# RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. MANJULBEN JAY ANTILAL NAKUM AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1997] 1 S.C.R. 304
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1997-01-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1997
- **Bench:** K. Ramaswamy, G.B. Paitanaik
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/rajkot-municipal-corporation-v-manjulben-jay-antilal-nakum-and-ors-15209
- **Pages:** 61

## Headnote

Torts:
Negligence-Breach of duty-Carelessljr-By Public AuthorityC Damages fo~iability-Arising of-Factors to be considered-Deceased
while walking on footpath of a public road was struck by a roadside tree,
which suddenly fell on him in still weather condition resulting in his
death-Suit ftled by deceased's wife and children claiming damages from
Municipal Corporation on ground of negligence in not properly maintaining
roadside trees-Held: Proximity of relationship between person who suffered
D damages and the wrong doer, foreseeability of danger and duty of care owed
by public authority must be established--Burden of proof on plaintiff-Plain·
tiff could not succeed by merely establishing occwrence of accident due to
negligence i.e. ~efendant's failure to take reasonable care as ordinal)' prudent
matt-Foreseeability of damage or danger to person or property must be
E
~a-related to public duty of care-Duty of care should be to avoid causing of
present or imminent danger created by positive act of public authority-Harm
complained of must be of the kind contemplated by statute-Action for
damages would not lie if statute did not intend to guard the kind of damage
suffered or if some other remedy was available or provided by statute-in the
circumstances of the case, Corporation not liable for damages-Proximity of
F relationship and foreseeability of danger not fountl-Corporation could not
be expected to have a duty to maintain constant supervision by testing the
healthy condition of the tree.~Special circumstances to be taken into account
stated-Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949.
G
Negligence-StatutOTy Corporation or public authority-Municipal Corporation-Principle of law of negligence-Applicability of-Held: Situations
different when act was one of commission and one of omission-Act would
110t be negligent, if it was done in good faith in the exercise of, and within the
limits of, the discretion.
H
Negligence-Before the repository of statutory power could be made
304
RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. MANJULBEN JAY ANTILAL
305
·· ~ ...,
liable for negligence for a failure to exercise it, the statute must impose a A
statutory duty and confer a private right of action in damages for breach
thereof-But common law duty must not be superimposed through process of
statutory interpretation-Duty of care when arose, discusse~ereseeability
as test-Imminent danger theory-The duty of care should not'impose an
intolerable burden on the public authority and prevent it from peifomting its B
,...
nonnal duties.
,.
~
Negligence--Misfeasance and non-feasance-Distinction be!ween-Explained.
Damages-Tortious liability-Held: In absence of statutory law in this c
regard, common law principles evolved in Engla11d might be applied in India
to the extent of suitability and applicability to Indian conditions.
Statutory Corporation~unicipal Corporation-Held; could be held
liable and be sued for wrongs involving fraud, malice as well as for wrong in
which intention was immaterial.
D
· "r
Tort and contract-Distinction betweert-Explained.
Interpretation of Statutes:
Legislative intent-Detennination oj-:£xplained.
E
Wordf and Phrases: "Misfeasance and non-feasance'~ "Negligence" and
"duty''-Meaning oHn tlte context of Law of Torts.
Legal Maxims : "volenti non fit injuria" and "novus actus interveniens'
-Applicability of
F
The deceased was· walking on footpath of a public r oad on the way
to his office, when a roadside tree, which was in a still cundition, had
suddenly fallen on him, as a result of which he sustained injuries on his
head and other parts of the body and later died in the hospital. The G
respondents, being the deceased's widow. and children, ftl ed a suit for
damages in a sum of Rs.llakh from the appellant-Corporation. The trial
--":" .....
Court decreed the suit for a sum of Rs.45,000 finding that the appellant
had failed in its statutory duty to check the healthy condition of trees and
to protect the deceased from the tree falling on him re

## Text

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A
RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
v.
MANJULBEN JAY ANTILAL NAKUM AND ORS.
JANUARY 17, 1997
B
[K. RAMASWAMY.AND G.B. PAITANAIK, JJ.)
Torts:
Negligence-Breach of duty-Carelessljr-By Public AuthorityC Damages fo~iability-Arising of-Factors to be considered-Deceased
while walking on footpath of a public road was struck by a roadside tree,
which suddenly fell on him in still weather condition resulting in his
death-Suit ftled by deceased's wife and children claiming damages from
Municipal Corporation on ground of negligence in not properly maintaining
roadside trees-Held: Proximity of relationship between person who suffered
D damages and the wrong doer, foreseeability of danger and duty of care owed
by public authority must be established--Burden of proof on plaintiff-Plain·
tiff could not succeed by merely establishing occwrence of accident due to
negligence i.e. ~efendant's failure to take reasonable care as ordinal)' prudent
matt-Foreseeability of damage or danger to person or property must be
E
~a-related to public duty of care-Duty of care should be to avoid causing of
present or imminent danger created by positive act of public authority-Harm
complained of must be of the kind contemplated by statute-Action for
damages would not lie if statute did not intend to guard the kind of damage
suffered or if some other remedy was available or provided by statute-in the
circumstances of the case, Corporation not liable for damages-Proximity of
F relationship and foreseeability of danger not fountl-Corporation could not
be expected to have a duty to maintain constant supervision by testing the
healthy condition of the tree.~Special circumstances to be taken into account
stated-Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949.
