# RAM AWADESH SINGH v. SUMITRA DEVI & ORS

- **Citation:** [1972] 2 S.C.R. 674
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1970-05-22
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 1384 and 1584 of 1970
- **Bench:** K. S. Hegde, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-awadesh-singh-v-sumitra-devi-ors-5530
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Representation of the People Act, 1951, ss. 33(4) and 36(4)-Nominatlon paper-Mista~en entry as to ct1ndidmes'. name in electoral ro~lMistake not substantial-Acceptance of nonunatwn paper does not vitiate
election.
Evidence-if several instances of corrupt practice are not separately
proved they have no collective effect.
During the mid term election held in 1969 in Bihar the respondent
and 11 others contested from the Arrah Assembly Constituency..
The
appellant was declared elected as ha,ing obtained the highest number of
votes. His nearest rival was the respondent. The respondent filed an
election petition challenging the election of the appellant on various
grounds. The principal ground taken was that the result of the ~lection
bad been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the appellant's
nomination papers. It was alleged that nomination paper showed that
the appellant's name was registered as an elector in the Arrah Constituency
whereas at the relevant time it had been removed therefrom. The returning Officer was therefore wrong in accepting the nomination paper. The
other allegations against the appellant related to corrupt practice.
The
High Court rejected the allegations as regards corrupt practice but it set
aside the election of the appellant on the ground that the nomination
paper had been improperly accepted and the election had been materially
affected thereby.. In appeal to this Court~
A
B
c
D
B
HELD : (i) The appellant was fully qualified to be nominated at ihe
election. The only thing said against his nomination was that his nomination paper was not properly filled in. It was proved from the evidence
that the Returning Officer did look into the nomination paper but unfortunately he also did not notice that the name of the appellant had been removed from the electoral roll of Arrah constituency. If he had noticed
F
that fact he .)Yould have asked the. appellant either to correct the mistake
or to file a fresh nomination paper. The appellant filed his nomination
paper on the 6th of January 1969 and the last date for filing the nomination paper was the 8th of that month. That being so there would have
been no difficulty for him dthcr to correct the nomination paper filed or
'
to file a fresh nomination paper. The appellant had with him a certified
copy of the electoral roll of Sandesb Constituency where his ni.ln1e was
enrolled and be bad shown the same to the Returning Officer. Mistakes
G
complained of occurred because both the appellant as well as the Returning Officer merely looked into the main voters' list in Arrah con~tituencv
but overlooked the deletion noted in a seporate list 1,670 A-DJ
From a combined reading of ss. 33 and 36 of the Representation of
the People Act 1961 it is clear that a mis-description as to the electoral
roll number of the candidate or of the proposer in the nomination paper
is not to be considered as a material defect in the nomination paper. The
H
High Court was accordingly not justified in allowin~ the election petition
o~ the ground that the nomination paper of the appellant wa. improperly
ll<ceptcd. [681 A: 683 EJ
B
c
D
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R. A. SINGH v. SUMITRA (Hegde, J.)
675
ln view of the above fincing the further question whether the result of
.the election was materially affected did not survive for consid=fation.
1683 E-F]
(ii) The appeal of the respondent on the question of corrupt practice
had no merit.
The three initances mentioned were in the opinion of tic
High Court not established ·,y the evidence.
Each intance of a corrupt
p<actice pleaded has to he c; tablish-cd separately. If every one of the instances was not proved all of them put together cannot be accepted as true
h•ocaus~ of the volume of e'idcnce. [685 B-C]
The election petition n1ust therefore be dismissed.
Kam.di Singh v. Election Tribuna, Hissar & Ors., 10 E.L.R.
189,
llungifill Choudhury v. Dah,1 Sao & Ors., [i1962] 2 S.C.R. 401, Namdeo
Chi11w11ji Toprc & Anr. v. C'ovi11<lda< Ratan/a/ Bhatia & Ors .• I.LR. 1

## Text

674
RAM AWADESH SINGH
v.
SUMITRA DEVI & ORS.
[)ecember 3, 1971
[K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Representation of the People Act, 1951, ss. 33(4) and 36(4)-Nominatlon paper-Mista~en entry as to ct1ndidmes'. name in electoral ro~lMistake not substantial-Acceptance of nonunatwn paper does not vitiate
election.
Evidence-if several instances of corrupt practice are not separately
proved they have no collective effect.
