# RAM AUTAR LAL JAIN v. MINISTER OF TRANSPORT & ORS

- **Citation:** [1974] 2 S.C.R. 514
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974
- **Case number:** Civil· Appeal No. 2606 of 1969
- **Bench:** K. K. Mathew, M. H. Beg
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-autar-lal-jain-v-minister-of-transport-ors-6159
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Motor vehicles Act (4 of 1939),-A.pp/ication for pern1it-Death of applicantB
If legal representative can prosecute qpplfcation.
Upon the death of an applicant for a stage carriage permit under Chap. IV of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, before his application had been
considered by
Regional Transport Authority, the heirs or legal representatives of the applicant
do not have the right to step into the shoes of the deceased applicant and prosecute
the application filed by him.
·
Section 61 of the Act, deals with cases in Which a transfer of the permit held
can be applied fOr. If it was the intention of the legislature to provide for' succession
to whatever claims an applicant for a pennit has even before a permit is granted
to hini, it would have similarly provided for such a situation. But neither the Motor
Vehicles Act nor the Rules made thereunder provide.-Jor tke substitution of heirs to
prosecute the application of a deceased applicant ,,for a permit. An application for
a pcnnit, gives on1y the right that the merits of ~e applicant should be considered
vis~a-11is other applicants. These merits depend /on the peculiar position, capabi·
Jities and qualifications of the applicant, which may be either personal or peculiarly
or particularly those of a concern or organisation.
I~ is not necessary that an heir
or successor of an applicant will also have the applicant's qualifications or capabilities
\vith regard to a transport service for the benefit of the public. [515H·516C; 517B-C];
Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari&: Ors., [19ti9] 2 S.C.R. 507, explained.
C1v1L APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Civil· Appeal No. 2606
of
1969.
c
D
From the Judgment and Order dated the !st July, 1968 of the Patna
E
High Court in C. W. J. C. No. 363 of 1968.
M. C. Chagla, K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B. B. Sinha, for the
appellant.
R. C. Prasad, for respondent Nos. l to 3.
S. V. Gupte, U. P. Singh and K. N. Sesha1', for respondent No. 4.
· I'

