# RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANR. ETC v. KRISHNA KANT ETC. ETC

- **Citation:** [1995] 3 S.C.R. 1118
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1995-05-03
- **Bench:** B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Suhas C. Sen, G.T. Nanavati
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rajasthan-state-road-transport-corporation-and-anr-etc-v-krishna-kant-etc-etc-12922
- **Pages:** 25

## Headnote

Civil Procedure Code, 190S-Section '}-Jurisdiction of Civil Court visa-vis Special Tribunals-Industrial Disputes-Concept of-Dispute between
C employer and workmen involving recognition, application or enforcement of
certified Standing Orders-Whether jurisdiction of Civil Court ba"ed-Effectiveness of remedies provided by Industrial Disputes Act.
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-Section 13A-Standing Order~ature of-Meaning and scope of Section 13-A-CerD tified Standing Orders are statutorily imposed conditions of service-Binding
both upon employers and employees-These do not amount to 'statutory
provision'-Violation of-Remedy available.
The respondents, employees of the appellant Corporation filed civil
E suits for a declaration that the order terminating their services was illegal
land invalid and for a further declaration that they must be deemed to
have continued and were still continuing in the services or the Corporation
with all consequential benefits. Pursuant to disciplinary inquiries held
against them on charges or ciisconduct, their services were terminated.
The Corporation resisted the suits on the ground that the Civil Court had
F no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The suits were decreed as prayed for
and the appeals as also second appeals filed by the Corporation were
dismissed. Hence these appeals.
The appellant Corporation urged that the disciplinary enquiries,
which resulted in the dismissal of the respondents were conducted perfectG ly in accordance with the Standing Orders; that a suit of this nature is not
maintainable in a civil court and the respondent's only remedy was to
approach the Labour Court for the reliefs sought for by them in the suit
as any and every violation of Standing Orders entitles the workman to
approach the Labour Court directly u/s 13-A of the Industrial Employment
H (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and ~btain relief and that the Labour Court
1118
RATASTHAN STATE RD. TPT. CORPN. v. KRISHNA KANT
1119
is empowered under this provision to adjndicate dispute between workmen A
and employer arising from the certificated Standing Order and grant such
relief as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
The respondents-workmen submitted that the certified Standing Orders have statutory force and their violation enables the Civil Court to
decree reinstatement in service and that bar of Section 14 of the Special B
Relief Act did not operate in such a case.
The question raised for consideration was whether by virtue of the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Standing Orders, the
Civil Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of such suits is barred.
Allowing the appeals, this Conrt
c
HELD : 1. Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e.,
where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit
filed in civil court cannot he said to be not maintainable, even though such D
a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of
Section 2(k).or Section 2-A the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. [1139-G]
2. Where, however, the dispute involves recogiiition, observance or
enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial
Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said E
Act. [1139-HJ
3. Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance
or enforcement of right and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called
'sister enactments' to Indnstrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide F
a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they
constitnte industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such
dispnte shall be either treated as an industrial dispnte or says that it shall G
be adjudicated by any of the forum cr

## Text

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A
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
AND ANR. ETC.
v
KRISHNA KANT ETC. ETC.
B
MAY 3, 1995
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, SUHAS C. SEN AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.]
Civil Procedure Code, 190S-Section '}-Jurisdiction of Civil Court visa-vis Special Tribunals-Industrial Disputes-Concept of-Dispute between
C employer and workmen involving recognition, application or enforcement of
certified Standing Orders-Whether jurisdiction of Civil Court ba"ed-Effectiveness of remedies provided by Industrial Disputes Act.
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-Section 13A-Standing Order~ature of-Meaning and scope of Section 13-A-CerD tified Standing Orders are statutorily imposed conditions of service-Binding
both upon employers and employees-These do not amount to 'statutory
provision'-Violation of-Remedy available.