During the mid term election held in 1969 in Bihar the respondent
and 11 others contested from the Arrah Assembly Constituency..
The
appellant was declared elected as ha,ing obtained the highest number of
votes. His nearest rival was the respondent. The respondent filed an
election petition challenging the election of the appellant on various
grounds. The principal ground taken was that the result of the ~lection
bad been materially affected by the improper acceptance of the appellant's
nomination papers. It was alleged that nomination paper showed that
the appellant's name was registered as an elector in the Arrah Constituency
whereas at the relevant time it had been removed therefrom. The returning Officer was therefore wrong in accepting the nomination paper. The
other allegations against the appellant related to corrupt practice.
The
High Court rejected the allegations as regards corrupt practice but it set
aside the election of the appellant on the ground that the nomination
paper had been improperly accepted and the election had been materially
affected thereby.. In appeal to this Court~
A
B
c
D
B
HELD : (i) The appellant was fully qualified to be nominated at ihe
election. The only thing said against his nomination was that his nomination paper was not properly filled in. It was proved from the evidence
that the Returning Officer did look into the nomination paper but unfortunately he also did not notice that the name of the appellant had been removed from the electoral roll of Arrah constituency. If he had noticed
F
that fact he .)Yould have asked the. appellant either to correct the mistake
or to file a fresh nomination paper. The appellant filed his nomination
paper on the 6th of January 1969 and the last date for filing the nomination paper was the 8th of that month. That being so there would have
been no difficulty for him dthcr to correct the nomination paper filed or
'
to file a fresh nomination paper. The appellant had with him a certified
copy of the electoral roll of Sandesb Constituency where his ni.ln1e was
enrolled and be bad shown the same to the Returning Officer. Mistakes
G
complained of occurred because both the appellant as well as the Returning Officer merely looked into the main voters' list in Arrah con~tituencv
but overlooked the deletion noted in a seporate list 1,670 A-DJ
From a combined reading of ss. 33 and 36 of the Representation of
the People Act 1961 it is clear that a mis-description as to the electoral
roll number of the candidate or of the proposer in the nomination paper
is not to be considered as a material defect in the nomination paper. The
H
High Court was accordingly not justified in allowin~ the election petition
o~ the ground that the nomination paper of the appellant wa. improperly
ll<ceptcd. [681 A: 683 EJ
B
c
D
'
H
R. A. SINGH v. SUMITRA (Hegde, J.)
675
ln view of the above fincing the further question whether the result of
.the election was materially affected did not survive for consid=fation.
1683 E-F]
(ii) The appeal of the respondent on the question of corrupt practice
had no merit.
The three initances mentioned were in the opinion of tic
High Court not established ·,y the evidence.
Each intance of a corrupt
p<actice pleaded has to he c; tablish-cd separately. If every one of the instances was not proved all of them put together cannot be accepted as true
h•ocaus~ of the volume of e'idcnce. [685 B-C]
The election petition n1ust therefore be dismissed.
Kam.di Singh v. Election Tribuna, Hissar & Ors., 10 E.L.R.
189,
llungifill Choudhury v. Dah,1 Sao & Ors., [i1962] 2 S.C.R. 401, Namdeo
Chi11w11ji Toprc & Anr. v. C'ovi11<lda< Ratan/a/ Bhatia & Ors .• I.LR. 1964
Bon1. 114 ;.1nd
~Vey Kanto Barooa!i v. Kushara111 Nath & Ors., XX.I
E.LR. 459. applied.
Narhatl<t Pra.md v. Chh1gal Lal & Ors., [1967] 1 S.C.R. 499, Ram
Dayal v. Brijl'ai Singh & Ors., r_l970] I S.C.R. 530 and Brijendrala/ Gupta
and Anr. v. Jawolonrarnd de Ors .. !.1960] 3 S.C.R. 650, distinguished.
Va1hist Narain Slwmw v. Der Chandra and Ors., [1965] S.C.R. 509,
referred to.
CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1384
and 1584 of 1970.
Appeals under SectiJn 116-A of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 from the Judgment and Order dated May 22,
1970 of the Patna High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1969 .
.f. P. Govat, Subhagmal Jain, S. P. Mukherjee, Pranab Chatterjee and G. P. Roy, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1384 of 1970)
and respondent No. I (in C.A. No. 1584 of 1970).
