account of agricultural incometax, if any, paid for the previous agricultural year ....... .
( c) cost of management equal to 15 per centum of
the gross assets."
Provision has been made for the
appointment of
assessment officers and for the preparation
of
draft
compensation assessment roll by them
after
hearing
objections. Right of appeal
has also been
provided
against their decision.
Chapter IV
concerns itself with the
payment
of
compensation.
Section 65 of this
chapter
provides
that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation in respect of the acqui~ition of
his
rights,
title and interest in every estate the amount declared
in that behalf under section 60.
Section 68 is in these
terms:-
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan/.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan f.
1064
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952}
"The compensation payable under this Act
shall
be given in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and
partly in bonds as may be prescribed."
Section 72 empowers the State Government to make
rules on all matters which are to be and may be prescribed. Sections 113 and 117 provide for the establishment and incorporation of a gaon samaj and for the
vesting of all lands not comprised in any holding or
grove and forests within the village boundaries, trees,
public wells, fisheries, ·hats, bazars etc., tanks and
ponds in the gaon Mmaj, which is to
supervise and
manage and control the lands subject
to
supervision
by the Government. Other provisions of the Act relate
to acquisition of bhumidari rights
and
of
sirdari
rights by tenants, thekiadars etc.,
on payment of
a
certain amount mentioned in the
Act.
A
bhumidar
has the status of
a
peasant
proprietor
in
direct
relation to Government
and
these
agrarian
reforms
contemplated
by
the
Act
aim
at converting the
zaminclari tenure system into a ryotwari system.
The main
questions
for
appeals are the following :-
1. Whether the impugned
enacted.
consideration
Act
was
111
these
validly
2. Whether thee acquisition
of
properties
contemplated by the Act is for a public purpose.
3. 'Vhether the delegation of power in the various
sections of the Act is within the permissible limits.
4. Whether the taluqclari properties
held
under
"sanads" from the British
Government
can be
the
'subject-matter of acquisition.
5. Whether the properties of the Maharajah of
Kapurthala in Oudh could in view of the article 12 of the
Pepsu Union Covenant be acquired under the Act.
6. Whether the said Act constitutes a fraud on
the Constitution.
The validity of the Act was attacked on a variety
of grounds by the learned counsel
appearing
111 the
different cases and the grounds urged
were
by
ne>
•
,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1065
means uniform or consistent and ~me of these were
destructive of one another.
Mr. P. R. Das, who
opened the attack, reiterated
the arguments he had
addressed to
us in the Bihar
appeals and urged that the obligation to provide for
compensation is
implicit in the
power
conferred on
the State
Legislature by
entry 36
of List II with
respect to acquisitions, that the words "subject to the
provisions of entry 42 of List III" in entry 36 compel
the court to construe entry 36 of List II along with
entry 42 of List III and, when so construed, it is clear
that compensation
has to be
provided
for whenever
power is exercised under
entry 36,
that there is no
provision for payment of compensation in the impugned Act,
the
word
"compensation"
meaning
the
equivalent in money
of the property
compulsorily
acquired, that the U. P. Legislature had no power to
enact this Act without making provision for payment
of: compensation and in legal contemplation the Act is
lh>t
law,
that article
31 (2)
confers a fundamental
right but has nothing to do with legislative, powers
which have been
conferred
by articles 245 and 246
read with the three lists, that: article 31(4) does not
in any way affect the rights conferred by article 31(2),
which exist notwithstanding article 31 ( 4), and it only
bars the remedy to challenge the Act on the ground
that it contravenes the
provisions of clause (2), that
the Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution, and
lastly that the Act is void by reason of delegation of
essential legislative power.
On the
question of the
invalidity
of tl1e Act for
want of a
provision for
payment of compensation,
Mr. P. R. Das reinforced his arguments by reference
to legislative practice in India and England and contended that even without any express provision for
compensation in the
different
enactments to
which
our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word
"purchase" implied that compensation was
a
concomitant obligation of
the exercise
of the power to
compulsorily
acquire
property.
For
the
reasons
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan f.
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan/.
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
given by me in the Bihar appeals I cannot accept this
contention.
If
the
Constitution
was silent on the
point and
provided for
compulsory acquisition, the
position might have been different.
Mr. Dhar, who appeared ·in some of the appeals,
supplemented
the
arguments
of
Mr.
Das on
this
point.