G
Negligence-StatutOTy Corporation or public authority-Municipal Corporation-Principle of law of negligence-Applicability of-Held: Situations
different when act was one of commission and one of omission-Act would
110t be negligent, if it was done in good faith in the exercise of, and within the
limits of, the discretion.
H
Negligence-Before the repository of statutory power could be made
304
RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. MANJULBEN JAY ANTILAL
305
·· ~ ...,
liable for negligence for a failure to exercise it, the statute must impose a A
statutory duty and confer a private right of action in damages for breach
thereof-But common law duty must not be superimposed through process of
statutory interpretation-Duty of care when arose, discusse~ereseeability
as test-Imminent danger theory-The duty of care should not'impose an
intolerable burden on the public authority and prevent it from peifomting its B
,...
nonnal duties.
,.
~
Negligence--Misfeasance and non-feasance-Distinction be!ween-Explained.
Damages-Tortious liability-Held: In absence of statutory law in this c
regard, common law principles evolved in Engla11d might be applied in India
to the extent of suitability and applicability to Indian conditions.
Statutory Corporation~unicipal Corporation-Held; could be held
liable and be sued for wrongs involving fraud, malice as well as for wrong in
which intention was immaterial.
D
· "r
Tort and contract-Distinction betweert-Explained.
Interpretation of Statutes:
Legislative intent-Detennination oj-:£xplained.
E
Wordf and Phrases: "Misfeasance and non-feasance'~ "Negligence" and
"duty''-Meaning oHn tlte context of Law of Torts.
Legal Maxims : "volenti non fit injuria" and "novus actus interveniens'
-Applicability of
F
The deceased was· walking on footpath of a public r oad on the way
to his office, when a roadside tree, which was in a still cundition, had
suddenly fallen on him, as a result of which he sustained injuries on his
head and other parts of the body and later died in the hospital. The G
respondents, being the deceased's widow. and children, ftl ed a suit for
damages in a sum of Rs.llakh from the appellant-Corporation. The trial
--":" .....
Court decreed the suit for a sum of Rs.45,000 finding that the appellant
had failed in its statutory duty to check the healthy condition of trees and
to protect the deceased from the tree falling on him resulting in his death:
On appeal, the Division Bench had held that the appellant had statutory H
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1997] 1 S.C.R.
A duty to plant trees on the roadsides as also the corresponding duty to
maintain the trees in proper condition. The statutory duty gave rise to
tortious liability on the State and as its agent, the appellant-Corporation
.being a statutory authority was guilty of negligence on its part in not taking
care to protect the life of the deceased. The respondents 'could not be called ,
B upon to prove that the tree had fallen due to the appellant's negligence.
Statutory obligation to maintain trees being absolute, and since the tree
had fallen due to its decay, the appellant had failed to prove that the
occurrence had taken place without negligence on its part. The appellant
failed to make periodical inspection whether the trees were in good and
healthy condition subjecting them to seasonal and periodical treatment
C and examination. Therefore, the appellant had not taken care to foresee
the risk of the tree's faJiing and causing damage to the passers-by. Thus
the appellant was liable to pay damages for the death of tbe deceased. The
Divisi~n Bench accordingly confirmed the decree of the trial Court. Hence
this appeal.
D
Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. Negligence is failure to use such care as a reasonable,
prudent and careful person would use, under similar circumstances. It is
E
the doing of-some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have
done under similar circumstances or failure to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances. Negligence
also is an omission to do something which a reasonable man; guided by
those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something, which a reasonable and prudent man
F would not do. Negligence would include both acts and omissions involving
unreasonable risk of having done harm to another. The breach of duty must
cause damage. How much of the damage to be compensated by the defen·
dant should be attributed to; his wilful conduct and how much to his wilful
negligence or careless conduct or remissness in performance of duty, are
G all relevant facts to be considered in a given act or omission in adjudging
duty of care. The element of carelessness or the breach of duty and whether
that duty is towards the plain tilT or class of persons to which the plaintiff
belongs are important components in tort of negligence. Negligence would,
tlterefore, mean careless conduct in commission or omission of an act,
H whereby another to whom the plaintiff owed duty of care has suffered
RAJKOTMUNTCIPALCORPN.v. MANJULBENJAYANTILAL
307
"'Y
damage. The duty of care is crucial in understanding the nature and scope A
of tort of negligence. [326E-F; 328-E-F; 327-C-D]
Black's Law Dictionary (6 th. Edn.), p. 1489, referred to.