V. M. Tarkunde, P. N. Tiwari, 0. C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain
and J.B. Dadachanji, for respondent No. I (in C.A. No. 1384 of
1970) and the appellant (in C.A. No. 1584 of 1970).
The .Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, .f. These ar~ cross-appeals under s. 116-A of the
Representation of the PeJp]e Act, 1951 (to be hereinafter referred
to as the Act) arising from an election petition filed by the first
respondent (who for the sake ot convenience will hereinafter be
referred to as the respo,ndent), before the High Court of Patna.
Durin_g the last mid term election for the Bihar Legislative
Assembly held in the beginning of 1969, the appellant, the respondent and J f. other cont1:sted from the Arrah Assembly Constitue,ncy.
The last date for Ji.Jing the nomination wa; ~anuary 8, 1969
and the date of scrutiny ·.vas .January 9, 1969.
The poll took place
on February 9. 1969 ard the votes were counted on the .next day.
The appellant was deciared elected as having obtained the highest
number of votes i.e. 13.556. His nearest rival was the respondent
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 2 S.C.K
who secured 12,278 votes.
The appellant was the nominee of the
Socialist party and the respondent was the nominee of the Congress
party.
After the publication of the results in the official gazette, the
respondent filed the election petition challenging the validity of the
appellant's electio,n on various grounds.
The principal ground
taken lib' her was that the result of the election had been materia,ly
affected by the improper acceptance of the appellant's nomination
papers.
She also charged the appellant with the commission of
various corrupt practices to which reforence will be made at a
later stage.
The learned trial judge accepted the contention of
the respondent that the result of the election bad been materially
affected by the improper acceptance of the appellant's nomination.
He accordingly set aside the election of the appellant;
but be
rejected the contention of the respondent that the appellant was
guilty of any corrupt practice. Aggrieved by the decision of the
High Court, the appellant has filed Civil Appeal No.
1384 of
1970 and the respondent has filed Civil Appeal No. 1584 of 1970.
The principal questions that arise for decision are : ( I) whether
the defects found in the nomination paper of the appellant are of
"substantial character" within the meaning of that expression in
s. 36(4) of the Act and (2) whether it is established that the
acceptance of the nomination of the appellant had materially
affected the result of the election.
After dealing with those questions, we shall proceed to consider
the appeal of the respondent challenging th':' conclusion of the trial
court regarding the corrupt practices alleged •o have been committed by the appellant.
Before proceeding to cnnsider the relevant provisions in the
Act, it is necessary to set out a few more facts.
The appellant has
been contesting from the Arrah constituency from about the year
1962.
He represented that constituency before the dissolution of
the Bihar Legislative Assembly.
He was registered as a.n elector
in tHe Sandesh Assembly Constituency of the Bihar State.
His
name continued to be on the electoral roll of that constituency even
at the time he filed his nomination from the Arrah constituenc)
on January 6, 1969 i.e. two days before the last date for filling the
nomination. It appears that in 1968, his name was also entered
in the electoral roll of Arrah constitue.ncy.
But later on, evidently
because his name stood entered in the Sandesh constituency. the
same was deleted from the Arrah constituency. But this deletion
was done without notice to the appellant. The deletion was shown
in a separate supplemented list.
In the main electoral roI.l. his
name continued to be shown in the Arrah constituency. According to the appellant when he came to file bis nomination paper, he
was not aware of the fact that his name was entered in the electoral
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R. A, SINGH v. SUM!TRA (Hegde, J.)
677
roU of the Arrah constituency.
Therefore he had brought with
him a certified copy of the electoral roll of the Sandesh constituency.
But in the morning of January 6, 1969 he came io know that his
name was also in the Arrah constituency.
At that time he did"
not notice the deletion of his name which was in a separate list.
Therefore in his nomination paper, he entered his electotal roll
No., as shown in the electoral roll of Arrah constituency.
But.at
the same time he showed to the Returning Officer the certified copy
of the scrutiny, no one objected to the nomination of the appellant.
The Returning Officer supports this version of the appellant. After
checking the name of the appellant as well as his electoral number
as found in the electoral roll of Arrah constituency, and also the
names and electoral roll number of his proposers, the Returning
Officer received the .nomination paper filed by him.
At the time
of the scrutiny, no one objected to the nomination of the appellant.
The Returning Officer accepted his nomination as a valid nomination.