He
contended
that
regarding
half of the
properties acquired,
the Act
was a piece of confiscatory
legislation
as
these
properties
were
nonincome
bearing,
and
that
as
regards
the
other
half,
though
compensation
at eight
times the net
income is provided, it is a mere sham inasmuch as
the Act makes payment of compensation discretionary
at the will and pleasure of the Government; the provision being that Government will pay when it chooses
to do so and it may never make the choice. He further
contended that the provisions of the Act regarding
compensation are
colourable
because
they completely
ignore the potential
incomes of
the zamindars, take
notice only of
the income
recorded
in the khatuni
entries which
do not
include the
sir income, and
acquire
rent-free
holdings
and
undeveloped
mines
without any compensation, that the deduction of agricultural income-tax . from the gross-income was unjust
and the object of deduction was to artiiicially reduce
the net
income, and the
same procedure had been
adopted in the case of forests.
Dr.
Ambedkar,
who
appeared
m
some of
the
appeals, suggested a new approach for declaring the
Act to be
bad.
He
contended that
qua "estates"
defined in
article 31-A,
Part I of the
Constitution
should be deemed as repealed and struck off from the
Constitution.
In deciding these appeals, therefore, we
are to look at the Constitution without the chapter on
Fundamental
Rights ;
but as the
Constitution aims
at securing liberty
and
equality
for the people and
gives only a restricted power
to the State, the obligation to pay
compensation
when
private property is
taken is implicit in the very spirit of the Constitution.
Mr. Das found the
obligation to
pay compensation
implicit in entry 36, but Dr. Ambedkar could not see
'
•
(
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
1067
eye to eye with him though he supported his contention by urging that the prohibition to acquire property
by legislation without payment of compensation was
implicit in the spirit of the Constitution .
Mr. Varma, who appeared in some other appeals,
supported
Mr.
Das's
argument
that
entry
36
should be read subject to the provisions of entry 42
and
further
contended
that
the
impugned
Act
was the culminating point of a series of enactments
passed as a device to
confiscate the
properties of the
zamindars after the passing of the resolution in 1946
by the U. P. Legislature.
Having negatived the contentions of Mr. Das, I
cannot for the same reasons accept the contentions of
Mr. Dhar as sound.
It is convenient now to examine
the point made by Dr.
Ambedkar that the obligation
to pay compensation is
implicit .in
the spirit of the
Constitution.
It is well-settled that recourse cannot be
had to the spirit
of the
Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter.
When the fundamental law has not limited either in
terms or by necessary
implication the general powers
conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce
a limitation from
oomething
supposed to be inherent
in the spiirit of the Constitution.
This elusive spirit is
no guide in this matter. The spirit of the Constitution
-cannot prevail as
against its
letter.
Dr. Ambedkar
Telied on the observations
of Nelson J. in People v.
Morris ('), quoted in the footnote, at p. 357 of Cooley's
Constitutional Limitation.
The footnote states :-
"It is
now
considered
an
uni versa!
and
fundamental proposition in
every well
regulated and properly administered government, whether embodied in
a constitutional
form or
not, that
private property
cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all
nor for public uses without a just compensation; and
that the obligation of contracts cannot be abrogated or
essentially impaired.
These and
other vested rights
of the citizen
are held
sacred and
inviolable, even
(1) l3 Wend. 325.
1952
-
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Annther.
Mahajan J.
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan f.
1068
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
against
the
plenitude of
power
of
the
legislative
department."
Those observations of
the learned
Judge, however,
do not lend support to the contention urged; on the
other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated
by Dr. Cooley at page -351 (Vol. I) that the courts are
not at liberty to declare an Act void, because in their
opinion it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade
the Constitution but not
expressed in words, has an
opposite application here.
It is
difficult
upon any
general principle
to limit the
omnipotence of the
sovereign legislative power
by
judicial
interposition
except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority.
The argument of Dr. Ambedkar cannot be accepted
for the further reason that it is based on an unwarranted assumption that qua the estates of the zamindars,
Part III of the Constitution stands repealed and is non
est. The truth is that Part III of the Constitution is
an importa11t and integral part of it and has not been
repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution ; on the other hand
article 31-A, while
providing that
no law providing
for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent
with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any
of the
provisions of
Part III, clearly
provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not
apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for
the consideration of
the
President
has received his
assent.
This proviso in express term5 keeps alive the
alternative provisions of Part
III of the Constitution
'm article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has
or has not complied with the provisions of article 31
(2).
The provisions of article 31(2), therefore, <lo not
stand repealed by article
31-A.
On the other hand,
they are kept
alive.
The
difference is that persons
whose
properties fail
within the definition of the
expression
"estate" in
article
31-A are
deprived of
their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and
•
•
..
..
•
..,,
.
_.J
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1069
the President
has been
constituted the sole judge of
deciding whether a State Law acquiring estates
under
compulsory power has
or has not complied with the
provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in
those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the
President and IS not justiciable.