1.2. Negligence connotes inadvertence to the consequences of his
conduct which can be a measure of behaviour where one person had been B
careless in that he did not behave as a prudent man would have done
~
)
whether by advertance or othenvise. The tort of negligence always requires
some form of careless conduct which is usually, although not necessarily,
the product of inadvertenc~. Not every careless conduct which causes
damage, however, will give rise to an action in tort. The negligence lies in c
failure to take such steps as a reasonable prudent man would have taken
in the given circumstances. ~at constitute carelessness are the conduct
and not the result of inadvertence. Thus negligence in this sense is a
ground for liability in tort. [329-E-G]
1.3. Th~ defendant must be under duty of care not to create latent D
..,.
course of physical danger/damage to the person or property of third party
; ...
whom he ought to have reasonably foreseen as likely to be affected thereby.
Those latent defects cause physical danger to the person or the property
giving cause of action and the defendant then is liable to pay damage for
tortious liability. It must, therefore, be the essential element to establish E
that there is positive act or duty and the defendant is under that duty. The
Court is not to create, by process of interpretation, latent source of
physical danger to the person or property of third party when the Act does
not envisage that the defendant ought to have reasonably foreseen hi_m as
~
likely to be affected thereby. [327-G-H; 328-A)
F
1.4. In every cas~ giving rise to tortious liability, tort consists of
in.jury and damage due to negligence. Claim for injury and damage may
be founded on breach of contract or tort. The liability in tort may be strict
liability, absolute liability or special liability. The degree of liability
depends on degree of mental element. The elements of tort of ~egligence G
consist in • (a) duty of care; (b) duty is owed to the plaintiff; (c) the duty
has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not entail liability unless the
-J
law exacts a duty in the given circumstances to observe care. Duty is an
obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct fraugbt with unreasonable
risk or damage to others. The question whet"er duty exists in a par-ticular
situation involves determination of law. [326-H; 327-A; 328-C-D]
H
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1997] 1 S.C.R.
A
1.5. The Court requires to examine the scope of duty of care, which
the local authority owes to the plaintiff. The Court is rec1uired to cons~r
the object, scope and breach of the Act, viz. the Bombay Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Though the statute Is of general character, since the Government or local authority is entrusted with the duty
B to implement the law, though at its discretion, and if damage is done in
execution thereof, what requires to be examined is whether the aforestated
elements of tort of negligence stand attracted. The Court is further re·
quired to consider whether extension of duty of care by the process of
Interpretation would elongate the public policy or retard its object or
frustrate public policy b~hind the statute and the inevitable effect thereof
C on the affected plaintiff as well as the general public. No general principle.
of law is desirable to be laid down as an acid test. [329-A-C]
Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) AC 562, referred to.
D
2.1. While considering whether an action would lie for breach of
statutory duty, what requires to be established, among other things, is that
the harm complained of is of the kind contemplated by the statute. The
question emerges: as to when would the breach of statutory duty under a
particular enactment give rise to tortious liability? The statutory
negligence is sui generis and independent of any other form of tortious
E liability. It would, therefore, be of necessity to find out from the construe·
tion of each statutory duty whether the particular duty is general duty in
public Jaw or private law duty towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
show that (a) the injury suffer·ed is within the ambit of statute: (b)
statutory duty imposes a liability for civil action: (c) the statutory duty was
F not fulfilled: and (d) the breach of duty lias caused him injury. These
essentials are required to be considered in each case. The action for breach
of statutory duty may belong to the category of either strict or absolute
liability which is required, therefore, to be considered ·in the nature of
statutory duty the defendant owes to the plaintiff; whether or not the duty
G is absolute; and the public policy underlying the duty. In most cases, the
statute may not give rise to cause of action unless it is breached and it has
caused damage to the plaintiff, though occasionally the statute may make
breach of duty actionable per se. The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff
to prove on balance of probabilities that the defendant owes that duty of
care to the plaintiff or class of persons to whom he belongs, that defendant
H was negligent in the performance or omission of that duty and breach of
' •
)
RAJKOTMUNICIPALCORPN.v. MANJULBENJAYANTILAL
309
duty caused or materially contributed to his injury and that duty of care A
is owed on the defendant. If the statute requires certain protection on the
principle of volenti non fit injuria, the liability stands excluded. The breach
of duty created by a statute, if it results in damage in an individual_prima
facie, is tort for which the action for damage will lie in the suit. One would
often take the Act, as a whole, to find out the object of the law and to find B
out whether one has right and remedy provided for breach of duty. It wol!ld,
therefore, be of necessity in every case to find the intention of legislature in
creating duty and the resultant cons~quences suffered from the action or
omission thereof, which are required to be considered. No action for
damages lies if on proper construction of statute, the intention is that some
other remedy is avdilable. One of the tests in determining the intention of C
the statute is to ascertain whether the duty is owed primarily to tbe general
public or community and only incidentally to an individual or primarily to
the individual or class of individuals and only incidentally to the general
public or the community. If the statute aims at duty to protect a particular
citiuD or particular class of citizens to which the plaintiff belongs, it prima D
facie creates at the same time co-relative right vested in those citizens of
which plaintiff is one; he has remedy for enforcement, namely, the action
for damages for any loss occasioned due to negligence or for failure of it.