The objection to the acceptance of the nomination of the
appellant was put forward for the first time i,n the election petition.
We have now to consider whether the appellant was
validly
nominated.
Section 5 of the Act prescribes the q ua\ifications for membership of a Legislative Assembly.
It says that :
"A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill
a seat in the Legislative Assembly of a State unless :
(a)
(b)
( c) in the case of any other seat, he is an elector for
any Assembly constituency in that State"
It is not denied that the appeJ.lant possesses all the qualifications
prescribed either under the Constitution or under the Act and
further that he has none of the disqualifications mentioned either
under the Constitution or under the Act.
All that is said against
his nominatio11 is that his nomination paper was not properly filled
in.
The law requires that the nomination of a candidate. should
~ in the prescribed form and among others it should contain the
name of the person nominated, his proposer's name as well as the
electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer.
Sub-cl.
( 4) of s. 3 3 provides that :
"On the presentation of a nomination paper, the
returning officer shall satisfy himself that the names and
electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer
as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those
entered i,n the electoral rolls :
Provided that no misnomer or inaccurate description
or clerical, technical or printing error in regard to the
·678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 2 S.C.R.
name of the candidate or his proposer or any other per-
~on, or in regard to any place, mentioned in the ·electoral
roll or the nomination paper and no clerical, technical
or printing error in regard to the electoral roll numbers
of any such person in the electoral rolJ or the nomination
paper, shall affect the full operation of the electoral roll
or the nomination paper with respect to such person or
place in any case where the de.>cription in regard to the
name of the person or 'place is such as to be commonly
understood; and the returning officer shall permit any
such misnomer or inaccurak description or clerical,
technical or printing error to be corrected and where
nece~sary, direct that any Such misnomer, inaccurate
description, clerical, technical or printing error in the
electoral roll or in the nomination paper shall be overlooked."
Sub-s. ( 5) ol' s. 33 provides that where a candidate is an elector
-0f a different constituency, a copy of the electoral roll of that
constituency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of
the relevant entries in such roll shall unless it has been filed along
with the nomination paper be produced before the Returning Officer
at the time of the scrutiny.
Section -36 of the Act prescribes the mode of scrutiny of the
nomination. Sub-s. ( 2) of that section says :
"The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide a!J objec!ions which may
be made to any nominatio,n and may. either on such
o!J!iection or on his own motion, after such summary
enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary. reject any :nomination on any of the following grounds :
(a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination the candidate either is not qualified or is
disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat u11der
any of the following provisions that may be
applicable namely :-
Articles 84, J 02, I 73 and I 91
( b) that there has been a failure to comply with any
of the provisions of section 33 or section 34; or
( c) that the sig,nature of the candidate or the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine."
Sub-s. (4 J of that section commands the Returning Officer not
~to reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect whic~1
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R. A, SINGH v. SUMITRA (Hegde, J.)
679
A
is not of a substantial character.
Sub-s. ( 6) of that section
prescribes that :
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"The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same
and, if the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in
writing a brief statemeint of his
reasons for
such
rejection."
The only other relevant provision which we need con.sider is
sub-s. (1 ) of s. 100 which prescribes the grounds for declaring
election to be void.
That section reads :
"Subjectto the provisions of sub-s. (2) if the High
Court is of opinion-
( a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified. to bechosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or
this Act or the Government of Union Territories
Act, 1963; or
( b) that any corrupt practice has been committed
by a returned candidate or his election agent or
by any other person with the consent of a returned
candidate or his election agent; or
(c) that any nomination has been improper rejected:
or
( d) that the
result of the election, in so [ar as it
concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected-
(i) by the improper acceptance of ·any nomina·
tion. or
<.ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the
interests of the returned candidate by an
agent other than his election agent or
(iii) by the improper reception, refosal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any
vote which is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisiom
of the Constitution or of this Act or of am·
rules or orders made under this Act,
·
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void."
The first question that we have got tp decide is whether the
defects found in the nomination paper of the appellant are of substantial character.
As mentioned earlier, the appellant was fully
680
SUPREME COURT REPORT;
(1972] 2 S.C.R.
qualified to be nominated for the election.
The only thing said
against his nomination is that his inomination paper was not properly filled in.