The respondents, employees of the appellant Corporation filed civil
E suits for a declaration that the order terminating their services was illegal
land invalid and for a further declaration that they must be deemed to
have continued and were still continuing in the services or the Corporation
with all consequential benefits. Pursuant to disciplinary inquiries held
against them on charges or ciisconduct, their services were terminated.
The Corporation resisted the suits on the ground that the Civil Court had
F no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The suits were decreed as prayed for
and the appeals as also second appeals filed by the Corporation were
dismissed. Hence these appeals.
The appellant Corporation urged that the disciplinary enquiries,
which resulted in the dismissal of the respondents were conducted perfectG ly in accordance with the Standing Orders; that a suit of this nature is not
maintainable in a civil court and the respondent's only remedy was to
approach the Labour Court for the reliefs sought for by them in the suit
as any and every violation of Standing Orders entitles the workman to
approach the Labour Court directly u/s 13-A of the Industrial Employment
H (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and ~btain relief and that the Labour Court
1118
RATASTHAN STATE RD. TPT. CORPN. v. KRISHNA KANT
1119
is empowered under this provision to adjndicate dispute between workmen A
and employer arising from the certificated Standing Order and grant such
relief as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
The respondents-workmen submitted that the certified Standing Orders have statutory force and their violation enables the Civil Court to
decree reinstatement in service and that bar of Section 14 of the Special B
Relief Act did not operate in such a case.
The question raised for consideration was whether by virtue of the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Standing Orders, the
Civil Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of such suits is barred.
Allowing the appeals, this Conrt
c
HELD : 1. Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e.,
where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit
filed in civil court cannot he said to be not maintainable, even though such D
a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of
Section 2(k).or Section 2-A the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. [1139-G]
2. Where, however, the dispute involves recogiiition, observance or
enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial
Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said E
Act. [1139-HJ
3. Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance
or enforcement of right and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called
'sister enactments' to Indnstrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide F
a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they
constitnte industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such
dispnte shall be either treated as an industrial dispnte or says that it shall G
be adjudicated by any of the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act.
Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open. [1140-B-CJ
4. It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the lndustrial
Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the
forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate govern- H
1120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 3 S.C.R.
A ment. The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to
be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not
Y .,
unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute
raised is a totally frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred is the power
to refer and not the power to decided, though it may be that the government
B is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex-facie frivolous, not merit·
ing an adjudication. [1140-D-E]
5. Consistent with the policy of law, .the Parliament and the State
legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal Directly-i.e. without the requirement
C of a reference by the government-In case of industrial disputes covered
by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in
removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies
provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. [1140-F)
6. The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance
D with the Industrial Tribunal Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 are
statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the
employers and employees, though they do not amount to 'statutory
provisions". Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee
to appropriate relief either before the forum crated by the Industrial
E Disputes Act or the Civil Court where recourse to Civil Court is open
according to the principles indicated herein. (1140-G·H)
7. The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its
sister enactment is to provide an alternative disputes resolution
mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive,
F informal and no-encumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and
appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the
powers of the Courts and Tribunals under the Industrial Dispures Act are
far more extensive in the sense that they can grant surh relief as they think
appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial
G dispute. [1141-B·CJ
Premier Automobiles Limited Etc. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of
Bombay & Ors. Etc., [1976) 1SCC496; Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Mis. Empire
of India & Ceylon Tea Co. & Anr., [1989] 3 SCC 582; Bagalkot Cement Co.
Ltd. v. R.K Pathan & Ors., [1962) Suppl. 2 SCR 697; Buckingham & Camatic
H Co. Ltd. v.Venkatiah & Anr., [1964) 4 SCR 2.65; Workmen of Dewan Tea
-...
RAJASTIIANSTATERD. TYT. CORPN. '· KRISHNAKANT[B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.J llZl
Estate & Ors. v. Management, (1964) 5 SCR 548; Workmen of Buckingham & A
Camatic Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Camatice Mills, Madras, (1970) 1
LW 26; D.K Yadav v. J.MA. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259, Bombay
Union of Journalist v The Hindu, (1961) 2 LW 436 SC; Dhulabhai v. State of
M.P., (1968) 3 SCR .662 and S.K Konde v. Pigment Lakes and Chemical
Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 12, relied on.
