# RAM CHANDER PRASAD SHARMA v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR

- **Citation:** [1966] 3 S.C.R. 517
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-02-08
- **Case number:** CRIMINAL .APPELATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 48 to 51 of 1963
- **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/ram-chander-prasad-sharma-v-state-of-bihar-anr-3587
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Indian Electricity Act (9 of 1910), ss. 39 and 50-Existence of artificial means for abstraction of e/ectriclty-Whm evidence of dishontlt
abstraction-Complaint to police on behalf of Company-If prosecutiort
at the Instance of person aggrieved.
The appellant's mill was supplied with electric energy by the Patna
Electricity Supply Company. The electric meter was tampered With by
breaking its seals, opening its stud and inserting a wire which prevented
Iba rotation of the disc, so that, the consumption of electricity waa DOI
registered. There was thus a perfected artificial means for abstraction of
electric energy. At the instance of the Chief Engineer of the Electricity
Supply Company, who had been specifically empowered to act on behalf
of the company, a report was madle by the Assistant Engineer against the
appellant to the police and the appellant was prosecuted for an offence
under s. 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. The trial Court acquitted
him but the High Court, on appeal, convicted him.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : (i) The appellant was guilty.
For a convicNon under s. 39, it must be established that there was a
perfected artificial means for abstraction of electrical ener¥Y and that the
dishonest abstraction was by the accused person. In the mstant case the·
tampering was so blatant and so effective that it could not have
been
done without the appellant's knowledge or connivance. (524 B-C]
lagannath Singh alias /ainath Singh and Soharl Lal v. B. S. Ramarwamy, (1966) 1 S.C.R. 885, explained.
·
(ii) Since the Electricity Supply Company was a body corporate, it
must act only through its officers, and therefore it would follow that the
law was set in motion hv the "person aggrieved" within the meaning of
s. 50 of the Act. (523 CJ
CRIMINAL .APPELATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 48
to 51 of 1963.
Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd January
1963 of the Patna High Court in Government Appeals Nos. I of
1960, 39 and 19 of 1959, and Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1959
respectively.
M/s. Nuruddin Ahmad and U. P. Singh, for the Appellants (Ir
Cr. As. Nos 48 to 50 of 1963, and Appellant No. 2 (In Cr. A
No. 51 of 1963) :
M/s. D. P. Singh and U. P. Singh, for Appellant No. I {It\
Cr. A. No. 51 of 1963) :
M/s. A. N. Sahay, N. K. Prasad Rukhaiyer and D. Goburdhan,
for Respondent No. I.
M/s. A. N. Sahay and S. P. Varma, for Respondent No. 2.
SIS
SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
[ 1966] 3 S.C.R.
The following judgment of the court was delivered by :
Mudholkar J.-By a common judgment delivered on January
23, 1963 the High Court at Patna decided four appeals preferred by
the State of Bihar and two criminal revision petitions, one on behalf
of the complainant and another on behalf of an accused person.
These appeals arose out of four prosecutions launched against
certain persons
running mills or factories which were supplied
with energy by the Patna Electricity Supply Company (hereafter
referred to as P. E. S. Co. for the sake of brevity). The offences
with which they were charged were under ss. 39 and 44 (c) of the
Indian Electricity Act, 19!0 (9 of 19!0) and r. 138 read with
r. 56 made under the Act. The trying magistrate acquitted all those
persons who are aprcllants before us in respect of each of these
offences, except Ram Chander Prasad, appellant in Crl. A .. 48
of 1963.
He was convicted of all the three offences and sentenced
variously. In appeal he was acquitted of the offence under s. 39
by the Additional s,,ssions Judge, Patna while his conviction and
sentences under the other two provisions were upheld. The State
thereupon preferred an appeal against his acquittal under s. 417,
Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court. The State
likewise preferred appeals against the acquittal of the accused
persons in the other three cases. All the appeals were heard together and were substantially allowed. The complainant
Ram
Chandar Parsad Sharma's petition was allowed and
that of an
accused person dismissed. The accu

## Text

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RAM CHANDER PRASAD SHARMA
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.
February 8, 1966
[A. K. SARKAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ]
Indian Electricity Act (9 of 1910), ss. 39 and 50-Existence of artificial means for abstraction of e/ectriclty-Whm evidence of dishontlt
abstraction-Complaint to police on behalf of Company-If prosecutiort
at the Instance of person aggrieved.