We have earlier seen that a duty is imposed on the
Returning Officer by sub-s. ( 4) of s. 33 to look into the nominatio;n
paper when it is presented and to satisfy himself that the names
and the electoral roll numbers of the candidate and that ol' the
proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those
entered in the electoral roll.
In this case it is proved that the
Returning Officer did look into the nomination paper but untortunately he also did not notice that the name of the appellant had
been removed from the electoral roll of Arrah constituency. If
he had noticed that fact, he would have asked the appellant either
to correct the mistake or to file a fresh nomination paper.
We
have earlier noticed that the appellant filed his nomination paper
on the 6th of January 1969 and the last date for filing the nomination paper was the 8th of that month.
That being so, there would
have been no difficulty for him either to correct the nomination
paper filed or to file a fresh nomination paper.
We have earlier
noticed that the appellant had with him a certified copy of the
electoral roll of the Sandesh constituency and he had shown the
same to the Returning Officer.
Mistakes complained or occurred
because both the appellant as well as the Returnin11; Officer mereJy
looked into the main voters' list but overlooked the deletion noted
in a separate list.
But the implication of s. 33 ( 4) is that a wrong
entry in a nomination paper as regards the name of the candidate
or the proposer or their electoral roll numbers is not a matter of
substantial importance.
That is why the legislature requires the
Returning Officer to look into them and if there are any mistakes
to get them corrected.
What is of importance in an election is
that the candidate should possess all the prescribed qualifications
and that he should not have incurred any of the disqualifications
mentioned either in the Constitution or in the Act.
The other
information required to be given in the nomination paper is only
to satisfy the Returning Officer that the cal)didate possesses the
prescr:bed qualification arid that he is not otherwise disqualified.
Ln other words those information relate to the proof of the required qualifications.
It may also be noted that the legislature itself has made distinction between the acceptance of a nomination and the rejection
of a nomination.
The Returning Officer is required to give reasons
for rejecting a nomination whereas he is not required to give
reasons for accepting a nomination. Further sub-s. (2) of s. 36
says that "he may reject the nomination paper". It is further seen
that the proviso to sub-c. ( 4) of s. 33 says that no inaccurate
description in regard to the name of the candidate or his proposer
or in regard to any place mentioned in the nomination paper shall
affect the full operation of the nomination.
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From a combined reading of ss. 33 and 36, it is clear that a
mis-description as to electoral roll number of the candidate or of
the proposer in the nomination paper is not to be considered as a
material defect in the nomination paper.
In KarnaiA Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar and ors.( 1), the
tribunal held that the nomination paper of one of the candidates
was wrongly rejected on the ground that column No. 8 in the
nomination paper was not duly filled up.
The only defect pointed
out was that the name of the sub-division was not stated therein.
But on the evidence i.t was quite clear that there was no difficulty
in identifying the candidate and the candidate himself pointed out
to the· returning officer the entry of his name in the electoral roll.
Agreeing with the tribunal this Court held that the defectin those
circumstances was a technical one and the tribunal was perfectly
right in holding that the deiect was not of a substantial character
and that the nomination paper should not have been rejected.
In Rangilal Choudhury v. Dahu Sao and ors.(2 ), this Court
held that the fact that the nami: of the constituency was wrongly
mentioned as 'Bihar' instead of 'Dhanbad' in the nomination paper
did not vitiate the :nomination as it was clear from a reading of
the entire nomination paper that the respondent was seeking election from the Dhanbad constituency.
In reaching that conclusiou
this Court referred to the requirements of s. 33(4), s. 36(2)(b)
and ( 4) . After referring to those provisions this Court observed :
"The result of these provisions is that the proposer
and the candidate are expected to file the nomination
papers complete in all respects in accordance with the
prescribed form; bu't even if there is some defect in the
nomination paper in regard to either the names of the
electoral ro]\ nwnbers, it is the duty of the
returning
officer to satisfy himself at the time of the presentation
of the nomination p&per about them a•nd if necessary to
allow them to be corrected, in order to bring them into
conformity with the corresponding entties in the electoral roll. Thereafter on scrutiny the returning officer
has the power to reject the nomination paper on the
ground of failure Ill comply with any of the provisions of
s. 33 subject however to this that no nomination paper
shall be rejected on the ground of any defect which is
not of a substantial character."
In Namdeo Chimanji Tapre and anr. v. Govinddas Ratan/al
Bhatia and ors.( 3 ), the High Court of Bombay held that as the
EL R 189
(2) [1962] 2, S.C.R. 401.
