# RAJENDRA KUMARI BAJPAI v. RAM ADHAR YADAV & OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1976] 1 S.C.R. 255
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-08-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1975
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, K. K. Mathew, V. R. Krishna Iyer, Nd S. M. Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rajendra-kumari-bajpai-v-ram-adhar-yadav-others-6494
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

' Representation of the People Act, (43 of 1951), s. 87-Applicability of 0.
XI. C.P.C. to trial of election petitions .
An application for delivery of interrogatories is One of the logical steps in
aid of the prosecution of an election petition and is fully covered by s. 87 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951.
( 1) Order XI, C.P.C., forms Part of the trial of suits and is not a special pro~
cedure. Order X relates to the procedure for examination of parties by the Court
and 0. XI, is a part of it, because, it provides for exam!nation through interroga·
turies, when personal appearance is not possible.
[262A~B]
(2) Before Act 47 of 1966 ame.nded the Representation of the r'eople Act,
1951, the power to try election petitions was conferred on the Election Tribunal .
"fhat Tribunal was not a Civil Court but was deemed to be a Civil Court, Though
s. 90, as it then stood, provided that every election petition shall be tried, as
nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure under tlle C.P.C., in order
to avoid doubts, the special powers under 0. XI, C.P.C., were conferred on the
Tribunal by s. 92. When Parliament has expressly conferred the powers conta'..ned in 0. XI on the Tribunal, it could not be contended that the principles
contained therein are excluded from the trial of election petitions, on the basis
of English Law.
f257F-Hl
(3) After the amendment of 1966, as election petitions are to be tried by the
High Court, a Court of Record, s. 87, which is based on the repealed s. 90, is sJJffi~
cient to conta:.O the entire procedure to be adopted by the High Court in trying
election petitions.
Section 87 is of widest amplitude so as to cover the entire
procedure mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure with only two exceptions,
(a) when the Act contains express provis!.on for certain matters which are in~
consistent with the procedure prescribed by the Code; and (b) when a particula.r
provision ·of the Code is either expressly or by necessary intendment excluded
by the Act. That is why a provision like the repealed s. 92 is unnecessary; and it
cannot be contended that sIDce Par1iament repealed that section, Parliament intended that the provisions of 0. XI, C.P.C., should not apply to election petitions
tried by the Hil:h Court, f258A-E: 269C-Dl
Sitaranz Hirachand Bir/a v. Yograisiligh Shankarsingh Parihar and others,
AIR 1953 Born. 293, Durvodhan v. Sitaram and others AIR 1970 All. l; Jugal
Kishore v. Dr, BaJdev Prakash AIR 1968 Punj, 152 (F.B.) and Keshari Lal Kavi
and another v. Narain Prqkash and others, AIR 1969 Raj. 75, referred to.
Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh and others A.l.R. 1966 S.C. 773, and
V. K. Sakleha v. Jagjiwan [1972] I S.C.C. 826, followed.
(4) Merely because in lnnmati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayya·
ppa and others [1959] S.C.R. 61 J it was held that the procedure contained in
0. 23, r. 1, C.P.C. does not apply to election petit!.ons it could not be contended
that 0. XI, C.P.C., would not also be applicable to election petitions. Order 23
r. 1 cannot be equated with the provisions of 0. XI. Having regard to the natur~
of an election petition which is a matter of moment and concern to the entire
constituency the notion of abandonment of the claim or withdrawal is absolutely
foreign to the scope of such proceeding<; and must, therefore, be held to be ex~
duded by the necessary intendment of s. 87 itself. [260H-261 B, D-EJ
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.

## Text

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RAJENDRA KUMAR! BAJPAI
v.
RAM ADHAR YADAV & OTHERS
August 6, 1975
255
[A. N. RAY, C.J., K. K. MATHEW, V. R. KRISHNA IYER ;,ND
S. M. FAZAL ALI, JJ.]
' Representation of the People Act, (43 of 1951), s. 87-Applicability of 0.