The appellant's mill was supplied with electric energy by the Patna
Electricity Supply Company. The electric meter was tampered With by
breaking its seals, opening its stud and inserting a wire which prevented
Iba rotation of the disc, so that, the consumption of electricity waa DOI
registered. There was thus a perfected artificial means for abstraction of
electric energy. At the instance of the Chief Engineer of the Electricity
Supply Company, who had been specifically empowered to act on behalf
of the company, a report was madle by the Assistant Engineer against the
appellant to the police and the appellant was prosecuted for an offence
under s. 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. The trial Court acquitted
him but the High Court, on appeal, convicted him.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : (i) The appellant was guilty.
For a convicNon under s. 39, it must be established that there was a
perfected artificial means for abstraction of electrical ener¥Y and that the
dishonest abstraction was by the accused person. In the mstant case the·
tampering was so blatant and so effective that it could not have
been
done without the appellant's knowledge or connivance. (524 B-C]
lagannath Singh alias /ainath Singh and Soharl Lal v. B. S. Ramarwamy, (1966) 1 S.C.R. 885, explained.
·
(ii) Since the Electricity Supply Company was a body corporate, it
must act only through its officers, and therefore it would follow that the
law was set in motion hv the "person aggrieved" within the meaning of
s. 50 of the Act. (523 CJ
CRIMINAL .APPELATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 48
to 51 of 1963.
Appeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd January
1963 of the Patna High Court in Government Appeals Nos. I of
1960, 39 and 19 of 1959, and Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1959
respectively.
M/s. Nuruddin Ahmad and U. P. Singh, for the Appellants (Ir
Cr. As. Nos 48 to 50 of 1963, and Appellant No. 2 (In Cr. A
No. 51 of 1963) :
M/s. D. P. Singh and U. P. Singh, for Appellant No. I {It\
Cr. A. No. 51 of 1963) :
M/s. A. N. Sahay, N. K. Prasad Rukhaiyer and D. Goburdhan,
for Respondent No. I.
M/s. A. N. Sahay and S. P. Varma, for Respondent No. 2.
SIS
SUPllEME COURT REPORTS
[ 1966] 3 S.C.R.
The following judgment of the court was delivered by :
Mudholkar J.-By a common judgment delivered on January
23, 1963 the High Court at Patna decided four appeals preferred by
the State of Bihar and two criminal revision petitions, one on behalf
of the complainant and another on behalf of an accused person.
These appeals arose out of four prosecutions launched against
certain persons
running mills or factories which were supplied
with energy by the Patna Electricity Supply Company (hereafter
referred to as P. E. S. Co. for the sake of brevity). The offences
with which they were charged were under ss. 39 and 44 (c) of the
Indian Electricity Act, 19!0 (9 of 19!0) and r. 138 read with
r. 56 made under the Act. The trying magistrate acquitted all those
persons who are aprcllants before us in respect of each of these
offences, except Ram Chander Prasad, appellant in Crl. A .. 48
of 1963.
He was convicted of all the three offences and sentenced
variously. In appeal he was acquitted of the offence under s. 39
by the Additional s,,ssions Judge, Patna while his conviction and
sentences under the other two provisions were upheld. The State
thereupon preferred an appeal against his acquittal under s. 417,
Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court. The State
likewise preferred appeals against the acquittal of the accused
persons in the other three cases. All the appeals were heard together and were substantially allowed. The complainant
Ram
Chandar Parsad Sharma's petition was allowed and
that of an
accused person dismissed. The accused persons have, therefore,
preferred four appeals before us and though we will deal with them
in this judgment we will take them separately one after the other.
Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 1963 :
According to the prosecution, on June II, 1958 the Assistant
Engineer (Mains) of the P. E. S. Co. by name Chatterjee visited the
Ramji Mills situated at Dinapur. The mill is run with a 15 horse
power motor which is supplied with electric energy by P. E. S. Co.
It is provided with a three phase meter. Chatterjee found the mill
working but noticed that the disc of the meter was not rotating
with the result
that the
consumption
of electrical energy
was not being regi,tered at all. Upon inspection of the meter
Chatterjee
noticed
that a piece of wire had been inserted
into the meter through the top stud hole on the right hand side
of the meter cover. This had been done by unscrewing the nut
and thus exposing the stud hole. Eventually a report was made
to the police by Chatterjee at the instance of Ramaswami the then
Chief Engineer and General Manager of P. E. S. Co. After investigation the appellant was placed for trial before the Judicial
Magistrate,
First Class, Dinapur. He framed charges against
him in respect of all the three offences. The appellant pleaded
not guilty and denied having inserted the wire inside the meter
<>r to have tampered with it in any way.