But this test is not always conclusive. [329-C-D; 330-B-R; 331-A-B]
Gonis v. State, (1874) LR 9 Ex. 125 and Kinlgollon v. W.Cooke & Co. E
Ltd., (1956) WLR 527, referred to.
2.2. Duty may be of such paramount importance that it is owed in
all the public. It would be wrong to think that on an action, the duty could
be enforced by way of damages when duty is owed in a section or public F
and cannot be enforced if an individual sustains damages to whom the
Corporation owes no duty and no private interest Is infringed. Breach of
statutory duty, therefore, requires to be examined in the context in which
the duty is created not towards the individual, but has its effect on the
right of individual vis-a-vis the society. Statutory duty generally is toWdrds G
public at large and not towards an individual or individuals and the
co-relative right is vested in the public and not in private person, even
though they may suffer damages. The duty in such a c-dse is to be enforced
by way of criminal prosecution or by way of injunction at the suit under
Section 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or with leave of Court
under Order I, Rule 8, CPC by public spirited person or in any appropriate H
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1997] 1 S.C.R.
A manner to enforce the right and not by way of private action for damages.
or
B
In that situation, the legislature, while recognising the private right vested
in an injured individual, may intend that it shall be maintained solely by
some special remedy provided for a particular case and not by ordinary
method of an action for damages as penalty or compensation. [331-C-F}
2.3. If the statute creates right and remedy, damages are recoverable
by establishing the breach of statute as the sole remedy available under
the statute. But where statute merely creates a duty without expressly
providing any remedy for breach of it, appropriate remedy, prima facie, is
punishment for misdemeanour in respect of the injury to the public and
C the action for damages in respect of any special damage suffered by an
individual. Where special remedy is e¥pressly provided prima facie that
was intended to be the only remedy and by implication it excludes the
resort to common law. But this is also by no means conclusive. The
consideration would be whether the statute intends to award damages for
D breach of statutory duty. Though general rule is that where a statute
creates an obligation and enforces performance in a specified manner,
performance cannot be enforced in any other manner. It depends on the
scope of the Act which creates the obli&ration and on consideration of the
underlying policy of the statute, effect on the individuals is to be carefully
examined and analysed as to what the statute has expressly laid down or
E probably what the statute aims to achieve. The action for damages will not
lie if the damage suffered by him is not of the type intended to be guarded
against. It seems to be contrary to statutory intendment to impose liability
upon public body for a th~ng for which no reasonable care in the performance of the concerned act could be inferred from the language used in
F
the statute; it ought not to be so construed as to innict the liability on the
public authority unless the purpose sought to be achieved has been wanting due to want of exercise of duty and reasonable care in tlte performance
of duty imposed by the statute. [331-F-H; 332-A-B; D-E)
3.1. Ordinarily principle of the law of negligence applies to public
G authorities als.o. They are liable to damages because by a negligent act or
failure to act when they are under duty to act or for a failure to consider
whether to exercise a power conferred on them with the intention that it
would be exercised if and when public interest requires it. Where the public
authority bas decided to exercise a power and has done it negligently a
H person, who has acted in reliance on what the public authority has done,
. ..,.
.,.