XI. C.P.C. to trial of election petitions .
An application for delivery of interrogatories is One of the logical steps in
aid of the prosecution of an election petition and is fully covered by s. 87 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951.
( 1) Order XI, C.P.C., forms Part of the trial of suits and is not a special pro~
cedure. Order X relates to the procedure for examination of parties by the Court
and 0. XI, is a part of it, because, it provides for exam!nation through interroga·
turies, when personal appearance is not possible.
[262A~B]
(2) Before Act 47 of 1966 ame.nded the Representation of the r'eople Act,
1951, the power to try election petitions was conferred on the Election Tribunal .
"fhat Tribunal was not a Civil Court but was deemed to be a Civil Court, Though
s. 90, as it then stood, provided that every election petition shall be tried, as
nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure under tlle C.P.C., in order
to avoid doubts, the special powers under 0. XI, C.P.C., were conferred on the
Tribunal by s. 92. When Parliament has expressly conferred the powers conta'..ned in 0. XI on the Tribunal, it could not be contended that the principles
contained therein are excluded from the trial of election petitions, on the basis
of English Law.
f257F-Hl
(3) After the amendment of 1966, as election petitions are to be tried by the
High Court, a Court of Record, s. 87, which is based on the repealed s. 90, is sJJffi~
cient to conta:.O the entire procedure to be adopted by the High Court in trying
election petitions.
Section 87 is of widest amplitude so as to cover the entire
procedure mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure with only two exceptions,
(a) when the Act contains express provis!.on for certain matters which are in~
consistent with the procedure prescribed by the Code; and (b) when a particula.r
provision ·of the Code is either expressly or by necessary intendment excluded
by the Act. That is why a provision like the repealed s. 92 is unnecessary; and it
cannot be contended that sIDce Par1iament repealed that section, Parliament intended that the provisions of 0. XI, C.P.C., should not apply to election petitions
tried by the Hil:h Court, f258A-E: 269C-Dl
Sitaranz Hirachand Bir/a v. Yograisiligh Shankarsingh Parihar and others,
AIR 1953 Born. 293, Durvodhan v. Sitaram and others AIR 1970 All. l; Jugal
Kishore v. Dr, BaJdev Prakash AIR 1968 Punj, 152 (F.B.) and Keshari Lal Kavi
and another v. Narain Prqkash and others, AIR 1969 Raj. 75, referred to.
Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh and others A.l.R. 1966 S.C. 773, and
V. K. Sakleha v. Jagjiwan [1972] I S.C.C. 826, followed.
(4) Merely because in lnnmati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basavaraj Ayya·
ppa and others [1959] S.C.R. 61 J it was held that the procedure contained in
0. 23, r. 1, C.P.C. does not apply to election petit!.ons it could not be contended
that 0. XI, C.P.C., would not also be applicable to election petitions. Order 23
r. 1 cannot be equated with the provisions of 0. XI. Having regard to the natur~
of an election petition which is a matter of moment and concern to the entire
constituency the notion of abandonment of the claim or withdrawal is absolutely
foreign to the scope of such proceeding<; and must, therefore, be held to be ex~
duded by the necessary intendment of s. 87 itself. [260H-261 B, D-EJ
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 104 of 1975.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and o~der da~ the
12th December, 1974 of the Allahabad High Court m Apphcat10n
Paper No. A-53 in Election Petition No. 30 of 1974.
Yogeshwar Prasad and Rani Arora, for the appellant.
K. C. Agarwala and K. M. L. Srivastava, for respondent no. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
fAZAL ALI, J.-This appeal by special '.eave involves an. imcr~
pretation of the scope and ambit of s. 87 ot the }\eprescntation .of
the People Act, 1951, as .ami;nd'1 by. Act 47 o.f 1966. The short
point that fails for deterrrunat10n m this appeal ~s as to whether or
not the provisioni; of 0. XI of the Code of Civil Procedure can be
· applied to the trial of election petitions in the High Court by force
of s. 87 of the said Act. For the purpose of brnV1ty, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 shall be referred to as 'the Act of 1951'.
and the Representation of the People Act as amended by Act 47 o!