Once the assent IS
given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31(2).
It is true that the principles of payment of compensation stated in the Act do not give anything like an
equivalent or quid pro quo for the property acquired
and provide only for payment of what is euphemistically described in the
resolution
of the U. P. Legislature
as
"equitable
compensation".
Properties
fetching no income pass to the State without payment
of any separate compensation and as comprising part
of an estate which yields some net income to the
proprietor.
According to the
affidavit filed
in the
Balrampur
Raj
case,
actual income of Rs. 1,42,000
that the owner receives at present, works out to a sum
of Rs. 10,000 under the provisions of the Act and property worth several crores is being acquired for a mere
fraction of
it~ true value.
Culturable waste which
for~ twenty per cent. of the entire area of the estate,
trees, sen:ral lakhs m number, water channels and
irrigation works
etc.,
are being acquired along with
the cultivated
lands
and
income-fetching
properties
without :my separate provision for payment of compensation.
But from those
facts the conclusion cannot be drawn that the
provisions as to compensation
in the Act are illusory .
In none of the cases could it be said that the provisions of the
impugned
Act
would
result m nonpayment of
compensation.
Great
emphasis was laid
on the circumstance that nothing was being paid fornon-income fetching
properties.
It has, however, to
be observed that these
non-income fetching properties
are
integral
parts
of
an
esate
as
defined
m
article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of
compensation is provided for on the basis of the net
income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahaian /.
1952
Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
is of
a
confiscatory
character.
Different coruiderations might have prevailed
if the estates as a whole
were not being
acquired but
different pieces of property were
made the
subject-matter of acquisiticn.
Properties comprised
in an estate
may be
incomefetching and non-income fetching, the value of these
to the owner in the market may well be on the basis
of income and if the Act has laid down the principle
of payment of compensation on the foot of net income,
it cannot be said tha.t the kgislattion is outside the
ambit of entry 42 of List III.
Dr. Ambedkar frankly
conceded
that he was not
prepared to go to the length of contending that the
compensation
~provided for
in the
Act
was illusory.
He, however, said that it was inadequate, whether
tested subjectively or
objectively.
During the period
that the Balrampur Raj was under the supervision of
the Court of Wards, part of the property acquired was
purchased on payment of Rs. 24,09,705 fetching a net
income of Rs. 25,915.
This property, however, under
the Act would be acquired on payment of Rs. 2,08,000.
Under the
U.
P.
Encumbered
Estates
Act
the
Government itself had valued properties in various
places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act on
standard multiples, viz., from 37 to 20 times the net
income.
Price of part of the property acquired
on
this basis comes to Rs. 47,14,696, while compensation
according to the Act payable would be about onefourth of this amount.
Be that as it may, article 31
(4) is a complete answer to all these contentions, as
held by me in the Bihar appeals. This Bill was pending in the legislature of the State on the 26th January,
1950, when the Constitution came into force and this
circumstance makes
article
31 ( 4)
applicable
to
all
these cases.
It was contended by Mr. Varma that the
U. P. Assembly was prorogued on the 21st January,
1950, and the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and on
the 26th
January, 1950, when the
Constitution came into force it could not be said to be
pending as it had lapsed.
This contention seems to be
based on a misapprehension as to the provisions of the
•
•
~- -
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1071
Constitution
Act of
1935 and the
provisions of the
present Constitution. Section 73 of the Government
of India
Act,
1931, and
article 196
of the present
Constitution provide in unambiguous terms that a Bill
pending in the legislature of a State shall not lapse by
reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses thereof.
In view of these clear provisions the content~on of
the learned counsel
that the Bill was not pending on
26th January, 1950, has to be rejected.
Further the
provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter
this law from any attack based on any of the provisions
of Part III of the Constitution.
This proposition was
not disputed.
As the validity of the Act could not be
impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the
Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on
its
constitutionality was
made on other
groundsingenious
but
unsubstantial-lying
outside the ambit
of Part III.
As
regards
the
contention
that
the provisions
with regard to
payment
of
compensation
would
result in
non-payment of
it as it is
payable at the
pleasure of
Government
and
the
debts
of
the
zamindars are to be deducted out of it, my view is
that both
these
contentions
are
unsound.
Under
the provisions
of the Act
above cited, compensation
becomes, due on the date of the vesting of the estate.
Interest at two and a half per cent. runs from that
date and
becomes payable forthwith.
Section 27 of
the Act makes it
obligatory on
the Government to
pay compensation.
Section 65 in clear terms provides
that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the
amount declared in that
behalf und_e.r
section 60.
Section 68 gives option to the Government to pay compensation either in cash or in bonds,
or partly in cash and partly in bonds
as: may be
prescribed.