.(
RAJKOTMUNICIPALCORPN. V. MANJULBEN JAYAN11LAL
311
may have no difficulty in proving that the damages which be bas suffered A
have been caused by the negligence. Where the damage has resulted from
a negligent failure to act there may be greater difficulty in proving causation and requires examination in greater detail. The liability in tort is for
the damage done, not for damage merely foreseeable or threatened or
imminent. [335-F-G; 344-F-G)
3.2. The general rule is that the public authorities are liable .for
positive action (misfeasance) but not for omission (non-feasance). In
considering the duty of public authority to avoid harm to those likely to
B
be affected by tbe.exercise of power or duty, the courts have evolved the
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood nexus, which exists between C
the person who suffered damages and wrong doer. Where there is allega·
tion of wrong doing it bas to be seen whether the latter reasonably ought
to have foreseen that the carelessness on his part, is likely to cause damage
to the other. If it is a reasonable foreseeability that carelessness on the
defend_ant's part will cause damage to the plaintiff, then the defendant is D
plaintitl's neighbour and prima facie owes towards the plaintiff a duty of
care which may, however, be negatived on the ground of public policy or
reasonable care taken at the operational stage. [334-G-H; 335-A·B]
33. The distinction between area of public policy and operational
area is a logical and convenient one. Undoubtedly, a public authority is E
liable for the negligent acts of its servants or agents in carrying out their
duties, or exercising their powers, within the operational area, although if
the performance of their duties or th~ exercise of their power involves the
exercise of discretion. An act will not be negligent, if it is done in good faith
in the exercise of, and within the limits of the· discretion. [33S.C-D]
F
4.1. Statutory power is not something like statutory duty. Before the
repository of a statutory power can be made liable for negligence for a
failure to exercise it, the statute must (either expressly or by implication)
impose a duty to exercise the power and confer a private right of action in G
damages for a breach of the duty so imposed. The question whether the
Act confers a private right of action depends upon the interpretation of
·the provisions of the Act. But by process of statutory interpretation, the
c~urts may not superimpose a general Common Law duty on a statutory
authority in order to give effect to its resumed idea of policy or. duty.
Common Law does not super-impose such a duty on a mere statl,ltory H
312
.SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1997] 1 S.C.R.
A
authority. The nature and scope of the Common Law duty of care owed .bY
a public authority exercising statutory powers must be discerned carefully
by reading the J.lrovisions of the Act, the objl'.ct it seeks to achieve and other
relevant considerations. The public authority is under a duty to take some
action whdhcr or not in exercise of its statutory power or not to prevent
B injury only if its antecedent acts, have created or increased a risk of injury
of that kind. The normal duty of care cannot be a duty to exercise the
statutory power to prevent injury in another or otherwise to act in such a
way as to prevent injury to him unless the authority has itself created or
increased the risk of injury of that kind. In the absence of such a statutory
duty, a normal duty of exercise of care cannot arise unless the act actually
C done in exea·cise of a statutory power, creates or increases the risk of
foreseeable injury to another and then the duty is to do those acts with
reasonable care and to ta ke reasonable precautions .to prevent that injury
from occurring. The duty of care, therefore, must have co-relationship to
the kind of damage that the plaintiff bas suffered and not to the plaintiff .
D or a class of which the plaintiff is a member. These cases relate to private
law tort. [336-B-G; 346-A]
E
Oversea? Tanks/zip (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Docks alld Engineering Co.
Ltd., (1961) AC 388, referred to.
4.2. The proper approach, therefore, is to consider whether a duty of
care situation exists in public law tort which the law ought to recognise
and whdher in that situation the defendant's conduct was such that he
should have foreseen the damage that would be innicted on the plaintiff.
As a general rule of law, one man is under no duty to control another so
F as to prevent· the IaUer from doing damage to a third. The first question
to be considered is: whether the plaintiff bas established necessary
relationship giving rise to the duty of care? The next question is whether
there is any negligence at the time when the act in question was committed?
The act complained of must have rational relationship to the damage
caused. The tort of negligence does not depend simply on the question of
G foreseeability. Foreseeability is not the sole criteria nor does the fact that
the damage is foreseeable creates any onus. What the court would ask or
look at is the operational structure of the Act. Is this a situation where a
duty does exist towards the plaintiff or class or persons to whom he belongs
keeping in mind tbe nature of the functions and the interest of tbe ·
H community? The further question would be: whether the damage to the
~
RAJKOT MUNICJP AL CORPN. v. MANJULBEN JAY ANTILAL
313
plaintiff is so foreseeable? In that behalf it must be further seen whether A
"'
there was sumciently proximate relationship between the plaintiff and the
1
defendant. [346-A-EJ
4.3. Each case requires to be examined in the light of the special
circumstances, viz., whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the B
plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is person or a class of persons to whom the
defendant owed a duty of care, whether the defendant was negligent in
performing that duty or omitted to take such reasonable care in the
..,
performance of the duty, whether damage must have resulted from that
particular duty of care which the defendant owed to the particular plaintiff
or class of persons. Public authorities discharge public obligations to the c
public at large. Therefore, it owes duty of care at common law to avoid
causing present or imminent danger to the safety of the J'laiotiff or a class
of persons to whom the plaintiff belongs. It is a statutory duty of care
under common law which could give rise to actionable claim·in the suit of
'
the individual and it is capable of co-existence along side a statutory duty. D
The duty of care imposed on a local authority by law may not be put beyond
.,...