1966 as 'the Act'. The circumstances under which this appeal arises
may be succinctly stated as follows.
An election for the U.P. Legislative Assembly for 275 Allahabad
North Assembly Constituency was held on February 26, 1974.
Irr
this election the appellant was a candidate pnt up by the Congress
Ruling party and his election was contested by the first respondent
Ram Adhar Yadav who was set up by the Sa.mukta Socialist party.
The appellant was declared duly elected in the said election and the
respondent No. 1 was defeated.
The respondent No. 1 filed an election petition being Election
Petition No. 30 of 1974 in the High Court of Allahabad some time
in April 197 4 challenging the election of the appellant on various
grounds.
The appellant filed a detailed written statement denying
all the allegations made by the first respondent in his petition. The
election pe~tion was assigned to J. M. L. Sinha, J., who framed a
nurnbel" of issues on October 4, 1974. In October 1974 respondent
No. 1 filed an application being Paper No. A /53 under 0. XI, r. J
of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of leave to respondent No. 1
to deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the appellant and filed certain interrogatories along with his application. The
apP".!lant filed her objections
being Paper No.
A/54 to the saic
application. conte':1'1ing, inter. alia, that the p~ocedure prescribed under
O.XI relatmg to mterrogatones was not apphcable to the trial of elec·
tion. petitions in t~e High Court and was not covered by s. 87 of the
Act. The application filed by the first respondent and the objections
of the appellant came up for consideration before the leamed Single
J~gc who by his order d~ted December 12, 1974, held that the prov1~1ons of O.XI. fu!lY apohed to the election petitions and accordingly
reie~ted the ob1ect10ns filed by the appellant. Hence this appeal by
special leave.
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RAJENDRA KUMAR! v. RAM ADHAR (Fazal Ali, ]. )
25 7
It appears that under the Act of 1951 the power to try election
petitions was conferred on the Tribunal and s. 92 of that Act expressly conferred powers under 0 .XI of the Code of Civil Procedure
on the Tribunal. The relevant portions of s. 92 of the Act of 1951
may be extracted thus :
"The Tribunal shall have the powers which are vested
in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act
V of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following
..
matters :
~·
(a) discovery and inspection;
(g)
x
x
x
x
x
issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses,
and may summon and examine s110 nwtu any person
whose evidence appears to it to be material; and
shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898)."
, ..
By the Amendment Act 4 7 of 1966 this section was, however, deleted
mad s. 90 of the Act of 1951 was replaced by s. 87 of the Act which
was the same as s. 90 of the Act of 1951.
Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted two points before us. In the first place he contended that
the provisions regarding inspection and discovery and interrogatories
as contained in O.XI of the Code of Civil Procedure are not an· integral part of the procedure in a civil suit but are special powers contained in the Code and cannot, therefore, be made applicable to election petitions which are proceedings of a special nature.
In amplification of this argument it was argued that the history of the English
Law as also the Eiection Law of our country before independence
would show that the procedure contained in O.XI of the Code of
Civil Procedure was not made applicable to the trial of election petitions.
It is, however, not necessary for us to examine the history of this
matter because the Act of 1951 settles the issue.
When the Parliament expressly conferred powers contained in O.XI on the Tribunal
under the statutory provision of s. 92 of the Act of 1951, it must
be presumed to have made a drastic departure from the old Jaw on
the subject and particularly the English Law.
In view of this enactment, therefore, it cannot be said that the provisions of our Election Law, particularly in regard to s. 92 of The Act of 1951
were in
pari materia with the provisions of the English Law on the sub""'1.
In fact s. 92 incorporating the entire provisions of 0.XI of the Code
of Civil Procedure was expressly enacted so that the elected representatives also mav be subiected to the same law of the land such as
the Code of Civil· Procedure as any other citizen. In these circumstances, we are unable to apply the English Law to the Act in order
to hold that the principles contained in 0. XI of the Code of Civil
Procedure are excluded from the trial of election oetitions. The first
contention put forward by counsel for the appellant must, therefore,
fail.