If the Government does
not prescribe
anything, it
is
obvious
that
CClffipensation
will be
payable forthwith.
If, on
the other
hand, Government makes any rules and
prescribes that compensation will be
payable at
some remote
time and not
within a
reasonable
period it will be
open to the
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
1952
.Raja Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
parties affected to challenge the validity of the rules
on the ground of abuse of power.
These provisions,
however, do not vitiate the Act and affect its validity.
So far as the debts are
concerned, they were payable
in certain instalments out of the income of the lands,
they have been made
payable at
once and provision
has been made that the amount be deducted from the
amount of compensation.
Instalments had been fixed
because of the
fact that they were recoverable from
the income of the land. When the lands are converted
into money, it follows as a matter of course that the
right to recover the debts from the income of the
lands is transferred to the compensation money and
the
provision
regarding
instalments becomes
infructuous by the fact of acquisition.
Dr. Ambedkar
further contended that in fixing the amount of compensation the State was a judge in its own cause and
this was against the spirit of the Constitution.
There
is
no
substance
in
this
contention
as the actual
amount of compensation
is to be
determined by the
compensation officer and his adjudication on the point
is subject to an appeal.
Government is not the judge
of the actual amount of
compensation.
So far as the
law is concerned, it is the act
o~ the legislature and
being within its competence, no challenge can be
made against the validity of the Act on this ground.
The question
that the
Act does
no postulate any
public
purpose
and
is
thus
unconstitutional
was
argued by Mr. Dhar
and Dr.
Ambedkar with some
vehemence and it was contended that there was no
public purpose
behind this
legislation.
Mr.
Dhar
urged that
the
sole
purpose
of the
acquisition of
zamindars' estates
was
for
increasing
the revenues
of the State and for selling the intermediaries' interests
to private
individuals,
the
intention being to make
money by trading activities and at the same time root
out the
zamindars- who
constitute
one-fourth of the
population of Uttar Pradesh.
It was contended that
no community in Uttar
Pradesh
derived any benefit
from the
provisions of
the Act
because the tenants
whose status was intended to be raised, had been given
•
·-
•
•
,
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1073
sufficient relief
under statutes
already
passed
and
what was humanly possible to do for them had been
done, that they were at present more prosperous than
the middle class: people and that the creation of a
classless society by destroying a class was not a public
purpose. Dr. Ambedkar on the other hand argued that
he would have been content had the State nationalised
the zammdaries because then the acquisition would be
for a public purpose, but as under the impugned Act
the State had merely
constituted
itself a trustee for
distribution
of the
intermediaries' interests amongst
h
"h
"
d
I
"h
" .
t e
aves
an
not
amongst tie
ave nots , t.e.,
amongst the bhumidars, sirdars, asamis and adhivasis
and not amongst the landless,
the Act was not for a
public purpose at all but was an unfortunate piece of
legislation as
property was
being acquired for the
private benefit of persons and not for public use and
that giving of property to gaon samaj
also could not
be held to be for public benefit or public use.
In my
opm10n,
as
already
stated
by me in the
Bihar appeals, these
arguments are unsound.
The
expression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise
definition and has not a rigid meaning.
It can only
be defined by a process
of judicial
inclusion and ex,
clusion.
In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in
which it occurs, the concept varying with the time
and state of society and its needs.
The point to be
determined in each case is whether the acquisition is
in the general
interest of the
community as distinguished from
the
private
interest
of an
individual.
Prof. Willis has
summarized the
present position in
the United States on
this subject,
at pages 817 and
818 of his book, in these words :-
"What is public use ? On this
question there have
been two
view-points.
One may be called the older
view-point and the
other newer view-point.
According
to
the
older
view-point,
in
order
to have
a
public
use,
there
must
be
the
use
by
the
public . . . . . . . . . . According to the newer view-point there
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v •
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
1952
Raia Suriya
Pal Singh
v.
The State of
U. P.
and Another.
Mahajan /.
1074
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1952]
is a public use if
the thing
taken is
useful to the
public. This makes public use for eminent domain
practically synonymous with
public
purpose for taxation
and
somewhat like
social
interest for
police
power.
Under this rule ·it is not
necessary for the
benefit to be for the
whole
community, but it must
be for a considerable number."
The High Court took the view that acquisition of
property
under
compulsory
powers for
securing an
aim declared in the
Constitution
to be a matter of
State policy is an acquisition for a public purpose.
The following
observations
from
the
judgment of
Bhargava J. may be quoted with advantage:-
"The effect of the impugned Act is to vest the
ownership and control
of a
considerable
part of the
material resources of the community
in the State
Government ; ..............