what the statute expects of the local authority or Corporation to perform
· the duty. The tort of insuperable negligence would emerge from imminent
danger created by positive act. But the duty of care imposed on local
authority by law may be gauged from the circumstances in which and the
conditions subject to which the duty of care has been imposed on the E
statutory authority. The immin.ent danger theory must be viewed keeping
at the back of mind the act or conduct creating the .danger to the plaintiff
or the class of persons to which he belongs and that by negligent conduct
the defendant causes damage to the property or person of the plaintiff,
though the defendant is not in know of the danger. The defendant also in F
, .
given circumstances, must owe special responsibility or proximity impos·
ing foreseeable duty to care, to safeguard the plaintiff from the danger or
to prevent it from happening. [359-H; 360-A-DJ
4.4. There must exist some proximity of relationship, foreseeability G
of danger and duty of care to be performed by the defendant to avoid the
1
accident or to prevent danger to person of the deceased. The requisite
•
degree of proximity requires to be established by the plaintiff in the
:-·-+
circumstances in whicb the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff would not
succeed by establishing that the accident had occurred due to negligence,
i.e., the defendant's failure to take reasonable care as ordinary prudent H
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{1997] 1 S.C.R.
A Dlan, under the circumstances, would bave taken and the liability in tort
to pay damages had arisen. If the defendant had become aware of the
decayed co~dition or that the tree was affected by disease and taken no
action to prevt:nt the accident, it would be actionable, though for nonfeasance. Mere appearance of danger gives rise to no liability. Actual
B damage had occurred before tortious liability for negligence arose. When
the defendant is under statutory duty to take care not to create latent
source of physical danger to the property or the person who in the
circumstances is considered to be reasonably foreseeable as likely to be
affected thereby, the defendant would be liable for tort of negligence. If the
latent defect causes actual physical damages to the person, _the defendant ·
C is liable to damages for tortious liability. The negligent act or omission of
the statutory authority must be examined with reference to the statutory
provisions, creating the duty and the resultant consequence. The negligent
act or omission must be specifically directed to safeguard the public or
some sections of the public to which the plaintiff was a member, from tht
D particular danger, which bas resulted. [360-G-H; 361-A-C)
S.l. The exercise of power/omissions must have been such that duty
of care bad arisen to avoid danger. Foreseeability of the danger or injury
alone is not sufficient to conclude that duty of care exists. The fact that
one could foresee that a failure of the authority to exercise a reasonable
E care would cause loss to the passers-by itself does not mean that such a
duty of care should be imposed on the statutory authority. The statutory
authority exercises its public law duty or function. It would be wrong to
think that the local authority always owns responsibility and continues to
have the same state of alT.airs. It would be an intolerable burden of 4uty
p
of care on the authority; otherwise it would detract the authority from
perfonniog its normal duties. If he were to gauge the risk of litigation, he
would avoid doing public duty of planting and nurturing the trees thinking
that it would be a hea~ burden on the local authority. It would always cause
hea~ financial burden on the statutory authority. If the duty of maintaining
constant vigil or verifying or testing the healthy condition of trees at public
G places with so many other functions to be perl'ormed were cast on it, the effect
would be that the authority would omit to perform statutory duty. Duty of
care, therefore, must be carefully examined and ti1e foreseeability of damage
or danger to the person or property must be co-refated to the public duty of
care to infer that the omission/non-feasance gives rise to actionable claim for
H damages agaJD$t the defendant. [361-D-G]
"
[
t
RAJKOT MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. MANJULBEN JAY ANTILAL
315
5.2. When a person uses a road or highway, under common law one A
.....
. 'I'
has a right to passage over the public way. When the defendant creates by
positive action any danger and no signal or warnings are given and
consequently damage is done, the proximate relationshii' gets established
between the plaintiff and the defendant and the causation is not too
remote. Eljually, when the defendant omits to perform a particular duty B
enj?ined by the statute or does that duty carelessly, there is proximity
between the plaintiff injured person and the defendant in performance of
·:...
.,.
the duty and when injury occurs or damage is suffered to person or
'
property, cause of action· arises to enable the plaintiff to claim damages
from the defendant. But when the causation is too remote, it is difficult to
.
anticipate with any reasonable certainty as ordinary reasonable prudent c
l
man, to foresee damage or injury to the plaintiff due to causation or
omission on the part of the defendant in the performance or negligence in
the performance of the duty. [361-H; 362-A-C)
5.3. When the defendant was not in know of the discoverable defect D
or danger and it had caused the damage by accident like sudden fall of the
:>-
tree, it would be difficult to visualise that the defendant had knowledge of
the danger and he had omitted to perform the duty of care to prevent its
fault. There would be no special relationship between the statutory
authority and the plaintiff who is a remote user of the footpath of the street
E
by the side of which the trees were planted, unless the defendant is aware
of the condition of the tree that it is likely to fall on the footpath on which
the plaintiff/class of persons to which he belongs frequents it. The defen·
dant by his non-feasance is not responsible for the accident or cause of the
death since admittedly there was no visible sign that the tree was affected
...,.