258
SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORT
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
It was then contended that even though express powers for ins- · A
pection and discovery were conferred on the Tribunal under s. 92 of
the Act of 19 51, yet by virtue of the amendment under Act 4 7 of
1966 this express provision was deliberately deleted, which shows
that the Parliament intended to give special protection to the elected
representatives so as not to compel them to answer interrogatories.
This is no doubt an attractive argument, but on closer scrutiny it does
not appear to be tenable.
The argument completely overlooks the
object of the Amendment Act 47 of 1966. By virtue of this enactment a basic change in the trial of election petitions was sought to
be introduced. Before 1966 the power to try election petitions was
conferred on the Tribunal which was not a civil court and, therefore,
special powers had to be conferred on it.
In fact clause (g) of s.
92 ot the Act of 1951 extracted above clearly shows that the Tribunal
was deemed to be a civil court hence there was the necessity of conferring special powers contained in O.XI of 'he Code of Civil Proeedure on the Tribunal to avoid further doubts. After the amendment
of 1966 as the election petitions were to be tried by 'he High Court,
s. 87 of the Act which is based on s. 90 of the Act of 1951 was con-.
sidered sufficient to contain the en'ire procedure to be adopted by
the High Court in trying the election petitions which were to be in
accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure as far as applicable. Since
the High Court is a court of record and a civil court is not, it was not
at all necessary for the Parliament to have enacted a separate section like
s. 92 of the Act of 1951 and that is whys. 92 was considered to
b~
unnecessary rn view of the change of forum and was deleted under the
amended Act.
From this it cannot be contended that the Parliament
intended that the provisions of 0. XI of the Code of Civil Procedure
should not apply to the election petitions tried by the High Court under the Act.
Counsel for the 'appellant was unable to cite any authority
directly ra point.
On the other hand, the view which we have taken in
this case, is amply supported by number of authorities of this Court
as well as other High Courts.
To begin with, this Court as far back as 1951, while considering
ss. 90 and 92 of the Act of 1951 observed in Harish Chandra Bajpai v.
Tri/oki Singh( 1) thus:
"The second contention urged on behoalf of the appellants
is that if the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are held
to be applicable in their entirety to the trial of election petitions, theia there was no need to provide under s. 92 that the
Tribunal was to have the powers of courts under the Code of
Civil Procedure in respect of the matters mentioned therein. as
those powers would pass to it under s,. 90(2). But this argument overlooks that the scope of s. 90(2) is in a material
particular different from that of s. 92.
While under s. 90(2)
the provisions of the Civil Proeednre Code are applicable
only subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made
thereunder, there is no such limitation as regards the powers
cd,1ferred by s. 92. It was -obviously the intention of the
legislature to put the powers of the Tribunal in respect of
(I) [1957] ~. C. R. 370.
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RA.TENDRA KlfM1iRI v. RAM .AbHAR ('Fazal Ali, J.)
259
the matter's mentioned in s. 92 as distinguished from the other
provisions of the Code on a higher pedestal, and as observed
;
in Sitaram v. Yograjsingh (A.l.R. (1953) Born. 293), they
are the irreducible minimum which the Tribunal is to possess.
(3) It is then argued that s. 92 confers powers on the
Tribunal in respect of certain matters, while s. 90(2) applies
the Civil Procedure Code i,1 respect of matters relating to
procedure, that there is a distinction between power
and
procedure, and that the granting of amendment being a power
and not a matter of procedure, it can be claimed only under
s. 92 and not under s. 90(2).
We do not see a'ny antithesis between 'procedure' in s. 90(2) and 'powers' under
s. 92.
When the respondent applied to the Tribunal for
amendment, he topk a procedural step, and that, he was clearly
entitled to do under s. 90(2).