8. These principles enunciated shall apply to all pending matters
except where decrees have been passed by the Trial Court and the matters
are pending in appeal or second appeal, as the case may be.
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3100 of C
1991 Etc. Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.8.90 of the Rajasthan High
Court in C.R.S.A. No. 36 of 1990.
Altaf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, P.P. Rao, Jitendra Shar- D
ma, Sushi! K. Jain, A.P. Dhamija, Ms. Kunwant Data, P. Gaur, Ejaz
Maqbool, M.D. Adkar, B.K. Misra, Maninder Singh and Ms. Chandan
Ramurthy for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Leave granted in all Special Leave Petitions.
E
The respondents in these appeals are the employees of the appellant-corporation, viz., Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. Pursuant to disciplinary enquiries held against them on charges of misconduct, F
their services were terminated. They filed civil suits for a declaration that
the order terminating their services is illegal and invalid and for a further
declaration that they must be deemed to have continued and are still
continuing in the service of the
Corporation with all consequential
benefits. The Corporation resisted the suits on the ground inter alia that G
the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The Trial Court
decreed the suits as prayed for. Appeals as also Second appeals preferred
by the Corporation were dismissed by the learned District Judge and High
Court.
When these appeals came up for hearing before a Bench of two H
1122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 3 S.C.R.
A learned Judges of this Court, the appellant-Corporation relied upon the
principles enunciated in Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the judirnent in Premier
Automobiles Limited etc. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors
Etc., [1976] 1 S.C.C. 496 and in particular upon the decision in Jitendra
Nath Biswas v. Mis. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. & Anr., [1989] 3
B S.C.C. 582. The Bench was of the opinion, agreeing with the decision in
Jitendra Nath Biswas, that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the present suits but in view of the order dated October 18, 1989 in S.L.P.
(C) No.9386 of 1988 (rendered by two-Judge Bench of this Court) holdil'.6
a civil suit concerning a similar dispute to be maintainable, the Bench
thought it appropriate that the appeals are heard by a Be~r,h of three
C Judges. It is pursuant to their order dated September 23, 1993 that these
appeals have been placed before this Bench.
The appellant-Corporation has been constituted under the Road
Transport Corporations Act, 1950. It is a statutory Corporation. Though
Section 45 of the said Act empowers the Corporation to fram~ regulations
D prescribing the conditions of service of its employees, no such regulations
have been framed in so far as the employees answering the description of
"workman" as defined in Section 2(S) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
are concerned. They are governed by the certified Standing Orders framed
under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing OrE ders) Act, 1946. These Standing Orders inter alia define "misconduct" and
prescribe the procedure for conducting the disciplinary proceedings
against such employees.
The Corporation says that the disciplinary enquiries, which resulted
F
in the dismissal of the respondents were conducted perfectly in accordance
with the Standing Orders, whereas the case of the respondents/plaintiffs is
that .they were conducted in violation of the Standing Orders. The precise
question in these appeals is whether a suit of this nature is maintainable in
a Civil Court. The Corporation says that it is not. According to them the
respondent's only remedy was to approach the Labour Court for the reliefs
G
sought for by them in the suit.
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that "the courts shall
(subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits
of a civil nature except the suits of which .their cognizance is either
H expressly or impliedly barred." The question is whether by virtue of the
.J
)
f
'
I
·-\
1
I
RAJAmIANSfATERD. TPT.CORPN.v. KRISHNAKANT[B.P.JEEVANREDDY,J.[ 1123
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act read with the Standing Orders A
aforesaid, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of such suits is
barred? This question calls for a brief reference to the relevant provisions
of the Industrial Disput~s Act as well as the Standing Orders Act, 1946.