by disease. It had fallen in a still condition of weather. [360-D-F]
F
· 5.4. In determining the legislative intent, the Court is required to
consider three factors, viz., the context and the o~jcct of the statute, the
nature and precise scope of the relevant provisions and the damage
suffered not of the kind to be guarded against. The object of the Act is to G
promote facilities of general benefit to the public as a whole in getting the
trees planted on roadsides, the discharge of which is towards the public at
large and not towards an individual,· even though the individual may suffer
.. .....;
some harm. The Act does not provide for any sanctions for. omission to
take action; i.e., planting trees or their periodical check up when planted.
By process of interpretation, the Court would not readily infer creation of H
316
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1997]1 S.C.R.
t .
A individual liability to a·named person or cause of action to an individual,
..., ...
unless the Act expressly says so. While considering the question whether
or not civil liability is imposed by a statue, the court is required to examine
all the provisions to find out the precise purJ)OSe of the Act, scope and
content of the duty and the consequential cause of action for omission
~
thereof. Action for damages will not lie in the suit by an injured person if
;.
B
i
the damage suffered by him is not of the kind intended to be protected by
r .
the Act. (321-G-H; 322-A-B]
..
"'i
6.1. The statute enjoins a power to plant trees on the roadsides or
in public places. There is no statutory sanction for negligence in that
c behalf. But the question is: whether the statutory function to plant trees
gives rise to duty of maintaining the trees. In a developing society it is but
obligatory on every householder, when be constructs bouse and equally for
a public authority to plant trees and properly nurture them up in a healthy
condition so as to protect and maintain the ceo-friendly environment. But
r
D the question is: ·whether the public authority owes a statutory duty towards
~
that class of persons who frequent and pass and repass on the public
highway or road or the public places. If the local authority/statutory body
~
has neglected to periorm the duty of maintaining trees in a healthy
condition and when damage, due to fall of the tree occurs, the question
emerges whether the neighbour relationship and proximity or the causaE tion and negligence and the duty of care towards the plaintiff have been
satisfactorily proved to have existed so as to fasten the defendant with the
liability due to tort of negligence. It depends on a variety of facts and
circumstances. It is difficult to lay down any set standards for proof
~
,.,
thereof. [362-D-G]
F
6.2. In a situation like the present one where the victim being not
.,....
aware of the disease/decay, the tree suddenly falls in a still weather
condition, no one can anticipate and it is difficult to foresee that a tree
}
would fall suddenly and thereby a person who would be passing by on the
G
roadside, would suffer injury or would die in consequence. The Corpora·
tion or the authority is not liable to be sued for tort of negligence since the
causation is too remote. Novus actus inconveniens snaps the link and, - ·
\
therefore, it is difficult to· establish Ia ck of care resulting in damage and
foreseeability of tbe damage. The case in band falls in this category. The
..__
deceased was admittedly passing on the roadside to attend to his office
H duty. The tree suddenly fell and he sustained Injury and consequently died.
...
RATKOTMUNICIPALCORPN. v. MANJULBEN JAYAN'JlLAL
317
It was difficult to foresee that a tree would fall on him. (363-D-Fl
A
7. The conditions in India have not developed to such an extent that
a Corporation can keep constant vigil by testing tht healthy condition of
the trees in the public places, roadside, highway frequented by passers-by.
There is no duty to maintain regular supervision thereof, though the local B
authority/other authority/owner of a proptrty is undet· a duty to plant and
maintain the tree. The causation for accident is too remote. Conse<JUently,
~ · ·..
there would be no Comr_non Law right to file suit for tort of n~:gligence. It
would not be just and proper to fasten duty of care and liability for
omission thereof. It would be difficult for the focal authority etc. to foresee
such an occurrence. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to C
conclude that the appellant has been negligent in the maintenance of the
trees planted by it on the roadsides. (363-(;..H; 364-A]
Bourhill v. Young, (1943) AC 92; Bolton & Ors. v. Stone, (1951) AC
850; Fanugia v. Great Western R/y., (1947) 2 AllER 565; In re Po/emis & D 1
Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd., (1921) 3 KB 560; Sheppaard v. Borough of
G/ossoppp, (1921) 3 KB 132; Groves v. Lord Wimbome, [1898] 2 QB 402;
Lonrlw Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., (1982) AC 173; Hadely v. Baxendale,
(1854) 9 Ex 341; Haynes v. Hanvood, (1935)1 KB 146; Dorser Yacht Co. v.