## Text

514
RAM AUTAR LAL JAIN
v.
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT & ORS.
N01•ember 28, 1973
(K. K. MATHEW AND M. H. BEG, JJ.)
Motor vehicles Act (4 of 1939),-A.pp/ication for pern1it-Death of applicantB
If legal representative can prosecute qpplfcation.
Upon the death of an applicant for a stage carriage permit under Chap. IV of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, before his application had been
considered by
Regional Transport Authority, the heirs or legal representatives of the applicant
do not have the right to step into the shoes of the deceased applicant and prosecute
the application filed by him.
·
Section 61 of the Act, deals with cases in Which a transfer of the permit held
can be applied fOr. If it was the intention of the legislature to provide for' succession
to whatever claims an applicant for a pennit has even before a permit is granted
to hini, it would have similarly provided for such a situation. But neither the Motor
Vehicles Act nor the Rules made thereunder provide.-Jor tke substitution of heirs to
prosecute the application of a deceased applicant ,,for a permit. An application for
a pcnnit, gives on1y the right that the merits of ~e applicant should be considered
vis~a-11is other applicants. These merits depend /on the peculiar position, capabi·
Jities and qualifications of the applicant, which may be either personal or peculiarly
or particularly those of a concern or organisation.
I~ is not necessary that an heir
or successor of an applicant will also have the applicant's qualifications or capabilities
\vith regard to a transport service for the benefit of the public. [515H·516C; 517B-C];
Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari&: Ors., [19ti9] 2 S.C.R. 507, explained.
C1v1L APPELLATE
JURISDICTION : Civil· Appeal No. 2606
of
1969.
c
D
From the Judgment and Order dated the !st July, 1968 of the Patna
E
High Court in C. W. J. C. No. 363 of 1968.
M. C. Chagla, K. K. Sinha, S. K. Sinha and B. B. Sinha, for the
appellant.
R. C. Prasad, for respondent Nos. l to 3.
S. V. Gupte, U. P. Singh and K. N. Sesha1', for respondent No. 4.
· I'
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG, J. -This appeal by certificate from a judgment of the High
Court at Patna comes before us in the following circumstances : An
application made by one Ram Autar Lal Jain before the Chhotanagpur
Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "RTA")
for grant of a stage carriage permit on a particular route. The appliG
cation was made within the time fixed. But, before the application
could be considered Ram Autar Lal Jain died leaving one widow
and two sons as his survivors, heirs and legal representatives. Ram
Autar Lal Jain's heirs'formed a partnership firm called M/s. Ram Autar
Lal Jain and an application was made before the RTA for substitution
of the firm in place of Ram Autar Lal Jain deceased, the original
applicant, so that the firm could prosecute the application before the
R
RTA. The RTA allowed the substitution but split up the route into
two parts and granted one part to the appellant and the other part to
the :Respondent No. 4. The matter did not, however, rest with the
A
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R. A. JAIN V. MINISTER OF TRANSPORT (Beg,/.)
515
decision of the RTA but was taken up in appeal before the State Transport Authority by as many as four different parties. The State Transport Authority set. aside the order of the RTA on various grounds,
such as : (i) that, the route could not be split up: and (ii) that, the
parties in whose favour the permit had been given had failed to produce
the vehicle within the time allowed by the RTA. The State Transport
Authority granted the permit to one Mangtulal T u\shiyan. It did
not go into the question oflegality of substitution of the appellant firm
in place of Ram Autar Lal Jain. Four revision petitions having been
filed against this order, the Minister concerned remanded the case to
the RTA for a reconsideration after hearing al\ the parties which had
appeared before the RTA on April 23, \965.
Mangtulal Tulshiyan
challenged this order of the Minister before the High Court of Patna
which set it aside and directed the Minister to re-hear on-ly the petitioners who ha<! filed revision petitions and not those who had not
complained against the previous order before the Minister. The Minister, on this occasion, granted the permit in favour of Bijoy Bahadur
Singh (who is respondent No. 4 in this appeal) on the ground that he
was competent and qualified and satisfied the requirement which the
RTA had laid down, that is to say, that a new-comer and a small operator should be introduced on the relevant route and also on the ground
that Government should try to break monopolies. In the course of
his order, the Minister rejected the appellant's applicationfor permit
on two grounds : firstly, the appellant not being an heir to Ram Autar
La\ Jain, should not have been allowed to prosecute the application
before the RTA; and, secondly, that the appellant did not satisfy the
criterion set up by the RTA in so far as the appellant was neither a
new-comer nor a small operator. The appellant took the matter to
the Patna High Court by means of a writ petition. The writ petition
was summarily dismissed by the High Court.
The principal question that has arisen for determination in this
appeal is whether, upon the death of an applicant for a stage carriage
permit before his application has been consider<? 'Y the Regional
Transport Authority, the heirs or legal representatives of the
1plicant
have the right to step into the shoes of the deceased appl.:ant and
prosecute the application filed byhim refore the Regional Transport
Authority. The problem arises because there is no provision in the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which provides for succession to an applicant's right to prosecute his application for a stage carriage permit
before the Transport Authorities.
It is clear that, although, no person is entitkd to a permit as a matter
of right, the Motor Vehicles Act has conferred upon a person the
right to make an aPPlication under Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles
Act for any of the four types of permits dealt with in that chapter.
A person has also the right to have his application considered by the
appropriate authority in accordance with the provisions of the Act
so long as he makes an application within the prescribed time and in
the prescribed form. If such an application is made the transport
authority cannot legally ignore that application
and consider
other applications only.
The
authority
could
reject the
516
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1974] 2 s.c.11.
application on merits. Thus, an application made for a permit under . A
Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act gives only the right that the·
merits of the applicant will he considered vis-a-vis other applicants.
These merits depend generally upon the peculiar position, capabilities;
and qualifications of an applicant which may be either personal or
peculiarly or particularly those of a concern or organisation. It _is
not necessary that an heir or successor of an applicant will also have the
applicant's qualifications or capabilities .with regard to a transport
service for the benefit of the public. Probably it was for this reason
that neither the Motor Vehicles Act nor the rules made tbereunder
provide for the substitution of heirs to prosecute the application of a
deceased claimant for a permit.
In Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari & Ors.(l) this Court had to answer
the question as to whether on the death of an applicant for a stage
carriage p:rmit in respect of his transport vehicles the Regional Transport Authority has p~w~r to allow the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicles to prosecute the application filed by the deceased
applicant. This Court on that occasion noted that neither Order
XXII of the Coje of Civil Procedure nor Section 306 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925, havo any application in such a case and also
that th:re is no express provision in the Motor Vehicles Act or the
rules framed under the Act to deal with this situation. This Court,
however, held that if a person in possession of transport vehicles
"dies after obtaining the permit, the Regional Transport Authority
has power under Section 61(2) to transfer the permit to the person
succeedingto the possession of the vehicles covered by the permit".
In the course of the judgment in that case this Court observed there:
"We are inclined to think that in the case of death of
the applicant before the ·final disposal of his application for
the grant of a permit in respect of his vehicles the Regional
Transport Authority_ has power to substitute the person
succeeding to the possession of the vehicles in place of the
deceased applicant and to allow the successor to prosecute the application. As the relief sought for in the application is dependent upon and related to the possession of
the vehicles the application is capable of being revived at
the instance of the person succeeding to the possession of
the vehicles."
The obs.ervations set out above, relied upon by the appellant,
do not cover a case where the deceased applicant is not in possession of any motor vehicles. The ratio of Dhani Devi's case (supra)
was simply this : since the right to and possession of the vehicles goes
from a deceased holder of a permit or an applicant for its "transfer"
to his heirs, the right to continue an application must also necessarily
go to them. It does not decide what will happen if there is no motor
Vehicle to which a deceased applicant's heirs or legal representatives
can succeed. Moreover, Dhanf Devl'.s case (supra) was one which
was specifically covered by Section 61 of the Motor Vehicles' Act
where the permit actually granted and held for a period specified seems
(IJ [I969J c2J s.c.R. so1.
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R. A. JAIN v. MINISTER OF TRANSPORT {Beg,/.)
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to be treated as an adjunct of the possession of the vehicle. It becomes
a kind of property right attached to the business of running a vehicle
which is actually serving the public on the road. In such case the right
does not remain a mere personal right to apply but is of a transferable
character. Therefore, Section 61 of the Act deals with cases in which
a "transfer" of the permit held can be applied for. If it was the inten-.
tion of the legislature to provide for succession to whatever claims.an
applicant for a permit has even before a permit is granted to him,
it would have similarly provided for the situation in the case before us.
As there is no such provision, we cannot,legislate and import one into
the Act. Indeed, as already pointed out, it is difficult to conceive of
succession to claims for the recognition of which personal or other
particular qualifications play so large a part.
It was also contended that Messrs. Ram Autar Lal Jain is, in the
eye of law, a new entity separate from both Ram Autar Lal Jain, the
deceased applicant, as well as his heirs and legal representatives, and
that it could not be the successor or legal representative of the deceased
in whom any right to continue any proceeding could vest by succession. As this appeal fails on other grounds discussed above, it is not
necessary to decide this question.
Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal dismissed . .