The Industrial Disputes Act (the Act) was enacted to make provision
for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain B.
other purposes. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill
(which became the Act) stated inter alia, "(T)he bill also seeks to re-orient
the administration of the conciliation machinery provided in the Trade
Disputes Act. Conciliation will be compulsory in all disputes in public
utility services and optional in the case of other industrial establishments. C
With a view to expedite conciliation proceedings, time limits have been
prescribed for conclusion thereof - fourteen days in the case of conciliation
officer and two months in the case of Board of Conciliation, from the date
of notice of strike. A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation
proceedings will be binding for such periods as may be agreed upon by the
parties and where no period has been agreed upon, for a period of one D
year, and will continue to be binding until revoked by _a three months'
notice by either party to the dispute."
Section 2 defines · certain expressions occurring in the Act. The
expression "industrial dispute" is defined in clause (k) in the following E
words:
"(k) 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between
employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or
between workmen and workmen, which is ·connected with the
employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or F
with the conditions of labour, of any person;'\
The expression "workman" is defined in clause (s), while the expression "employer" _is defined in clause (g). Sections 4 to 7 provide for
appointment/constitution of Conciliation Officers, Boards of Conciliation, G
Courts of Enquiry and Labour Courts while Sections 7-A and 7-B provide
for con~titution <:>f Tribunals and National Tribunals. Sectio,," 9-A provides
that any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in
respect of matters specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be effected only
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by it. Section 10 is relevant
for our purposes since it provides for reference to disputes to Boards, H
1124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1995) 3 S.C.R.
A Courts or Tribunals. It provides for the government referring an industrial
dispute to specified authorities for adjudication, where it is of the opinion
that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Section 10-A provides
for voluntary reference of an industrial dispute to arbitration. Section 11
prescribes the procedure and powers of the Courts and Tribunals while
Section 11-A confers upon the Labour Court and Tribunals an express
B power to substitute the punishment awarded in the domestic enquiry if it
is satisfied that such a course is called for in the circumstances of a given
case. Section 12 prescribes the duties of conciliation officers. It says that
"where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation
officer may, or where the disputes relates to a public utility service and
C notice under Section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation proceedings
in the prescribed manner." The duty of such officer is to bring about a
settlement as far as possible and if he fails in that effort, to make a report
to the government. The government is thereupon empowered to refer the
dispute to appropriate Tribunal or Court for adjudication. Sub-section ( 6)
provides that a report under Section 12 shall be submitted within fourteen
D
days of commencement of the conciliation proceedings unless of course
extended by agreement between the parties to the dispute. Section 14
provides that a court shall decide a matter referred to it within six months
of the commencement of enquiry. Section 15 directs the authorities to
decide the matters expeditiously and within the period specified in the
E
order of reference. Section 16 provides for submission of the award by the
Tribunal/Court, while Section 17 provides for its publication by the
Government in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 then
says "subject to the provisions of Section 17-A, the award published under
Sub-section {1) shall be final and shall not be called in question by any
court in any manner whatsoever". Section 18 provides for a settlement
F
between the parties to an industrial dispute while Section 19 provides for
certain matters incidental thereto. Chapter-V prohibits strikes and lockouts.Chapter-VA and Chapter V-B contain several provisions of substantive nature regulating retrenchment and lay-off of workmen, closure of
industrial establishments and other related matters. Chapter-VJ deals with
G penalties. Section 29 provides that any person who commits a breach of
any award which is binding upon him shall be punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with both as provided therein. Chapter-VJ! contains
certain miscellaneous provisions. Section 33-C provides for recovery of
money due from an employer to a workman in the manner provided
thereby. The forum prescribed is the Labour Court. For the purpose of
H
these appeals, it may not be necessary to refer to the five schedules
)"
...
-'
(
RAJASTI!ANSTATERD. TPT. CORPN. v. KRISHNAKANT(B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,1.J 1125
appended to the Act.