His main defence, however,
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R. P. SHARMA v. BIHAR (Mudholkar, !.)
519
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was that the mill belonged to the joint family and its manageme~t
was in the hands of his father Nathuni Thakur. He further said
that he was practising medicine and was running a homoeopathic
dispensary in Dinapur. He did not deny that the meter
had
been tampered with but according to him this was done by Chatterjee himself because he was not given illegal gratification which he
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had demanded from Lohari Pandit, who was the munshi of the
mill.
All the courts are concurrent in holding that the appellant was
running the mills and that he was a consumer as defined in s. 2(c)
of the Act.
Moreover, his convictions under s. 44(c) and under
r. 138 read with r. 56 are not challenged before us. In the cirC
cumstances it is not open to him now to say that he had no concern
with the mills. The only question then is whether the offence
under s. 39 has been brought home to him. Section 39 of the
Act reads thus :
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"Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses
any energy shall be deemed to have committed theft
within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code and the
existence of artificial means for such abstraction shall
be prima facie evidence of such dishonest abstraction."
It has been concurrently found by the courts below that at the time
of the inspection the mill was working but the meter was not
registering the consumption. It has also been found concurrently
that the meter had been tampered with, that its seals were broken,
that its stud was open and a wire had actually been inserted in it
which prevented the disc from rotating. These findings were not
challenged before us and in our opinion quite rightly. What was,
however, said was that in view of our recent decision in Jagannath
Singh alias Jainath Singh and Sohari Lal v. B. S. Ramaswami(')
these facts by themselves would not justify the inference that the
appellant has committed an offence
under s. 39. That was a
case in which, though the meter seal was broken and the sealing
nut was loosened which exposed the stud hole of the meter there
was no evidence to show that a wire or any other foreign matter
had been introduced in the meter which would have the effect
of stopping or retarding the rotation of the disc. The meter was
actually registering consumption of energy and the prosecution
had not established by using a check meter or otherwise that what
was being registered was less than the current actually consumed
by the mill. It is in the background of these facts that this Court
observed :
"The effect of the last part of s. 39 is that the existence
of the unauthorised means for abstraction is prima facie
(I) (1966] l S.C.R. 885.
520
SUPRBMB comT lll!POR.TS
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
evidence of dishonest abstraction by some person. The
special rule of evidence goes no further. The prosecution
must prove a/iunde that the accused made the abstraction.
The fact that the accused is in possession and control of the
artificial ·means for abstraction coupled with other circumstances showing that he alone is responsible for the
abstraction may lead to the inference that he is guilty of
the dishonest abstraction."
This Court also held that an exposed stud hole cannot by itself
be regarded as a perfected artificial means for abstraction of electrical energy. In the present case, however, the artificial means
was 'perfected' because a wire had actually been introduced through
the stud hole and kad the effoct of preventing the rotation of the
disc. The High Court has held that the appellant was not merely
a consumer but was the person who supervised over the working
of the mill and the custody of and control over the meter could
not be with anyone else but him. Tampering was so blatant
and so effective that it could not have been done without his
knowledge or connivance. Further there is evidence on record
to the effect that it takes a considerable time and requires certain
amount of skill to do what has been found to have been done to
this meter. Clearly, therefore, it could not be the work of any
one other than
an interested person. Indeed, looking to the
effectiveness of the tampering it must follow that its object was to
prevent the recording of electrical energy consumed by the mill.
The person interested in this would naturally be the consumer.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge no doubt said that the
possibility of the appellant's father or some other member of the
family tampering with the meter cannot be ruled out. In our
view such a speculative possibility is not enough to create reasonable doubt, the benefit of which could be given to the appellant.
In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right and accordingly
we dismiss this appeal.
Criminal Appeal No. 49 o/1963 :
This case deals with Onkar Mills which, according to the prosecution, is run by the appellant Jainarain Lal. When Chatterjee inspected this mill along with Kamla Prasad, Government inspector, on
June 13, 1958 he found
that two sealing wires of the meter were
broken. He drew up a report of this on August 2, 1958 and submitted it to Ramaswami. Before this date, however, that is, on
July I, 1958 Ramaswami had visited the place along with Chatterjee and Srinivasan, the then Mains Superintendent. Both the
appellants took these persons to the room in which the meter had
been installed.
Ramaswami found the sealing wires cut near
the seals and also found that both the seals had been tampered with.
According to the prosecution, therefore, the appellants were guilty
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R. p. SHARMA y. BlliAR ( M udholkar. I.)
5 21
of offences not only under r. 138 read with r. 56 framed under that
Act but also of offences under s. 44(c) and s. 39 of the Act. In
so far as the offence under s. 39 is concerned what is mainly relied
upon by the prosecution is that while between June 28 and July l,
1958 the meter reading showed a daily consumption of electric
energy at about 300 units, for the period prior to that it showed
an average daily consumption of only 100 units.
In so far as the offence under s. 44(c) is concerned the facts
to be borne in mind are these : On July 1, 1958 the meter was bound
with wires at the instance of the P. E. S. Co. officials. It is, however, a fact that the meter stopped registering the current used all
of a sudden within 24 hours:
Indeed, on this score the
appellants themselves made a complaint to the P. E. S. Co. by
telegram. When the meter was examined it was found _that nitric
acid had been poured on it and thus the meter had been tampered
with. This evidence was not accepted by the trying magistrate
who felt that things looked rather suspicious. On the other hand
the High Court upon a consideration of the evidence has come to
the conclusion that the meter had been deliberately tampered with .
The appellants have been found by the High Court to be consumers
and in our opinion rightly and, therefore, with respect to the offence
of tampering which is punishable under s. 44(c) they must be held
to be guilty. It is not for . us to re-assess the evidence ori the
point because it is the High Court which as the final court of facts,
has to assess evidence. In the circumstances we see no ground to
interfere with the convictions and sentences passed on the appellants
by the High Court for the offence under s. 44(c) of the Act.
In so far as the offence under r. 138 read with r. 56 is concerned
it is clear that the offence has been established.
Indeed, it is
not even the appellants' case that the meter was not tampered with.
But according to them all this was done by Chatterjee. This
explanation has been rejected by the High Court and in our opinion
rightly. We, therefore, dismiss their appeal in respect of their
conviction and sentences for this offence.
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In our opinion, the conviction of the offences under s. 39 is
unsustainable. It is no doubt true that the meter had been tampered
with. But there is nothing to Ghow that there was any perfected
artificial means in existence so as to raise the presumption of dishonest abstraction under s. 39 prior to the stopping of the meter.
The mere fact that the consumption of energy between June 28
and July 1, 1958 was about 300 units per day whereas it was much
less prior to that date does not necessarily lead to the inference
that in the past there was dishonest abstraction of electric energy.
The rise in consumption between June 28 and July 1, could be
accounted for by circumstances such as longer working hours,
user of current in a wasteful manner, user of current for more
522
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
(1966] 3 S.C.R.
appliances and so on. In the circumstances, therefore, we do not
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think that the High Court was right in convicting the appellants
under 39 of the Act. We, therefore, set aside their convictions
and sentences in respect of the offence under s. 39.
Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 1963 :
This appeal concerns the tampering of seals of three power
meters installed in the mill belonging to the appellant Krishna Prasad
Sao. Accepting the evidence of N. N. Ghosh, a meter inspector,
the High Court has held the prosecution ca~e to be established.
While assessing the evidence of Ghosh the prosecution has referred
to the evidence of Ramaswami who had inspected the meters ill
question three days after Ghosh had inspected them and also to
the evidence of the Mains Superintendent Bhattacharya and meter
reader Sen who accompanied him. The High Court has also
accepted the prosecution case that at the inspection by Ramaswami
it was found that the terminal covers of two of the meters were
dislodged from their normal positions and were actually hanging
by the wires. It was also found that the cover seals of all the meters
had been tampered with. Indeed, according to Ramaswami the
seals had been so cut and placed that despite what had been done
they gave a deceptive appearance of being in tact. It was further
found that there were no seals on two of the cut-outs that the seals
on the terminal covers of all the three meters were not genuine and
that one of the meters had registered· no advance whatsoever
subsequent to Ghosh's visit on the 19th while the other two had
registered only 49 and 50 units respectively between that date and
the 22nd July.
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It may be mentioned that Krishan Prasad actually made an
e11:tra-judicial confession when he was questioned by Ramaswami
regarding the tampering. He no doubt retracted the confession
but the High Court has relied upon it.
Acting on the evidence
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the High Court set aside the acquittal of Krishan Prasad in respect
of all the offences including the one under s. 39 of the Act.
Before we come to the merits we will deal with an objection
to the effect that the prosecution was incompetent as it was not
launched by a person competent to do so. It is based upon
s. 50 of the Act which runs thus :
"No prosecution shall he instituted against any person
for any offence against this Act or any rule, licence or order
thereunder, except at the instance of the Government or
an Electric Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the
same."
The prosecution here was commenced with a chargesheet submitted
by the police to the Judicial Magistrate. The offences were investigated into by the police after the first information report was launched
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R. P. SHARMA v. BIHAR (Mudholkar, /.)
523
with them by Bhattacharya. What is contended is that information given by him could not entitle the police to submit the chaq~e
sheet. It is also said that submission of a chargesheet by t11;e pohce
is not the same thing as institution of prosecution at the mstance
of the State. It is, however, not disputed that if the !aw was .set
in motion by a person aggrieved by making a first mform~t10n
report to the police a chargesheet could properly be subnutted
by the police. It is true that Bhattacharya was not himself a "person.
aggrieved" and that the "person aggrieved" was the P. E. S. Co.
The P. E .S. Co. however, is a body corporate and must a ct only
through its directors or officers. Here we have the evidence of
Ramaswami to the effect that he held a general power of attorney
from the P. E. S. Co., and that he was specifically empowered thereunder to act on behalf of P. E. S. Co., in all legal proceedings.
The evidence shows that it was at his instance that Bhattacharya
launched
the first information report and, therefore, it would
follow that the law was set in motion by the "person aggrieved".
The objection based on s. 50 must, therefore, be held to be
untenable.
Now as to the merits. In so far as convictions for the offences
under s. 44(c) of the Act and r. 138 read with r. 56 are concerned
there is ample evidence. In addition to the evidence of Ramaswami and Bhattacharya there is the evidence of Kamla Prasad,
Assistant Electrical Inspector who is an independent person. The
evidence of these witnesses has been believed by the High Court
and it shows clearly that the meters were tampered with and the
seals cut. The finding of the High Court that Krishna Prasad
Sao was a consumer and that the meters were in his custody and
• under his control is also based upon adequate material. The High
Court was,
therefore, justified in convicting the appellants for
offences under those provisions. The High Court has also relied
upon the extra-judicial confession of Krishna Pradsad which, it
may be mentioned, was retracted by him later in the sense that he
denied having made any such confession. Mr. Nur-ud-din Ahmed
on behalf of the appellant contended that no conviction can be based
upon a retracted extra-judicial confession. The respondent contended that this was not a case of retracted confession to which
the rule of prudence requiring corroboration applies. It would
not be profitable to discuss the merits of the rival contentions and
we will proceed on the assumption that this is a case of retracted
confession. It seems to us that in any event Mr. Nur-ud-din's
contention cannot be accepted. In Pyarelal v. State(') this Court,
while pointing out that ordinarily corroboration is required it
is not a rule of law but only a rule of prudence. It is also said
that it is not an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that in no
circumstances such a conviction can be based without corrobo-
(1) (1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 689.
524
SUPllBMB COUllT REPOllTB
[1966] 3 S.C.R.
ration, on a retracted confession. We are satisfied that the High
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Court had before it adequate material apart from the retracted
confession for holding that the meters had been tampered with and
the 'eals broken.
In so far as the conviction under s. 39 is concerned the matter
stands on a different footing.
It is not sufficient to say that a
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meter had been tampered with and that it was under the control of
tke accused per,on. It is further necessary to show that there was
dishonest abstraction, consumption or use of electrical energy by
the ac.:used person. Before raising a presumption thereunder
that there was dishonest ab8traction the presence of an artificial
means which would render abstraction of energy possible has to
be established. Here we have three-phase meters and, therefore,
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unless an arc tampered with abstraction of energy without fear of
detection is not possible. It is difficult to presume that the appellant would have knowingly done something to the meter which
would not have escaped detection of a meter reader and facilitated .
the abstraction of electric energy. In fact what he had said in
his confession was that Jai Narain, a meter reader of the company
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had done something to the meter. That may or may not be so.
Jai Narain who was co-accused with the appellant was acquitted
by the trial court and his acquittal was not challenged by the State.
There is no material on the basis of which it could be held that
there was either a perfected artificial means of abstraction or there
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in fact any abstraction of electrical energy. In the
circumstances the presumption permissible under s.
39 can
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not be raised in favour of the prosecution. It follow, therefore,
that the appellant's conviction under s. 39 is unsustainable. We
accordingly set it aside as also the sentences passed upon him in •
respect of that offence.
Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1963 :
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The appellant here is Durga Prasad. The mains which were
alleged by the prosecution to have tampered with were installed
in Shankarji Mills. According to the prosecution the appellant
Durga Prasad and Chandra Mohan Prasad are the proprietors of
the mill, having purchased it from one Musanlal. It is not disputed that the sale deed is in their names. According to the appelG
lants, however, it was purchased by Sarju Prasad father of Durga
Prasad and maternal grandfather of Chandra Mohan. On June 18,
1958, Chatterjee inspected the installation. Further, according to
him the normal consumption of the mill would be 70 units per
day of eight hours working while the meter showed 700 lo 750
units per month. He also found that both the seals provided on
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the top cover of the meter had been tampered wit.h and the ~op
right scaling nut on the stud to be loosened and raised up leav10g
stud hole on the meter exposed. He also found lot of dust in the
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R. P. SHARMA V. BIHAR (Mudho/kar, !.)
52 s;
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meter. The company's seals on one of the cut-outs were also
found missing. He, therefore, reported the matter to Ramaswami
and also on June 19, 1958 there was a joint inspection by
Ramaswami and Chatterjee. Eventually a prosecution was launched
against the appellants for offences under s. 39 and s. 44(c) of the
Act and r. 138 read with r. 56. As already stated, the appellants
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were acquitted by the trying magistrate but were convicted by the
High Court.
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The main contention raised on the appellant's behalf by
Mr. Nur-ud-din is that the appellants cannot be regarded as consumers and, therefore, they could not be convicted of any of the
offences.
It is no doubt true that in the company's books it is Musanlal,
the original owner who is shown as proprietor of the mill. But
it is not denied that he sold the mill to the appellants. It may be·
that the consideration came from Sarju Prasad but the evidencewhich has been accepted by the courts below shows that the mill
was actually run by both the appellants. According to the prosecution the appellants are partners. Though it is true that the
partnership deed has not been placed before us there is other
material which would justify the conclusion that they are partners.
The fact that the sale deed stands in the names of both these persons
shows prima facie that both of them have interest in the mill. Then
there is a statement of Ramaswami to the effect that they were
partners. Then there is the evidence to the effect that both of
them were taking part in running the mill. In the circumstance-s
they could both be held to be the co-owners of the mill. Before
its amendment in the year 1959 the definition of consumer in
s. 2(c) was as follows :
"Consumer means any person who is supplied with energy
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by a licensee, or whose premises are for the time being connected for the purposes of a supply of energy with the works
of a licensee."
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It is an admitted fact that the mill was connected with wor.ke of
P. E. S. Co. If, therefore, the appellants became co-owners by
reason of the purchase of the mill from Musanlal they must be regarded as consumers even though Musanlal's name still continues
to be borne on the records of P. E. S. Co.
The High Court has found as a fact, after consideration of the
evidence, that the meters had been tampered with and the company's
seals broken. The appellants who are consumers are thus liable
to be convicted under s. 44(c) and r. 138 read with r. 56.
In so far .as the offence under s. 39 is concerned the position
is, however, different. There is no material on the basis of which
it could be said that what was done to the meter was a perfected
MllSup/Cl66-2
526
SUPREME COUl.T REPORTS
(1966] 3 S.C.R.
artificial means by reason of which dishonest abstraction, consumpA
tion or use of electrical energy was possible. Nor again, is there
evidence to show that electrical energy was being consumed by the
~
mill over and above what was recorded by the meters. In these
;...
circumstances the conviction of the appellants under s. 39 cannot
be maintained. We, therefore, allow
his appeal to this extent
and set aside the conviction and sentence in respect of the offence
B
under s. 39 of the Act.
•
Whatwe have said above is sufficient to dispose of all the
appeals.
Appeal 48163 dismissed.
Appeal Nos. 49, 50 and 51
of '63 allowed in part.
c
. '
•
,
,
•