Home Office, (1970) AC 1004; Kemp & Dougall v. Damgavil Cool Co. Ltd.,
(1909) AC 1314; Geddis v. Proprietors of Bonn Reservoir, (1878) 3 AC 430; E
Murphy v. Brentwood Distt. Council, (1991) 1 AC 398; Anns v. Merton
London Borough, (1978) AC 728; Caparo Industries Pic. v. Dickman, (1990)
2 AC 605; Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, (1989) AC 53;.Smith v .
Littlewoods Organisation Ltd., (1987) AC 241; London Passenger Transport
Board v. Upson, (1949) AC 155; Stovin v. Wise (Norfolk County Council,
F
Third Party), (1994) 3 All ER 467; Burton v. West Suffolk County Council,
(1960) 2 WLR 745; Blyth v. Binningham Watenvorks Co., (1856) tl Exch.
781; Pardon v. Harcourt Rivington, (1?32) 146 LT 391; Baxter v. Stocktonon-Tees Corpn., [1959) 1 QB 441; Wilson v. Kingscon-upon-Thames C01pn,
(1949) 1 All ER 679; CA, Noble v. Harrison (1926) 2 KB 332; Barker v.
Herbert (1911) 2 KB 633; Cunliffe v. Bankes (1945) 1 All ER and Caminer G
v. Nonhem & London Investment Tmst Ltd., (1950) 2 All ER 486, referred
to.
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd., (1964) AC 465;
Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. H
318
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1997] 1 S.C.R. ·
A Ltd., (1985) AC 10; Leigh and Sillavan Ltd. v.Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd.,
(1986) AC 785; Curran v. Nort!tem Ireland Co- ownership Housing Assn. Ltd.,
(1987) AC 718; Council of the Shire of Sutherland v. Heyman, (1985) 157
CLR 424; Rylands v. Fletcher, (1986) 3 HL 330 and Yzwt Kun-Yey v. Attorney
General of Hong Kong, (1988) AC 175, cited.
B
8. Thete is a distinction between misfeasance (positive action) and
non-feasance (omission). Misfeasance is wilful, reckless or heedless conduct in commission of a positive act lawfully done but with improper
conduct. Non-feasance means non- performance of some act, which ought
to be performed, or omission to perform required duty or total neglect of
C duty. In the case of misfeasance, the defendant is the author of the source
of danger to cause damage due to careless conduct, to the person/property
of plaintiff. He has knowledge that the act may give rise to tort but in the
case of non-feasance several factors require consideration for giving rise
to actionable negligence. [342-D-F}
D
9. There is no statutory law in India, unlike in England regulating
E
F
damages for tortious liability. In the absence of statutory law in this regard
in India, Common law principles of tort evolved by the courts in England
may be applied in India to the extent of suitability and applicability to the
Indian conditions. [324-G·H; 325-A]
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai
[1987] 3 SCC 234 and KRamdas Sltenoy v. The Chief Officer, Town
Municipal-Council, Udipi & Ors., AIR (1974) SC 2177, relied on.
Stevens v. Midland Counties Rly. Co., (1854) 10 Ex. 352, referred to.
10. It is well settled that a Municipal Corporation can be held liable
and accordingly it may be sued for wrongs involving fraud, malice, as well
as for wrong in which intention is immaterial. [325-C)
Barwick v. English Joirzt Stock Bank, (1867) LR 2 Ex. 259; Comford v.
G Carlton Bank, [1900] l QB 22 and Glasgow Corporation v. Loremer, (1911)
AC 209, referred to .
. 11. Duty primarily is fixed by law, which on violation fastens liability
to pay damages. It is personal to the injured. Tort and contract are
distinguishable. In tort, liability is primarily faxed by law while in contract
H it is faxed by the parties themselves. In tort, the duty is towards tbe persons
.>
-
+
RAJKOTMUNICIPAL CORPN. v. MANJIJLBEN JAY ANTli..AL(RAMASWAMY, J.)
319
generally while in contract it is towards specific person or persons. If the A
claim depends upon proof of the contract, action does not lie in tort. If the
claim arises, from the relationship between the parties, independent of the
contract, an action would lie in tort at the election of the plain tifT, although
he might alternatively have pleaded in contract. [325-E-F]
Sir Percy Winfield: "Province of the Law of Tori'~ p 32; Clerk and B
Liodsell: "Torts'~ Common Law Library, Series No. 3 (12th Edn.) Ch. 3, p
I, para I, Cb. 4, para 2; Oliver Lindel Holmes : "Common Law", (1881 Edn.)
p 96; Michael A. Jones : "Torts" (Fourth Edn.) 1955; Lawman (India) Pvt.
Ltd. Ch.