A
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 was
enacted by Parliament to require employers in industrial establishments to
define formally the conditions of employment under them with sufficient
precision and to make them known to the workers. The Act applies to every
industrial establishment wherein 100 or more workers are employed or B
were employed on any day of the preceding 12 months. Clauses (c), (d)
and (e) define the expressions "certified officer'',"employer" and "industrial
establishment". The expression "workman" carries the same meaning as is
assigned to it in the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 3 makes it obligatory
upon every industrial establishment to frame Standing Orders in respect of C
matters set out in the Schedule to the Act and submit the same to the
certified officer who shall, after making the necessary enquiry, certify the
same, on being satisfied that they have been framed in accordance with the
Act. Upon such certification, the Standing Orders become binding upon
both the employer and the employees. They are required to be published D
in the manner prescribed by the Act. Model Standing Orders have been
framed which are to be effective till the certified Standing Orders are made
and publislied under the Act. Failure to submit or frame Standing Orders
by the employer is made punishable by Section 13 while Section 13-A
prescribes the forum for determination of questions arising with respect to
the application or interpretation of the certified Standing Orders. Section E
13-A reads as follows:
"13-A.-lnterpretation, etc., of standing orders. If any question arises
as to the application or interpretation of a standing order certified
under this Act, any employer or workman [or a trade union or F
other representative body of the workmen] may refer the question
to any one of the Labour Courts constituted under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, and specified for the disposal of such proceeding by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official
Gazette, and the Labour Court to which the question is so referred,
shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide G
the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the
parties."
The schedule to the Act specified the matters which have to be
provided for in the Standing Orders.
H
1126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 3 S.C.R .
. A
Rules have been made called 'Industrial Employm'ent Standing OrB
ders (Central) Rules, 1946'.
The Nature of the Standing Order and the meaning and scope of
Section 13-A:
With a view to clear the ground, we may deal with these two issues
debated before us at some length. The first one relates to the nature and
character of the certified Standing orders. We may indicate the relevance
of this discussion. Sri Jitender Sharma, learned counsel for respondentsworkmen submits that the certified Standing Orders have statutory force
C and their violation enables the Civil Court to decree reinstatement in
service and that bar of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act does not
operate in such a case. He relies upon the holding in Sukhdev Singh v.
Bhagat Ram, [1975] 3 S.C.R. 618. The appellant's counsel, however, dispute proposition. Bereft of authority, we find it difficult to agree with Shri
D Sharma. The certified Standing Orders are not in the nature of
delegated/subordinate legislation. It is true that the Act makes it obligatory
upon the employer of ail industrial establishment to which the Act applies
or is made applicable) to submit draft standing Orders providing for the
several matters prescribed in the Schedule to the Act and it also provides
the procedure inter alia, the certifying officer has to examine their fairness
E and reasonableness - for certification thereof. Yet it must be noted that
these are conditions of service framed by the employer - the employer may
be a private corporation, a firm or an individual and not necessarily a
statutory Corporation - which are approved/certified by the prescribed
statutory authority, after hearing the concerned workmen. The Act does
F not say that on such certification, the Standing Orders acquire statutory
effect or become part of the statute. It can certainly not be suggested that
by virtue of certification, they get metamorphosed into delegated/subordinate legislation. Though these Standing Orders are undoubtedly binding
upon both the employer and the employees and constitute the conditions
of service of the employees, it appears difficult to say, on principle, that
G they have statutory force. The decisions of this Court, however, read
differently though some dissonance is to be found among them. In Bagalkot
Cemellt Co. Ltd. v. R.K Pathan & Ors., [1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 697, the
question was whether the certifying officer had the power to add a condition prescribing the procedure for applying for leave and the authority
H competent to sanction it. The Court held that the office did possess such
.__ -
I
RAJASI11AN STATE RD. TPT. CORPN. v. KRISHNA KANT (B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.) 1127
a power. In that connection, Gazendragadhar, J. Speaking for the Bench, A
referred to the object and scheme of the enactment and observed :
"That is why the Legislature took the view that in regard to
industrial establishments to which the Act applied, the conditions
of employment subject to which industrial labour was employed,
precisely known to both tho parties. With that object, the Act has E
made relevant provisions for making Standing Orders which, after
they are certified, constitute the statutory tenns of employment
between the industrial establishments in question and their
employees. That is the principle object of the Act."
c
In Buckingham and Camatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah & Anr., [1964] 4
S.C.R. 265 the service of the respondent employee was terminated under
and as provided by the Standing Orders. The order of termination was
interferred with by the Labour Court, whose award was affirmed by the
Letter Patent Bench of the High Court. The appellant's contention was that
once it has acted in accordance with the Standing Orders, the Lab\)ur D
Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with it. In that connection,
Gajendragadker, J. speaking for the Bench, observed :
"The certified Standing orders represent .the relevant terms and
conditions of service in a statutory fonn and they are binding on E
the parties at/east as much, if not more, as private contracts embodying similar tenns and conditions of seTVice".
In The Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate & Ors. v. The Management,
[1964] 5 S.C.R. 548 the contention of the management was that Standing
Order S(a)(i), having been certified before insertion of the definition of F
"lay-off' by Section 2(kkk) in the Industrial Disputes Act, should be construed in the light of the said definition. While rejecting the said argument
Gajendragadkar, J. observed thus with respect to the nature of the Standing
Orders:
"It will be recalled that the Standing Orders which have been G
certified under the Standing Orders Act became parl of the statutory
tenns and conditions of service between the industrial employer and
his employees. Section 10(1) of the Standing Orders Act provides
that the Standing Orders finally certified under this Act shall not,
except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
1128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 3 S.C.R.
liable to modification until the expiry of six months from the date
on which the Standing orders or the last modification thereof came
into operation. If the Standing Orders thus become the part of the
statutory terms and conditions of seivice, they will govern the relations between the parties unless, of course, it can be shown that
any provision of the Act is inconsistent with the said Standing
Orders."
Jn Workmen and Buckingham & Camatic Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Camatic Mills, Madras, (1970) 1 L.L.J 26 Vaidialingam, J.,
speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges, stated :
"(T)he labour court has observed that the standing orders of the
company which have been certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, though binding on the employer
and the workers have no statutory force and, in consequence, they
are merely directive and not mandatory. It has further observed
that any non-compliance of the standing orders will not render an
enquiry bad, for that reason.
We may straightaway say that these observations of the labour
court are erroneous. The labour court has misunderstood the
decisions of this Court on this point. This Court has held that
standing orders. which have been certified under the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, become part of the
statutory terms and conditions of seivice between the industrial
employer and his employees and that they will govern the relations
between the parties - vide workers of Dewan Tea Estates & Ors. v.
Their Manager, (1964) 1 LU 358."
In D.K. Yadav v. !.MA. Industries Ltd., [1993] 3 S.C.C. 259 K.
Ramaswamy, J. has observed:
"It is settled law that certified standing orders have statutory force
which do not expressly exclude the application on the principles
of natural justice."
It is evident from a perusal of the above decisions that while the first
decision referred to the certified Standing Orders as constituting "the
H statutory terms of employment", they were described as "conditions of
'
~,
RAJASTHANSTATERD. TPT. CORPN. •.KRISHNA KANT(B.P.lEEVAN REDDY.J.( 1129
service in a statutory form" and as "binding on the parties at least as much, A
if not more, as private contracts embodying similar terms and conditions
of service" in the second decision. The third decision, reiterated the holding
in the first decision. So far as the two last mentioned decisions are concerned, it is obvious, they only purport to set out the purport of the earlier
decisions. Vaidialingam, J. used the very expression "part of the statutory B
terms and conditions of service", while K. Ramaswamy, J. stated more
emphatically that "certified standing orders have statutory force" It must,
however, be said that in the decision rendered by Ramaswamy, J., the
question as to the nature and character of the certified Standing Orders
did not arise for consideration; the said observation was made in another
context. The concensus of these decisions is: the certified Standing Orders C
constitute statutory terms and conditions of service. Though we have some
reservations as to the basis of the above dicta as pointed out supra, we
respectfully accept it both on the ground of stare' decisis as well as judicial
discipline. Even so, we are unable to say that they constitute 'statutory
provisions' within the meaning of the dicta in Sukhdev Singh where it was D
held: "(f)he employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and
they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions". Indeed, if it is
held that certified Standing Orders constitute statutory provisions or have
statutory force, a writ petition would also lie for their enforcement just as
in the case of violation of the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 E
of the Constitution. Neither a suit would be necessary nor a reference
under Industrial Disputes Act. We do not think the certified Standing
Orders can be elevated to that status. It is one thing to say that they are
statutorily imposed conditions of seivice and an altogether different thing to
say that they constitute statutory provisions themselves.
F
So far as the meaning and ambit of Section 13-A of the Standing
Orders Act is concerned, a good amount of debate took place before us.
Certain decisions of the High Courts have also been brought to our notice.
The Section provides that 'if any question arises as to the application or
interpretation of a Standing Order certified under this Act," any employer G
or workman or their union may refer the question to "the Labour Court
constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and specified for the
disposal of such proceedings by the appropriate Government by notification in the official gazette'. The determination of the Labour Court is made
final and binding on the parties. The contention of Shri Altaf Ahtμed, H
1130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 3 S.C.R.
A Learned Additional Solicitor General is that any and eve!y violation of
standing Order entitles the workman to approach the Labour Court directly under this provision and obtain relief. He submits that the Labour Court
is empowered under this provision to adjudicate disputes between
workmen and employer arising from the certified Standing Orders and
grant such relief as is appropriate in the circumstances of case. We are
B afraid, we cannot give effect to this submission. Acceptance of the said
subm;ssion would mean that Section 13-A creates a parallel forum for
adjudication of the very questions which the Labour Court or the Industrial
Tribunal has been' empowered to adjudicate under the Industrial Disputes
Act and that too without the requirement of a reference by the GovernC
ment. While we agree that language of Section 13-A is not very dear, it
cannot certainly be understood as creating a forum for adjudication of
industrial disputes involving the application and/or interpretation of the
Standing Orders. That is the function of the Courts and Tribunals constituted under the Industrial disputes Act. The limited purpose of Section
D 13-A is to provide a forum for determination of any question aJising "as to
the application or interpretation" of the certified Standing Orders as such,
in case either the employer or the employee(s) entertain a doubt as to their
meaning or their applicability. Probably it was thought that a decision of
the appointed forum on the said question would itself facilitate the resolution of an industrial dispute, whether existing or apprehended. So far as
E
the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or other adjudicatory bodies under
the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned, it is agreed on hands - and we
endorse it - that where a dispute is referred to any of them they are
undoubtedly competent to go into and decide questions as to the application or interpretation of the certified Standing orders insofar as they are
F necessary for a proper adjudication of the question or dispute referred.
The scope of "Industrial Dispute" :
The expression "Industrial Dispute" is defined in Section 2(k) to
mean any dispute or difference (i) between employers and employers; (ii)
G between employers and workmen; and (iii) between workmen and
workmen, provided such dispute is connected with the employment, nonemployment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person.