The question of power
arises only with refere1,1ce to the order to be passed on the
petition by the Tribunal. Is it to be held that the presentation
of a petition is competent, but the passing of any order
thereon is not ? We are of opinion that there is no substance
in this contention either."
The Court porated out that the object of s. 92 was merely to secure
powers of the Court in respect of the matters mentioned therein ·and
that there was no antithesis between ss. 90(2) and s. 92 of the Act of
1951.
Similarly in Sitaram Hirachand Bir/a v. Yograjsingh Shankarsing
Parihar and others,(1) Chagla, C.J., clearly pointed out that the distinction between the power and procedure was completely artificial 'a'.o.d
a distinction without any difference.
The learned Chief Justice speaking for the Court observed as follows :
"In ·our opinion, Mr. Kotwal is right, because on principle it is difficult to make a distinction between procedure
and the powers of a Court as suggested by Mr. Patwardhan.
The whole of the Civil Procedure Code, oas its very 1rnme implies, deals with procedure.
In the course of procedure the
Court always exercises powers and when the Court is exercising its powers, it is exercising them in order to carry out the
procedure laid down in the Code.
Therefore procedure and
powers in this sense are really interchangeable terms and it
is difficult to draw a line between procedure and powers. The
powers cdaferred under s. 92 is not any subsf'antive power,
it is a procedural power, a power intended for the purposes
of carrying out the procedure before the Tribunal."
In a recent decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court
in Duryodhmt v. Sitaram and others(') the Court held that the matters
mentioned in s. 92 appertain to the procedure for trial, and oare also
attracted by virtue of s. 90(1). The Court observed as follows :
(1) A. I. R. 1963 Born. 293.
(2) ZA. I. R. 1970- AIL I.
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19761 1 e.c.a.
"In my opinidn, the matters mentioned in Section 92
. appertain to the procedure for trial, and are also attracted
by virtue of Section 90( 1). They wero separately stated in
Section 92 to make them operate in spite of any provision to
the contrary in the Act or the Rules, and not with a view to
curtail the amplitude of Sec. 90(1). The provisions of 0.9,
Rr. 8 and 9, Civil P.C. even if they deal with powers, would
be procedural powers and be attracted by virtue of Section
90(1) ."
While dealit.1g with the scope and ambit of s.90 of the Act of 1951
this Court in Dr. lagjit Singh v. Giani Kartar Singh and others(1)
observed as follows :
"The true legal position in this matter is no longer in
doubt.
Section
92
of
the
Act
which
defines
the
powers of the Tribunal, in terms, confers on it, by Cl. (a),
the powers which are vested in a Court under the Code of
Civil Procedure when trylug a suit, inur alia, in respect of
discovery and inspection."
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A full in Bench of the Punjab High Court in Jugal Kislwre v. Dr. Baldev.
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PrakasJi,(') while construing the provisions of s. 87 of the Act clearly
pointed out that the High Court was a Court of record ruid possessed
all inherent powers of a Court while trying election petitions. In this
colinection, Grover, J ., observed as follows :
"It is quite clear that there is no distinct provision in the
Act laying down any particular or special procedure which is
to be followed when the petitioner cboolles to commit default either in appearance or in production of evidence or
generally in prosecuting the petition. The provisidns of the
Code of Civil Procedure would, therefore, be applicable under
Section 87 of the Act.
I am further of the opinion ihat any
argunlent which could be pressed and adopted for saying
that the inherent powers of the Court could not be exercised
in such circumstances would be of no avail now as the High
Court is a Court of record a!nd possesses all inherent powers
of a Court while trying election petitions."
We fuly approve of the line of reasoning adopted by the High Court
in that case.
The Rajastban High Court in Keshari Lal Kavi and
another v. Narain Prakash and others(•)
followed the Punjab case
and has taken the same view.
Some reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant
on the decision in lnamati Mallappa
Basappa v. Desai
Basavarai
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· Ayyappa and others, (4)
where this Court held that the procedure
contained in 0. 23, r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply
to .election petitions and, therefore, on a parity of reasoning 0. 11
C.P.C. also could not be applicable to the trial of electiCJlll petitions.