I. 10. . . .
.
3. r.L.R. 1964 Bom.114.
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972) 2 S.C.R.
identity of the candidate was not in dispute, the rejection of the
nomination paper by the Returning Officer was not valid having
regard to the provisions in s. 33 a.nd s. 36 of the Act.
In Dtv Kanta Barooah v. Kusharam Nath and ors.( 1), a nomination paper for the Nowgong constituency of the Assam Legislative Assembly contained a recital in the heading that the respondent was thereby nominated as a candidate for e1ection "from the
Nowgong Assembly constituency", but against column No. 2 of
the nomination paper relating to the elctoral roll number of the
proposer and column No. 5 relating to the electoral roll number
of the candidate, the entry was
"Assam Legislative Assembly
constituency, Part No. I 0 of the Electoral Roll of village Phulaniati, Mouza Hatichung, Police Station Sadar,
NowgQllg, Roll
No ...... "
The Returning Officer rejected the nomination paper
on the ground that the name of the constitueiucy to which the elec·
toral roll related was not mentioned in columns 2 and 5 as required
bb' section 33 ( 4) of the Act.
This Court agreeing with the tribunal and the High Court held that the rejection ot the nomination
was improper.
Our attention has not been invited to any decision either of this
Court or of any High Court or even of a tribunal where the Returning Officer had accepted the :nomination paper oi a qualified candidate, the same was found to be improper because of some defect
in the nomination paper.
The case of rejection of a nomination
paper by the Returning Officer stands on a footing different from
that of an acceptance of a nomination paper.
In the latter case
the main though not the only question to be considered is whether
the candidate is qualified to be a candidate.
The very fact that
the law requires the Returning Officer to look into the nomination
paper, when filed and g;et any mistake regarding the name or
electoral number of the candidate or his proposer corrected shows
that the mistake regarding them is not 'l material defect.
Learned Counsel for the respondent has sought to place reliance
on some decisions of this Court in support of his cQntention that
the appellant's nomination paper was impruperly accepted.
We
shall now refer to the decisions relied on by him.
In Narhada Prasad v. C!ihagan Lal and ors.{"), a candidate's
nomination paper was rejected by the Returning Officer on the
ground that he did not produce the proof required under s. 33 ( 5)
of the Act. That rejection was upheld by this Court.
We fail to
see how that decision lends any support to the respondent's case.
Without the required proof, the Returning Officer could not satisfy
himself that the candidate was qualified to seek election.
0) XX!. E.L.R 459.
(2) [19691 1. S.C.R499
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Reliance was next placed on the decision of this Court in Ram
Dayal v. Brijraj Singh and ors. ( 1)
Therein the proposer of thi!·
candidate was an illiterate person.
He had not got authenticated
or attested the mark put by him in the nomination paper by one
of the desiginated officers as required by the relevant provisions of
the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Hence the nomination
paper was rejected 1J'¥ the Returning Officer.
That rejection was
upheld both by the High Court as well as by this Court. No nomination can be held to be valid unless the candidate .is duly proposed. If the mark put by the proposer is not authenticated in the
manner required by law. it cannot be said that the candidate has
heen properly nominated.
In Brijendra/al Gupta and anr. v. Jira/apra.lad and or;.(').
th:, Court observed that the wJrd 'defect' in s. 36(4) ~ncluded
an omission to satisfy the details prescribed in the nomination.
It further observed that the distinction laid down in English cases
between "omission·· and "inaccurate description" depended on the
specific provisions of the English statute which did not
obtain
under the Indian law.
This decision, again has no bearing on the
pomt in issue.
For the rea5ons mentioned above we are of the opinion that
the defect in the appellanfs nomination paper was not a substantial
defect.
Hence the High Court was not justified in allowing the·
election petition on the ground that his nomination was improper!}
accepted.
In view of the conclusion reached above, it is not necessary
for us to go into the question as to the true interpretation of
s. 100(1 )(d).
We shall merely notice the arguments advanced
on either side on that question.
According to the appellant the
legislature has made a clear distinction between improper rejection
and improper accephmce of a nomination.
In the case of improper
rejection, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void but in the case of improper acceptance before
the election of the returned candidate can be declared void, the
election petitioner will have to establish that the result of the elec·
tion in so far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected.
At this stage we may notice that prior to theamendment of the Act in 1956, improper rejection and improper
acceptance were placed in the same category.
Clause ( c) of
s. 100( 1) as it stood then read :
"If the Tribunal is of opinion ...
( c) that the result of the electi001 has been materially
affected by the improper acceptance or refection
of any nomination.
([) [t970] t S.C.R. 530.
(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R.650.
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972] 2 S.C.R.
the Tribunal shall declare the election
to be
wholly void."
A
B
This Court in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and
ors.(1) observed in the course of its judgment that where the person
whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the returned
candidate himself, it may be readily conceded that his nomination
has materially affected the resu1t of the election.
This ob.servation
was .not the ratio of that decision.
That apart, after this observation was made, the Parliament has amended the relevant provision
and has made a distinction between improper rejection and improper acceptance of a 1nomination.
It was urge,d on beha1f of the
appellant that in view of the amendment the observation made by
this Court in Vashist Narain Sharma's case (supra), can no more
govern the point ~n issue.
According to the learned
Counsel,
clause (d) of s. 100(1) as it now stands definite.ly requires that
c
in the case of improper acceptance of any nomination, the election
petitioner must establish that the result of the election in so far as
11 concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected.
He urged that the word "any" ins. IOO(l)(d) (I) means every
nomination.
On the other hand it was urged on behalf of the
respondent that the amendment of s. 100(1) did not affect the
correctness of the observation made by this Court and that observation had been quoted by this Court in two cases arising under
D
the amended provision. In view of our earlier finding abQut the
validity of the appellant's nomination, it is not necessary to decide
l!I
the controversy relating to the interpretation of s. 100 (1 )( d).
For the reasons mentioned above, differing from the view taken
by the learned trial judge, we have come to the conclusion that
the nomination of the appella.nt was properly accepted.
This takes us to the appeat filed by the respondent.
As mentioned earlier, the High courf has rejected the charges of corrupt
practices levelled by the respondent against the appellant.
Those
charges were sought to be established only by oral evide,nce.
The
learned trial judge was unable to accept the evidence adduced in
support of the alleged corrupt practices.
Ordinarily this Court
does not reappreciate oral evidence.
Our attention has not been
\nvited to any exceptional circumstance in this case requiring us
to go into the evidence afresh. It is well known that the factious
feelings generatt:d during elections continue even af_ter the election
and hence the contesting parties are able to produce before court
large 111umber of witnesses, some of whom may be seemingly disinterested.
But that by itself' is no guarantee of the truth of the
evidence adduced.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the respondent put forward ·three broad contentions i111 support of the
{I) [1955] S.C.R. 509.
F
G
H
A
B
D
E
R. A. SINGH v. SUMITRA. (Hegde, J.)
685
appeal preferred by the respondent.
They are : ( 1) that the
High Court failed to take an overall view of the evidence adduce<!;
it merely contented itself by examining evidence relating to each
one of the instances, (2) the High Court erred in not relying on
the evidence relating to an instance when the same is spoken to by
a single witness and ( 3) the High Court erred in rejecting the
testimony of some of the witnesses on the ground that they were
chance witnesses.
None of these contentions appear to have any
merit.
Each instance of a corrupt practice pleaded had to be
estalUished separately.
If every one of those· instances are not
proved, all of them put together cannot be accepted as true because
of the volume of evidence.
Now coming to the inst~nces sought to be proved by the evidence of a single witness, the learned trial judge observed in the
course of his judgment that those instances were not seriously
pressed by the Counsel for the respQndent.
Evidently · thme
charges were given up.
In appreciating evidence of the witnesses.
the courts have to take into consideration the probability of their
being present at the time of the alleged incident.
Courts have
always viewed with suspicion the evidence of chance witnesses.
There was nothing wrong in the learned judge 1not being able to
place much reliance on the evidence of chance witnesses.
Hence
we see no merit in the appeal filed_ by the respondent.
For the reasons mentioned att:>ve we allow Civil Appeal 1384
of 1970 and dismiss Civil Appeal No .. 1584 of 1970.
In the
result the election petition stands dismissed with costs both in the
High Court as well as in this Court~in this Court the appe'fant
is entitled to only one hearing fee.
G.C.
C.A. No. 1384/70 allowed/ ,
I
, .. 1
C.A. No. 1584/70 dismisstd.
t3-L643Sup.Cl/72