It is well settled by several decisions of this court that a dispute between
the employer and an individual workmen does not constitute an industrial
H dispute unless the cause of the workman is espoused by a body of workmen
,~
~1
\
RAJASTIIAN STATE RD. Tl'f. CORPN. , .. KRISHNA KANT [B.P. JEEVAN REDDY,J.] 1131
(See Bombay Union of Jownalist v. "1he Hindu", (1961) 2 LLI 436 SC). Of A
course, where the dispute concerns the body of the workers as a whole or
to a section thereof, it is an industrial dispute. It is precisely for this reason
that Section 2-A was inserted by Amendment Act 35 of 1965. It says,
"where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the service of an individual workman, any dispute or difference B
between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out· of,
such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to
be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any
union of workmen is a party to the dispute". By virtue ofthis provision, the
scope of the concept of industrial dispute has been widened, which now
embraces not only Section 2(k) but also Section 2-A. Section 2-A, however, C
covers only cases of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination
otherwise of services of an individual workman and not other matters,
which means that - to give an example - if a workman is reduced in rank
pursuant to a domestic enquiry, the dispute raised by him does not become
an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2-A. (However, if the D
union or body of workmen espouses his cause, it does become an industrial
dispute.) We have given only one instance; there may be many disputes
which would not fall within Section 2(k) or Section 2-A. It is obvious that
in all such cases, these remedy is only in a Civil Court or by way of
arbitration according to law, if the parties so choose. The machinery
provided dispute (in short, Section 10 or 12) does not apply to such a E
dispute.
Secondly, where a right or obligation is created by the Industrial
Disputes Act, it is agreed by all sides that disputes relating to sllch right
or obligation can only be adjudicated by the forums created by the Act.
This is principle No.3 in Premier Automobile ..
The core question :
F
. We may now indicate the area of dispute. It is this : where a dispute
between the employer and the employee does not involve the recognition G
or enforcement of a right or obligation created by the Industrial Disputes
Act and where such dispute. also amounts to an industrial dispute within
the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, whether the Civil Court' Jurisdiction to entertain a suit with respect to such dispute is barred? To put it
nearer to the facts of these appeals, the question can be posed thus : Where H
1132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1995] 3 S.C.R.
A the dispute between the employer and the workman iovolves the recognition, application or enforcement of certified Standing Orders, is the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit with respect to such dispute
is barred? This question involves the perennial problem concerniog the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court vis-a-vis Special Tribunals, a subject upon
B which the decisions of this Court, let alone other courts is legion. We do
not, however, propose to burden this judgment with all of them. We shall
refer only to those which have dealt with the question io the context of
Industrial Disputes Act. By way of introduction though, We may refer to
the summary of principles enunciated in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., [1968J
3 SCR 662=AIR (1969) SC 78. They are the followiog:
c
D
E
F
G
"(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special
tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded
if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would
normally do io a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude
those ·cases where-the provisions of the particular Act have not
been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental priociples of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court,
an examioation or the scheme of the particular Act to find the
adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be
relevant but is not decisive to sustaio the jurisdiction of the civil
COilrl.
Where there is no express exclusion the examioation of the
remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the
iotendment becomes necessary and the result of the ioquiry may
be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute
creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determioation of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions
about the said right and liability shall be determioed by the
tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated
with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or
not.
(3) Challenge to the provision of the particular Act as ultra vires
cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act.
H
Even the High Court cannot go into the question on a revision or
.,
1
RAJASIHAN SfATE RD. TPT. CORPN. '· KRISllNA KANT fB.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J.) 1133
.
reference from the decision of the Tribunals.
A
.
.., '
( 4) When provision is already declared unconstitutional or the
constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open.
A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim
is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it
B
is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
( 5) Where the particulars Act contains no machinery for refund
of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally col-
,.__,..(,
lected a suit lies .
•
( 6) Q •estions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its c
constitutionality are for the decision of the authority and a civil
suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be
final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In
either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined
because it is a relevant enquiry.
D
f.
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily
to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply."
Dhula~hai, it must be remembered, concerned a dispute arising
under a sales tax enactment. Most of the decisions referred to therein E
concerned taxing enactments. Having regard to the facts of the case,
therefor, it would fall under Principle No. 2 enunciated therein.
Premier Automobiles was decided by a Bench comprising A. Alagiriswarni, P.K. Goswami and N. L. Untwalis, JJ. The Court found that the F
Dispute concerned therein involved adjudication of rights/obligations
created by the Industrial Disputes. Act which means that it fell under
Principle No. 2 in Dhulabhai. Even so, the Court considered several
decisions, English and Indian, on the subject and enunciated the following
principles in Paras 23 and 24. :
"23.