H
(I) A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 773.
(J) A. r. R. 1969 Raj. 75.
(2) A. I. R.1968 Punj.152 (F. B.).
(4) [1959] S. C. R. 611.
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RAJENDRA KUMAR! v. Ri\M ADHAR (Fazal Ali, !.)
261
We are, however, unable to agree with this argument.
The provision
contained in O. 23 r. 1 cannot be e<:juated with the provisions of 0. XI
because the election petition being a matter of moment and concerning the entire cdnstituency there could be no question of the election
petition being withdrawn by the petitioner who had filed the same.
This was highlighted by this Court in that case when the Court observed
as follows :
"Orde,r 23, r.1, sub-rule (2), provides for liberty bei%1
given by the Court to a party withdrawing or abandoninJ!
a part of his claim to file a fresh suit on the same cause of
aciion, if so advised. in the very nature of things such liberty
could '"°t be reserved to a petitioner in an election petition.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
On a due consideration of all .these provisionS, we arc of
opinion that the provisions of 0. 23, r, 1, do not apply to the'
election petitions and it would not be open to a petitioner to
withdraw or abandon a part of his claim once· an election
petition was presented to the Election Commission."
Having regard to the nature of the election petition, the notion of
abandonment of the claim or withdrawal is absolutely foreign tO the
scope of such proceedings and must, therefore, be held to be excluded
by necessary intendment of s. 87 of the Act itself.
This authority;
therefore, does not appear to be of any assistance to counsel fo{ the.
appellant.
·
The matter, however, seems to be concluded by a recent decision
of this Court in Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. lagjiwan and others(!)
where the Chief Justice speaking for the Court interpreted s. 87 of
the Act and observed as follows :
.
"Under Section 87 of the Act every election petition shall
be tried by the High Court as noarly as may be in accordance
with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits.
Under Section 102 of the Code the
High Court may make rules regulating their own procedure
and the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their supervision and may by such rules vary, alter or add to any of the
rules in the First Schedule to the Code."
The relevant part of s. 87 runs thus :
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any
rules made thereunder, every electio.1 petition shall be tried
by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with
the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure,
19()8 to the trial of suits:"
A bare perusal of this section leads to the irresistible conclusion that
election petitions shall have to be tried in accordance with the proce-
(I) [1972] I S. C. C. 826.
262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C;R,
dure applicable under the code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits.
In other words, election petitions would be tried like ordinary civil suits .
. We are unable to agree with counsel for the appellant that 0. XI
does 1,1ot form part of the trial of suits but is a special procedure.
This
is repelled by a reference to 0. XI of the Code of Civil Procedure itA
self.
It will appear that 0. X relates to the procedure for examinaB
tion of parties by the Court and 0. XI is a part of that procedure, because it provides that where witnesses are not able to appear before
the Court personally they are examined through interrogatories.
In
these circumstances, therefore, 0. XI is as much a part of the procedure
as 0. X relating to trial of suits in mutters regarding summoning of
witnesses, documents etc.
In these circumstances it cannot be said
that s. 87 of the Act either expressly or impliedly excludes the applic
cation of O. XI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In fact we are clearly
of opinion that s. 87 of the Act is of the widest amplitude so as to
cover the entire procedure mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure
with only two exceptions-(i) where the Act contains express provision
for certain matters which are inconsistent with the procedure prescribed
by the Code; and (ii) where a particular provision of the Code of
Civil Procedure is either expressly or by necessary intendment excluded
D
by the Act. Subject to these two exceptions, s. 87 is very wide in its
connotation.
I
We, therefore, agree with the learned Single Judge who was trying
the election petition that the application for interrogatories was one
of the logical steps in aid of the prosecution of the petiti0',1 and was
fully covered by s. 87 of the Act.
The second contention raised by
E
counsel for the appellant thns fails.
For the reasons given above, there is no merit in this appeal whicl:.
fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed.